23CA0959 Peo v Sanchez 10-23-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0959 City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CR7590 Honorable Jay S. Grant, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Karl A. Sanchez,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK Harris and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 23, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Christina Van Wagenen, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Karl A. Sanchez, appeals his convictions for
criminal negligence resulting in serious bodily injury to an at-risk
person, theft from an at-risk person of $500 or more, and offering a
false instrument for recording. He argues that (1) the district court
erred by failing to dismiss two jurors for cause; (2) the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the theft conviction; and (3) the court
admitted business records without proper authentication. He also
contends that the restitution order must be vacated along with the
theft conviction. We affirm the judgment and the restitution order.
I. Background
¶2 Sanchez lived with his elderly mother, Betty Lue Sanchez,1 in
her longtime home. Betty was showing signs of cognitive decline,
and Sanchez told his family he would serve as her caregiver.
¶3 Several months after Sanchez moved into Betty’s home, he
asked his friend, Jennifer Wesson, for help caring for Betty, and
Wesson agreed. When Wesson went to the home, Betty’s bedroom
“didn’t look like the rest of the house.” While the house was
1 The record contains different spellings of the victim’s name: “Betty
Lue Sanchez” and “Betty Lou Sanchez.” We use the spelling used on her medical records. Because she shares the defendant’s last name, we refer to her by her first name, intending no disrespect.
1 generally well kept, Betty’s room was “super cluttered” and smelled
strongly of feces. Betty was in her bed — a twin bed with one sheet
and a “very teeny blanket” — with dried feces on her hands. The
bed, the rug, and Betty’s clothing were all soiled with urine and
feces, and Betty had a bedsore on her tailbone. Wesson cleaned the
bedroom and helped Betty shower and change into clean clothes.
¶4 Days later, Wesson returned to the home to bring Betty
sheets, a warm blanket, lights, and a heater. When she arrived,
Betty was stuck under her bed, again covered in feces. Sanchez
told Wesson that Betty had been under the bed for “[a] couple days
. . . [s]ince the last time [Wesson] was there.” Wesson helped Betty
get out from under the bed, showered her, and put a diaper on her.
She asked Sanchez if Betty could go to the hospital, but Sanchez
said he was “afraid of what the neighbors would think.”
¶5 Wesson returned two days later and again found Betty
“soiled,” wearing the same diaper Wesson had put on her during
her previous visit. This time, Sanchez agreed to let Wesson take
Betty to the hospital. Betty was admitted to the intensive care unit.
She was in shock as a result of diabetic ketoacidosis (a high level of
acid in her blood), an infection, and severe dehydration. She was
2 also showing signs of extended malnourishment and had several
injuries, including bruising to her hip and buttocks, an infection in
her ankle, and abrasions on her perineum. Concerned about
neglect, the doctor reported Betty’s condition to law enforcement.
¶6 The ensuing investigation revealed that Betty had previously
granted Sanchez a durable power of attorney (POA) over her
finances. Two months earlier, Betty had received an inheritance of
approximately $70,000. Ten days after the funds were deposited
into Betty’s account, Sanchez withdrew a $36,500 cashier’s check,
which he used to buy a truck. Three days later, he withdrew an
additional $27,733 as a cashier’s check and $3,000 in cash. The
investigating detective also discovered a recorded deed, which he
believed had been backdated, gifting Betty’s home to Sanchez.
¶7 Sanchez was charged with criminal negligence resulting in
serious bodily injury to an at-risk person, theft from an at-risk
person of $500 or more (for the withdrawals from Betty’s bank
account), and offering a false instrument for recording (for the
allegedly backdated deed), as well as a crime of violence sentence
enhancer. Sanchez was convicted by a jury on all counts and
3 sentenced to four years in the custody of the Department of
Corrections. He was also ordered to pay restitution.
II. Denial of Juror Challenges for Cause
¶8 Sanchez first contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his challenges for cause of two jurors who
expressed sympathy for elderly crime victims. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
¶9 At the beginning of voir dire, the district court instructed the
jury on “a few basic rules of law that apply in all criminal cases.”
One of those instructions was: “Sympathy and prejudice have no
place in a criminal trial. The guilt or innocence of the defendant
must not be decided as a result of either sympathy or prejudice for
or against the [p]rosecution or the defendant.” The court then
asked the venire if there was “anyone who cannot follow these rules
as I’ve laid them out.” No one responded that they could not.
