The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY February 25, 2021
2021COA23
No. 17CA2132, Peo v Thomas — Constitutional Law — Fourth Amendment — Searches and Seizures — Motor Vehicles — Warrantless Search — Community Caretaking Exception — Exclusionary Rule — Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
A division of the court of appeals considers the novel question
whether the community caretaking exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement permits a police officer to
impound a vehicle whenever the driver is arrested and no one else
is present to take custody of the vehicle. The division concludes
that the answer is “no.” Because the prosecution here did not show
that the seizure furthered a valid community caretaking function,
impounding the legally parked vehicle from a residential
neighborhood was unreasonable. The evidence discovered during
the subsequent inventory search of the vehicle was therefore inadmissible. Accordingly, the division reverses the defendant’s
convictions depending on that evidence. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA23
Court of Appeals No. 17CA2132 Jefferson County District Court No. 17CR248 Honorable Lily W. Oeffler, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Kyle Christopher Thomas,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO J. Jones and Yun, JJ., concur
Announced February 25, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel K. Mercer, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 This case presents the novel question whether the community
caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement permits a police officer to impound a vehicle whenever
the driver is arrested and no one else is present to take custody of
the vehicle. We conclude that the answer is “no.” Because the
prosecution here did not show that the seizure furthered a valid
community caretaking function, impounding the legally parked
vehicle was unreasonable. The evidence discovered during the
subsequent inventory search of the vehicle was therefore
inadmissible. As a result, we reverse the judgment of conviction
entered against defendant, Kyle Christopher Thomas, and we
remand for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural History
¶2 Around midnight, Arvada Police Officer Brandon Valdez saw a
vehicle roll through a stop sign and fail to signal a turn. The officer
activated his overhead lights to stop the vehicle, and the vehicle’s
driver promptly pulled it over to the right-side curb of a residential
street. Thomas, the driver and sole occupant, provided his
identification and the vehicle’s registration to the officer, but
Thomas could not produce proof of current insurance. When the
1 officer checked Thomas’s identification, the officer discovered an
outstanding warrant for Thomas’s arrest for failure to appear in
court regarding a “larceny” charge. The officer arrested Thomas.
¶3 According to Thomas’s later testimony at a motions hearing,
he asked the officer if he could call his wife — who co-owned the
vehicle and was at their home a few blocks away — to pick up the
vehicle. Officer Valdez did not deny that Thomas had made such a
request. Instead, the officer testified that he did not ask Thomas
whether Thomas’s wife could retrieve the vehicle because he did not
know that Thomas was married. In any event, Thomas’s wife was
not given the chance to pick up the vehicle from its parking space.
¶4 Evidence presented at the hearing showed that the Arvada
Police Department had the following policy: “Whenever the driver of
a vehicle is arrested, the officer will have the vehicle towed unless a
properly licensed driver authorized by the vehicle owner is readily
available to take control of the vehicle.” As Officer Valdez
understood that policy, he was required to tow a vehicle any time
the driver was arrested unless a licensed, authorized driver was
physically present to take the vehicle. Because Thomas was the
only person present, Officer Valdez requested a tow.
2 ¶5 To prepare the vehicle for towing, Officer Valdez conducted an
inventory search. He found a handgun, methamphetamine, a knife,
and a blackjack. Based on that evidence, the prosecution charged
Thomas with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, three counts of possession of a weapon by a previous
offender, and possession of an illegal weapon.1
¶6 Thomas moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the
inventory search as the fruits of an illegal seizure. As pertinent
here, he argued that impounding the vehicle was unreasonable
because (1) his wife was only a few blocks away and could have
retrieved the vehicle and (2) the vehicle was legally parked on a
residential street in his neighborhood, was not blocking any
driveway, and was not obstructing traffic. The prosecution
responded that police policy required the officer to tow the vehicle
because Thomas had been arrested and no one else was present to
take the vehicle.
¶7 The district court agreed with the prosecution and denied
Thomas’s motion to suppress. The court reasoned that, because an
1The prosecution also charged Thomas with traffic violations. He does not challenge those convictions.
3 arrested person is unable to safeguard their vehicle, Officer Valdez
needed to impound it for safekeeping.
¶8 Thomas was tried before a jury and convicted as charged.
II. Standard of Review and Background Principles
¶9 Thomas maintains that the district court erroneously denied
his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the inventory
search. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 10 Review of a district court’s order regarding a defendant’s
motion to suppress involves a mixed question of fact and law.
People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶ 13. We defer to the district court’s
factual findings if they are supported by competent evidence in the
record, but we review de novo the court’s application of those facts
to the law. Id.
