23CA0798 Peo v Sanchez 01-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0798 Adams County District Court No. 22CR1589 Honorable Patrick H. Pugh, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Joshua Larry Sanchez,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Tow and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Megan Ryan Machak, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Madeline Dobkin, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Joshua Larry Sanchez, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of second
degree burglary, theft, and possession of an illegal weapon. We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The following factual background reflects evidence the jury
heard at trial.
¶3 On May 18, 2022, Tiffany Gonzales arrived home in the middle
of the day and heard noises coming from the basement. Gonzales
thought the noises might have been from her stepfather, with whom
she lived, and she called out to see if he was home before she
realized he was already at work. Gonzales then saw an unknown
man walk up the basement stairs, grab a black backpack, and exit
the house into the backyard. After the man jumped a gate in the
backyard, Gonzales got in her car to follow him. While driving
behind the man, Gonzales called 911 to report the incident. She
followed the man down the street until he jumped over a fence and
appeared to enter a backyard. Gonzales returned home to meet
with sheriff’s deputies who were responding to her 911 call.
1 ¶4 Deputy Alexander Lofgren walked through Gonzales’s home
with her to see if anything had been stolen. While Deputy Lofgren
was conducting the walk-through with Gonzales, other deputies
searched the neighborhood but didn’t find or arrest anyone in
connection with the burglary.
¶5 During the walk-through, Gonzales noticed that each floor of
her home had drawers open, papers on the floor, and “things . . .
not the way [she] left them.” Gonzales also saw two bags near the
garage door that contained items from throughout her home —
electronics, an old ID, money, and cords. Gonzales stated that the
bags weren’t there when she left her house earlier that day.
Although Gonzales didn’t report any items missing at that time,
about a week later she noticed her spare car key and two charm
bracelets were missing. She called the sheriff’s office to report the
missing items.
¶6 One week after the burglary, Gonzales was outside her home
speaking with a neighbor about the burglary when she saw a man
walk down the street and enter a house. She believed that the man
was the same person whom she had seen the prior week in her
home, so she called 911.
2 ¶7 After deputies arrived at Gonzales’s residence, a couple of
deputies went to the house that Gonzales had seen the man enter.
As deputies approached that house, they saw the man walking
down the driveway. The man matched the description that
Gonzales had provided, so deputies detained him for investigative
purposes.
¶8 Deputy Jared Cantor remained with Gonzales while the other
deputies contacted the man. After the other deputies detained the
man, and before the show-up identification procedure began,
Deputy Cantor read Gonzales the six admonitions required under
section 16-1-110(3)(d)(I)(A)-(F), C.R.S. 2025.
¶9 The deputies who had detained the man described that they
took the man out of handcuffs, walked him away from their patrol
cars, and stepped about ten feet away from the man so that
Gonzales would have a clear view of him. Deputy Cantor then drove
Gonzales past the man in his patrol car and asked her if she could
identify him. Gonzales twice confirmed to Deputy Cantor that she
was “100% confident” that the man with the other deputies was the
same man whom she had seen in her home on May 18.
3 ¶ 10 Deputies arrested the man, who was later identified as
Sanchez, and placed him into custody. The deputies also took
Sanchez’s backpack and processed the contents, which contained
brass knuckles. Ultimately, the prosecution filed a complaint
charging Sanchez with second degree burglary, theft, and
possession of an illegal weapon.
II. Procedural History
¶ 11 Sanchez filed a motion to suppress Gonzales’s identification of
him, asserting that the show-up identification procedure was
impermissibly suggestive and violated his right to due process. The
district court held a hearing and concluded that the show-up
identification wasn’t “so impermissibly suggestive or extremely
unfair that it should be excluded as a violation of due process
rights.” The court thus denied the motion to suppress.
¶ 12 The day before trial, Sanchez sought to sever the possession of
an illegal weapon charge from the other charges. Sanchez argued
in the alternative that the court should bifurcate the trial. The
court denied the motion.
