23CA1574 Peo v McLean 07-02-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1574 Arapahoe County District Court No. 21CR2216 Honorable Shay Whitaker, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Mickel McLean,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rachel Lieb, Assistant Attorney General II, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Claire Pakis, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Mickel McLean, appeals the trial court’s judgment
of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of second
degree assault, third degree assault, illegal discharge of a firearm,
two counts of domestic violence, and three counts of reckless
endangerment. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In October 2021, McLean and his girlfriend, Nancy Allen, got
into a verbal altercation in their apartment. The fight got physical
and McLean decided to leave the apartment. While McLean was
retrieving his belongings from a closet, including his clothes and a
handgun, he and Allen had a physical “tussle” and the gun fired.
Neither McLean nor Allen was shot, but the bullet went through the
wall into the neighboring apartment and struck S.S. in the head.
After seeing the bullet hole in the shared wall, McLean ran to the
neighboring apartment to check on his neighbors and called the
police.
¶3 Deputy Bjorn Lickteig arrived at the scene, handcuffed
McLean, and transported him to the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s
Office (ACSO) headquarters for questioning. At ACSO
headquarters, Investigator Charles Kelley reviewed McLean’s
1 Miranda rights with him, which McLean later waived. Lickteig and
Kelley questioned McLean for about an hour. During the interview,
McLean admitted to the officers that the gun was in his hands when
it fired and that it was his fault that S.S. was shot.
¶4 The prosecution charged McLean with (1) first degree assault;
(2) second degree assault; (3) menacing; (4) illegal discharge of a
firearm; (5) third degree assault; (6) three counts of reckless
endangerment; and (7) two counts of crime of violence sentence
enhancers.1 At trial, defense counsel argued that McLean didn’t
have the requisite mens rea to commit any crime and that the gun
fired accidentally.
¶5 The jury acquitted McLean of first degree assault but convicted
him of second degree assault, illegal discharge of a firearm, third
degree assault, two counts of domestic violence, and three counts of
reckless endangerment. McLean was sentenced to community
corrections for five years.
1 The prosecution dropped the menacing charge before trial.
2 II. Analysis
¶6 McLean raises two issues on appeal. He contends (1) that the
statements he made during his custodial interrogation were
involuntary and should have been suppressed and (2) that the trial
court abused its discretion by redacting part of his custodial
interrogation. We disagree with both contentions.
A. McLean’s Statements Were Voluntary
¶7 McLean’s theory of defense was that the gun went off
accidentally during the tussle with Allen and that he never
intentionally pulled the trigger. He argues that, during his
interview, Kelley coerced him into changing his story — to the gun
going off when he hit Allen on the leg — and that because his
statements weren’t made voluntarily, they should have been
suppressed.2 We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress as a
mixed question of law and fact. People v. Ramadon, 2013 CO 68,
2 In his motion to suppress, McLean argued that the entire video of
his interview should have been suppressed, but on appeal, he clarifies that “all statements made after 28:44 in People’s Exhibit 7 should be suppressed as involuntary.”
3 ¶ 21. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings and uphold them
when they are supported by the record. Id. But we review the legal
effect of the facts de novo. Id. Where the interrogation has been
audio- or video-recorded and there are no disputed facts outside the
recording pertinent to a suppression ruling, we are in the same
position as the trial court to decide whether a statement was
voluntary. Id. In such instances, the question on appeal is one of
law and is reviewed de novo. See People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208,
211 (Colo. 1998); People v. Wickham, 53 P.3d 691, 694 (Colo. App.
2001).
¶9 A defendant’s involuntary statements are not admissible
evidence. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25;
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 387 (1978); People v. Raffaelli, 647
P.2d 230, 234 (Colo. 1982). In determining whether a statement
was voluntary, courts consider the totality of the circumstances and
focus on whether the officers’ behavior overcame the defendant’s
will and resulted in an inculpatory statement that wasn’t “freely
self-determined.” Ramadon, ¶ 20.
