22CA0801 Peo v Harrison 02-06-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA0801 Jefferson County District Court No. 20CR3510 Honorable Diego G. Hunt, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert Eugene Harrison,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Brown and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 6, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, River B. Sedaka, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Robert Eugene Harrison, appeals the district
court’s order requiring him to pay restitution. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 A jury convicted Harrison of various offenses arising out of a
carjacking in which, as now relevant, one of the victims sustained
serious injuries after being struck by a car.1 The prosecution
sought restitution for The Hartford, an insurance company, for the
losses it had paid on the victim’s behalf for her treatment at Saint
Anthony’s Hospital. The losses totaled $5,000. Harrison’s counsel
objected and the district court set the matter for a hearing.
¶3 At the hearing, the district court took judicial notice of the
jury’s verdicts, in particular the jury’s finding that Harrison caused
serious bodily injury to the victim on October 12, 2020. The court
also took judicial notice of the testimony at trial concerning the
“transport and treatment of the victim” — specifically, that on
October 12, 2020, immediately after the assault, the victim was
1 A division of this court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
People v. Harrison, (Colo. App. No. 22CA0202, Nov. 27, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). 1 transported to Saint Anthony’s Hospital and was treated there for
her injuries.
¶4 The prosecution presented evidence from an insurance
adjuster with The Hartford. The insurance adjuster testified that
The Hartford made a $5,000 payment to Saint Anthony’s Hospital
for treatment the victim received on October 12, 2020. The
prosecution also admitted a payment ledger showing that The
Hartford paid $5,000 to Saint Anthony’s Hospital, for “medical
payments” on behalf of the victim, which were for services
performed on October 12, 2020. Harrison didn’t present any
additional evidence.
¶5 Based on the evidence presented, the district court found that
Harrison’s conduct was the proximate cause of The Hartford’s
losses and ordered him to pay $5,000 in restitution.
II. Discussion
¶6 Harrison contends that the prosecution presented insufficient
evidence at the restitution hearing to support the district court’s
findings that (1) the insurance payout was for the victim in this
2 case and (2) he was the proximate cause of the $5,000 in losses
sustained by The Hartford. We disagree with both contentions.
A. Governing Law
¶7 A district court may award restitution for costs incurred by an
insurer that provides medical benefits to a victim for losses or
injuries that were proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.
See § 18-1.3-602(3)(d), C.R.S. 2024. The prosecution bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
victim’s losses were proximately caused by the defendant. People v.
Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 6. In the context of restitution, proximate
cause is a cause which in natural and probable sequence produced
the claimed loss and without which the claimed loss would not have
been sustained. People v. Dyson, 2021 COA 57, ¶ 13.
B. Standard of Review
¶8 The parties disagree, at least in part, on the appropriate
standard of review. While they agree that Harrison’s first
contention brings a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge that we
should review de novo, see Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 19,
they part ways concerning his second contention. Harrison asserts
that his second contention also presents a sufficiency challenge, 3 while the People, relying on Martinez, ¶ 3, assert that we should
review for clear error.
¶9 As we understand it, Harrison’s second contention is a
challenge to the district court’s proximate cause determination.
Such a determination will not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 32 (clear error is the appropriate standard of
review for evaluating a district court’s determination of proximate
cause for restitution). Applying this standard, we must affirm the
court’s findings unless they are without record support. Id. at
¶ 34.2
C. Analysis
¶ 10 Harrison first contends that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that the person named in the evidence presented at the
hearing was the actual victim in this case. He relies on People v.
Cooper, 104 P.3d 307 (Colo. App. 2004), noting the absence of
additional identifying evidence such as a “date of birth, home
address, or [social security number].”
