Peo v. Olson

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 2, 2025
• Docket: 23CA1293
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA1293 Peo v Olson 10-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1293 El Paso County District Court No. 20CR3264 Honorable Michael P. McHenry, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Luke Morris Olson,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 2, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Victor T. Owens, Alternate Defense Counsel, Parker, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Luke Morris Olson, appeals the district court’s

denial of his Crim. P. 35(c) motion alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel in connection with an order imposing restitution. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 According to the affidavit for an arrest warrant, on the day in

question, Olson was driving on a major road in Colorado Springs,

“weaving in and out of traffic,” “cutting vehicles off” during lane

changes, and rapidly accelerating and braking. Witnesses observed

Olson quickly change lanes directly in front of a motorcyclist,

causing the motorcyclist to “lock[] up his own brakes” in an effort to

avoid a collision. The motorcyclist was ejected from the motorcycle

and suffered serious injuries, including eight rib fractures, a

collapsed lung, and a brain injury. Olson fled the scene. A

motorist who witnessed the crash followed Olson and tried to block

him in at a traffic light. Olson backed up, hitting another car, and

fled onto the interstate.

¶3 The district attorney charged Olson with leaving the scene of

an accident, vehicular assault, reckless driving, and careless

1 driving causing bodily injury. Olson resolved the charges through a

plea agreement containing the following terms:

• Olson agreed to plead guilty1 to leaving the scene of an

accident;

• he acknowledged that he was “the driver of a vehicle directly

involved in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury to

[the motorcyclist]” and that he failed to stop at the scene of the

• he agreed to “pay restitution for all counts and cases governed

by th[e] plea agreement, including counts and/or cases

dismissed as part of th[e] plea agreement,” and he “stipulate[d]

to causation for restitution purposes in this case and in any

case(s) dismissed as part of th[e] agreement”;

• the prosecution agreed to “dismiss all other remaining charges

in th[e] case subject to the payment of restitution”; and

1 Olson entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400

U.S. 25 (1970), but he acknowledged during the Crim. P. 11 advisement that “an Alford plea still counts the same as a regular guilty plea.” See People v. Birdsong, 958 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Colo. 1998) (“An Alford plea is a guilty plea.”). Thus, we reject his unsupported argument that an Alford plea somehow precluded the court from imposing restitution for all of the claimed losses.

2 • the parties agreed that sentencing would be open, with a cap

of two years in the custody of the Department of Corrections

(DOC).

¶4 The district court accepted Olson’s guilty plea and sentenced

him to two years in the DOC. At the sentencing hearing in April

2021, Olson represented that his insurance company had covered

the motorcyclist’s losses. Because the parties did not know

whether the payout satisfied Olson’s entire restitution obligation,

the court found that Olson owed restitution and reserved the

determination of the amount for ninety-one days.

¶5 About two months later, the prosecution submitted a request

for $328,008.07 in restitution to be paid to six parties2 who had

reported losses due to Olson’s conduct. The next day, the court

granted the request and entered a restitution order.

¶6 In April 2022, Olson filed a pro se Crim. P. 35 motion for

postconviction relief, arguing that he had recently learned of the

restitution order; he was not liable for restitution because his

2 Almost all of the requested restitution was ordered to be paid to

the motorcyclist’s insurance company, American Family Insurance, and to Penrose St. Francis Hospital.

3 insurance company, Farmer’s Insurance, had paid the motorcyclist

$25,000 to settle all claims arising from the accident; and his public

defender had failed to object to the restitution motion and request a

hearing, entitling him to vacatur of the order.

¶7 The district court reappointed Olson’s public defender to

represent him. The public defender filed an objection to the

restitution order on the same grounds articulated in the pro se

motion and requested a hearing. The parties and the district court

agreed to bypass Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings and proceed directly to

a restitution hearing. The prosecution also agreed to apply the

$25,000 insurance payment as a credit against any restitution

judgment.

¶8 But the day before the scheduled hearing, the public defender

moved to withdraw because Olson “wishe[d] to raise issues that

involve ineffective assistance of counsel.” On the day of the

hearing, Olson confirmed that he wanted to forgo the hearing in

favor of pursuing his Crim. P. 35(c) ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. The district court appointed alternative defense counsel

(ADC) to represent Olson in his postconviction proceedings.