B. The Protection Against Unreasonable Seizures
¶ 11 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. Allen, ¶ 15.2 A warrantless
2In the district court, Thomas cited both the Federal and the Colorado Constitutions, but he did not argue that the state
4 search or seizure is presumed unreasonable and thus
unconstitutional. Id. Because the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness, however, the warrant requirement is
subject to several exceptions. Id.; People v. Cattaneo, 2020 COA 40,
¶ 17. The prosecution bears the burden to prove that an exception
to the warrant requirement applies. Allen, ¶ 15.
¶ 12 When an officer obtains evidence in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, “the exclusionary rule ordinarily bars the prosecution
from introducing that evidence against the defendant in a criminal
case.” People v. Vaughn, 2014 CO 71, ¶ 10. The exclusionary rule
applies both to illegally obtained evidence and to derivative evidence
— often called “fruit of the poisonous tree.” People v.
Schoondermark, 759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939)). Thus, evidence
discovered during an otherwise reasonable search ordinarily will be
suppressed if the search resulted from an unreasonable seizure.
constitution affords him any greater protection in this context. Nor does he develop such an argument on appeal. Therefore, we will treat the federal and state protections against unreasonable seizures as the same. See People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶¶ 15, 18- 21 (applying both provisions, without distinguishing them, when assessing the constitutionality of a vehicle seizure).
5 See People v. Brown, 2018 CO 27, ¶¶ 17-18 (Brown II) (suppressing
evidence discovered during inventory search where the predicate
seizure was unreasonable); People v. Brown, 2016 COA 150, ¶ 32
(Brown I), aff’d, Brown II.
C. The Community Caretaking Exception
¶ 13 Under one exception to the warrant requirement, officers may
seize and remove vehicles from the streets as part of their
administrative community caretaking responsibilities, provided that
the seizure conforms to standardized criteria limiting police
discretion. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976);
Allen, ¶ 20; Brown II, ¶¶ 8-9. After impounding a vehicle, an officer
may search the vehicle to inventory its contents, again provided
that the search conforms to standardized criteria limiting police
discretion. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); Allen,
¶ 20; Brown II, ¶¶ 8-9. Such inventory searches “serve to protect
an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure
against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard
the police from danger.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372.
¶ 14 Accordingly, the first question when analyzing the
constitutionality of an officer’s decision to impound a vehicle is
6 whether standardized criteria authorized the impoundment. See
Allen, ¶¶ 20-21 (“[T]he existence of standardized criteria or policies
is a necessary condition of the community caretaking exception to
the warrant requirement . . . .”). If not, the seizure was
unreasonable, and the analysis ends. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 21 (finding
seizure unreasonable solely because “the People did not present any
evidence at the motions hearing to establish that the officers
[impounded the vehicle] in accordance with any written or oral
standardized criteria or policies”). But the fact that a seizure
conforms to standardized criteria is not sufficient to survive Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. Brown II, ¶ 12; see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.3(c),
Westlaw (6th ed. database updated Sept. 2020) (“It is nonetheless
possible . . . [that] an impoundment regulation could be deemed so
irrational as to not fall within what the [Bertine] Court there
characterized as the requisite ‘reasonable police regulations.’”).
¶ 15 Rather, even if a seizure complies with standardized criteria,
the court must also ask “whether the impoundment and
subsequent inventory serve an administrative community
7 caretaking function.” Brown II, ¶ 12.3 Valid community caretaking
purposes may include the need to remove vehicles that impede
traffic or threaten public safety or convenience and the need to
protect the vehicle and its contents against vandalism or theft. See
id. at ¶ 14 (identifying such purposes where the driver was unable
to drive his vehicle lawfully because his license was suspended); see
also Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005)
(identifying the same purposes in a case involving impoundment
from the defendant’s driveway).
¶ 16 To determine whether impounding a vehicle furthers some
community caretaking purpose, courts should consider the totality
of the circumstances, including whether the driver was arrested,
the time and location of the arrest, whether the driver could
produce proof of ownership, whether a licensed and authorized
person was available to take custody of the vehicle, and whether an
3Because compliance with standardized criteria is not sufficient, in and of itself, to render a seizure of a vehicle reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we cannot follow People v. Milligan, 77 P.3d 771, 776-77 (Colo. App. 2003), which rests on that mistaken premise. See People v. Garcia, 251 P.3d 1152, 1162 (Colo. App. 2010) (a division of the court of appeals is not bound to follow another division’s ruling).