2 In any event, Harrison’s claim fails under the sufficiency standard.
4 ¶ 11 Cooper is distinguishable. Cooper concerned a habitual
offender proceeding in which the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused is the person who was
previously convicted. See id. at 310. The division concluded,
applying that standard, that documents concerning prior
convictions showing the same name and date of birth as the
defendant were insufficient to satisfy the identity element,
particularly since the defendant’s name wasn’t unusual or
distinctive. Id. at 310-12.
¶ 12 In a restitution proceeding, however, a lesser burden —
preponderance of the evidence — applies. Stone, ¶ 6; see also
People in Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 24 (while more than
speculation is required, “the prosecution is not required to prove
restitution by the same quality of evidence required in a trial”). And
applying that standard, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient.
¶ 13 The district court considered the “undisputed” trial testimony
that the victim was transported to Saint Anthony’s Hospital and
treated there on October 12, 2020. The Hartford’s payment ledger
5 references a name matching the victim’s, the date the patient was
treated (which also matches the date of offense), and that the
treatment occurred at Saint Anthony’s Hospital. Attached to the
payment ledger is a cover letter referencing a name for the insured
that is the same as the victim’s and showing The Hartford as the
“Responsible Party.” And the insurance adjuster testified that The
Hartford insured the victim in October 2020, paid $5,000 for her
treatment in relation to this case, and that the payment ledger,
reflecting this same information, “can’t be modified.” This evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to
establish that the person named in the evidence provided at the
hearing was the victim in this case.
¶ 14 Second, Harrison contends that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that he was the proximate cause of the $5,000
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22CA0801 Peo v Harrison 02-06-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA0801 Jefferson County District Court No. 20CR3510 Honorable Diego G. Hunt, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert Eugene Harrison,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Brown and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 6, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, River B. Sedaka, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Robert Eugene Harrison, appeals the district
court’s order requiring him to pay restitution. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 A jury convicted Harrison of various offenses arising out of a
carjacking in which, as now relevant, one of the victims sustained
serious injuries after being struck by a car.1 The prosecution
sought restitution for The Hartford, an insurance company, for the
losses it had paid on the victim’s behalf for her treatment at Saint
Anthony’s Hospital. The losses totaled $5,000. Harrison’s counsel
objected and the district court set the matter for a hearing.
¶3 At the hearing, the district court took judicial notice of the
jury’s verdicts, in particular the jury’s finding that Harrison caused
serious bodily injury to the victim on October 12, 2020. The court
also took judicial notice of the testimony at trial concerning the
“transport and treatment of the victim” — specifically, that on
October 12, 2020, immediately after the assault, the victim was
1 A division of this court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
People v. Harrison, (Colo. App. No. 22CA0202, Nov. 27, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). 1 transported to Saint Anthony’s Hospital and was treated there for
her injuries.
¶4 The prosecution presented evidence from an insurance
adjuster with The Hartford. The insurance adjuster testified that
The Hartford made a $5,000 payment to Saint Anthony’s Hospital
for treatment the victim received on October 12, 2020. The
prosecution also admitted a payment ledger showing that The
Hartford paid $5,000 to Saint Anthony’s Hospital, for “medical
payments” on behalf of the victim, which were for services
performed on October 12, 2020. Harrison didn’t present any
additional evidence.
¶5 Based on the evidence presented, the district court found that
Harrison’s conduct was the proximate cause of The Hartford’s
losses and ordered him to pay $5,000 in restitution.
II. Discussion
¶6 Harrison contends that the prosecution presented insufficient
evidence at the restitution hearing to support the district court’s
findings that (1) the insurance payout was for the victim in this
2 case and (2) he was the proximate cause of the $5,000 in losses
sustained by The Hartford. We disagree with both contentions.
A. Governing Law
¶7 A district court may award restitution for costs incurred by an
insurer that provides medical benefits to a victim for losses or
injuries that were proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.
See § 18-1.3-602(3)(d), C.R.S. 2024. The prosecution bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
victim’s losses were proximately caused by the defendant. People v.
