Peo v. Haskin

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 24, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0207
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0207 Peo v Haskin 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0207 Mesa County District Court Nos. 20CR842 & 21CR995 Honorable Bryan J. Flynn, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jack Alfred Haskin,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Tow and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 24, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kirstiana Perryman, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jack Alfred Haskin, appeals the district court’s

order revoking his probation and resentencing him to the custody of

the Department of Corrections (DOC). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2022, Haskin entered into a combined plea agreement to

resolve charges from several cases, including a 2020 case in which

he was charged with felony identity theft, felony forgery, and

misdemeanor theft, and a 2021 case in which he was charged with

two counts of felony possession of a weapon by a previous offender.1

In the combined plea agreement, Haskin pleaded guilty to felony

identity theft, one count of felony possession of a weapon by a

previous offender, and misdemeanor unauthorized use of a financial

device.

¶3 In August 2022, the district court accepted Haskin’s plea and

sentenced him to two years of probation as agreed by the parties, to

run concurrently on each felony.

¶4 In 2023, Haskin’s probation officer filed a probation revocation

complaint. The complaint alleged that Haskin had violated several

1 Haskin’s plea agreement additionally resolved two other cases not

before us on appeal.

1 terms and conditions of supervision requiring him to comply with

substance use testing and treatment. Following a hearing held on

December 14, 2023 (violation hearing), the district court found that

Haskin had violated the conditions of his probation.

¶5 At a separate hearing on December 18, 2023 (resentencing

hearing), the court revoked Haskin’s probation and resentenced him

to a three-year term in the DOC for the 2020 case and an

eighteen-month term in the DOC followed by a year of parole for the

2021 case, to run concurrently.

¶6 On appeal, Haskin contends that the court erred by (1) finding

that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish that

he violated his probation; (2) interpreting Colorado’s probation

revocation statute, § 16-11-206(5), C.R.S. 2025, to require

resentencing within seven days of finding a probation violation; and

(3) failing to order a presentence investigation report (PSIR) before

resentencing. We address each contention in turn.

II. Sufficiency of Probation Violation Evidence

¶7 Haskin argues that the prosecution didn’t present sufficient

evidence that he violated a condition of his probation that required

2 him to submit to drug testing as directed by his probation officer.

We aren’t persuaded.

A. Additional Facts

¶8 At the violation hearing, the probation officer testified that

Haskin had tested positive on drug and alcohol tests, although he

couldn’t remember what substances Haskin tested positive for. The

probation officer also testified that Haskin failed to submit to drug

testing on “several dates” and failed to complete substance abuse

treatment. The court received as an exhibit the probation officer’s

report detailing Haskin’s progress while on probation. As relevant

here, the report indicated that Haskin tested positive for

methamphetamine on June 9, 2023. The report also indicated that

Haskin had missed drug tests on September 6, 2023, September

19, 2023, October 2, 2023, and October 17, 2023.

¶9 Ultimately, the district court found that the prosecution had

established that Haskin hadn’t complied with multiple conditions of

his probation. Noting that the probation officer’s testimony was

credible and undisputed, the court found that the prosecution had

proved the following relevant violations based on the testimony and

the probation report:

3 • Haskin used methamphetamine;

• Haskin failed to submit to required drug testing on four

occasions between early September 2023 and mid-October

2023, as specified in the report; and

• Haskin failed to cooperate with and report for substance abuse

treatment as directed.

B. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 10 “Probation is a privilege, not a right,” and may be revoked if a

probationer violates any condition of probation. People v. Howell,

64 P.3d 894, 896 (Colo. App. 2002). Where a probation violation

doesn’t involve the commission of a criminal offense, the

prosecution must establish a defendant’s violation of the condition

by a preponderance of the evidence. § 16-11-206(3).