¶ 10 During voir dire, the prosecutor told the jury that the charges
involved crimes against an at-risk person and asked if hearing that
gave anyone concerns or “caused them to feel any sort of way
whatsoever just by what the allegations are.” No one responded.
4 ¶ 11 Defense counsel then followed up on this line of inquiry,
asking the prospective jurors if there was anyone who, “after you
heard that the victim in this case was elderly[,] . . . automatically
felt a sense of protectiveness or sympathy towards her.” Several
jurors raised their hands, including Juror L.C. and Juror W.
¶ 12 Juror L.C. explained that he raised his hand because most of
his landscaping business clients are elderly. He added, “I see how
they can’t really do things for themselves as much as they used to,
and, and that does give me — I do have some sympathy for the
elderly.” Defense counsel then asked Juror L.C. how he felt
learning he might hear evidence that the victim suffered serious
bodily injury. Juror L.C. responded that he felt sympathy for the
victim, “[b]ut the evidence does need to be given that it for sure
happened.” When asked if evidence of serious bodily injury would
make him feel biased toward one side or the other, Juror L.C. said,
“Until completely proven guilty or innocent, then I can’t really start
with either one.” But he reiterated that he would “feel sympathy.”
¶ 13 Juror W. also said he would “feel either bias or sympathy” if he
heard evidence of serious bodily injury. He elaborated:
5 I guess I just think about my own grandmother. . . . And if anybody were to harm her or take advantage of her in any sort of way, that would make me pretty angry. And I just think about somebody else doing that, and it makes me kind of angry as well.
¶ 14 At the close of voir dire, before hearing defense counsel’s
challenges for cause, the district court explained:
[Y]ou’re probably going to strike the entire panel. I’m going to tell you that the way that the questions were asked about people having sympathy, you’d have to be inhumane to not have sympathy.
. . . [Y]ou were asked the narrative of, [i]f you heard that . . . an at-risk adult had serious bodily injury, would you have sympathy? How could a person not? And you stated, without anything more.
....
You did not follow up with, how would that affect your deliberations? Would you . . . not be able to follow the law? So I’m just letting you know what . . . my position is on those.
¶ 15 Defense counsel acknowledged that “there is a level of
humanity” that comes into play with an elderly victim. But she
argued that her use of the qualifier, “without hearing more,” meant
that jurors who responded in the affirmative were inappropriately
starting the trial with “protectiveness or sympathy” for the victim.
6 The district court again pointed out that defense counsel had not
followed up by asking the prospective jurors if their expressed
sympathy would affect their verdict or their ability to be impartial.
¶ 16 Defense counsel then moved to strike Juror L.C. and Juror W.
(and other jurors who had similarly expressed sympathy for an
elderly or at-risk victim) for cause. The district court denied the
challenges, and Juror L.C. and Juror W. served on the jury.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 17 Defendants have a constitutional right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury. People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 14. To
protect this right, the court must sustain a challenge for cause to a
juror who has “a state of mind . . . evincing enmity or bias toward
the defendant or the state.” § 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2025; see
Marko v. People, 2018 CO 97, ¶ 20. But a juror who has expressed
bias shall not be removed for cause “if the court is satisfied, from
the examination of the juror or from other evidence, that [the juror]
will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the
evidence submitted to the jury at the trial.” § 16-10-103(1)(j).
¶ 18 Thus, “[a] prospective juror’s expression of concern or
indication that he or she possesses a preconceived belief as to some
7 aspect of the case does not . . . mandate exclusion of that juror for
cause.” Marko, ¶ 21. Rather, in determining whether a prospective
juror will impartially follow the law, the district court must evaluate
the juror’s state of mind based on their responses, demeanor, and
body language throughout voir dire. Id. Absent rehabilitation, a
challenge for cause must be granted when the juror’s statements
“compel the inference that he or she cannot decide crucial issues
fairly.” People v. Merrow, 181 P.3d 319, 321 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 19 We review the district court’s denial of a challenge for cause
for an abuse of discretion. Marko, ¶ 22. In doing so, we grant the
district court great deference because it is in “a superior position to
evaluate the ‘juror’s credibility, demeanor, and sincerity.’” Id.
(citation omitted). And we consider the district court’s ruling in the
context of the entire voir dire. People v. Ambrose, 2021 COA 62,
¶ 30. A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Marko, ¶ 22.
