Peo v. Parsley

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 6, 2025
• Docket: 23CA1144
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA1144 Peo v Parsley 02-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1144 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CR3328 Honorable Jay S. Grant, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Joshua A. Parsley,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Schock and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 6, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Cata A. Cuneo, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, John Patrick Galligan, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Joshua A. Parsley, appeals the district court’s

order requiring him to pay restitution. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Parsley was charged with two counts of menacing and one

count each of false imprisonment and failure to leave premises or

property upon request of a peace officer. As pertinent here, the

charges were based on allegations that Parsley used a knife to hold

N.F., who was naked in her bathroom, against her will.

¶3 Parsley pleaded guilty to failure to leave premises or property

upon request of a peace officer in exchange for dismissal of the

remaining counts.

¶4 The prosecution moved for restitution, seeking reimbursement

to the Crime Victim Compensation Board (CVCB) for $1,914.00 that

it had paid to N.F. for lost wages. Parsley objected and the district

court held a hearing. The only evidence presented at the hearing

came from N.F., who testified that she missed work because Parsley

“held [her] hostage in [her] bathroom,” “with a knife,” “wouldn’t let

[her] out,” and “wouldn’t leave.”

1 ¶5 Based on the evidence presented, the district court found that

Parsley proximately caused the CVCB’s losses and ordered him to

pay $1,914.00 in restitution.

II. Discussion

¶6 Parsley challenges the restitution award. He contends that the

district court erred by ordering him to pay restitution to the CVCB

because he was not convicted of an offense pertaining to N.F.’s lost

wages and did not agree to pay restitution for such losses under the

plea agreement. In the alternative, Parsley contends that the

prosecution failed to prove he proximately caused the damages

underlying the district court’s restitution order. We reject each of

these contentions.

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles Governing Restitution

¶7 Whether a court has authority to order a defendant to pay

restitution is a legal question that we review de novo. People v.

Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 23; Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 11. We

review challenges to a court’s proximate cause finding for clear

error. Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶¶ 3, 32.

¶8 Restitution means “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim

[that is] proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and that can

2 be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.” § 18-1.3-

602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024. In the context of restitution, proximate

cause is a cause which in natural and probable sequence produced

the claimed loss and without which the claimed loss would not have

been sustained. People v. Dyson, 2021 COA 57, ¶ 13.

¶9 A crime victim may seek compensation from the CVCB for lost

wages. See § 24-4.1-109(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024. If the CVCB pays such

a claim, a court may order the defendant to reimburse the CVCB for

the amount of assistance that it paid to the victim. See § 18-1.3-

602(4)(a)(IV). The prosecution bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the victim’s losses were

proximately caused by the defendant. People v. Stone, 2020 COA

24, ¶ 6. However, “[i]f, as a result of the defendant’s conduct,” the

CVCB provides “assistance to or on behalf of a victim[,] . . . the

amount of assistance provided and requested by the [CVCB] is

presumed to be a direct result of the defendant’s criminal conduct

and must be considered by the court in determining the amount of

restitution ordered.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(a), C.R.S. 2024. In other

words, section 18-1.3-603(10)(a) creates a rebuttable presumption

that shifts the burden to the defendant to show that the amount

3 paid by the board was not a direct result of their criminal conduct.

See People v. Henry, 2018 COA 48M, ¶¶ 16-19.

¶ 10 A court may impose restitution only for losses proximately

caused by an offender’s conduct. See Cowen, ¶¶ 16-21; see also

People v. Steinbeck, 186 P.3d 54, 60 (Colo. App. 2007). For that

reason, a court may not award restitution for losses proximately

caused by conduct for which the defendant was never charged, see

People v. Sosa, 2019 COA 182, ¶ 26, or for losses suffered as a

result of acquitted conduct, see Cowen, ¶ 24. Nor may a court

order restitution for losses related to criminal charges the

prosecution later dismisses, absent an agreement stating otherwise.

Roddy, ¶ 32.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 Parsley argues that the district court erred by ordering

restitution to the CVCB for reimbursement of N.F.’s lost wages

because the offense he pleaded guilty to did not pertain to those

losses and did not list N.F. as a victim. He further argues that he

should not be liable for the awarded restitution because the

offenses listing N.F. as a victim were dismissed, and he did not

4 agree to pay restitution for dismissed counts as part of the plea

agreement.

