24CA0184 Peo v Mankin 03-26-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0184 Alamosa County District Court No. 22CR98 Honorable Kim Cortez-Rodriguez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Paul Mankin,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Graham*, and Berger*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 26, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Ainsley E. Baum, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Defendant, Paul Mankin, appeals the judgment of conviction
entered pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree
assault. He argues that the guilty verdict is inconsistent with the
jury’s not guilty verdict and special interrogatory findings for
attempted second degree murder. We disagree and therefore affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Mankin and Martin Ramos were involved in an altercation in
Ramos’s garage. Mankin wielded a box cutter and Ramos suffered,
among other injuries, a deep, six-inch-long laceration to his flank.
Mankin left the scene, and his friend who lived above the garage
called the police. Once police arrived, they called an ambulance for
Ramos. They arrested Mankin the following day.
¶3 As relevant here, the People charged Mankin with attempted
second degree murder, see §§ 18-3-103(1)(a), 18-2-101, C.R.S.
2025, and first degree assault causing serious bodily injury with a
deadly weapon, see § 18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. They also
charged Mankin with two crime-of-violence sentence enhancers for
attempted murder: (1) use of a deadly weapon and (2) causing
serious bodily injury. See § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(A), (B), C.R.S. 2025.
1 ¶4 At trial, Mankin asserted the affirmative defense of
self-defense. The jury found him not guilty of attempted second
degree murder, but guilty of first degree assault. The
crime-of-violence interrogatories asked the jury whether Mankin (1)
“used a deadly weapon in the attempted commission of the crime of
murder in the second degree” or (2) “caused serious bodily injury] in
the attempted commission of the crime of murder in the second
degree.” Given the option to select only “yes” or “no,” the jury
selected “no” for each question.
¶5 Defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing
that the jury must have credited Mankin’s assertion of self-defense,
which is a defense to both attempted murder and first degree
assault. The district court denied the motion, finding that because
the elements of the charged crimes are distinct, the jury could find
Mankin not guilty of one and guilty of the other without finding that
he had acted in self-defense. The court sentenced Mankin to
sixteen years in prison.
II. Discussion
¶6 On appeal, Mankin contends that the jury verdicts are
inconsistent because (1) disproving self-defense was an element of
2 both crimes, and the jury’s findings on self-defense should apply to
both verdicts; and (2) the jury’s special interrogatory responses
negate the deadly weapon and serious bodily injury elements of first
degree assault as charged. See § 18-3-202(1)(a) (“A person commits
the crime of assault in the first degree if . . . [w]ith intent to cause
serious bodily injury to another person, he causes serious bodily
injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon . . . .”).
¶7 The People argue that the verdicts are not inconsistent, and
even if the verdicts are inconsistent, reversal is not required. We
agree with the People.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 We review de novo whether jury verdicts are legally and
logically inconsistent (or “mutually exclusive”). People v. Delgado,
2019 CO 82, ¶ 13. Two guilty verdicts are mutually exclusive when
an essential element of one crime necessarily negates an essential
element of the second crime. People v. Brooks, 2020 COA 25, ¶ 36
(citing Delgado, ¶¶ 2-3).
¶9 Similarly, a special interrogatory response and a verdict are
mutually exclusive when the response necessarily negates an
essential element of the general verdict to which it is attached. Id.
3 at ¶ 19; see People v. Shockey, 2026 CO 10, ¶ 32 (examining an
internal inconsistency between a substantive verdict and a special
interrogatory); cf. Rail v. People, 2019 CO 99, ¶ 46 (concluding that
any inconsistency between the response to a unanimity
interrogatory and the general verdict forms did not cast serious
doubt on the reliability of the judgment). “[T]he question is whether
the jury’s interrogatory responses nullify its verdict.” Shockey, ¶ 19
(citation modified).
¶ 10 We will uphold a guilty verdict if we can reconcile any
inconsistency and discern the jury’s intent. Id. at ¶ 29.