¶ 13 A jury found Sanchez guilty of all three charges. Sanchez
appeals his judgment of conviction, asserting that the court erred
4 by admitting evidence of the show-up identification and denying his
motion to sever or bifurcate the weapon charge from the other two
charges. Sanchez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for
the theft conviction.
III. The Show-Up Identification Wasn’t Impermissibly Suggestive
A. Additional Background
¶ 14 Defense counsel called Deputy Cantor as a witness at the
suppression hearing to testify about the show-up identification
procedure that the deputies conducted on May 25. Deputy Cantor
testified that he carries a show-up identification procedure card,
which lists six admonitions to be given to witnesses on one side and
the sheriff’s office’s policies on the other side.
¶ 15 One of the policies listed on the card says, “The officer shall
photograph or video the subject and the show-up location at the
time of that identification. If there is a body cam, the entire
procedure shall be recorded, including admonition given to the
witness.” Deputy Cantor testified that he didn’t record the show-up
procedure “due to safety reasons” because “[he wasn’t] going to
drive and hold a camera.” He also testified that the sheriff’s office
5 didn’t receive body worn cameras until several months after the
show-up identification that occurred in this case.
¶ 16 Deputy Cantor, describing the circumstances of the show-up
identification, said that Gonzales sat in the back of his patrol car
while he slowly drove past Sanchez, who was standing at the edge
of the curb by himself, unhandcuffed. He said that deputies were
standing to the right side of Sanchez, about ten feet away from him.
Deputy Cantor couldn’t remember where Sanchez’s backpack was.
He also couldn’t remember where the other deputies’ patrol cars
were, but he did recall that the cars weren’t close to Sanchez and
didn’t obstruct Gonzales’s view. And he confirmed that the
identification occurred during the middle of the day, sometime
before 3 p.m.
¶ 17 During the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued that,
because deputies stood ten feet away from Sanchez during the
identification, patrol cars were present, and the backpack “was
within the area,” the show-up identification procedure was
suggestive, even if officers didn’t intend it to be so.
¶ 18 Defense counsel further argued that none of the deputies
recorded the procedure, despite having at least one camera on
6 scene capable of recording, which was a violation of their sheriff’s
office’s policies. Defense counsel then argued that “[the deputies]
had the opportunity to use various other forms to do the
identification,” and “[t]hey knew exactly where [Sanchez] lived,” but
“they chose to do their . . . show-up this way.”
¶ 19 The court found that the facts favoring the conclusion that the
show-up procedure was suggestive were (1) Sanchez was the only
person standing next to deputies and their patrol cars; and (2) the
identification occurred at a location different from where Gonzales,
on May 18, had seen the man who burglarized her home enter a
backyard. Conversely, the court found that the following facts
weighed against the procedure being suggestive:
• Sanchez wasn’t in handcuffs.
• Although deputies were present, they were approximately
ten feet away from Sanchez.
• Deputy Cantor admonished Gonzales that the person —
Sanchez — may not be the offender and that it “[was] just
as important to determine whether [the] person [was] not
the offender.”
7 • Deputies didn’t ask Sanchez to place his braided hair
within his T-shirt as Gonzales had described seeing
during the burglary.
Based on these findings, the court concluded that the show-up
identification procedure wasn’t “so impermissibly suggestive as to
be unreliable.”
B. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 20 A show-up identification is a “procedure in which an
eyewitness is presented with a single subject in person for the
purpose of determining whether the eyewitness identifies the
individual as the suspect.” § 16-1-110(1)(b). While “[o]ne-on-one
showups are not per se violative of due process, . . . the procedure
is viewed with disfavor because of its strong potential for
unnecessary suggestiveness.” People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101,
109 (Colo. 1983); accord People v. Martinez, 2015 COA 37, ¶ 11.
¶ 21 A court violates a defendant’s constitutional right to due
process if it allows a jury to consider evidence of an unreliable
identification. See People v. Borghesi, 66 P.3d 93, 103 (Colo. 2003).
