24CA1566 Peo v Miller 12-18-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1566 Jefferson County District Court No. 22CR2894 Honorable Theresa M. Cisneros, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Eric Shane Miller,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 18, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Alonzi Pellow Beggan, LLC, Mike K. Pellow, Shana R. Beggan, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Eric Shane Miller, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of sexual assault on
a child as part of a pattern of abuse by one in a position of trust
and aggravated incest. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The prosecution charged Miller with the above offenses after
his stepdaughter, K.G., came forward with allegations that he had
repeatedly sexually assaulted her starting when she was nine years
old. It later added a third count of unlawful sexual contact
involving N.M., Miller’s stepson’s girlfriend, alleging that Miller held
N.M.’s waist and touched her bottom at a family gathering.
¶3 Before trial, Miller moved to suppress statements he made to
the police before his arrest, when he was contacted at work,
transported to the police station, and interviewed in a closed room.
Miller conceded his statements were voluntary but argued the
circumstances amounted to a custodial interrogation and he was
never advised of his Miranda rights. The trial court disagreed,
concluding Miller was not in custody, and denied the suppression
motion.
1 ¶4 The prosecution also filed a pretrial motion to introduce K.G.’s
undated journal entries. The court held that some portions of the
journal entries were admissible under CRE 807, while the rest had
to be redacted.
¶5 At trial, Miller testified in his own defense, denying the
allegations and stating he was “shocked” when police told him K.G.
had accused him of touching her inappropriately. During cross-
examination, the prosecutor played the video of Miller’s police
interview to impeach his testimony — pointing out that Miller’s
initial and repeated response to the allegations was to focus on his
lack of intent and that he acknowledged the possibility of
inadvertently touching K.G.’s vagina and bottom during an athletic
massage.
¶6 The jury found Miller guilty of both charges involving K.G. but
acquitted him of the offense involving N.M. The court sentenced
him to an indeterminate term of eight years to life in prison.
¶7 Miller appeals, arguing the court reversibly erred by failing to
suppress the police interview, allowing the prosecution to add the
charge involving N.M., and admitting K.G.’s journal entries into
2 evidence. He further asserts he is entitled to a new trial based on
cumulative error. We disagree with Miller’s arguments and affirm.
II. Failure to Suppress
¶8 To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, Miranda prohibits the prosecution from introducing
any statement procured by custodial interrogation unless the police
preceded their questions with certain warnings. People v. Klinck,
259 P.3d 489, 493 (Colo. 2011). Because such unwarned custodial
statements are illegally obtained, they are inadmissible as direct
evidence of a suspect’s guilt. People v. Trujillo, 49 P.3d 316, 321
(Colo. 2002).
¶9 Critically, however, while “[s]tatements made by a defendant
that violate the parameters of Miranda are subject to suppression,
. . . so long as the defendant made those statements voluntarily, the
prosecution may use them for impeachment purposes.” Klinck, 259
P.3d at 495; see also Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 877 (Colo.
2010) (“[S]tatements made by a defendant in circumstances
violating the strictures of Miranda are subject to only partial
suppression . . . .”). That is, “[i]f the defendant testifies at trial and
his testimony is inconsistent with his unwarned, voluntary,
3 custodial statements, then the prior statements are admissible to
impeach his credibility.” Trujillo, 49 P.3d at 321.
¶ 10 Such is the case here. Before trial, Miller conceded that his
statements were voluntary, and the trial court agreed. Miller makes
no attempt to challenge the court’s voluntariness finding on appeal.
Instead, he argues only that the court improperly applied the
factors described in People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 465-66 (Colo.
2002), where our supreme court set forth a list of factors for
determining whether a police station interview is custodial for
purposes of Miranda. Perhaps because this was the basis for the
trial court’s initial suppression ruling, the parties spend most of
their briefs discussing how the Matheny factors apply to the issue of
custody.
¶ 11 But we need not apply Matheny or decide whether Miller was
in custody for purposes of Miranda because the prosecution did not
admit his statements as substantive evidence of guilt. The video of
Miller’s interview was neither introduced as an exhibit during the
prosecution’s case-in-chief nor admitted into evidence for the jury’s
consideration. Instead, the prosecution played portions of it only
during cross-examination, after Miller testified — inconsistently
4 with his prior statements — that he “was shocked more than
anything” upon hearing about the allegations and had never
touched K.G. inappropriately.
