22CA1932 Peo v Meyer 10-17-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA1932 Adams County District Court No. 10CR1042 Honorable Robert W. Kiesnowski, Jr., Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ryan John Meyer,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO Dunn and Richman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 17, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Tara Jorfald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Ryan John Meyer, appeals the district court’s order
denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
¶2 In April 2010, Meyer and three accomplices — Kenneth Lacey,
Tikim Alexander, and Ryan Harrison — drove to the victim’s house
to steal money and drugs. Meyer parked his van a short distance
from the house, and he and the accomplices waited for the victim to
leave. Once the victim left, Lacey, Alexander, and Harrison broke
into the victim’s house; however, they were interrupted when she
returned home with her children. One accomplice phoned Meyer,
who was in the van, and Meyer entered the house. The accomplices
took the victim and the children down to the basement at gunpoint,
and they searched the house. When police arrived to investigate a
report of suspicious activity, Meyer and his accomplices fled the
scene. Later, they were all apprehended. See People v. Meyer, slip
op. at ¶ 2 (Colo. App. No. 12CA2166, Sept. 15, 2016) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶3 At a jury trial, Lacey testified about the incident. None of the
other accomplices testified, nor did the victim. Meyer was convicted
of two counts of second degree kidnapping, aggravated robbery, first
1 degree burglary, first degree trespassing, two counts of child abuse,
second degree burglary, two counts of crime of violence sentence
enhancers, and three counts of habitual criminal sentence
enhancers. Id. at ¶ 1. On direct appeal, a division of this court
vacated Meyer’s conviction for second degree burglary but otherwise
affirmed the judgment. Id.
¶4 In 2020, Meyer petitioned for postconviction relief under Crim.
P. 35(c), asserting that he had received ineffective assistance from
trial counsel and that he was entitled to an extended proportionality
review of his sentences under Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M.1
Regarding his trial counsel, Meyer asserted that counsel did not
adequately (1) investigate the victim or call her to testify;
(2) investigate Harrison or call him to testify; and (3) pursue a plea
agreement from the prosecution. The district court granted an
evidentiary hearing on Meyer’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim regarding the victim but denied his other claims without a
1 Meyer also raised other claims in his postconviction motion, but
we deem them abandoned because he does not pursue them on appeal. See People v. Ortega, 266 P.3d 424, 428 (Colo. App. 2011).
2 hearing. After a hearing on Meyer’s claim pertaining to the victim,
the court denied that claim too.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
¶5 We disagree with Meyer that the district court erred by
denying his claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance.
A. General Law and Standard of Review
¶6 In postconviction proceedings, the legality of the judgment and
the regularity of the proceedings leading up to the judgment are
presumed, and the defendant bears the burden to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the allegations in the postconviction
motion. People v. Firth, 205 P.3d 445, 449 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶7 “A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to effective
assistance from his counsel.” People v. Ardolino, 69 P.3d 73, 76
(Colo. 2003). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The defendant must show both
that (1) their attorney’s performance was deficient and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced them. Id. at 687; Dunlap v.
People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo. 2007). If the court determines
that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient, it
3 need not consider the prejudice prong. See People v. Sparks, 914
P.2d 544, 547 (Colo. App. 1996). Likewise, if the court concludes
that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice, the court may
resolve the claim on that basis alone. See People v. Garcia, 815
P.2d 937, 941 (Colo. 1991).
¶8 Deficient performance is that which falls outside “the wide
range of professionally competent assistance.” People v.
Washington, 2014 COA 41, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). To establish
prejudice, the defendant must prove a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Id. at ¶ 23. A reasonable probability is
one sufficient to undermine confidence in the case’s outcome. Id.
¶9 Review of a district court’s denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) claim after
an evidentiary hearing presents a mixed question of fact and law.