When a defendant challenges a pretrial identification, the court
must conduct a two-step analysis. People v. Williams, 2019 COA
8 32, ¶ 7. First, the defendant must demonstrate to the court that
the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Id. at
¶ 8. Impermissibly suggestive identification procedures are those
that are “so unnecessarily suggestive as to render the identification
unreliable.” Martinez, ¶ 11; see Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S.
228, 238-39 (2012) (“[D]ue process concerns arise only when law
enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is both
suggestive and unnecessary.”). “A claim that identification
procedures were impermissibly suggestive must be evaluated in
light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances.” People v.
Horne, 619 P.2d 53, 56 (Colo. 1980).
¶ 22 If the defendant demonstrates the show-up identification
procedure was impermissibly suggestive, then the burden shifts to
the prosecution to prove that the identification is nevertheless
reliable. Williams, ¶ 7. However, a court doesn’t reach the second
step if the defendant doesn’t carry his burden on the first step. See
Bernal v. People, 44 P.3d 184, 191 (Colo. 2002) (“It is important to
note that these two steps must be completed separately; it is only
necessary to reach the second step if the court first determines that
the [procedure] was impermissibly suggestive.”).
9 ¶ 23 The constitutionality of a pretrial identification procedure is a
mixed question of fact and law. Id. at 190. We therefore defer to
the district court’s findings of fact if they’re supported by the record
but review the court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id. Furthermore,
“on appeal ‘we look solely to the record created at the suppression
hearing’ to determine whether the trial court properly suppressed
the evidence.” People v. Nkongolo, 2025 CO 20, ¶ 14 (quoting
People v. Thompson, 2021 CO 15, ¶ 16).
C. Analysis
¶ 24 As an initial matter, we disagree with the parties that Sanchez
preserved the specific argument that the deputies’ noncompliance
with section 16-1-110 rendered the show-up procedure
impermissibly suggestive. At the suppression hearing, defense
counsel acknowledged that section 16-1-109(3), C.R.S. 2025,
discusses the policies that law enforcement officers are supposed to
implement for show-up identifications. But defense counsel didn’t
reference or present argument about section 16-1-110 in the
motion to suppress or during the suppression hearing. That
specific argument is therefore unpreserved, and we review the
court’s identification suppression determination for plain error. See
10 Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14; see also Crim. P. 52(b) (“Plain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”).
¶ 25 “Plain error” is error that is both obvious and substantial.
Hagos, ¶ 14. An error is “obvious” when a trial judge should be
able to avoid it without the benefit of an objection, Romero v. People,
2017 CO 37, ¶ 6, and includes an error that contravenes a clear
statutory command, People v. Kadell, 2017 COA 124, ¶ 25. But
plain error requires reversal only if the error “so undermined the
fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on
the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” People v. Crabtree,
2024 CO 40M, ¶ 43 (quoting Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415, 420
(Colo. 1987)). “In review for plain error, the defendant has the
burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” People v. Boykins,
140 P.3d 87, 95 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 26 Section 16-1-110 limits law enforcement use of show-up
identifications to specific circumstances. One of those limited
circumstances includes when an officer
has detained a subject in [a] crime within minutes of the commission of the crime and near the location of the crime[,] . . . neither a
11 live lineup nor photo array are available as a means of identification[,] and . . . [t]he eyewitness reasonably believes [they] can identify the subject.
§ 16-1-110(2)(a)(I)(A)-(C).
¶ 27 Sanchez argues that the show-up identification procedure here
was impermissibly suggestive because the identification occurred a
week after the burglary, rather than “within minutes” as required
by section 16-1-110(2)(a)(I)(A). We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 28 A law enforcement officer’s failure to comply with section
16-1-110’s procedures doesn’t render a particular show-up
identification per se impermissibly suggestive. Rather, an officer’s
failure to follow the statute’s procedures becomes a factor the court
must consider in determining whether a particular show-up
identification was impermissibly suggestive. See § 16-1-110(3)(b)
(“The court shall consider any failure by law enforcement to comply
with the requirements of this section with respect to any challenge
to a showup identification.”).