C. Analysis
¶ 20 We are not persuaded that Juror L.C.’s and Juror W.’s
statements, read in context, alone evinced a bias against Sanchez
or for the prosecution that required the jurors’ dismissal for cause.
8 ¶ 21 Both Juror L.C. and Juror W. acknowledged their
unremarkable instinct to feel sympathy toward an elderly victim
who was seriously injured, with Juror W. adding that it would make
him “kind of angry.” But as the district court noted, neither juror
indicated that this sympathy would influence his verdict or his
assessment of the evidence. They did not, for example, suggest they
were more likely to believe an elderly victim or less likely to believe a
person accused of such a crime. See People v. Gulyas, 2022 COA
34, ¶ 24 (juror said he would believe a child witness “[p]robably 90
percent of the time”); Merrow, 181 P.3d at 321 (juror said she would
not “count the testimony of anybody who’s under the influence”).
Nor did either suggest he would be unable to follow the law or apply
the presumption of innocence. See People v. Wilson, 114 P.3d 19,
24 (Colo. App. 2004) (juror said the defendant had “a strike against
him” because of juror’s past experience with alcohol abuse).
¶ 22 To the contrary, Juror L.C. expressly qualified his statement
by explaining that “the evidence does need to be given that [a crime]
for sure happened.” And when asked if he would feel biased toward
one side or the other, he confirmed — albeit, inartfully — that he
would not make a decision until he saw the proof. See People v.
9 Garcia, 2018 COA 180, ¶ 22 (“A trial court may give substantial
weight to a potential juror’s assertion that he could be fair and
impartial.”); People v. Simon, 100 P.3d 487, 492–93 (Colo. App.
2004) (holding that juror’s expressed “sympathy for the victim” did
not require removal for cause where juror said she would “base her
decision on the evidence presented”). Although Juror W. did not
make any affirmative representations to this effect, neither he nor
Juror L.C. responded when the court asked if anyone was unable to
follow its instructions — including that “[t]he guilt or innocence of
the defendant must not be decided as a result of . . . sympathy.”
¶ 23 The right to a fair and impartial jury does not prohibit jurors
from feeling sympathy toward a sympathetic situation or from
candidly expressing that emotion during voir dire. See id. at 492.
What it requires is that jurors are able to set aside that sympathy
and make a decision based exclusively on the evidence and the
court’s instructions. Id. Juror L.C.’s and Juror W.’s
acknowledgments that they would feel sympathy for a seriously
injured elderly victim did not “compel the inference” that they could
not do so. Merrow, 181 P.3d at 321. Rather, the district court
could reasonably determine on this record that these statements
10 “simply reflect[ed] an honest effort to express feelings and
convictions about matters of importance in an emotionally charged
setting.” People v. Sandoval, 733 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo. 1987).
¶ 24 Sanchez contends that Juror L.C.’s and Juror W.’s statements
were sufficiently problematic as to at least require rehabilitation.
See Marko, ¶ 25 (holding that juror was sufficiently rehabilitated
after initially expressing concerns about following the law). But
rehabilitative questioning is required only when a potential juror’s
statements otherwise “evince the sort of enmity or bias that
warrants dismissal [of the juror] under [section] 16-10-103(1)(j).”
Merrow, 181 P.3d at 321. Because Juror L.C.’s and Juror W.’s
statements did not rise to this level, the district court could “deny
[the] challenge[s] for cause without further inquiry.” Id. For the
same reason, we need not consider whether the court’s pre-voir dire
admonition that “[s]ympathy and prejudice have no place in a
criminal trial” — and the jurors’ failure to indicate they could not
heed that instruction — could “preemptively rehabilitate” the jurors.
11 Absent statements raising “a genuine doubt about a potential
juror’s impartiality,” no rehabilitation is necessary.2 Garcia, ¶ 21.
¶ 25 Finally, Sanchez also asserts that Juror L.C.’s statement that
“[u]ntil completely proven guilty or innocent, then I can’t really start
with either one,” indicated he could not uphold the presumption of
innocence. But Sanchez did not raise this as a ground for his
challenge for cause in the district court. See People v. Russo, 713
P.2d 356, 361 (Colo. 1986) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the challenging
party to clearly state of record the particular ground on which a
challenge for cause is made.”). By failing to do so, he waived it. See
Crim. P. 24(b)(2); Richardson v. People, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 25.