¶ 10 This analysis requires a two-step inquiry, asking (1) whether
the official conduct was coercive and (2) whether the coercive
4 conduct “played a significant role in inducing the statements.”
People v. Munoz-Diaz, 2023 COA 105, ¶ 14 (quoting Ramadon,
¶ 20). Both steps of this inquiry require consideration of several
nonexhaustive factors:
(1) whether the defendant was in custody;
(2) whether the defendant was free to leave;
(3) whether the defendant was aware of the situation;
(4) whether the police read Miranda rights to the defendant;
(5) whether the defendant understood and waived Miranda
rights;
(6) whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with
counsel or anyone else prior to or during the
interrogation;
(7) whether the statement was made during the
interrogation or volunteered later;
(8) whether the police threatened the defendant or promised
anything directly or impliedly;
(9) the method or style of the interrogation;
(10) the defendant’s mental and physical condition just prior
to the interrogation;
5 (11) the length of the interrogation;
(12) the location of the interrogation; and
(13) the physical conditions of the location where the
interrogation occurred.
Cardman v. People, 2019 CO 73, ¶ 23; see also People v. Zadran,
2013 CO 69M, ¶ 11 (listing the same thirteen factors).
¶ 11 Whether a statement was made voluntarily isn’t determined by
“rote tabulation” or a “mechanical[] tally” of these nonexhaustive
factors but on whether the officers’ conduct “actually overbore” the
defendant’s will. People v. Liggett, 2014 CO 72, ¶ 35 (quoting People
v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39, ¶¶ 19, 20 n.2). Thus, the relevant
question is whether the officers used the pressures inherent in
custody to extract statements through intimidation, domination, or
manipulation. See People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 242 (Colo.
1999). Coercive conduct includes not only physical abuse or
threats directed against a person but also subtle forms of
psychological coercion. People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 843-44
(Colo. 1991). The deliberate exploitation of a person’s weakness by
psychological intimidation can, under some circumstances,
6 constitute a form of governmental coercion that renders a statement
involuntary. Ramadon, ¶ 19.
2. Additional Applicable Facts
¶ 12 Shortly after the shooting, Deputy Lickteig drove McLean from
his apartment to ACSO headquarters, where he was placed in
custody, for questioning. The entire interview was captured on
Lickteig’s body-worn camera. Investigator Kelley was also present
at the interview and conducted most of the questioning. Before
asking questions, Kelley read and explained McLean’s Miranda
rights. McLean waived his Miranda rights and his right to an
attorney orally and in writing. The interview lasted approximately
one hour. McLean wasn’t handcuffed during the interview, he was
free to move around the room, and the door remained open for the
duration of the interview.
¶ 13 McLean told the officers that, after he and Allen started
arguing, he told Allen that he was leaving. McLean went into the
closet to collect his things, and as he was pulling his clothes and
gun from the top shelf, Allen pulled him backward and the gun
accidentally went off as he caught his balance.
7 ¶ 14 Kelley told McLean that his observations at the scene didn’t
align with McLean’s description of the event. Kelley believed that
McLean didn’t intend to fire the gun but that “guns just don’t go off
like that.” McLean then said, “I don’t know if my finger
automatically touched the trigger or something like that . . . my
hand was on it; my hand was on it Mr. Kelley . . . . If my hand
actually accidentally grabbed the trigger, I’ll pay my penalty for
that.” Kelley told McLean that he shouldn’t “make it worse by
lying.” Kelley insinuated that McLean was “pissed off” and “couldn’t
take it anymore” because McLean and Allen were struggling with
their relationship, their daughter had recently died, and McLean
“had a momentary lapse of judgment.”
¶ 15 Kelley also said that he was “trying to help [McLean] out” by
encouraging him to be honest. As McLean sat on the floor of the
room, Kelley leaned over McLean and said,
I saw a pendant of Jesus Christ, right? I’m a believer, and you’re a believer, and [Lickteig] is too. Lies only make things worse. I’m asking you to take a leap of faith and tell me, exactly, because I already know what happened. I’m asking you to take a leap of faith, no matter how bad you think it makes you look. All I’m asking for from you is the truth. We can work this, we can work this together.