See People v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M, ¶ 16. We defer to the
court’s factual findings if supported by the evidence, but we review
de novo the court’s legal conclusions. See id.; People v. Johnson,
2022 COA 2, ¶ 9. As to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
in particular, we review de novo the district court’s ultimate
4 determinations about whether counsel’s performance was deficient
or prejudicial under the Strickland standard. See Sifuentes, ¶ 16.
¶ 10 And we review de novo a district court’s denial of a Crim. P.
35(c) claim without an evidentiary hearing. People v. Gardner, 205
P.3d 1262, 1266 (Colo. App. 2010).
B. The Victim
¶ 11 Meyer alleged that his trial counsel did not sufficiently
investigate the victim’s account of the incident or call her as witness
at trial. Meyer also alleged that he was prejudiced by this failure
because the victim’s testimony would have contradicted Lacey’s
testimony implicating Meyer. To reiterate, the district court denied
this claim after an evidentiary hearing. We agree with the court
that Meyer did not show prejudice from counsel’s failure to further
investigate the victim or call her as a witness.2 We reach this
conclusion for two reasons: (1) the record makes clear that the
victim would have refused to testify even if called as a witness and
(2) her account of the incident did not substantially contradict
Lacey’s trial testimony.
2 Hence, we need not consider whether counsel’s performance was
deficient.
5 ¶ 12 The victim testified at the postconviction hearing. She said
multiple times that she would not have testified at Meyer’s trial if
she had been called as a witness because she would not “feel
comfortable testifying in somebody’s defense who was in my home.”
She also explained that she would have invoked her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination due to the evidence
found in her home indicating that she manufactured drugs. In fact,
the victim said she would have refused to testify at Meyer’s trial
even if the trial court had limited the questioning so as not to elicit
testimony incriminating her and even if the trial court would have
held her in contempt for refusing to testify. The victim then
acknowledged a caveat: she said that, if a contempt finding would
have risked revocation of her probation and resulted in her ensuing
arrest, such a situation would “more than likely” have been a
“factor” in deciding whether to testify.
¶ 13 Based on the victim’s testimony at the postconviction hearing,
the district court gleaned from the “conflicting information” that “it
appears” Meyer’s trial counsel “could have cajoled” the victim into
testifying at trial. It is not clear whether this is a factual finding or
merely an observation about a possible inference that could be
6 drawn from the victim’s testimony. But to the extent this
constitutes a factual finding, we conclude that the record does not
support it. See People v. Johnson, 2024 CO 47, ¶¶ 35-36
(concluding that a trial court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous
when the record showed that the court “misremembered or
misunderstood testimony” from the evidentiary hearing).
¶ 14 As discussed, the victim acknowledged that, if a contempt
finding could have threatened her probation and led to her arrest,
she might have reconsidered her refusal to testify at Meyer’s trial.
The record shows, however, that the victim was not on probation at
the time of the trial. While she had pleaded guilty to charges
related to the drugs found in her home, she had not been sentenced
yet. (After Meyer’s trial, she was sentenced to probation.)
Therefore, her concerns about a revocation of probation could not
have influenced her decision about testifying at Meyer’s trial.
Because the possible exception to her refusal to testify at his trial
did not apply, the victim’s adamant declarations that she would
have refused are uncontradicted. Therefore, Meyer did not show
prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to call the victim as a witness.
7 ¶ 15 Moreover, even if the victim had testified, we do not perceive a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different because the victim’s account of the incident (as
revealed at the postconviction hearing) was largely consistent with
Lacey’s testimony, the chief witness against Meyer. Lacey’s
testimony covered a wide range of topics, many of which the victim
did not address because she had no knowledge of them.
¶ 16 Lacey testified in detail about Meyer’s planning of the crimes
and how the crimes unfolded on scene. As relevant here, Lacey
testified that only he, Alexander, and Harrison initially entered the
victim’s house. After the victim returned home, Lacey said Harrison
and Alexander seized her at gunpoint and made her lie face down
on the floor. Lacey testified that Meyer then entered the house
wearing a red bandana over his face and asked the victim “where
everything was at.”