4 ¶9 ADC filed a supplemental Crim. P. 35(c) motion, asserting that

the public defender provided ineffective assistance by failing to

timely object to the restitution order and request a restitution

hearing and by failing to obtain a setoff for the $25,000 insurance

payment.3 According to ADC, had a hearing been held, no

restitution would have been ordered because the offense of

conviction — leaving the scene of an accident — did not proximately

cause any losses, and Olson could not be held liable for losses

attributable to the dismissed counts.

¶ 10 The court held a nonevidentiary hearing on the motion in June

2023. First, ADC raised the setoff issue. The prosecution

acknowledged that Olson was entitled to a $25,000 setoff against

the restitution amount, and the court agreed to “accept the

stipulation” and to enter an amended payout order reflecting the

credit. Next, ADC raised the legal issue of whether Olson was only

3 ADC’s supplemental motion also claimed that the public defender

should have challenged the “accuracy of the alleged damages” to the listed victims, raised the insurance company’s settlement agreement with the motorcyclist as a limit on liability, and preserved Olson’s right to appeal the restitution order. But because Olson does not reassert those claims on appeal, we consider them abandoned. See People v. Delgado, 2019 COA 55, ¶ 9 n.3.

5 liable for losses proximately caused by the conduct underlying the

charge to which he pleaded guilty. ADC conceded that if Olson had

pleaded guilty to causing the accident, “it would have been obvious

that restitution was part of the plea [agreement].” But, he argued,

because those charges had been dismissed, Olson’s stipulation to

causation in the plea agreement could only have referred to leaving

the scene of the accident, and that conduct did not cause any loss.

¶ 11 The court generally denied Olson’s motion, concluding that,

“when [a] defendant agrees to pay restitution on dismissed counts

as part of the plea deal and acknowledges restitution in the written

plea agreement the way Mr. Olson has here[,] . . . trial counsel

could not be ineffective by not contesting the restitution.” However,

the court entered an amended order reducing the amount of

restitution by $25,000.

II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

A. Legal Principles

¶ 12 “A defendant convicted of a felony offense must pay restitution

for any pecuniary loss he proximately caused [the] victim.”

Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 13 (citing § 18-1.3-602(3)(a),

C.R.S. 2025); see also § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2025 (every order of

6 conviction for a felony offense must include the consideration of

restitution).

¶ 13 In the restitution context, the term “victim” is not limited to

the person against whom a felony has been perpetrated but instead

includes “any person aggrieved by the conduct of an offender.”

§ 18-1.3-602(4)(a). And the definition of “person” includes a

corporation or other legal entity. § 2-4-401(8), C.R.S. 2025.

Therefore, “insurance companies generally qualify as victims” under

the restitution statute, People v. Lockett, 2025 COA 1, ¶ 16, as does

a hospital.

¶ 14 Proximate cause in this context is defined as a cause which in

natural and probable sequence produced the claimed injury and

without which the claimed injury would not have been sustained.

People v. Dyson, 2021 COA 57, ¶ 13. “Absent an agreement

between the defendant and the prosecution at the time the plea is

entered, a court may not impose restitution for pecuniary losses

proximately caused by conduct exclusively related to dismissed

charges.” § 18-1.3-603(11); People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 5.

¶ 15 The imposition of restitution is a critical stage of the criminal

proceedings. People v. Hernandez, 2019 COA 111, ¶ 24. Because

7 criminal defendants have a right to counsel at every critical stage of

the proceedings, People v. Guzman-Rincon, 2015 COA 166M, ¶ 20, a

defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in

resolving the issue of restitution, see Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d

875, 880 (Colo. 1987) (“[T]he right to counsel includes the right to

effective assistance of counsel.”).

¶ 16 To demonstrate that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must

establish that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning it

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the defense, meaning there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of

the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). The failure to establish either of

these two prongs defeats an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 50.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 17 A court may deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing if

the allegations are merely conclusory, vague, or lacking in detail;

the claims raise only issues of law; the allegations, even if true, do

not provide a basis for relief; or the record directly refutes the

8 defendant’s claims or otherwise clearly establishes that the motion

lacks merit. See People v. Castillo, 2022 COA 20, ¶ 14; People v.

Duran, 2015 COA 141, ¶ 9.