8 ¶ 16 Several minutes later McLean reenacted the event with a fake
gun. McLean stood up to demonstrate and said that he used the
“back part” of the gun to hit Allen’s leg while his hand was wrapped
around the gun. McLean surmised that when he hit Allen, he must
have pulled the trigger.
¶ 17 Before trial, McLean moved to suppress the statements he
made during the interview, arguing that they were not made
voluntarily. The trial court reviewed the interview video recording
and held a hearing on the motion, at which Lickteig and Kelley
testified.
¶ 18 Ultimately, the court found that McLean’s statements were
voluntary and denied the motion.
3. Discussion
¶ 19 While McLean doesn’t suggest that the officers physically
threatened or intimidated him, he asserts that, under the totality of
the circumstances, their conduct was psychologically coercive
because (1) the officers repeatedly told him that he was lying about
his version of events; (2) Kelley’s tone began to increase in volume
and hostility at the midway point of the interview; (3) McLean was
in a fragile mental and emotional state during the interrogation;
9 and (4) Kelley mentioned the death of McLean’s infant and tried to
appeal to McLean’s religious beliefs to get him to “tell the truth.”
Based on our review of the interview, we conclude that the
statements were voluntary.
¶ 20 As an initial matter, it is undisputed that McLean was in
custody at ACSO headquarters, he was aware of the situation
surrounding his arrest, he had been read his Miranda rights, he
understood and waived his Miranda rights, he was offered a lawyer
but waived his right to speak to one, he made his statements during
the interrogation, and the interrogation lasted for approximately an
hour. While those factors may have communicated to McLean that
he wasn’t free to leave, they don’t establish coercion. See People v.
Helm, 633 P.2d 1071 (Colo. 1981).
¶ 21 The record reflects that, once the interview began, the officers
reduced many of the pressures ordinarily associated with custodial
questioning. For example, they removed McLean’s handcuffs, left
the interview room door open, advised McLean that he didn’t have
to answer questions if he didn’t want to, and concluded the
interview when McLean indicated that he wanted to end it. The
record also demonstrates that McLean understood the purpose of
10 the interview and his Miranda rights and that he waived them and
his right to an attorney. The officers didn’t imply that McLean was
expected to sign the waiver; instead, they told him to sign only if he
wanted to. When the officers asked if he understood why they were
speaking with him, McLean responded that “its y’all job” and that
he understood the officers needed to determine whether he was
“telling the truth” or “telling a damn lie.”
¶ 22 McLean’s argument that Kelley engaged in implied threats and
promises when he told McLean that he was lying is unavailing.
Although Kelley challenged portions of McLean’s story and urged
him to tell the truth, courts have consistently held that the “soft
technique” of encouraging a defendant to tell the truth doesn’t
overbear “the defendant’s will as to have caused the defendant’s
statement to be constitutionally involuntary.” People v. Theander,
2013 CO 15, ¶ 45 (quoting Gennings, 808 P.2d at 846-47) (finding
the defendant’s will was not overborne when officers encouraged the
defendant to tell the truth for her children’s sake); see also People v.
Miranda-Olivas, 41 P.3d 658, 662 (Colo. 2001) (finding no coercion
when police encouraged the defendant to tell the truth to clear his
girlfriend’s name).
11 ¶ 23 Likewise, the officers’ statements that “we can work this
together” weren’t promises because the officers never promised
McLean leniency or that the outcome of the investigation was
dependent on McLean’s confession. Courts have determined that
similar statements made to elicit cooperation from a defendant
weren’t coercive. See, e.g., Zadran, ¶ 19 (concluding that statement
made by an officer that “it would be in [the defendant’s] best
interest” to speak wasn’t coercive); People v. Sellers, 2022 COA 102,
¶ 13 (holding that officer’s statement, “I’m going to make sure that
you get a fair shake,” wasn’t coercive), aff’d on other grounds, 2024
CO 64; cf. Cardman, ¶ 28 (finding that police interview was coercive
when detective conveyed to the defendant that “the case would go
away and would not proceed” if the defendant “met [him] halfway”
and apologized to the victim).