¶ 26 In any event, we do not view Juror L.C.’s statement as
indicating that he was unable or unwilling to apply the law. That
statement was of course an inaccurate expression of the burden of
proof: a defendant does not need to prove they are innocent, and a
2 Sanchez also filed a pretrial motion to limit judicial rehabilitation
of prospective jurors by asking them if they could set aside their personal beliefs and decide the case based solely on the evidence and the instructions. Although defense counsel later clarified that she was merely asking the court to be “more conscientious and more careful” in its rehabilitation — not to forgo rehabilitation altogether — Sanchez’s request was at least somewhat inconsistent with his argument on appeal that the court should have done more.
12 juror does start with innocence. But read in context, Juror L.C.
was not trying to describe the presumption of innocence. He was
simply attempting to explain that he would not prejudge the case.
Indeed, his immediately preceding statement that evidence must be
“given that it for sure happened” was consistent with the
presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proof.
¶ 27 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Sanchez’s challenges for cause to Juror L.C. and Juror W.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Theft
¶ 28 Sanchez next argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his theft conviction because there was no evidence he
lacked authorization to withdraw Betty’s funds. He also argues that
because the restitution order was based on the theft conviction, the
restitution order must be vacated as well. We again disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 29 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
record de novo to determine whether the evidence was sufficient
both in quantity and quality to sustain the conviction. Johnson v.
People, 2023 CO 7, ¶ 13. We do not “serve as a thirteenth juror and
consider whether [we] might have reached a different conclusion.”
13 People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 33. Instead, we view the evidence
as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine if it is “substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion
by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnson, ¶ 13 (citation omitted).
¶ 30 As relevant to this case, “[a] person commits theft when he or
she knowingly obtains, retains, or exercises control over anything of
value of another without authorization . . . and . . . [i]ntends to
deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of the
thing of value.” § 18-4-401(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. A person acts
“without authorization” when “the owner of the property has not
given him or her permission to obtain or exercise control over that
property.” People v. Stell, 2013 COA 149, ¶ 14.
B. Analysis
¶ 31 Sanchez’s theft conviction was based on three withdrawals
that he made from Betty’s bank account: (1) a $36,500 cashier’s
check payable to a car dealership that he used to buy a truck; (2) a
$27,733 cashier’s check payable to himself; and (3) $3,000 in cash.
¶ 32 Sanchez does not dispute that he made the withdrawals. But
he argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he lacked
14 authorization to do so because Betty had granted him a POA over
her finances. More specifically, he cites provisions of the POA
authorizing him to withdraw funds from Betty’s accounts, write
checks on the account, and pay for Betty’s living expenses.
¶ 33 A power of attorney is “an instrument by which a principal
confers express authority on an agent to perform certain acts or
kinds of acts on the principal’s behalf.” In re Tr. of Franzen, 955
P.2d 1018, 1021 (Colo. 1998). But powers of attorney must be
“strictly construed” according to their language and the
surrounding circumstances. Stell, ¶¶ 17–18. And an agent acting
under a power of attorney must act in accordance with the
principal’s reasonable expectations or in the principal’s best
interest; in good faith; and, unless otherwise provided, for the
principal’s benefit. Id. at ¶ 20; § 15-14-714(1)–(2) C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 34 This best interest standard and duty of loyalty were expressly
incorporated into the terms of the POA. The POA designated
Sanchez to “act as the Agent for [Betty’s] benefit” and to “exercise
powers in [Betty’s] best interest and general welfare, as a fiduciary.”
Thus, the POA authorized Sanchez to spend Betty’s money only to
the extent he acted for Betty’s benefit and in her best interest.
15 ¶ 35 The evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that he
did not. First, the truck that Sanchez purchased with Betty’s funds
was titled in Sanchez’s name alone. There was no indication that
Betty ever drove it, and given her condition, it is reasonable to infer
she never would. Moreover, Sanchez had another car at the time,
suggesting that Betty had no need for the truck as a passenger
either. Indeed, Wesson testified that when Sanchez finally agreed
Betty could go to the hospital, Wesson drove her there in her own
car. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a jury could reasonably conclude that Sanchez bought
the truck for himself — not Betty — and therefore that he acted
without authorization in doing so. That purchase alone is sufficient
to sustain Sanchez’s conviction of theft of more than $500.
