23CA1790 Peo v Wortman 05-07-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1790 Weld County District Court No. 19CR539 Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jeremy Edward Wortman,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Fox and Dunn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 7, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joshua J. Luna, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Emeson & Zale, LLC, Brian S. Emeson, Boulder, Colorado for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jeremy Edward Wortman, appeals the district
court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(b) motion following an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Wortman was charged with first degree kidnapping, second
degree kidnapping, third degree assault, and obstruction of
telephone or telegraph service. The charges stemmed from
allegations that Wortman and the victim (his ex-girlfriend) met in a
parking lot to discuss custody issues concerning their daughter.
The victim got into Wortman’s car to talk. When they began to
argue, however, Wortman drove off. He drove erratically, crashing
the car at one point, and refused to let the victim out of the car or
allow her to call 911. When the victim tried to escape the car,
Wortman grabbed her, causing pain and injury. Eventually, law
enforcement officers stopped the car and Wortman was arrested.
¶3 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wortman pleaded guilty to
attempted first degree kidnapping. The remaining counts were
dismissed. The parties stipulated to a prison sentence of between
eight and eighteen years. The district court imposed an eighteen-
year sentence. Wortman didn’t directly appeal his sentence.
1 ¶4 Thereafter, Wortman filed a pro se motion under Crim. P.
35(c), asserting that (1) plea counsel had provided him with
ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion under Crim. P. 35(b)
despite promising to do so, and (2) his sentence was grossly
disproportionate. The district court appointed counsel, who later
supplemented Wortman’s ineffective assistance claim and included
additional information pertinent to the Crim. P. 35(b) motion. At a
status conference, the prosecution confessed Wortman’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, and the court agreed to allow Wortman
to pursue his untimely Crim. P. 35(b) motion.
¶5 Wortman asked the district court to reconsider his sentence
based on his (1) expressed remorse for his actions; (2) progression
from maximum security to minimum security incarceration and his
lack of disciplinary reports while in the custody of the Department
of Corrections (DOC); (3) successful completion of multiple DOC
classes, programs, and treatment; (4) successful completion of
educational courses through Pueblo Community College and Adams
State University; and (5) strong family support. In a written
response, the prosecution opposed any reduction in Wortman’s
sentence, noting the seriousness of the offense, Wortman’s prior
2 criminal history, and the victim and her family’s strong support of
the original sentence.
¶6 The district court set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing,
the court heard testimony from the victim, the victim’s family,
Wortman, and Wortman’s family. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court declined to reduce Wortman’s sentence. The court
remarked that it was “impressed” with all the classes Wortman had
taken and was convinced that his work spoke “very highly” of his
“character” and would set him up for “success” upon his release.
However, the court acknowledged the “seriousness of the offense”
and the “extremely aggravated nature of the case.” And the court
observed that the sentence, while punitive, also recognized that
Wortman was “not beyond rehabilitation” because the sentence
allowed for his “ultimate release into the community.” (Wortman
had faced a potential sentence of life in prison.) The court also
observed that although Wortman was remorseful, his remorse
“reflect[ed] primarily a concern about [him]self and [his] family” and
not the victim. Further, the court noted that the classes Wortman
had taken “appear[ed] to be [about] improving [him]self and [his]
situation,” but didn’t seem to have “that same focus on victim
3 impact” and “understanding the impact on others in making sure
that this type of behavior d[id not] happen again.” Ultimately, the
court concluded that a reduction in Wortman’s sentence wasn’t
warranted but noted that its decision didn’t “diminish the amount
of work or the quality of work that [Wortman had] done.”
II. Discussion
¶7 Wortman contends that the district court abused its discretion
by denying his Crim. P. 35(b) motion because the court (1) relied on
an erroneous factual finding that he hadn’t expressed remorse for
the victim and (2) concluded that Wortman’s performance and
rehabilitation in prison was insufficient to warrant a sentence
reduction. We don’t see any abuse of discretion.
A. Standard of Review
¶8 We review the denial of a Crim. P. 35(b) motion for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Chavez, 2020 COA 80M, ¶ 8. A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or “based on an erroneous view of the law.”
Hoang v. People, 2014 CO 27, ¶ 12.
4 B. Analysis
¶9 Crim. P. 35(b) permits a district court to review a sentence to
ensure that it is proper before making it final. People v. Dunlap, 36
P.3d 778, 780 (Colo. 2001). “Any decision to reduce a sentence
based on a Crim. P. 35(b) motion remains within the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Id.
¶ 10 In exercising its discretion, a district court must “consider all
relevant and material factors, including new evidence as well as
facts known at the time the original sentence was pronounced.”