8 arrested driver could return promptly to the vehicle after posting
bail. See Brown II, ¶ 13; LaFave, § 7.3(c) (“[I]t would appear that
impoundment is generally impermissible where the driver has been
arrested for such a minor offense [that the driver’s prompt release
can be anticipated], at least until it appears that he will be unable
to post collateral at the station or other appropriate place and thus
will not be in a position to depart promptly with the car.”).
III. Application
¶ 17 To reiterate, the evidence Thomas sought to suppress was
discovered during the police’s inventory search of his vehicle
following its impoundment. Because the impoundment gives rise to
the need for and justification of an inventory search, the threshold
inquiry when determining the reasonableness of an inventory
search is whether the impoundment of the vehicle was proper. See
State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
¶ 18 The record shows that Officer Valdez impounded the vehicle
for purely administrative reasons, and the People do not justify the
seizure as part of the officer’s duty to investigate criminal activity.
Cf. People v. Delacruz, 2016 CO 76, ¶ 14 (describing a protective
search of a car based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
9 and suspicion that an occupant may be armed and dangerous);
People v. Zuniga, 2016 CO 52, ¶ 14 (describing automobile
exception based on probable cause that the vehicle contains
evidence of a crime). Therefore, the dispositive issue is whether the
prosecution carried its burden to prove that the officer’s decision to
impound Thomas’s vehicle was a reasonable seizure under the
community caretaking exception. Because the prosecution
provided no evidence that the seizure furthered some community
caretaking purpose beyond the officer’s compliance with his
department’s procedure, we conclude the prosecution did not carry
its burden.4
¶ 19 Turning first to the interest in public safety and convenience,
we note that officers may reasonably remove vehicles that are
hazardous or disabled, that are parked illegally, that are blocking
access to private property, or that are obstructing traffic on public
4 Thomas argues that Officer Valdez did not follow the police department’s policy when he impounded the vehicle because Thomas’s wife was available to promptly pick up the vehicle. Thomas also argues that the department’s policy did not place meaningful limits on Officer Valdez’s discretion. We do not address those contentions because we agree with Thomas that the vehicle’s removal did not further any community caretaking function.
10 roads. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69 (listing circumstances
justifying removing a vehicle); Pineda v. People, 230 P.3d 1181,
1186 (Colo. 2010) (holding that officers reasonably removed a
vehicle from the right-hand lane of a busy avenue after arresting
the driver because “[n]o one was present to take possession of the
vehicle, and the officers could not leave it blocking traffic”),
disapproved on other grounds by Vaughn, ¶ 14; see also, e.g., United
States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991)
(expressing similar rationale).
¶ 20 The evidence presented at the suppression hearing, however,
showed that Thomas’s vehicle was legally parked on a residential
street. The evidence did not show that the street was busy, that the
vehicle was obstructing traffic, that it was dangerous or disabled, or
that it was blocking any driveway. The prosecution presented no
evidence that it was illegal, hazardous, or even unusual to leave a
vehicle parked in that location. Without such evidence, the
prosecution did not demonstrate any interest in public safety or
convenience that justified removing Thomas’s vehicle. See Brown II,
¶ 16 (finding impoundment unreasonable, in part because “[t]here
was no suggestion that the car was impeding traffic or threatening
11 public safety and convenience where it was stopped”); United States
v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding
that community caretaking exception did not permit impounding a
vehicle where the driver “appropriately pulled over to the curb when
he was stopped in a residential neighborhood,” and the vehicle was
parked legally and did not pose a safety hazard); cf. People v.
Camarigg, 2017 COA 115M, ¶ 21 (holding that impounding a
parked vehicle was reasonable because “it was blocking a gas pump
and likely to be a nuisance”).
¶ 21 Next, the People contend that Officer Valdez needed to
impound the vehicle to protect the vehicle “against danger or loss,
or even false claims of loss” — even if it posed no threat to public
safety and convenience. The People reference a discussion in
Bertine in which the Court explained that inventory searches serve
to protect an owner’s property “while it is in the custody of the
police,” to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized
property and to guard the police from any danger posed by the
vehicle and its contents. 479 U.S. at 372-73 (emphasis added); id.
at 373 (“[T]he police were potentially responsible for the property
taken into their custody.”); see also Brown II, ¶ 8; Pineda, 230 P.3d
12 at 1185. The Court did not hold that protecting a vehicle against
loss or protecting the police from danger posed by the vehicle
justifies impounding the vehicle (i.e., taking it into police custody).
Instead, the Court upheld the impoundment there because the
police’s decision was guided by standardized criteria “related to the
feasibility and appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle
rather than impounding it.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-76.