¶ 17 At the postconviction hearing, the victim testified that she saw
two Black men in her house,3 one of whom pointed a gun at her
and forced her to lie down on the floor. She said she saw only those
3 Meyer is not a Black man.
8 two people but heard “three or four” different voices in the house.
As to the people whom she heard but did not see, the victim
testified that they did not try to communicate with her. Finally, the
victim said she had never seen Meyer before the hearing.
¶ 18 According to Meyer, the victim’s testimony that she did not see
him in the house would have been exculpatory at trial. We agree it
would have been, to a limited extent. But the victim’s account did
not contradict Lacey’s testimony, who never indicated that the
victim saw Meyer. Instead, Lacey testified that Meyer did not enter
the house until after the victim was forced to lie face down on the
floor and that Meyer was wearing a bandana over his face. As the
district court aptly put it, “Lacey’s testimony placed [Meyer] in [the]
[v]ictim’s home yet out of sight of [the] [v]ictim.” In fact, the victim’s
account that she was forced to lie on the floor and that she heard
some people whom she did not see was consistent with Lacey’s
testimony about what happened.
¶ 19 As best we can tell, only one aspect of the victim’s testimony
contradicted Lacey’s testimony. Lacey testified that Meyer asked
the victim “where everything was at” after he entered the house.
9 But the victim testified that none of the people whom she heard but
did not see tried to communicate with her.
¶ 20 We cannot conclude that this single discrepancy between
Lacey’s testimony at trial and the victim’s testimony at the
postconviction hearing established a reasonable probability that the
trial’s outcome would have been different if the victim had testified
at trial.4 The only relevant import would have been to impeach
Lacey’s testimony, but the impeachment would have related only to
one detail of the entire episode, and the defense otherwise
impeached Lacey’s testimony extensively.
¶ 21 For instance, on cross-examination, defense counsel pointed
out that (1) Lacey had been previously convicted of attempted
robbery; (2) Lacey refused to speak with the prosecution until he
received a favorable plea deal; and (3) some aspects of Lacey’s
testimony were inconsistent with his earlier statements to police.
4 Meyer argues that, according to a document produced in discovery
before trial, the victim identified Lacey and Alexander as the men who threatened her with a gun and kidnapped her. Meyer says this information would have conflicted with Lacey’s testimony identifying Harrison and Alexander as the assailants. At the postconviction hearing, however, the victim did not identify who threatened her with a gun and kidnapped her. Therefore, her testimony did not contradict Lacey’s account on this point.
10 Defense counsel also challenged Lacey’s testimony based on
contradictory statements Lacey allegedly made to an inmate while
in prison, and that inmate was also called to testify. In light of this
considerable impeachment of Lacey’s credibility, we are not
convinced that a single contradictory statement from the victim
would have swayed the jury’s verdict in a meaningful way —
especially given that the victim’s testimony would not have excluded
Meyer’s presence in her home. Cf. Margerum v. People, 2019 CO
100, ¶ 16 (concluding that the district court’s error in limiting
impeachment of a witness was harmless, in part because the jury
received important other evidence bearing on the witness’s
credibility).
¶ 22 Reenforcing our conclusion is the fact that the victim’s
account did not contradict Lacey’s testimony that Meyer was the
“mastermind” of the crimes. Her statements did nothing to
challenge Lacey’s testimony that Meyer planned the crimes. And as
the district court noted, other physical evidence corroborated
Lacey’s version of events. For example, gloves and a prybar were
found in Meyer’s van, and gloves and a red bandana that contained
traces of Meyer’s DNA were found near the victim’s house.
11 ¶ 23 Accordingly, we conclude that Meyer did not show that he was
prejudiced by his trial counsel’s decision not to further investigate
the victim or call her as a witness at trial.