¶ 11 Whether a person has violated the terms of their probation is a

factual determination for the court. People v. Elder, 36 P.3d 172,

173 (Colo. App. 2001). If the court finds that a violation has

occurred, it has the discretion to decide whether probation should

be revoked. Id.; Howell, 64 P.3d at 896. We won’t disturb a court’s

finding of a violation “merely because there is a conflict in the

evidence,” Howell, 64 P.3d at 897, or substitute our judgment for

4 that of the district court if the evidence sufficiently supports a

finding of a violation, see People v. Moses, 64 P.3d 904, 908 (Colo.

App. 2002). Likewise, we won’t disturb a decision to revoke

probation unless the district court’s judgment is “against the

manifest weight of the evidence.”2 Elder, 36 P.3d at 174.

¶ 12 Any single probation violation can justify a court’s decision to

revoke probation, and where a court bases revocation on multiple

violations, the revocation remains valid as long as one violation is

sustained. People v. Loveall, 231 P.3d 408, 416 (Colo. 2010).

2 We disagree with the parties that Haskin’s sufficiency of the

evidence claim is subject to de novo review. The supreme court has made clear that probation revocation proceedings are fundamentally different than preconviction criminal proceedings. See Byrd v. People, 58 P.3d 50, 55-57 (Colo. 2002); see also People ex rel. Gallagher v. Dist. Ct., 591 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Colo. 1978) (“[A] probation revocation order operates . . . primarily as a reassessment of the correctness of the original sentence.”). We have found no authorities supporting the proposition that de novo review applies in the probation revocation context, and the cases cited by the parties — People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 31 (reviewing de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction); McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 27 (same); and Adair v. People, 651 P.2d 389, 391 (Colo. 1982) (applying abuse of discretion standard to review revocation of deferred judgment) — are inapposite.

5 C. Analysis

¶ 13 Haskin asserts that the court erred because the prosecution

didn’t provide evidence that the probation officer ordered him to

take drug tests on the specific dates that he allegedly missed. We

disagree.

¶ 14 The probation report indicated that, in April 2023, Haskin’s

probation officer placed Haskin on a call-in schedule to complete

drug testing. Haskin reportedly reviewed and acknowledged the

instructions for completing his drug testing on a call-in basis. One

month later, the probation officer again provided Haskin with

instructions for completing his drug testing on a call-in basis. The

probation report noted that, as of June 2023, Haskin “continued to

miss” calling in to complete his drug tests. Similarly, for September

and October 2023, the probation report indicated that Haskin

continued not to report for drug testing. Considering the evidence

as a whole, it can reasonably be inferred that the specific dates on

which Haskin was alleged to have missed drug tests are dates that

he was required to submit to testing under the call-in procedure.

¶ 15 And because the record reflects that Haskin failed to follow

through with the call-in drug testing procedure as directed by the

6 probation officer, we aren’t persuaded that the evidence was

insufficient to support the court’s finding that Haskin failed to

comply with this condition of his probation.

¶ 16 In any event, Haskin doesn’t challenge the evidence

supporting the court’s findings that he violated other conditions of

his probation. Thus, because the district court’s findings that

Haskin violated one or more conditions of probation have record

support, we won’t disturb them or the order of revocation. See

Loveall, 231 P.3d at 416.

III. The Seven-Day Resentencing Deadline in Colorado’s Probation Revocation Statute

¶ 17 Haskin contends that the district court erred when it

“interpreted Colorado’s probation revocation statute to require

resentencing within seven days of finding a probation violation.”

We discern no error.

¶ 18 After the district court found at the violation hearing that

Haskin had violated certain conditions of his probation, the court

asked the parties how they wanted to proceed with Haskin’s

resentencing.

7 ¶ 19 Defense counsel stated that the probation revocation statute,

§ 16-11-206(5), required the court to decide whether to revoke

Haskin’s probation within seven days, but that it didn’t require the

court to sentence Haskin within those seven days if it decided to

revoke his probation. The prosecutor said that she read the statute

as requiring resentencing within seven days.

¶ 20 The court agreed with the prosecutor, noting that it was

required “to revoke or reinstate probation within seven days,” but

that either the defendant or the prosecution could waive that

requirement. Defense counsel responded that Haskin would

“waiv[e] the right to be resentenced within seven days to the extent

it exists,” but the court noted that the prosecution hadn’t agreed to

waive that right. After defense counsel said she wasn’t ready to

proceed to immediate resentencing, the court set the resentencing

hearing within seven days. The court said that it would decide at

the resentencing hearing whether to revoke Haskin’s probation.