¶ 24 McLean asserts that Kelley’s hostile tone midway through the
interview was coercive and caused McLean to change his version of
events. This argument is unpersuasive. Although Kelley’s tone
may have seemed “confrontational” at one point during the
interview, we agree with the trial court that “the officers . . .
maintain[ed] their distance” and that the tone was conversational.
12 Throughout the interview — and, importantly, before the twenty-
eight-minute mark that McLean now challenges — McLean insisted
that the shooting was accidental even while acknowledging that he
was holding the gun. He also corrected Kelley when he believed
that Kelley misunderstood him and modified his story on his own
initiative. McLean’s ability to disagree with and correct Kelley
throughout the interview is inconsistent with the actions of a
suspect whose will was overborne. Cf. Ramadon, ¶¶ 11-12
(concluding that investigator’s accusatory tone and threats of
violence that defendant would face from being deported or jailed if
he didn’t reveal the circumstances of the crime were coercive).
¶ 25 It is undisputed that McLean was distraught during the
interview, but the officers didn’t exploit his emotional state, nor
were McLean’s statements involuntarily made based on his
distressed condition. Indeed, the record supports the opposite of
what McLean asserts — McLean was allowed to sit on the floor
when he became emotionally distressed, the officers gave him
water, and he was allowed to remove some of his clothing when he
became too warm. Moreover, “a defendant’s weakened mental
condition, in the absence of deliberate exploitation and intimidation
13 by law enforcement officers, is insufficient to render the defendant’s
statements involuntary.” People v. Cisneros, 2014 COA 49, ¶ 84;
see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (“[A]
defendant’s mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to
official coercion, should [n]ever dispose of the inquiry into
constitutional ‘voluntariness.’”).
¶ 26 Finally, although Kelley mentioned the death of McLean’s
infant daughter (as an acknowledgment that McLean was going
through a difficult time) and McLean’s religious beliefs, Kelley’s
references weren’t coercive. They were brief, and Kelley didn’t
elaborate on McLean’s daughter’s death and didn’t otherwise
suggest that McLean should tell the truth out of a moral duty to
her. See, e.g., Cisneros, ¶ 82 (finding that detective did not exploit
the defendant’s emotional and psychological vulnerability after the
defendant watched his ten-year-old daughter die); Theander, ¶ 44
(concluding that it wasn’t coercive for police to indicate that the
children would want to know that the defendant had helped find
their father’s killer); Munoz-Diaz, ¶ 25 (concluding that the
detective’s appeal to the defendant’s religion and the victim’s
family’s need for closure didn’t rise to police coercion).
14 ¶ 27 Under the totality of the circumstances described above, we
conclude that McLean’s statements during the interview were given
voluntarily and weren’t coerced.
B. The Court Properly Redacted Part of McLean’s Custodial Interrogation
¶ 28 McLean argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
depriving him of the ability to present a complete defense when it
redacted a portion of his interrogational video recording. We
disagree.3
¶ 29 Trial courts have broad discretion in determining the
admissibility of evidence based on its relevance, its probative value,
and its prejudicial impact. People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.
1993). We review a court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of
discretion. Campbell v. People, 2019 CO 66, ¶ 21. A trial court
abuses its discretion where “its ruling is ‘manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair,’ or where it is based on an erroneous view
of the law.” People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 20 (citation omitted).
3 The parties disagree about the standard of reversal.Because we perceive no error, we need not resolve this disagreement.
15 ¶ 30 Unless otherwise prohibited by law, all relevant evidence is
admissible. CRE 402. Relevant evidence is any evidence “having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” CRE 401.
Relevant evidence may be excluded if “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” CRE
403.
¶ 31 Just before the start of trial, the prosecution moved to redact
the portion of McLean’s interview recording where Kelley mentioned
that he and Lickteig shared McLean’s Christian beliefs on the
grounds that Kelley’s comments were “prejudicial under [CRE] 403.”