¶ 29 Here, the court received testimony that deputies didn’t arrange
a live lineup or photo array. Although the court didn’t reference
section 16-1-110(3)(b) when making its findings, the court indicated
12 that it considered that testimony and the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the show-up procedure — including the
delay in time between the offense and Gonzales’s identification of
Sanchez — to determine whether the procedure violated due
process. Assuming without deciding that this was insufficient to
satisfy section 16-1-110(3)(b)’s requirement that the court
“consider” the deputies’ failure to follow the procedural
requirements of section 16-1-110(2)(a)(I)(A), Sanchez hasn’t
demonstrated that such error by the court undermined the fairness
of his trial or casts serious doubt on the reliability of his conviction.
¶ 30 By their nature, single person show-up identifications tend to
be suggestive. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 134 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (the use of a single person in an
identification procedure “dramatically suggests to the witness that
the person . . . must be the culprit”). But they aren’t per se invalid,
see Martinez, ¶ 11, and we disagree with Sanchez that this
particular show-up identification was impermissibly suggestive.
¶ 31 While the court found at the suppression hearing that some
facts favored suggestiveness, the court also found that other facts
disfavored the conclusion that the show-up identification procedure
13 was impermissibly suggestive. Specifically, the court found that the
deputies stood ten feet away from Sanchez, didn’t handcuff him
during the procedure, didn’t require Sanchez to place his braided
hair inside his shirt, and appropriately admonished Gonzales before
conducting the show-up identification. We defer to these
record-supported findings. See Bernal, 44 P.3d at 190.
¶ 32 And contrary to Sanchez’s assertion, Deputy Cantor’s failure
to record the show-up procedure doesn’t establish that the
procedure itself was impermissibly suggestive. Sanchez had the
initial burden at the suppression hearing, but the record doesn’t
demonstrate that the deputies, in conducting the show-up
procedure, aggravated the suggestiveness of the identification in
any way. See Johnson v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir.
1987) (concluding that the identification wasn’t impermissible
because the police didn’t aggravate the suggestiveness).
¶ 33 Accordingly, we conclude that Sanchez didn’t demonstrate
that the show-up identification procedure was impermissibly
suggestive. We therefore affirm the court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. See Bernal, 44 P.3d at 191.
14 IV. The Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Sanchez’s Request to Sever or Bifurcate the Illegal Weapon Charge
¶ 34 Sanchez had a backpack with him when deputies arrested him
on May 25. The arresting deputy found a pair of brass knuckles in
the front pocket of the backpack. Thus, the prosecution charged
Sanchez with possession of an illegal weapon under section
18-12-102(4), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 35 The court addressed Sanchez’s motion to sever on the first day
of trial, before jury selection began. The prosecution objected to
severing the weapon charge, arguing that Sanchez had a
presumption of innocence on all three charges and that trying the
charges together wouldn’t violate his right to due process. The
court concluded that Sanchez hadn’t established that he would
suffer actual prejudice if the weapon charge was tried with the
burglary and theft charges. The burglary-related charges didn’t
contain any allegations of the use of force or the use of a weapon, so
the court concluded that there wasn’t an inference that Sanchez
committed burglary and theft because he allegedly possessed brass
15 knuckles. The court also concluded that the jury would be able to
separate the facts and legal principles applicable to each offense.
¶ 36 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure
governs permissive joinder of offenses. Permissive joinder allows
the prosecution to charge a defendant with two or more offenses in
the same complaint “if the offenses charged . . . are of the same or
similar character or are based on two or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or
plan.” Crim. P. 8(a)(2).
¶ 37 Conversely, Crim. P. 14 gives a district court discretion to
sever offenses if either the defendant or the prosecution would be
prejudiced by joinder of the offenses. A defendant requesting
severance under Rule 14 must demonstrate “that the joinder
caused ‘actual prejudice’ and that the trier of fact was unable to
separate the facts and legal principles applicable to each offense.”