¶ 12 Because Miller testified, and his testimony was inconsistent
with his prior statements to police, the prosecution was entitled to
use those voluntary statements for impeachment purposes. See
Effland, 240 P.3d at 877; see also § 16-10-201, C.R.S. 2025 (the
jury is permitted to consider prior inconsistent statements both for
impeachment purposes and as substantive evidence). Therefore,
whether Miller was in custody when he made his voluntary
statements is irrelevant. That is, even if we were to assume without
deciding that Miller’s voluntary statements were custodial in nature
and a Miranda advisement was therefore required, we nevertheless
discern no error. See People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 55 n.7
(we may affirm on any ground supported by the record).
III. Added Charge Involving N.M.
¶ 13 Miller also asserts he is entitled to a new trial because the trial
court improperly allowed the prosecution to add the charge
involving N.M. He argues the court abused its discretion by
5 allowing joinder of the offenses under Crim. P. 8 because they were
not part of a schematic whole.
¶ 14 But when the prosecution moved to add the charge involving
N.M., defense counsel objected only on the grounds that the statute
of limitations had run. Although counsel later indicated he may
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24CA1566 Peo v Miller 12-18-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1566 Jefferson County District Court No. 22CR2894 Honorable Theresa M. Cisneros, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Eric Shane Miller,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 18, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Alonzi Pellow Beggan, LLC, Mike K. Pellow, Shana R. Beggan, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Eric Shane Miller, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of sexual assault on
a child as part of a pattern of abuse by one in a position of trust
and aggravated incest. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The prosecution charged Miller with the above offenses after
his stepdaughter, K.G., came forward with allegations that he had
repeatedly sexually assaulted her starting when she was nine years
old. It later added a third count of unlawful sexual contact
involving N.M., Miller’s stepson’s girlfriend, alleging that Miller held
N.M.’s waist and touched her bottom at a family gathering.
¶3 Before trial, Miller moved to suppress statements he made to
the police before his arrest, when he was contacted at work,
transported to the police station, and interviewed in a closed room.
Miller conceded his statements were voluntary but argued the
circumstances amounted to a custodial interrogation and he was
never advised of his Miranda rights. The trial court disagreed,
concluding Miller was not in custody, and denied the suppression
motion.
1 ¶4 The prosecution also filed a pretrial motion to introduce K.G.’s
undated journal entries. The court held that some portions of the
journal entries were admissible under CRE 807, while the rest had
to be redacted.
¶5 At trial, Miller testified in his own defense, denying the
allegations and stating he was “shocked” when police told him K.G.
had accused him of touching her inappropriately. During cross-
examination, the prosecutor played the video of Miller’s police
interview to impeach his testimony — pointing out that Miller’s
initial and repeated response to the allegations was to focus on his
lack of intent and that he acknowledged the possibility of
inadvertently touching K.G.’s vagina and bottom during an athletic
massage.
¶6 The jury found Miller guilty of both charges involving K.G. but
acquitted him of the offense involving N.M. The court sentenced
him to an indeterminate term of eight years to life in prison.
¶7 Miller appeals, arguing the court reversibly erred by failing to
suppress the police interview, allowing the prosecution to add the
charge involving N.M., and admitting K.G.’s journal entries into
2 evidence. He further asserts he is entitled to a new trial based on
cumulative error. We disagree with Miller’s arguments and affirm.
II. Failure to Suppress
¶8 To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, Miranda prohibits the prosecution from introducing
any statement procured by custodial interrogation unless the police
preceded their questions with certain warnings. People v. Klinck,
259 P.3d 489, 493 (Colo. 2011). Because such unwarned custodial
statements are illegally obtained, they are inadmissible as direct
evidence of a suspect’s guilt. People v. Trujillo, 49 P.3d 316, 321
(Colo. 2002).
¶9 Critically, however, while “[s]tatements made by a defendant
that violate the parameters of Miranda are subject to suppression,
. . . so long as the defendant made those statements voluntarily, the
prosecution may use them for impeachment purposes.” Klinck, 259
P.3d at 495; see also Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 877 (Colo.
2010) (“[S]tatements made by a defendant in circumstances
violating the strictures of Miranda are subject to only partial
suppression . . . .”). That is, “[i]f the defendant testifies at trial and
his testimony is inconsistent with his unwarned, voluntary,
3 custodial statements, then the prior statements are admissible to
impeach his credibility.” Trujillo, 49 P.3d at 321.
¶ 10 Such is the case here. Before trial, Miller conceded that his
statements were voluntary, and the trial court agreed. Miller makes
no attempt to challenge the court’s voluntariness finding on appeal.