¶ 36 The evidence was also sufficient to support a finding that the
other two withdrawals were not for Betty’s benefit and in her best
interest either. Sanchez highlights the lack of evidence as to how
he spent the funds and suggests that he could have used the funds
for Betty’s benefit — including for home improvements or medical
expenses. But Wesson testified that Betty was effectively living in
an island of squalor in an otherwise well-kept home. There was
16 evidence that Sanchez blocked Betty’s access to the kitchen and
placed padlocks on the refrigerator and cupboards to prevent her
from getting food. And by the time Betty was taken to the hospital,
she was malnourished and her health was so dire that she was
placed in the intensive care unit with a “life-threatening” condition.
¶ 37 From this evidence, a rational jury could reasonably infer that
Sanchez did not use the withdrawn funds in Betty’s best interest.
See Stell, ¶ 21. To the extent the evidence could have supported a
contrary conclusion, that was for the jury to decide. See People v.
Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 31 (“The jury, not the court, must perform the
fact-finding function when conflicting evidence — and conflicting
reasonable inferences — are presented.”). Our role is limited to
determining whether the record supports the jury’s verdict. Id.
¶ 38 Sanchez also asserts that, even if the POA did not grant him
authorization, the prosecution failed to prove that Betty did not
expressly authorize his withdrawals. But several witnesses testified
to Betty’s severely declining mental state and diminished
communication abilities around the time of the withdrawals. And
as we have explained, Betty’s physical health and living conditions
were abysmal. Under these circumstances, the inference that Betty
17 did not authorize Sanchez to withdraw tens of thousands of dollars
of her money for his own benefit does not rest on mere speculation.
It is supported by a “logical and convincing connection” to the
evidence. People v. Trujillo, 2025 COA 22, ¶ 20 (citation omitted).
¶ 39 We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
support Sanchez’s theft conviction. And because Sanchez’s
challenge to the restitution order is contingent on his theft
conviction being vacated, we affirm the restitution order as well.
IV. Admission of Records
¶ 40 Sanchez’s final argument is that the district court erred by
admitting records from an online legal document company based in
Canada showing that he downloaded a gift deed in February 2021
— more than a year after the date on the deed gifting Betty’s home
to him. He asserts that the records were foreign business records
that were not properly authenticated. We are not persuaded.
¶ 41 During the investigation, Detective Kenneth Klaus discovered
a recorded deed of gift of Betty’s home from Betty to Sanchez.
Although the deed was dated January 12, 2020, the document had
a copyright date through 2021, which led Klaus to believe that the
18 deed had been backdated. He determined that the deed had been
downloaded from “LawDepot.com” (LawDepot), and he subpoenaed
LawDepot for records associated with Sanchez’s email account.
¶ 42 In response, LawDepot produced four documents — a receipt
for a subscription under Sanchez’s name and email address on
February 23, 2021; “user answer data” showing that the account
downloaded a gift deed the same day; and two subsequent
subscription renewal receipts — along with an affidavit from the
custodian of records of “Sequiter Inc. trading as LawDepot,”
certifying the records’ authenticity. The affidavit was signed in
Canada and stated that the custodian was from Canada, but the
subscription receipts listed a California address for the company.
¶ 43 The prosecution moved to admit the LawDepot documents
under CRE 902(11) as certified domestic records of regularly
conducted activity. Defense counsel objected on the ground that
the records were not domestic records because LawDepot is based
in Canada and the records were sent from there. The prosecution
countered that the records were produced in response to a
subpoena served on LawDepot’s California office and concerned a
United States subscriber. The district court overruled the objection
19 and admitted the records, concluding that the documents appeared
to have been produced through a “domestic office” of LawDepot.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 44 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings, including as to
authentication, for an abuse of discretion. People v. Glover, 2015
COA 16, ¶ 10. A court abuses its discretion if it “misconstrues or
misapplies the law or otherwise reaches a manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair result.” Id. We review de novo the district
court’s “application or interpretation of the law when making an
evidentiary ruling.” People v. Dominguez, 2019 COA 78, ¶ 13.
¶ 45 Authentication requires “evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”
CRE 901(a). The standard for authentication is “minimal — all
that’s required is a prima facie showing that the evidence is what its
proponent claims.” Gonzales v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 42. This
burden is satisfied if “the proponent has offered a satisfactory
foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the
evidence is authentic.” Id. at ¶ 27 (citation omitted).