C. Harrison
¶ 24 Next, Meyer contends that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate and call Harrison as a witness at trial. The
district court denied this claim without a hearing. Because Meyer’s
allegations, even if true, do not show prejudice from counsel’s
performance, we conclude that the court’s ruling was correct.
¶ 25 In his Rule 35(c) motion, Meyer contended that Harrison
would have contradicted Lacey’s trial testimony. For example,
Meyer claimed that Harrison would have testified to the following:
• The men originally intended to buy marijuana from the
victim, not to rob her.
• Harrison believed that it was Lacey’s idea to break into
the victim’s home.
• Harrison did not see the victim come home, nor did he
talk to Meyer about her.
• Harrison did not see Lacey and Alexander take the victim
and her children to the basement.
12 • Meyer entered the house but did not see or speak with
the victim.
¶ 26 The district court decided that Meyer did not sufficiently allege
deficient performance or prejudice in counsel’s failing to investigate
or present Harrison’s alleged account at trial. The court noted that
evidence admitted at trial showed that Meyer had sought to
communicate with Harrison in an apparent attempt to influence his
potential testimony at trial. Specifically, Meyer had written a letter
to a third party asking them to contact Harrison and give Harrison
a version of the incident that implicated Lacey and exculpated
Meyer. The court concluded that calling Harrison to testify at trial
would have further highlighted Meyer’s attempts to influence
Harrison’s testimony, thus undermining Meyer’s defense. In
addition, the court determined that, even if Harrison had testified,
his testimony would have been “thoroughly discredited” and that
there was “no reasonable probability that his testimony would have
produced a different result.”
¶ 27 Like the district court, we find significant the evidence
showing that Meyer attempted to influence Harrison’s testimony —
an attempt to give Harrison a version of the incident to “drill . . .
13 into his head.” Meyer’s version conveniently inculpated Lacey,
while minimizing Meyer’s involvement. Although Meyer argues that
his letter attempting to influence Harrison was not received by the
intended recipient, the testimony that Harrison would have given at
trial (as alleged in Meyer’s postconviction motion) largely matched
the version of events that Meyer sought to drill into Harrison’s head
before trial.
¶ 28 Moreover, the evidence of the burglary tools found in Meyer’s
van, a receipt for purchase of the burglary tools, and gloves and a
bandana with Meyer’s DNA on them would have cast serious doubt
on any testimony by Harrison that the initial plan was merely to
buy drugs from the victim (not to rob her) and that Lacey came up
with the burglary plan only after they discovered that the victim
was not home. So, given the powerful evidence undermining
Harrison’s credibility, we agree with the district court that there is
no reasonable probability that the jury would have been swayed by
Harrison’s testimony.
¶ 29 Additionally, Harrison’s alleged testimony would not have been
entirely favorable to Meyer. According to the postconviction motion,
Harrison would have placed Meyer inside the victim’s home —
14 where his accomplices brandished a weapon and kidnapped the
victim. And Harrison’s testimony would have emphasized for the
jury Meyer’s attempt to influence Harrison, further suggesting
Meyer’s consciousness of guilt.
¶ 30 Given all this, we conclude that Meyer’s allegations about
Harrison fail the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.
D. Plea Negotiations
¶ 31 Meyer contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance with respect to a possible plea bargain with the
prosecution. Again, we disagree, but this time we conclude that
Meyer did not sufficiently allege deficient performance.