People v. Busch, 835 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. App. 1992). The district
court isn’t required to make findings of fact when ruling on a
motion for reduction of a sentence but should “provide a statement
of the basic reasons in support of its ruling.” People v. Olivas, 911
P.2d 675, 677 (Colo. App. 1995). “Only if the trial court has refused
to consider any information in mitigation and fails to make findings
in support of its decision is there a failure by the trial court to
exercise its judicial discretion.” Busch, 835 P.2d at 583.
¶ 11 Wortman first contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion based on a purportedly erroneous
factual finding that he expressed no remorse for the harm he had
5 caused the victim. Specifically, he asserts that the court
erroneously found that he had not expressed concern for the victim
because the court said, “[b]ut I didn’t hear anything about [the
victim],” which he argues suggested that he appeared more
concerned with the impact his sentence had on him and his family.
But the court made this statement after already acknowledging that
Wortman had “apologized multiple times.” Nevertheless, it was the
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23CA1790 Peo v Wortman 05-07-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1790 Weld County District Court No. 19CR539 Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jeremy Edward Wortman,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Fox and Dunn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 7, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Joshua J. Luna, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Emeson & Zale, LLC, Brian S. Emeson, Boulder, Colorado for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jeremy Edward Wortman, appeals the district
court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(b) motion following an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Wortman was charged with first degree kidnapping, second
degree kidnapping, third degree assault, and obstruction of
telephone or telegraph service. The charges stemmed from
allegations that Wortman and the victim (his ex-girlfriend) met in a
parking lot to discuss custody issues concerning their daughter.
The victim got into Wortman’s car to talk. When they began to
argue, however, Wortman drove off. He drove erratically, crashing
the car at one point, and refused to let the victim out of the car or
allow her to call 911. When the victim tried to escape the car,
Wortman grabbed her, causing pain and injury. Eventually, law
enforcement officers stopped the car and Wortman was arrested.
¶3 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wortman pleaded guilty to
attempted first degree kidnapping. The remaining counts were
dismissed. The parties stipulated to a prison sentence of between
eight and eighteen years. The district court imposed an eighteen-
year sentence. Wortman didn’t directly appeal his sentence.
1 ¶4 Thereafter, Wortman filed a pro se motion under Crim. P.
35(c), asserting that (1) plea counsel had provided him with
ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion under Crim. P. 35(b)
despite promising to do so, and (2) his sentence was grossly
disproportionate. The district court appointed counsel, who later
supplemented Wortman’s ineffective assistance claim and included
additional information pertinent to the Crim. P. 35(b) motion. At a
status conference, the prosecution confessed Wortman’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, and the court agreed to allow Wortman
to pursue his untimely Crim. P. 35(b) motion.
¶5 Wortman asked the district court to reconsider his sentence
based on his (1) expressed remorse for his actions; (2) progression
from maximum security to minimum security incarceration and his
lack of disciplinary reports while in the custody of the Department
of Corrections (DOC); (3) successful completion of multiple DOC
classes, programs, and treatment; (4) successful completion of
educational courses through Pueblo Community College and Adams
State University; and (5) strong family support. In a written
response, the prosecution opposed any reduction in Wortman’s
sentence, noting the seriousness of the offense, Wortman’s prior
2 criminal history, and the victim and her family’s strong support of
the original sentence.
¶6 The district court set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing,
the court heard testimony from the victim, the victim’s family,
Wortman, and Wortman’s family. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court declined to reduce Wortman’s sentence. The court
remarked that it was “impressed” with all the classes Wortman had
taken and was convinced that his work spoke “very highly” of his
“character” and would set him up for “success” upon his release.
However, the court acknowledged the “seriousness of the offense”
and the “extremely aggravated nature of the case.” And the court
observed that the sentence, while punitive, also recognized that
Wortman was “not beyond rehabilitation” because the sentence
allowed for his “ultimate release into the community.” (Wortman
had faced a potential sentence of life in prison.) The court also
observed that although Wortman was remorseful, his remorse
“reflect[ed] primarily a concern about [him]self and [his] family” and
not the victim. Further, the court noted that the classes Wortman
had taken “appear[ed] to be [about] improving [him]self and [his]
situation,” but didn’t seem to have “that same focus on victim
3 impact” and “understanding the impact on others in making sure
that this type of behavior d[id not] happen again.” Ultimately, the
court concluded that a reduction in Wortman’s sentence wasn’t
warranted but noted that its decision didn’t “diminish the amount
of work or the quality of work that [Wortman had] done.”
II. Discussion
¶7 Wortman contends that the district court abused its discretion
by denying his Crim. P. 35(b) motion because the court (1) relied on
an erroneous factual finding that he hadn’t expressed remorse for
the victim and (2) concluded that Wortman’s performance and
rehabilitation in prison was insufficient to warrant a sentence
reduction. We don’t see any abuse of discretion.