B. Application
¶ 11 First, we reject Mankin’s argument that the jury’s not guilty
verdict for attempted second degree murder necessarily turned on
the element of self-defense. Acquittals may have various
explanations. Delgado, ¶ 26; Brooks, ¶ 12. One obvious
explanation for these verdicts lies in the jury’s interpretation of
Mankin’s mental state. The jury could have found that Mankin did
not knowingly take a substantial step toward causing Ramos’s
death, as required for attempted second degree murder, but he did
intend to cause serious bodily injury, as required for first degree
4 assault. Compare § 18-3-103(1)(a), and § 18-2-101, with
§ 18-3-202(1)(a). In other words, the jury could have found that
Mankin intended to seriously injure Ramos with a box cutter but
did not knowingly try to kill him. Because the jury could reach its
verdicts without finding that Mankin acted in self-defense, we
presume that it did so. See People v. Hood, 878 P.2d 89, 92 (Colo
App. 1994) (“Every presumption is in favor of the verdict.”). We
conclude that the general verdicts were not legally or logically
inconsistent.
¶ 12 Next, for two reasons, we reject Mankin’s argument that the
jury’s responses to the attempted murder crime-of-violence
interrogatories negated the deadly weapon and serious bodily injury
elements of first degree assault. One, the plain language of the
interrogatories asked the jury whether Mankin used a deadly
weapon or caused serious bodily injury “in the attempted
commission of the crime of murder in the second degree.” Thus,
the jury’s answers do not signify a finding as to whether Mankin
used a deadly weapon or caused serious bodily injury while
committing the crime of first degree assault. Two, neither the jury
instructions nor the verdict forms clearly informed the jury that it
5 should not respond to the crime-of-violence interrogatories if it
found Mankin not guilty of attempted murder. Having so found, the
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24CA0184 Peo v Mankin 03-26-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0184 Alamosa County District Court No. 22CR98 Honorable Kim Cortez-Rodriguez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Paul Mankin,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Graham*, and Berger*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 26, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Ainsley E. Baum, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Defendant, Paul Mankin, appeals the judgment of conviction
entered pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree
assault. He argues that the guilty verdict is inconsistent with the
jury’s not guilty verdict and special interrogatory findings for
attempted second degree murder. We disagree and therefore affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Mankin and Martin Ramos were involved in an altercation in
Ramos’s garage. Mankin wielded a box cutter and Ramos suffered,
among other injuries, a deep, six-inch-long laceration to his flank.
Mankin left the scene, and his friend who lived above the garage
called the police. Once police arrived, they called an ambulance for
Ramos. They arrested Mankin the following day.
¶3 As relevant here, the People charged Mankin with attempted
second degree murder, see §§ 18-3-103(1)(a), 18-2-101, C.R.S.
2025, and first degree assault causing serious bodily injury with a
deadly weapon, see § 18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. They also
charged Mankin with two crime-of-violence sentence enhancers for
attempted murder: (1) use of a deadly weapon and (2) causing
serious bodily injury. See § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(A), (B), C.R.S. 2025.
1 ¶4 At trial, Mankin asserted the affirmative defense of
self-defense. The jury found him not guilty of attempted second
degree murder, but guilty of first degree assault. The
crime-of-violence interrogatories asked the jury whether Mankin (1)
“used a deadly weapon in the attempted commission of the crime of
murder in the second degree” or (2) “caused serious bodily injury] in
the attempted commission of the crime of murder in the second
degree.” Given the option to select only “yes” or “no,” the jury
selected “no” for each question.
¶5 Defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing
that the jury must have credited Mankin’s assertion of self-defense,
which is a defense to both attempted murder and first degree
assault. The district court denied the motion, finding that because
the elements of the charged crimes are distinct, the jury could find
Mankin not guilty of one and guilty of the other without finding that
he had acted in self-defense. The court sentenced Mankin to
sixteen years in prison.
II. Discussion
¶6 On appeal, Mankin contends that the jury verdicts are
inconsistent because (1) disproving self-defense was an element of
2 both crimes, and the jury’s findings on self-defense should apply to
both verdicts; and (2) the jury’s special interrogatory responses
negate the deadly weapon and serious bodily injury elements of first
degree assault as charged. See § 18-3-202(1)(a) (“A person commits
the crime of assault in the first degree if . . . [w]ith intent to cause
serious bodily injury to another person, he causes serious bodily
injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon . . . .”).