Bondsteel v. People, 2019 CO 26, ¶ 59 (quoting People v. Garcia,
2012 COA 79, ¶ 28); see also People v. Gregg, 298 P.3d 983, 985–86
(Colo. App. 2011) (noting that reversal based on the consolidation of
offenses is appropriate only if a defendant demonstrates actual
16 prejudice resulting from the jury’s inability to separate the facts and
legal theories applicable to each offense).
¶ 38 A defendant asserting that offenses were improperly joined
must show that the counts are so “fundamentally and strikingly
different” that the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) aren’t met.
Bondsteel, ¶¶ 31, 42. To determine whether a defendant has met
this burden, courts consider factors such as “the elements of the
offenses at issue, the temporal proximity of the underlying acts, the
likelihood that the evidence will overlap, the physical location of the
acts, the modus operandi of the crimes, and the identity of the
victims.” Id. at ¶ 38.
¶ 39 We review a district court’s decision whether to sever offenses
for an abuse of discretion. Washington v. People, 2024 CO 26, ¶ 37.
A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or based on an erroneous
understanding or application of the law. People v. McFee, 2016
COA 97, ¶ 17. We apply a harmless error standard of reversal to a
defendant’s preserved claim of misjoinder of charges. Washington,
¶ 23.
17 C. Analysis
¶ 40 As a threshold matter, the People agree with Sanchez that he
preserved his argument under Rule 14 but argue that he didn’t
preserve his argument that joinder was inappropriate under Rule
8(a)(2). The People therefore assert that “the court’s decision under
Rule 14 is reviewed for harmless error, [but] the question of joinder
under Rule 8 is reviewed for plain error.” We disagree.
¶ 41 “[A] pretrial motion to sever joined cases is substantively the
same as an objection to joinder.” Bondsteel, ¶ 23. Therefore,
Sanchez’s argument that the court erred by denying his motion to
sever is preserved in its entirety.
¶ 42 Sanchez contends that he was actually prejudiced by the
court’s decision not to sever the illegal weapon charge because all
six factors set forth in Bondsteel, ¶ 38, weigh against finding that
the illegal weapon charge is of a “same or similar character” to the
burglary and theft charges. In support of this contention, Sanchez
argues that the weapon charge and the burglary and theft charges
don’t share substantive elements, modus operandi, or victims.
¶ 43 That may be true, but Rule 8(a)(2) allows offenses to be joined
when “the offenses arise from broader circumstances that do not
18 necessarily constitute one criminal episode,” Williams, ¶ 44, which
is precisely the situation in this case. The burglary-related charges
and the weapon charge weren’t one criminal episode, but the
weapon charge certainly arose from the broader circumstances
surrounding the investigation into the burglary because the brass
knuckles were discovered after a deputy conducted a search
incident to a lawful arrest. Additionally, the offenses were
temporally proximate, having occurred one week apart; evidence of
the weapon charge and the burglary-related charges — namely, the
backpack and testimony from the arresting deputy — overlapped;
and the offenses shared a physical proximity because Sanchez had
the backpack with the brass knuckles when deputies arrested him
a few houses down from where the burglary occurred.
¶ 44 Yet Sanchez argues that he suffered actual prejudice because
trying the weapon charge with the burglary-related charges injected
extraneous character evidence into the trial, which allowed the
jurors to conclude that the sort of person who carries brass
knuckles is also the sort of person who commits crimes like
burglary. But this argument is a bald assertion. See People v.
19 Venzor, 121 P.3d 260, 264 (Colo. App. 2005) (declining to review
issues presented in a perfunctory or conclusory manner).