¶ 46 There are various paths to authentication. See Glover, ¶ 14.
For example, a record can be authenticated through the testimony
20 of a witness with knowledge or through the record’s contents and
distinctive characteristics, in conjunction with the circumstances.
CRE 901(b)(1), (4). Alternatively, some categories of records are
self-authenticating, meaning no extrinsic evidence of authenticity is
required. CRE 902. One such category is domestic records of
regularly conducted activity accompanied by a custodian affidavit.
CRE 902(11). Foreign records of regularly conducted activity,
however, are self-authenticating only in civil cases. CRE 902(12).
¶ 47 The parties’ arguments on appeal center on whether the
LawDepot documents are “domestic” records that are self-
authenticating or “foreign” records that are not. But we are not
convinced it matters. See People v. N.T.B., 2019 COA 150, ¶ 34
(holding that records were properly authenticated under CRE
901(b)(1) despite lack of CRE 902(11) certification); Glover, ¶¶ 21–24
(holding that user account records that did not satisfy CRE 902(11)
were sufficiently authenticated under CRE 901(b)(1) and (4)).
¶ 48 Klaus testified that he subpoenaed LawDepot for records
associated with Sanchez’s email address and received the records at
issue in response, along with an affidavit from a LawDepot
21 custodian certifying that the records were from the specified
account. See N.T.B., ¶ 34 (holding that detective had sufficient
personal knowledge to authenticate records where detective served
warrants, received records in response, and knew the defendant
had an account tied to his email address); Glover, ¶ 27 (holding that
similar testimony established authenticity of Facebook records).
¶ 49 Three of the documents were on LawDepot letterhead and
included Sanchez’s email address, and all four included Sanchez’s
name. Moreover, one of the records showed a query for a gift deed
with the address of Betty’s home, consistent with the LawDepot gift
deed Betty granted to Sanchez. See Glover, ¶¶ 30, 32 (requiring
corroborative evidence linking records to defendant); cf. People v.
Heisler, 2017 COA 58, ¶ 12 (holding that social media
communications may be authenticated through registration of the
account to the sender and “any other confirming evidence”). This
evidence was sufficient to permit a jury finding that the records
were LawDepot records for Sanchez’s account and that Sanchez
made the query they reflected. See N.T.B., ¶ 34; Glover, ¶ 33.
¶ 50 But even assuming CRE 902(11) was the only available path to
authentication, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
22 concluding that the records were “domestic” records — that is,
records from the United States.3 See Black’s Law Dictionary 612
(12th ed. 2024) (defining “domestic” as “[o]f, relating to, or involving
one’s own country”). Klaus testified that LawDepot’s United States
headquarters is in California, and the prosecution proffered that
Klaus served the subpoena on LawDepot at its California address.
The subscription receipts had a letterhead with the California
address and identified the items ordered as “Trial Site Subscription
(USA)” and “Site — Subscription Renewal (USA).” The “user answer
data” also displayed “US” in the box labeled “Country.” And the
records were associated with a Colorado account. Indeed, nothing
in the records themselves suggests any connection to Canada.
¶ 51 Sanchez nevertheless argues that the records are “foreign”
because the affidavit was signed in Canada and the records
custodian is Canadian. But CRE 902(11) does not require the
records to be certified in the United States; it simply requires the
records themselves to be domestic. And the fact that the records
custodian happens to be in Canada does not mean the records
3 Sanchez does not dispute that the LawDepot custodian affidavit
satisfied the certification requirements of CRE 902(11).
23 themselves — electronic records for a United States account
produced in response to a subpoena of LawDepot’s United States
office and bearing the address of that office — are Canadian.
Rather, the district court could reasonably determine that such
records are more closely connected to the United States.
¶ 52 Finally, to the extent Sanchez asserts that the records were
inadmissible hearsay because they were not properly authenticated,
he conflates these two distinct evidentiary rules. But in any event,
his hearsay argument fails for the same reason. Even assuming the
apparently computer-generated receipt and search result could be
considered hearsay, but see People v. Hamilton, 2019 COA 101,
¶ 24, the business records hearsay exception may be satisfied by a
certification that complies with CRE 902(11). CRE 803(6). Other
than his argument that CRE 902(11) does not apply, Sanchez does
not otherwise argue that the records failed to satisfy CRE 803(6).
¶ 53 The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the LawDepot records.
V. Disposition
¶ 54 The judgment and order are affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.