¶ 22 Nevertheless, our supreme court in Brown II, ¶ 8, and Allen,
¶ 19 — without distinguishing between seizures and inventory
searches conducted pursuant to a community caretaking function
— recently indicated that police may impound a vehicle to protect
against danger, loss, and false claims of loss. Therefore, we must
consider whether Officer Valdez was justified in impounding
Thomas’s car to protect it from theft or vandalism.
¶ 23 The People imply that impoundment for safekeeping is
permissible any time the arrest of the driver would otherwise result
in a lawfully parked vehicle being left unattended, regardless of any
remaining circumstances. We are not persuaded. Cf. United States
v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Opperman
13 ‘cannot be used to justify the automatic inventory of every car upon
the arrest of its owner.’”) (citation omitted).
¶ 24 The People identify no case holding that the police may always
remove a lawfully parked vehicle for safekeeping whenever it would
otherwise be left unattended. To the contrary, courts have
recognized that “[t]he mere fact that [the] defendant’s vehicle would
have been left unattended is insufficient to justify its
impoundment.” People v. Spencer, 948 N.E.2d 196, 205 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2011); see State v. Fortune, 689 P.2d 1196, 1203 (Kan. 1984) (“If
the person responsible for the vehicle desires that the vehicle be left
lawfully parked upon the streets or that it be turned over to some
other person’s custody, then, absent some other lawful reason for
impounding the vehicle, his or her wishes must be followed.”);
Manalansan v. State, 415 A.2d 308, 310-11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1980) (holding that the decision to impound the automobile was
unreasonable where there was no indication that “when the
appellant was arrested from his automobile that his automobile was
not then at rest in a legitimate parking spot”); State v. McDaniel,
383 A.2d 1174, 1179 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (“The
common theme underlying these cases and others . . . is that
14 something more must be shown to justify impoundment of a car
than that it would otherwise be left unattended.”).
¶ 25 Consistent with Brown II, courts consider whether the totality
of the circumstances demonstrates some appreciable risk that the
vehicle would be vulnerable to vandalism or theft if it were left
where it was parked, or whether some other factors support
impoundment. See Brown II, ¶¶ 13-14; see, e.g., United States v.
Staller, 616 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir. 1980) (impounding a lawfully
parked vehicle was reasonable where “the officers were aware that a
car parked overnight in a mall parking lot runs an appreciable risk
of vandalism or theft”); United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 706
(9th Cir. 2005) (impoundment was reasonable where the officer’s
concerns about vandalism were reasonable, the vehicle was
obstructing traffic, and the officer had probable cause to believe it
contained illegal drugs); United States v. Andas-Gallardo, 3 F. App’x
959, 963 (10th Cir. 2001) (impoundment reasonable where (1) there
was no evidence suggesting how long it might take the defendant or
a family member to retrieve the vehicle from a private commercial
lot; (2) there was no evidence indicating how safe the vehicle would
be if left unattended; and (3) there was the “distinct possibility” that
15 it contained a firearm); Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 785
(removing a vehicle from the shoulder of a busy highway was
reasonable because it “would have been easy prey for vandals” and
“would have posed a safety threat”).5
¶ 26 Indeed, regardless of whether the driver was arrested or cited,
courts regularly reject the safekeeping rationale for removing a
vehicle if the prosecution presented no particularized evidence that
the vehicle would be vulnerable to vandalism or theft in its current
location. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 968 F.3d 123, 127
(1st Cir. 2020) (“No evidence suggests personal property was visible
inside the car, and the officers do not claim that the car faced any
greater threat than that faced by any other car lawfully parked in
the neighborhood.”); Cervantes, 703 F.3d at 1141-42 (“[T]he
government presented no evidence that the vehicle would be
vulnerable to vandalism or theft if it were left in its residential
location, or that it posed a safety hazard, and thus failed to meet its
burden to show that the community caretaking exception applied.”);
Commonwealth v. Brinson, 800 N.E.2d 1032, 1037-38 (Mass. 2003)
5 We mention these particular cases because the People rely on them in their answer brief.
16 (“[U]nder a community caretaking analysis, impoundment of
lawfully parked cars requires a showing of likelihood of threat or
vandalism. There was no such showing here.”) (citation omitted);
State v. Slockbower, 397 A.2d 1050, 1055 (N.J. 1979) (“When the
instant defendant was apprehended, there appears by contrast to
have been no reason why defendant could not have been permitted
to park his car properly and lock it, just as he would have done if
he had had any business in the neighborhood.”).