Instead, he argues only that the court improperly applied the
factors described in People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 465-66 (Colo.
2002), where our supreme court set forth a list of factors for
determining whether a police station interview is custodial for
purposes of Miranda. Perhaps because this was the basis for the
trial court’s initial suppression ruling, the parties spend most of
their briefs discussing how the Matheny factors apply to the issue of
custody.
¶ 11 But we need not apply Matheny or decide whether Miller was
in custody for purposes of Miranda because the prosecution did not
admit his statements as substantive evidence of guilt. The video of
Miller’s interview was neither introduced as an exhibit during the
prosecution’s case-in-chief nor admitted into evidence for the jury’s
consideration. Instead, the prosecution played portions of it only
during cross-examination, after Miller testified — inconsistently
4 with his prior statements — that he “was shocked more than
anything” upon hearing about the allegations and had never
touched K.G. inappropriately.
¶ 12 Because Miller testified, and his testimony was inconsistent
with his prior statements to police, the prosecution was entitled to
use those voluntary statements for impeachment purposes. See
Effland, 240 P.3d at 877; see also § 16-10-201, C.R.S. 2025 (the
jury is permitted to consider prior inconsistent statements both for
impeachment purposes and as substantive evidence). Therefore,
whether Miller was in custody when he made his voluntary
statements is irrelevant. That is, even if we were to assume without
deciding that Miller’s voluntary statements were custodial in nature
and a Miranda advisement was therefore required, we nevertheless
discern no error. See People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 55 n.7
(we may affirm on any ground supported by the record).
III. Added Charge Involving N.M.
¶ 13 Miller also asserts he is entitled to a new trial because the trial
court improperly allowed the prosecution to add the charge
involving N.M. He argues the court abused its discretion by
5 allowing joinder of the offenses under Crim. P. 8 because they were
not part of a schematic whole.
¶ 14 But when the prosecution moved to add the charge involving
N.M., defense counsel objected only on the grounds that the statute
of limitations had run. Although counsel later indicated he may
want to file a motion to sever the charges, he never did so. We
therefore review this issue for plain error. See People v. Ujaama,
2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (an issue is unpreserved for appeal when an
objection at trial was made on grounds different from those raised
on appeal). Under this standard, we will only reverse if the error is
obvious, is substantial, and so undermines the fundamental
fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the judgment
of conviction. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.
¶ 15 Even if we assume, without deciding, that the trial court erred
by allowing the prosecution to join the charges in this case, and
that the error was obvious, we conclude any error does not cast
serious doubt on the reliability of Miller’s convictions. The
prosecution did not use the charge involving N.M. to argue that
Miller was guilty of the offenses against K.G. In fact, the prosecutor
did not reference the charge involving N.M. at all during closing
6 argument. The jury was also properly instructed to consider the
evidence for each offense separately and not to let its verdict on one
offense influence its verdict on another. We presume the jury
understood and followed this instruction. Washington v. People,
2024 CO 26, ¶ 31.
¶ 16 Moreover, the jury acquitted Miller of unlawful sexual contact,
demonstrating that it could disentangle the facts and legal
principles of each offense. See id. at ¶ 33 (any misjoinder was
harmless where a split verdict indicated jurors exercised discretion
in their deliberations); see also Hagos, ¶ 14 (reversal for plain error
requires that the error impair the reliability of the judgment of
conviction to a greater degree than harmless error). Accordingly,
reversal is not warranted.
IV. Admission of K.G.’s Journal Entries
¶ 17 Next, we reject Miller’s challenge to the trial court’s pretrial
ruling that portions of K.G.’s journal entries were admissible
pursuant to CRE 807. While the court initially based its ruling on
CRE 807, it decided midtrial that K.G.’s journal entries were
admissible in their entirety because they were prior consistent
statements and the defense implied K.G. was lying. Miller does not
7 challenge that alternative ground for admitting this evidence. We
are therefore required to conclude the evidence was properly
admitted. See People v. Archer, 2022 COA 71, ¶ 42 (an appellant’s
failure to challenge all of the court’s reasons for a decision requires
affirmance).
V. Cumulative Error
¶ 18 “For reversal to occur based on cumulative error, a reviewing
court must identify multiple errors that collectively prejudice the
substantial rights of the defendant, even if any single error does
not.” Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25. Because we
have assumed only one error and concluded it does not warrant
reversal, we necessarily reject Miller’s cumulative error argument.
VI. Disposition
¶ 19 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE YUN concur.