Stone, 2020 COA 24, ¶ 6. In the context of restitution, proximate
cause is a cause which in natural and probable sequence produced
the claimed loss and without which the claimed loss would not have
been sustained. People v. Dyson, 2021 COA 57, ¶ 13.
B. Standard of Review
¶8 The parties disagree, at least in part, on the appropriate
standard of review. While they agree that Harrison’s first
contention brings a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge that we
should review de novo, see Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 19,
they part ways concerning his second contention. Harrison asserts
that his second contention also presents a sufficiency challenge, 3 while the People, relying on Martinez, ¶ 3, assert that we should
review for clear error.
¶9 As we understand it, Harrison’s second contention is a
challenge to the district court’s proximate cause determination.
Such a determination will not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 32 (clear error is the appropriate standard of
review for evaluating a district court’s determination of proximate
cause for restitution). Applying this standard, we must affirm the
court’s findings unless they are without record support. Id. at
¶ 34.2
C. Analysis
¶ 10 Harrison first contends that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that the person named in the evidence presented at the
hearing was the actual victim in this case. He relies on People v.
Cooper, 104 P.3d 307 (Colo. App. 2004), noting the absence of
additional identifying evidence such as a “date of birth, home
address, or [social security number].”
2 In any event, Harrison’s claim fails under the sufficiency standard.
4 ¶ 11 Cooper is distinguishable. Cooper concerned a habitual
offender proceeding in which the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused is the person who was
previously convicted. See id. at 310. The division concluded,
applying that standard, that documents concerning prior
convictions showing the same name and date of birth as the
defendant were insufficient to satisfy the identity element,
particularly since the defendant’s name wasn’t unusual or
distinctive. Id. at 310-12.
¶ 12 In a restitution proceeding, however, a lesser burden —
preponderance of the evidence — applies. Stone, ¶ 6; see also
People in Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 24 (while more than
speculation is required, “the prosecution is not required to prove
restitution by the same quality of evidence required in a trial”). And
applying that standard, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient.
¶ 13 The district court considered the “undisputed” trial testimony
that the victim was transported to Saint Anthony’s Hospital and
treated there on October 12, 2020. The Hartford’s payment ledger
5 references a name matching the victim’s, the date the patient was
treated (which also matches the date of offense), and that the
treatment occurred at Saint Anthony’s Hospital. Attached to the
payment ledger is a cover letter referencing a name for the insured
that is the same as the victim’s and showing The Hartford as the
“Responsible Party.” And the insurance adjuster testified that The
Hartford insured the victim in October 2020, paid $5,000 for her
treatment in relation to this case, and that the payment ledger,
reflecting this same information, “can’t be modified.” This evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to
establish that the person named in the evidence provided at the
hearing was the victim in this case.
¶ 14 Second, Harrison contends that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that he was the proximate cause of the $5,000
in losses sustained by The Hartford. While Harrison concedes that
the victim was treated for her injuries on the date of the offense, he
argues that the district court’s causation finding was “speculative”
given the possibility that the victim could have “received other
services that were not medically necessary as a direct result of the
6 conduct for which [Harrison] was convicted.” In support, Harrison
points to the absence of an itemized bill or testimony from a witness
with personal knowledge as to the exact treatment the victim
received. But these arguments go to the weight of the evidence, not
its sufficiency. See A.V., ¶ 29 (“As the fact finder, the court had the
authority to determine the weight of the evidence [and] the
witnesses’ credibility . . . .”). And the district court considered and
rejected these arguments, finding that, in light of the hearing
testimony, “the only services that the payments could pertain to at
Saint Anthony’s would be those sustained as a result of [the
victim’s] injuries based on the conduct of the defendant here.” The
district court’s findings were well within its sole province to weigh
the evidence. Consequently, we conclude that the district court’s
finding that Harrison’s conduct proximately caused the losses
sustained by The Hartford wasn’t clearly erroneous.
III. Disposition
¶ 15 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE YUN concur.