¶ 27 We agree with those courts from other jurisdictions that
require particularized evidence of a likelihood of vandalism or theft
to justify impounding the vehicle for safekeeping. Where officers
can identify no reason to believe that the vehicle would be at
unusual risk of vandalism or theft if it were left where it was
parked, assuming the care and control of the vehicle and its
contents “could only increase the risk of liability.” United States v.
Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that “there is no
tort for omission by state actors” with regard to protecting property
from private injury); see Brown I, ¶ 24 (“Stated in the simplest
terms, ‘[t]he state owes no legal duty to protect things outside its
custody from private injury.’” (quoting Duguay, 93 F.3d at 353)).
17 ¶ 28 Here, the People justify the need to protect the vehicle on the
sole basis that the vehicle would be left unattended at night. But
the prosecution below presented no evidence that the vehicle’s
location in the residential neighborhood (six blocks from Thomas’s
home) made it vulnerable to vandalism. That is, the prosecution
presented no evidence that parking a vehicle overnight in that
location created an appreciable risk of vandalism or theft, or that
Thomas’s arresting offense would cause the vehicle to remain
unattended for an extended period of time before he could post bail.
Indeed, the evidence presented at the hearing suggested that the
vehicle would not have been left unattended for long because
Thomas’s wife, the co-owner, was only a short distance away and
could have taken custody of it.6 Cf. Andas-Gallardo, 3 F. App’x at
963 (impoundment reasonable where, among other things, there
was no evidence suggesting how long it might take the defendant or
his family to retrieve the vehicle). Finally, the prosecution
6 We do not suggest that Officer Valdez was required to wait with the vehicle until Thomas’s wife appeared. We note merely that the officer had reason to believe that the vehicle would not be left unattended for long if he simply left it locked and legally parked. It appears that the only reason the officer did not do so was his attempt to comply with the department’s impoundment policy.
18 presented no evidence that any peculiar characteristics such as
broken windows or plainly visible valuables made the vehicle a
tempting target for thieves. In any event, Thomas provided proof of
ownership and testified that he asked the officer to allow him to call
his wife to retrieve the vehicle from where it was parked, thereby
assuming the risk of vandalism and theft if his wife did not do so.
¶ 29 Given all this, we conclude that the prosecution failed to
demonstrate that it was necessary to seize the vehicle to protect it
against loss. Rather, the record indicates that Thomas could have
safeguarded his vehicle in the same manner as any person who
legally parks a vehicle in a residential neighborhood — by locking it
until he or his wife retrieved the vehicle.
¶ 30 Finally, we address the People’s argument that the officer
needed to impound the vehicle because Thomas did not provide
proof of current insurance and the vehicle could not lawfully be
operated without valid insurance. See § 42-4-1409(1), C.R.S. 2020
(providing that no person shall operate an uninsured motor vehicle).
We reject this argument for two reasons.
¶ 31 First, the prosecution offered no evidence of standardized
criteria or policies requiring (or permitting) officers to impound
19 uninsured vehicles. See Allen, ¶¶ 8, 21 (concluding that the seizure
of a car due to the lack of proof of insurance was unreasonable
where the prosecution did not present evidence that the seizure was
done in accordance with standardized criteria or policies). Second,
our supreme court in Brown II, ¶ 13, rejected a similar argument
where the defendant could not lawfully remove the vehicle because
his license had been suspended. After noting that the power to
impound a vehicle pursuant to community caretaking
responsibilities is distinct from the power to investigate illegal
activity, the court held, “[a]lthough the officers may have reason to
suspect that the driver will unlawfully drive the vehicle upon their
departure, the community caretaking exception . . . cannot support
seizures on the basis of suspicion that the driver has committed, is
committing, or will commit a crime.” Brown II, ¶ 15; see also People
v. Quick, 2018 CO 28, ¶ 8 (same). Likewise here, the officer could
not impound the vehicle solely on the suspicion that Thomas or
someone else would later operate it without insurance.
¶ 32 In sum, because neither the safekeeping rationale nor any
other community caretaking function applied here, the prosecution
failed to meet its burden to prove that the seizure of Thomas’s
20 vehicle fell within the community caretaking exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Accordingly, the
seizure was unreasonable, and the fruits of the subsequent
inventory search should have been suppressed. See Brown II, ¶ 17.
Given that the People offer no argument that admitting the
contested evidence was harmless, we reverse. See Hagos v. People,
2012 CO 63, ¶ 11 (holding that the People bear the burden of
establishing that an error of constitutional magnitude was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).
IV. Conclusion
¶ 33 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.7
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE YUN concur.
7 Those portions of the judgment not challenged on appeal — Thomas’s convictions for failure to stop a vehicle at a stop sign, turning without signaling, and failure to display proof of insurance — remain undisturbed.