¶ 21 At the resentencing hearing, held four days after the violation

hearing, the court revoked Haskin’s probation and resentenced him.

8 B. Applicable Legal Principles

¶ 22 Colorado’s probation revocation statute provides mandatory

requirements for a court’s actions following a probation revocation.

As relevant here, the statute states,

If the court determines that a violation of a condition of probation has been committed, it shall, within seven days after the . . . hearing, either revoke or continue the probation. If probation is revoked, the court may then impose any sentence or grant any probation . . . which might originally have been imposed or granted.

§ 16-11-206(5). Additionally, after revoking a defendant’s

probation, a district court “may immediately resentence a defendant

without holding a new sentencing hearing.” McCarty v. People, 874

P.2d 394, 396 (Colo. 1994). That is, the decision of whether to hold

a resentencing hearing following a probation revocation is within

the court’s discretion. Id. at 400.

C. Analysis

¶ 23 Contrary to the position taken by the prosecutor at the

resentencing hearing, on appeal, the People agree with Haskin that

the seven-day timeframe in section 16-11-206(5) applies only to the

court’s determination of whether to revoke a defendant’s probation,

9 not to its determination of when resentencing must occur once the

defendant’s probation is revoked. And the People assert that the

court complied with the statute because it “set another hearing

within seven days to decide whether to revoke [Haskin’s] probation

once it determined [Haskin] violated his probation terms.” We agree

with the People.

¶ 24 The record reflects that at the violation hearing, the court

found that Haskin had violated the conditions of his probation but

didn’t revoke Haskin’s probation at that time. Instead, the court

expressly revoked Haskin’s probation at the resentencing hearing

four days later and imposed a prison sentence in the DOC.

Moreover, the court had discretion to proceed to immediate

sentencing during the same hearing at which it revoked Haskin’s

probation. See McCarty, 874 P.2d at 396. Regardless, therefore, of

the accuracy of the court’s statements about when resentencing

was required to occur under section 16-11-206(5), we discern no

error in its procedure.

10 IV. Presentence Investigation Report

¶ 25 Haskin contends that the district court erred by denying his

request that a PSIR be completed before resentencing. We conclude

that any error was harmless.

¶ 26 At the violation hearing, defense counsel requested that the

probation officer prepare a PSIR under section 16-11-102, C.R.S.

2025 (presentence investigation statute), to determine whether

Haskin was eligible for a community corrections program. The

court denied Haskin’s request, finding that the presentence

investigation statute wasn’t applicable to Haskin’s probation

revocation resentencing.

¶ 27 At the resentencing hearing, defense counsel requested that

the court consider sentencing Haskin to a two-year term in the

DOC. Counsel acknowledged that Haskin “struggles with

substance abuse addiction” but argued that the court should

consider a shorter term of incarceration because documentation of

Haskin’s medical history submitted at the violation hearing and

resentencing hearing indicated that Haskin suffers from strokes,

seizures, and executive functioning issues. Defense counsel further

11 provided the court with information about Haskin’s education level

and existing family and community support. The court then gave

Haskin an opportunity to speak, at which point Haskin admitted he

needed “help with [his] addiction.”

¶ 28 In its sentencing ruling, the court considered the nature and

circumstances of Haskin’s offenses, deterrence considerations,

protection of the public, and Haskin’s character and potential for

rehabilitation. Noting that Haskin had six felony convictions, one of

which was “a very dangerous crime for the community,” the court

resentenced Haskin to three years in the DOC.

¶ 29 Colorado’s presentence investigation statute provides, in

relevant part, that “following a finding of guilt on [a felony other

than a class 1 felony] where the issues were tried to the court . . . ,

the probation officer shall make an investigation and written report

to the court before the imposition of sentence.” § 16-11-102(1)(a)(I).