¶ 18 We review a court’s summary denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion

de novo. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14.

III. Analysis

¶ 19 Olson contends that he is entitled to a hearing on his motion

because he sufficiently alleged that the public defender provided

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the restitution order on

causation grounds and request a hearing. For several reasons, we

disagree.

¶ 20 First, the district court held a hearing on the motion. Olson

says that his motion “raises questions of fact, which remain

unanswered by the existing record,” but he does not identify any of

those questions of fact and, as far as we can tell, the facts are

undisputed, meaning an evidentiary hearing is unwarranted. See

Castillo, ¶ 14. And if Olson thought that further fact finding was

necessary, ADC could have said so at the hearing, rather than

telling the court that resolution of the motion turned on “an

interesting legal issue.”

9 ¶ 21 Second, the basis for Olson’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim is that the public defender failed to timely object to the

restitution order and request a hearing. But later, the public

defender did object and request a hearing, and a hearing was

scheduled. So it is unclear how the public defender’s initial lack of

diligence prejudiced Olson. The only reason the hearing did not

proceed was because Olson opted to forgo the hearing to pursue an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim against the public defender,

even though the remedy for that claim is a restitution hearing.

¶ 22 Third, even setting both of those issues aside, Olson cannot

show a reasonable probability that but for the public defender’s

alleged deficient performance, the outcome of the restitution

proceeding would have been different. Olson contends that had a

hearing been held, the prosecution could not have proved that his

conduct in leaving the scene of the accident proximately caused any

losses. But the prosecution did not have to prove that, because in

the plea agreement, Olson agreed to pay restitution for the

dismissed counts, including vehicular assault. And as ADC

acknowledged at the hearing (and appears to concede on appeal),

10 the conduct underlying the dismissed counts indisputably caused

the victims’ losses.

¶ 23 Olson says that, despite his agreement, the court could not

impose restitution in connection with the dismissed charges. But

the case law is uniformly to the contrary. See Roddy, ¶ 28

(explaining that “the prosecution and the defendant may strike a

plea agreement that extends the scope of the restitution order to

include . . . dismissed counts,” but reversing the restitution order

because “the plea agreement contained no language that Roddy

would pay restitution for injury or loss related to the dismissed

charges”); People v. Sosa, 2019 COA 182, ¶ 30 (“[W]hen a defendant

agrees to make restitution for losses stemming from uncharged

conduct or dismissed counts, [he] is bound by that agreement.”);

People in Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 14 (when a defendant

agrees in a plea agreement to pay restitution for dismissed counts,

he cannot challenge causation as to those counts).

¶ 24 To the extent Olson argues that the plea agreement’s

restitution provisions are too vague to impose liability for dismissed

counts, that argument amounts to a challenge to the restitution

order, not a claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance. We

11 may not review a challenge to the restitution order, though, because

Olson failed to file a direct appeal within the deadline. See C.A.R.

4(b)(1) (a defendant is required to file a notice of appeal within forty-

nine days after entry of the order appealed from); People v. Baker,

104 P.3d 893, 895 (Colo. 2005) (“Unless notice of appeal is timely

filed, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.”).

And as noted, he does not reassert any ineffective assistance of

counsel claim related to a direct appeal.

¶ 25 Regardless, we see nothing vague or equivocal about the term

requiring Olson to “pay restitution for all counts and cases governed

by this plea agreement, including counts and/or cases dismissed as

part of this plea agreement” or the term requiring him to “stipulate[]

to causation for restitution purposes.” A reasonable person would

understand those terms to mean that he had to pay restitution for

dismissed counts. See People v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 825, 829 (Colo.

2000). And in any event, Olson has never alleged that he did not

understand the plea agreement’s provisions or that the public

defender misadvised him about restitution.

¶ 26 Finally, we decline to consider the argument that the

provisions requiring Olson to pay restitution for dismissed counts

12 render the plea agreement invalid. That argument was not raised in

the motion and is entirely undeveloped on appeal. See People v.

Huggins, 2019 COA 116, ¶ 17 (issues not raised in the

postconviction motion are not preserved for appeal); People v.

Garcia, 2022 COA 144, ¶ 6 n.1 (An appellate court will not consider

a “bald legal proposition presented without argument or

development.”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 27 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.