¶7 The People argue that the verdicts are not inconsistent, and
even if the verdicts are inconsistent, reversal is not required. We
agree with the People.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 We review de novo whether jury verdicts are legally and
logically inconsistent (or “mutually exclusive”). People v. Delgado,
2019 CO 82, ¶ 13. Two guilty verdicts are mutually exclusive when
an essential element of one crime necessarily negates an essential
element of the second crime. People v. Brooks, 2020 COA 25, ¶ 36
(citing Delgado, ¶¶ 2-3).
¶9 Similarly, a special interrogatory response and a verdict are
mutually exclusive when the response necessarily negates an
essential element of the general verdict to which it is attached. Id.
3 at ¶ 19; see People v. Shockey, 2026 CO 10, ¶ 32 (examining an
internal inconsistency between a substantive verdict and a special
interrogatory); cf. Rail v. People, 2019 CO 99, ¶ 46 (concluding that
any inconsistency between the response to a unanimity
interrogatory and the general verdict forms did not cast serious
doubt on the reliability of the judgment). “[T]he question is whether
the jury’s interrogatory responses nullify its verdict.” Shockey, ¶ 19
(citation modified).
¶ 10 We will uphold a guilty verdict if we can reconcile any
inconsistency and discern the jury’s intent. Id. at ¶ 29.
B. Application
¶ 11 First, we reject Mankin’s argument that the jury’s not guilty
verdict for attempted second degree murder necessarily turned on
the element of self-defense. Acquittals may have various
explanations. Delgado, ¶ 26; Brooks, ¶ 12. One obvious
explanation for these verdicts lies in the jury’s interpretation of
Mankin’s mental state. The jury could have found that Mankin did
not knowingly take a substantial step toward causing Ramos’s
death, as required for attempted second degree murder, but he did
intend to cause serious bodily injury, as required for first degree
4 assault. Compare § 18-3-103(1)(a), and § 18-2-101, with
§ 18-3-202(1)(a). In other words, the jury could have found that
Mankin intended to seriously injure Ramos with a box cutter but
did not knowingly try to kill him. Because the jury could reach its
verdicts without finding that Mankin acted in self-defense, we
presume that it did so. See People v. Hood, 878 P.2d 89, 92 (Colo
App. 1994) (“Every presumption is in favor of the verdict.”). We
conclude that the general verdicts were not legally or logically
inconsistent.
¶ 12 Next, for two reasons, we reject Mankin’s argument that the
jury’s responses to the attempted murder crime-of-violence
interrogatories negated the deadly weapon and serious bodily injury
elements of first degree assault. One, the plain language of the
interrogatories asked the jury whether Mankin used a deadly
weapon or caused serious bodily injury “in the attempted
commission of the crime of murder in the second degree.” Thus,
the jury’s answers do not signify a finding as to whether Mankin
used a deadly weapon or caused serious bodily injury while
committing the crime of first degree assault. Two, neither the jury
instructions nor the verdict forms clearly informed the jury that it
5 should not respond to the crime-of-violence interrogatories if it
found Mankin not guilty of attempted murder. Having so found, the
jury may have perceived its “no” responses to best reflect its intent
to acquit Mankin of that crime. For these reasons, we conclude
that the interrogatory responses and the guilty verdict for first
degree assault were not legally or logically inconsistent. See Hock v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 1242, 1259 (Colo. 1994) (“If there is
a view of the case that makes the jury’s answers consistent, an
appellate court has a duty to reconcile the special verdict in that
way.”).
¶ 13 Finally, we agree with the People that even if the verdicts were
inconsistent, Mankin would not be entitled to relief. Consistency
between guilty and not guilty verdicts is not required. Delgado,
¶ 14; People v. Frye, 898 P.2d 559, 570-71 (Colo. 1995). Unlike
mutually exclusive guilty verdicts, which are specific findings
“encompassing all the elements of the crime,” an acquittal is not a
finding. Delgado, ¶ 26. Inconsistent guilty and not guilty verdicts
may be explained by a jury’s mistake, compromise, or lenity — they
do not show that the jury was unconvinced of a defendant’s guilt or
necessitate an acquittal. Frye, 898 P.2d at 569 (citing United States
6 v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984)). And we generally uphold
convictions despite any “rational incompatibility” with acquittals.
Id. at 568. Here, we uphold Mankin’s conviction for first degree
assault because the jury’s guilty verdict unambiguously established
its intent to find that the People proved each element of that crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Shockey, ¶ 34.
III. Disposition
¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GRAHAM and JUDGE BERGER concur.