A. Standard of Review
¶8 We review the denial of a Crim. P. 35(b) motion for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Chavez, 2020 COA 80M, ¶ 8. A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or “based on an erroneous view of the law.”
Hoang v. People, 2014 CO 27, ¶ 12.
4 B. Analysis
¶9 Crim. P. 35(b) permits a district court to review a sentence to
ensure that it is proper before making it final. People v. Dunlap, 36
P.3d 778, 780 (Colo. 2001). “Any decision to reduce a sentence
based on a Crim. P. 35(b) motion remains within the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Id.
¶ 10 In exercising its discretion, a district court must “consider all
relevant and material factors, including new evidence as well as
facts known at the time the original sentence was pronounced.”
People v. Busch, 835 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. App. 1992). The district
court isn’t required to make findings of fact when ruling on a
motion for reduction of a sentence but should “provide a statement
of the basic reasons in support of its ruling.” People v. Olivas, 911
P.2d 675, 677 (Colo. App. 1995). “Only if the trial court has refused
to consider any information in mitigation and fails to make findings
in support of its decision is there a failure by the trial court to
exercise its judicial discretion.” Busch, 835 P.2d at 583.
¶ 11 Wortman first contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion based on a purportedly erroneous
factual finding that he expressed no remorse for the harm he had
5 caused the victim. Specifically, he asserts that the court
erroneously found that he had not expressed concern for the victim
because the court said, “[b]ut I didn’t hear anything about [the
victim],” which he argues suggested that he appeared more
concerned with the impact his sentence had on him and his family.
But the court made this statement after already acknowledging that
Wortman had “apologized multiple times.” Nevertheless, it was the
court’s perception that his words reflected “primarily” a concern
about himself and his family. The hearing transcript supports this
finding. Wortman apologized twice to the victim but also said the
following:
• “This [hearing] has brought some hope to me and my family during a very depressing time in our lives.”
• “I can’t express enough how sorry I am to [the victim] and everyone else affected, including the community.”
• “Of course, this time has been extremely difficult on me. But what makes it worse is that I’m not the only one suffering. It breaks my heart knowing how hard this has been on my loved ones. And to hear my mother crying completely crushes me, because I know how badly that she wants me home.”
6 • “It’s not only emotionally difficult, but this prison time has been a huge financial burden on my family, as well.”
• “And year after year, my poor mother continues to help pay for my food, hygiene, clothing, [and] phone time. I feel terrible not being able to provide for myself as a grown adult.”
• “Again, I want to apologize to . . . the victim, her family, my family, and anyone else that was affected that night.”
¶ 12 Thus, contrary to Wortman’s characterization of the district
court’s findings, the record reflects that it considered and weighed
the evidence before it. And its determination is supported by the
record.
¶ 13 We next reject Wortman’s second contention — that the
district court abused its discretion by not reducing his sentence
based on his performance and rehabilitation in prison.
¶ 14 To begin, we disagree with the People’s assertion that this
portion of the appeal should be dismissed because it concerns only
the propriety of the sentence imposed. See Olivas, 911 P.2d at 677
(“There is no right to appeal the trial court’s denial of a motion for
reduction of sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(b) when the only
issue presented to and resolved by the court is the propriety of the
7 sentence itself.”). Rather, we conclude that this claim challenges
the propriety of the court’s Crim. P. 35(b) ruling and is properly
before us. See id.
¶ 15 Wortman contends that his performance in prison warranted a
reduction in his sentence. In support, he recounts the numerous
courses, programs, classes, and therapy he has completed as well
as his exemplary disciplinary record. But the district court
expressly acknowledged that it had considered Wortman’s progress
in prison and commended him for it. Nevertheless, the court found
this information unpersuasive when weighed against other factors:
(1) the serious nature of the offense; (2) that the current sentence
provided a “punitive sanction” but also accounted for Wortman’s
“ultimate release into the community”; and (3) the remorse
Wortman expressed was “primarily” directed toward himself and his
family and not toward the victim. This wasn’t an abuse of
discretion. See id. (no abuse of discretion if the district court “noted
the matters it considered” and “provide[d] a statement of the basic
reasons in support of its ruling”); see also Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 782
(“Crim. P. 35(b) affords trial judges a large amount of discretion
when considering the defendant’s motion.”).
8 ¶ 16 Because the district court’s order reflects sufficient
consideration of the mitigating evidence provided by Wortman and
states the basic reasons for denying the motion, we perceive no
abuse of discretion.
III. Disposition
¶ 17 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE DUNN concur.