Defense counsel objected, saying that “the content of those
questions and the method which they [were] posed . . . during th[e]
interview [wa]s highly relevant” to McLean’s responses. The trial
court granted the motion and allowed the prosecution to redact
approximately ten seconds of the video discussing Kelley’s,
Lickteig’s, and McLean’s religious beliefs, because the “religious
16 belief aspect . . . tip[ped] the scale a bit more in terms [of being]
more prejudicial than probative.”
¶ 32 McLean’s theory of defense was that the gun went off
accidentally while he and Allen tussled over clothing and that he
never pulled the trigger intentionally. He asserts that his story
changed after Kelley mentioned McLean’s religious beliefs. Under
McLean’s revised version of events, the gun went off when he hit
Allen on the leg. He claims that by excluding the portion of the
interview where Kelley invoked his shared beliefs as a method to get
McLean to change his story, the trial court prevented him from
presenting a complete defense.
¶ 33 But other than his conclusory statement, McLean doesn’t
articulate how the redacted portion impaired his ability to present a
complete defense. In any event, his claim is unavailing because the
right to present a defense isn’t absolute and may be conditioned
upon adherence to the rules of evidence. People v. Cline, 2022 COA
135, ¶ 77. Moreover, the record doesn’t support McLean’s assertion
that he was unable to present a coercion-based theory of defense.
McLean’s counsel discussed the theory during opening statements
17 and closing argument. And counsel directed the jury to multiple
points in the interview that, in the defense’s view, demonstrated
improper pressure by investigators.
¶ 34 Also, the isolated reference to religion occurred after McLean
had already admitted to holding the gun and pulling the trigger.
¶ 35 We are not otherwise persuaded by McLean’s reliance on
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), and People v. Lopez, 946
P.2d 478 (Colo. App. 1997). Crane and Lopez stand for the
proposition that even if a court declines to find that a defendant’s
confession was involuntary based on coercive police conduct, the
defendant still has the right to present evidence showing the jury
that his confession was unworthy of belief, and exclusion of that
evidence surrounding the circumstances of the confession deprives
him of the right to present his defense. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 686-
91; Lopez, 946 P.2d at 482.
¶ 36 Crane and Lopez are distinguishable from McLean’s case. In
Crane, the Supreme Court concluded that the circumstances of the
defendant’s confession were relevant because his entire defense was
that there was no physical evidence linking him to the crime and
his earlier admission of guilt shouldn’t be believed because he was
18 a young, uneducated boy who had been kept in a small, windowless
room for a protracted period of time until he confessed. 476 U.S. at
691. Similarly, in Lopez, the defendant requested and was
erroneously denied the opportunity to present expert testimony on
the circumstances surrounding his confession, including that his
mother had threatened to kill him, herself, and his younger sister
unless he spoke to the investigating officer and that he was
interrogated for nearly thirty hours over a period of five days before
confessing. 946 P.2d at 480-82.
¶ 37 In contrast to the defendants in Crane and Lopez, McLean had
ample opportunity to present his argument that his story changed
because of officer coercion. Apart from about ten seconds, the jury
was able to see the entire interview, and it was able to assess the
circumstances that yielded what McLean claims was a change in
his version of events. Moreover, the probative value of the redacted
portion was minimal. Although certain details may have changed,
the core substance of McLean’s confession remained consistent
throughout the investigation: He acknowledged throughout his
interview that the gun was in his hands and that he pulled the
trigger, including before Kelley referenced religion at all.
19 ¶ 38 In sum, the trial court acted within its discretion by weighing
the probative value of the redacted portion of the video recording
against the prejudicial effect of including it. McLean was able to
present his theory that the gun fired accidentally, and the exclusion
of this limited portion of the interview didn’t impair McLean’s ability
to present his case. The jury was equipped to evaluate the
substance of the interview and McLean’s characterization of it.
III. Disposition
¶ 39 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.