¶ 12 Parsley pleaded guilty to failure or refusal to leave premises or

property upon request of a peace officer under section 18-9-119(2)

and (4), C.R.S. 2024. Section 18-9-119(2) provides:

Any person who barricades or refuses police entry to any premises or property through use of or threatened use of force and who knowingly refuses or fails to leave any premises or property upon being requested to do so by a peace officer who has probable cause to believe a crime is occurring and that such person constitutes a danger to himself or herself or others commits a class 2 misdemeanor.

Further, “[a]ny person who violates subsection (2) . . . of this section

and who, in the same criminal episode, recklessly or knowingly

causes a peace officer to believe that he possesses a deadly weapon

commits a class 1 misdemeanor.” § 18-9-119(4).

¶ 13 At the restitution hearing, N.F. testified that she did not go to

work June 17 through June 25, 2022, because she was “emotional

and [she] was a mess.” She explained that “something traumatic

happened to [her]” — namely, Parsley “lost his mind and he held

5 [her] hostage [with a knife]” while she was “in [her] bathroom

naked,” and “he wouldn’t let [her] out” and “wouldn’t leave.”

¶ 14 N.F. was a person aggrieved by Parsley’s conduct of refusing to

leave while holding her hostage in her bathroom with a knife. His

actions gave the police probable cause to believe a crime was

occurring and constituted a danger to others. This conduct

proximately caused N.F.’s trauma, which led her to miss nine days

of work and wages. Because the pecuniary losses in the restitution

order directly relate to the unlawful conduct underlying the charge

Parsley pleaded guilty to, the court did not err in awarding

restitution.

¶ 15 We are not persuaded otherwise by Parsley’s argument that he

is not liable for reimbursement of N.F.’s lost wages because the

offense to which he pleaded does not list N.F. as a victim. Parsley’s

argument construes the restitution statutes too narrowly. A

“victim” is “any person aggrieved by the conduct of an offender.”

§ 18-1.3-602(4)(a) (emphasis added); see also § 18-1.3-601(1)(b),

C.R.S. 2024 (“Persons found guilty of causing [physical, emotional,

and psychological injury and loss of property] should be under a

moral and legal obligation to make full restitution to those harmed

6 by their misconduct.”); § 18-1.3-602(3)(a) (“‘Restitution’ means any

pecuniary loss suffered by a victim . . . .”).

¶ 16 Our supreme court has held that legislative amendments to

the restitution statute “demonstrate[] a legislative intent to include

additional victims beyond only those named in the information or

indictment.” Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41, 45 (Colo. 2009). In

Dubois, the court looked to the conduct underlying the conviction to

determine whether certain persons, though not named in the

charging document, were nevertheless victims to whom restitution

could be ordered, and concluded that they were. Id. at 45-46.

Because N.F.’s testimony establishes that she was “aggrieved by”

Parsley’s conduct — to which he pleaded guilty — she falls within

the meaning of “victim” for restitution purposes, even though she

was not the named victim for the offense. See id. at 46.

¶ 17 Having concluded that N.F.’s pecuniary losses are directly

related to the unlawful conduct underlying the charge Parsley

pleaded guilty to, we need not address Parsley’s claim related to

dismissed counts.

¶ 18 Parsley’s alternate contention that the prosecution failed to

prove that he proximately caused the damages supporting the

7 district court’s restitution order is equally unavailing. Parsley

argues that the district court clearly erred by ordering restitution

for the same reasons he asserts the court was without authority to

order restitution — namely, the order was based on counts that had

been dismissed, and he did not agree as part of the plea agreement

to pay restitution for dismissed counts. As discussed, the court did

not impose restitution based on dismissed counts, and because the

restitution award was supported by an appropriate “evidentiary

link” between the charged conduct and victim’s losses, see People v.

Moss, 2022 COA 92, ¶ 19, we reject this argument.

¶ 19 The district court found that that there was “a nexus between

[Parsley’s] conduct and [N.F.’s] losses due to the trauma she

suffered at the hands of [Parsley] in this case.” The court noted

that N.F. “provided credible testimony” that “[s]he was in trauma”

and “due to that, she missed work.” Thus, the court concluded that

“the presumption ha[d] not been rebutted,” “restitution is

reasonable . . . and it’s the proximate cause of [Parsley’s] conduct.”

The court’s findings and conclusion that the conduct to which

Parsley pleaded guilty proximately caused the claimed losses are

supported by the record. Further, because the court did not impose

8 restitution for conduct relating exclusively to the dismissed charges,

the court’s finding that Parsley failed to rebut the presumption

promulgated by section 18-1.3-603(10)(a) was not “misplaced.”

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s restitution order.

III. Disposition

¶ 20 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE SCHOCK and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.