¶ 30 The presentence investigation statute further provides,

Each presentence report must include a substance abuse assessment or evaluation . . . and, unless waived by the court, must include . . . information as to the defendant’s family background, educational history,

12 employment record, and past criminal record . . . ; an evaluation of the alternative dispositions available for the defendant; . . . and such other information as the court may require.

Id. Crim P. 32(a)(1)(I)(a) similarly requires that a probation officer

create a PSIR before the imposition of a sentence “[i]n any case in

which the defendant is to be sentenced for a felony and the court

has discretion as to the punishment.”

¶ 31 Subject to exceptions not applicable here, the court “may

dispense with the presentence examination and report” upon the

agreement of the defendant and the prosecution. § 16-11-102(4);

Crim. P. 32(a)(1)(II). And the supreme court has concluded that the

plain language of section 16-11-102(1)(a) grants a district court

“discretion to waive certain requirements” of the PSIR if the

information that would normally appear in a PSIR is available from

another source. People v. Valencia, 906 P.2d 115, 118 (Colo. 1995).

¶ 32 We therefore review the district court’s decision to resentence

Haskin without a PSIR for an abuse of discretion. See id. A district

court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or if its decision is based on an erroneous

understanding or application of the law. People v. Kendrick, 2017

13 CO 82, ¶ 36. When an abuse of discretion occurs, we will only

reverse if the court’s error affected the defendant’s substantial

rights. See Crim. P. 52(a).

¶ 33 The parties disagree whether a PSIR is required when a person

is resentenced after a probation revocation. Neither party alerts us

to, nor have we found, any directly applicable case law. However,

we need not resolve this dispute because, as we next discuss, any

error by the court in not ordering a PSIR was harmless. See

Crim.P. 52(a).

¶ 34 At the resentencing hearing, defense counsel provided the

court with information about Haskin’s educational background,

family and community support, and medical needs. Haskin

provided additional information about his background and needs

when he spoke directly to the court, and the court reviewed

Haskin’s criminal history and the probation report.

¶ 35 Although Haskin argues he was harmed because the lack of a

PSIR “reduced his likelihood of being accepted to a community

corrections program,” Haskin didn’t request that the court consider

sentencing him to a community corrections program at the

14 resentencing hearing; instead, he asked the court to consider a

two-year DOC sentence, which was on the lower end of the

prosecution’s request for a two- to six-year DOC sentence.

Moreover, Haskin’s assertion that a PSIR would have supported his

chances of being accepted into community corrections is

conclusory. The court maintained its discretion to refer or directly

sentence Haskin to a community corrections program, regardless of

whether a PSIR was completed. See § 18-1.3-301(1)(a),(b), C.R.S.

2025 (a court’s authority to refer or sentence a defendant to

community corrections is not premised on its receipt of a PSIR); see

also § 16-11-102(1)(a)(II) (requiring PSIRs to contain a statement

that “[a] defendant’s eligibility for community corrections or parole

does not necessarily mean that community corrections or parole

will be granted”).

¶ 36 Here, the court was familiar with the case and explicitly

considered Haskin’s health issues, including his substance use

disorder and his failure to engage in substance treatment while on

probation, before determining a term in the DOC was the most

appropriate sentence. Haskin thus fails to specify the effect that

any additional information provided by a PSIR would have had on

15 the court’s sentencing decision beyond the conclusory allegation

that it denied Haskin “the opportunity to have the court’s decision

guided by” a PSIR. See People v. Martinez, 32 P.3d 520, 532 (Colo.

App. 2001) (concluding that error in sentencing a defendant without

a PSIR was harmless given, in part, the defendant’s failure to allege

on appeal how he was prejudiced by the absence of a PSIR),

abrogated on other grounds by, People v. Johnson, 121 P.3d 285

(Colo. App. 2005), rev’d, 142 P.3d 722 (Colo. 2006).

¶ 37 Accordingly, we conclude that any error in sentencing Haskin

without a PSIR was harmless.

V. Disposition

¶ 38 The order revoking Haskin’s probation and resentencing him

is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LUM concur.