¶ 45 Furthermore, Sanchez doesn’t provide any support for his
contention that the jury was unable to separate the facts and legal
principles applicable to each offense. Instead, Sanchez’s argument
that he was prejudiced rests on his assertion that “jurors are only
human.” But this assertion alone without more isn’t enough to
demonstrate actual prejudice. See Washington, ¶ 37 (“The
discretionary nature of a Rule 14 decision creates a high bar for a
defendant hoping for reversal. The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating . . . ‘actual prejudice’ caused by the joinder . . . .”
(quoting Bondsteel, ¶ 59)). And, as Sanchez acknowledges, the
court instructed the jury to consider the counts and evidence
separately, and we must presume that the jury followed these
instructions. See Bondsteel, ¶ 62.
¶ 46 Accordingly, we can’t conclude that the court abused its
discretion when it denied Sanchez’s request to sever or,
alternatively, bifurcate the weapon count from the other charges.
20 V. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Theft Conviction
A. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 47 Section 18-4-401(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, provides that “[a] person
commits theft when he . . . knowingly obtains, retains, or exercises
control over anything of value of another without authorization” and
intends to permanently deprive that person of the use or benefit of
the thing of value.
¶ 48 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
“[w]e review the record de novo to determine whether the evidence
before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality to
sustain the defendant’s conviction.” Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287,
1291 (Colo. 2010). “[T]he prosecution has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of guilt through introduction of
sufficient evidence.” Id. We consider “whether the relevant
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole
and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial
and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that
the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”
McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63 (quoting Clark, 232 P.3d at
1291).
21 ¶ 49 However, “[w]e do not sit as a thirteenth juror to determine the
weight of the evidence presented to the jury.” Clark, 232 P.3d at
1293.
B. Analysis
¶ 50 Sanchez argues that the evidence presented to the jury didn’t
establish that he obtained, retained, or exercised control over
Gonzales’s spare car key or charm bracelets. He argues that the
prosecution didn’t present any evidence that these three items that
Gonzales reported were missing were ever “located or placed” in his
possession. Sanchez thus asserts that the theft count “rests only
on conjecture, assumptions, and speculation.” We disagree.
¶ 51 Gonzales testified that, on the day of the burglary, she saw a
man she didn’t know inside her home. She said that she observed
his eyes, forehead, hair, and skin complexion. She also observed
his height, weight, and walking gait. Gonzales described the man’s
physical appearance as including brown eyes and long, braided hair
tucked into his shirt.
¶ 52 Gonzales also said that, on all three floors of her house,
drawers were open, papers were on the floor, and she could tell that
the house wasn’t the way she had left it. About a week later, she
22 called the sheriff’s office to report a spare car key and two charm
bracelets missing. Gonzales testified that she kept her spare car
key in a “junk drawer” and that she always kept the charm
bracelets hidden underneath clothes in a drawer in her bedroom.
Gonzales participated in the show-up identification one week later
and indicated that she was “100% confident” that the man — later
identified as Sanchez — was the same man she had previously seen
in her house.
¶ 53 While it is true that the prosecution didn’t present any direct
evidence that Sanchez possessed Gonzales’s spare car key or charm
bracelets, it was up to the jury to assess the credibility and weight
of the evidence presented to it. See People v. Richardson, 2018 COA
120, ¶ 13, aff’d, 2020 CO 46. There’s no indication from the record
that it didn’t appropriately do so. And based on Gonzales’s
testimony that she knew the items to be in her home before the
burglary and gone after the burglary, and that Sanchez was the
unknown person she saw in her house on the date of the burglary,
the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented to it
that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the
23 elements of theft.1 See id.; see also People v. Donald, 2020 CO 24,
¶ 27 (noting jurors may draw reasonable inferences from both direct
and circumstantial evidence).
¶ 54 Thus, we conclude that the evidence presented, viewed as a
whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was
substantial and sufficient enough to support Sanchez’s theft
conviction. See McCoy, ¶ 63.
VI. Disposition
¶ 55 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LUM concur.
1 Sanchez doesn’t dispute that the prosecution presented sufficient
evidence to determine the value of the three missing items.