¶ 32 In his Rule 35(c) motion, Meyer alleged that his counsel
contacted the prosecution in November 2010 with an offer in which
Meyer would “plead guilty to the burglary charge in a 4-24 year
[sentencing] range, COV [crime of violence].” According to the
motion, the prosecutor rejected the offer, was difficult to negotiate
with, and was “generally not interested in plea negotiations because
he thought [Meyer] was the ‘mastermind’ of the crimes.” Meyer also
alleged that his counsel recalled later receiving a plea offer “in the
range of 30 years,” but Meyer rejected the offer. And after he was
15 convicted but before the habitual criminal adjudication, Meyer
received another plea offer that included a forty-two-year sentence
(less than half the sentence he eventually received), but he also
rejected that offer because he did not want to waive his right to
appeal.5
¶ 33 A defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel extends to
the plea-bargaining process. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144
(2012). Thus, a claim alleging ineffective assistance during plea
negotiations is subject to Strickland’s two-part analysis. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
¶ 34 Courts have recognized ineffective assistance claims regarding
plea negotiations in a few contexts: (1) counsel’s failure to initiate
plea negotiations; (2) counsel’s failure to convey an actual plea offer
to the defendant; and (3) counsel’s erroneous or incomplete advice
about a plea offer. See People v. Delgado, 2019 COA 55, ¶¶ 16-18;
Sifuentes, ¶¶ 17-18; People v. Sherman, 172 P.3d 911, 913-14 (Colo.
App. 2006). Meyer’s counsel was not deficient under any of these
theories. According to Meyer’s allegations, his counsel initiated plea
5 Given his reason for rejecting the plea offer, it is questionable
whether Meyer would have accepted any plea deal.
16 negotiations and later conveyed the prosecution’s plea offers to
Meyer. And Meyer did not allege that his counsel gave him
inadequate advice about any plea offer.
¶ 35 Instead, Meyer alleged that his counsel was constitutionally
deficient because his counsel did not give so-called mitigating
information to the prosecution in hopes of securing a plea offer
better than the two offers that Meyer rejected. Meyer cites no
authority accepting this novel theory of ineffective assistance of
counsel in plea negotiations. The one case he cites about a failure
to present mitigating information concerned the sentencing stage of
a case. See Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1063.
¶ 36 Absent any authority holding that defense counsel performs
deficiently by not presenting mitigating information to the
prosecution in hopes of receiving a plea offer better than those the
defendant rejected — and given that we “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance” — we conclude that Meyer’s
allegations (even if true) do not show deficient performance by his
counsel. Id. (citation omitted). Our decision is supported by the
fact that most of the allegedly mitigating information identified by
17 Meyer either had nothing to do with the charged incident (it dealt
with his childhood abuse) or was already possessed by the
prosecution because it was included in the discovery materials.
¶ 37 Moreover, Meyer did not allege in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion
that he had informed his trial counsel of his childhood abuse, much
less that he had authorized his counsel to share those personal
details with the prosecution. “Trial counsel’s alleged failure to
investigate or present mitigating evidence does not constitute
ineffective assistance ‘when the essential and foundational
information required to trigger such an investigation is withheld
from the defendant’s attorney by the defendant himself.’” People v.
Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 295 (Colo. 1996) (citation omitted); see
also Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding
that “trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims to
which his client has neglected to supply the essential underlying
facts . . . ; clairvoyance is not required of effective trial counsel”).
¶ 38 Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly denied
this claim without a hearing.
18 III. Proportionality Review
¶ 39 Meyer maintains that the district court erred by rejecting his
request for another review of his sentence for constitutional
proportionality. He is mistaken in light of Rule 35(c)(3)(VII), which
provides that, with some exceptions, a court “shall deny any claim
that could have been presented in an appeal previously brought.”
A. Additional History
¶ 40 Before sentencing, Meyer sought a proportionality review of
the statutorily mandated sentence. After an abbreviated review, the
trial court concluded that the sentence was not unconstitutionally
disproportionate to Meyer’s crimes. He did not challenge that ruling
in his direct appeal.
¶ 41 In his postconviction motion, however, Meyer alleged that his
sentence is “grossly disproportionate and unconstitutional” and
that he is entitled to a proportionality review of his sentence. He
did not mention Rule 35(c)(3)(VII) or cite an exception to that
provision. In its response, the prosecution invoked Rule
35(c)(3)(VII), but Meyer again failed to address that provision in his
reply.
19 ¶ 42 The district court rejected Meyer’s request for a proportionality
review because it was procedurally barred by Rule 35(c)(3)(VII).
B. Analysis
¶ 43 On its face, Rule 35(c)(3)(VII) bars Meyer’s request for a
proportionality review of his sentences because he could have
raised the issue on direct appeal but did not do so. See People v.
McDonald, 2023 COA 23, ¶¶ 8, 24 (concluding that Rule 35(c)’s bars
on successive claims apply to a sentencing proportionality claim),
(cert. granted Nov. 14, 2023). On appeal, Meyer concedes that a
postconviction request for a proportionality review “is subject to the
provisions of Crim. P. 35(c),” but he then says, “there is a question
of whether a claim for postconviction relief under the Eighth
Amendment can ever be considered successive.” To the extent he
means to challenge the reasoning of McDonald, we reject the
challenge because we find that decision persuasive.
¶ 44 Meyer also contends that two exceptions to the procedural bar
apply to his claim: Rule 35(c)(3)(VII)(c) (section VII(c)) and Rule
35(c)(3)(VII)(e) (section VII(e)). The People answer that this
contention is not properly before us because Meyer did not raise
any such exceptions in his postconviction motion or reply. See
20 DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo. 1996) (“Issues not
raised before the district court in a motion for postconviction relief
will not be considered on appeal of the denial of that motion.”).
¶ 45 Regarding section VII(c), we disagree with the People because
Meyer relied on that provision in substance even though he did not
cite it. Section VII(c) excepts from the procedural bar “[a]ny claim
based on a new rule of constitutional law that was previously
unavailable, if that rule should be applied retroactively to cases on
collateral review.” In his postconviction motion, Meyer relied on
Wells-Yates, a decision announced after his convictions became
final. He argued that “[i]n Wells-Yates, our supreme court created a
new rule related to Eighth Amendment proportionality review and
otherwise clarified the doctrine.” Thus, Meyer essentially argued
that the district court should retroactively apply to his case the new
rule of constitutional law announced in Wells-Yates.
¶ 46 But, while Meyer adequately raised section VII(c), that
exception does not apply to his claim. As held in McDonald, “to the
extent Wells-Yates announced new constitutional rules, those rules
are procedural and don’t apply retroactively.” McDonald, ¶ 2. To
reiterate, we follow McDonald because it is well reasoned.
21 ¶ 47 Regarding section VII(e), we agree with the People that Meyer
did not rely on it in his motion or reply. Section VII(e) excepts from
the procedural bar “[a]ny claim where an objective factor, external
to the defense and not attributable to the defendant, made raising
the claim impracticable.” But Meyer did not cite section VII(e) or an
objective factor that made raising his proportionality claim
impracticable in his direct appeal. Instead, he identified a new case
that, in his view, strengthened his proportionality claim — a claim
that he had raised before his sentencing and a claim that
defendants have raised for years well before Well-Yates. See, e.g.,
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). Therefore, Meyer’s
allegation that section VII(e) excepts his claim from the procedural
bar is not properly us. See DePineda, 915 P.2d at 1280; People v.
Goldman, 923 P.2d 374, 375 (Colo. App. 1996) (“Allegations not
raised in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion or during the hearing on that
motion and thus not ruled on by the trial court are not properly
before this court for review.”).
¶ 48 In any event, even if the applicability of section VII(e) were
properly before us, we would reject Meyer’s reliance on that
provision. In his view, section VII(e) applies to a claim relying on a
22 change in the law announced after a defendant’s conviction became
final even if the change should not be applied retroactively under
the proper retroactivity analysis. Accepting Meyer’s view of
section VII(e) would render section VII(c) superfluous, even a nullity.
Therefore, we cannot accept his interpretation. See People v.
Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 32 (“[W]e must avoid interpretations that
render any provision in a statute superfluous.”).
¶ 49 As a result, we conclude that the district court properly denied
Meyer’s claim as successive under Rule 35(c)(3)(VII).
IV. Conclusion
¶ 50 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE RICHMAN concur.