24CA0617 Peo v Hall 06-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0617 El Paso County District Court No. 23CR1351 Honorable Samuel A. Evig, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Harris Hall,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Welling and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kimberly J. Davis, Deputy State Public Defender, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Harris Hall, appeals the district court’s order
imposing $1,287.66 in restitution. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Hall, his girlfriend, L.M., and their son were staying at a motel.
One morning, the couple got into an argument that led to a physical
altercation during which Hall choked L.M. and she twisted her
ankle. Hall was charged with second degree assault, harassment,
and child abuse.
¶3 Hall entered into a plea agreement for deferred judgment and
sentencing. As part of the agreement, he pleaded guilty to
harassment as an act of domestic violence. This guilty plea would
be vacated once he successfully completed probation. He also
agreed to pay L.M. restitution for all pecuniary losses arising from
the charges against him, including those that were dismissed under
the plea agreement, and stipulated “to causation for restitution
purposes.” The agreement outlined the restitution procedure:
The Court will order restitution, the People will submit the proposed amount within 42 days of sentencing, and the Defendant is provided 21 days to object to the final determination of the amount. The Parties stipulate to a sufficient showing of “good cause” under section 18-1.3- 603(l)(b)[, C.R.S. 2024,] and “extenuating
1 circumstances” under section 18-1.3-603(2) allowing the Court to reserve its right to order additional restitution beyond the 91 day period but not to exceed 180 days unless the Court makes additional findings prior to the expiration of 180 days. ¶4 A timeline of subsequent relevant events follows:
• On September 25, 2023, the trial court accepted the plea
agreement. There is no transcript of the providency
hearing in the appellate record.
• Thirty-nine days later, on November 3, 2023, the
prosecution filed the proposed restitution amount:
$1,287.66.
• Forty-one days after sentencing, on November 5, the
court entered the restitution order, which provided that
the restitution funds would be paid to the Colorado
Department of Health Care Policy and Financing. The
order included a “Notice to Defendant,” which stated as
follows:
If you object to the restitution amount you shall file a written objection before this Court within 14 days to set a hearing date. Failure to request a timely hearing will result in a final order for the full amount of restitution requested, and the order will not be subject to review.
2 • On December 4, 2023 — seventy days after sentencing
and twenty-nine days after the November 5 restitution
order — Harris filed an objection to the amount of
proposed restitution. The motion did not mention
Harris’s failure to comply with the deadlines set forth in
the plea agreement or in the district court’s subsequent
restitution order. Neither party contacted the court to
request a hearing after Harris filed his objection.
• Due to an administrative error, the court did not receive
Hall’s objection until February 2, 2024, well beyond the
expiration of the ninety-one-day statutory deadline to
determine restitution. Upon receipt, the court set the
matter for a hearing for February 20, 2024, 150 days
after sentencing.
¶5 At the hearing, Hall objected to the restitution order’s finality,
arguing that the order was invalid because the court had not
provided him with a hearing to object to the restitution amount
before the statutory deadline expired. Additionally, he asserted, the
court lacked the authority to shorten the ninety-one-day deadline.
The prosecution responded that, because Hall failed to file an
3 objection to the restitution order within fourteen days of its
issuance, the amount of restitution became final before the ninety-
one-day statutory deadline expired.
¶6 The court agreed with the prosecution, finding that its
November 5 restitution order became final when Hall failed to object
within the fourteen-day deadline that the order set. The court
noted that the deadline was “specifically designed to comply with
the” ninety-one-day statutory deadline and the supreme court’s
holding in People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75. Alternatively, the court
found it had authority to set a hearing outside the statutory
deadline because Hall’s untimely objection amounted to a waiver of
the deadline. Thus, it declined to disturb the award of restitution.
II. Analysis
¶7 Hall contends that the restitution order must be vacated
because (1) he objected to the restitution order before the expiration
of the statutory deadline and the court failed to set a hearing prior
to that deadline and (2) the court failed to find good cause to extend
the deadline beyond ninety-one days. We are not persuaded.
4 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶8 The restitution statute requires every order of conviction to
include one of four types of restitution orders. § 18-1.3-603(1). As
relevant here, section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires an order of
conviction to include “[a]n order that the defendant is obligated to
pay restitution, but that the specific amount of restitution shall be
determined within the ninety-one days immediately following the
order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the
time period by which the restitution amount shall be determined.”
In other words, the court must determine the amount of restitution
within ninety-one days of the judgment of conviction and may
extend this time period only if, before the deadline expires, it makes
an express finding of good cause to do so. Weeks, ¶¶ 4-5. Thus,
the statute places an obligation on the sentencing court to ensure
that restitution is resolved within ninety-one days from the entry of
the order of conviction. People v. Brassill, 2024 COA 19, ¶ 20.
¶9 Nevertheless, “district courts have the inherent authority to
manage their dockets through scheduling orders.” People v. Owens,
2014 CO 58M, ¶ 16; Brassill, ¶ 17; see also Redden v. SCI Colo.
Funeral Servs., Inc., 38 P.3d 75, 84 (Colo. 2001) (trial courts are
5 responsible for managing their dockets, moving cases toward
completion, and assuring that parties comply with deadlines);
People v. Kilgore, 2020 CO 6, ¶ 26 (trial courts have inherent
discretion to manage cases).
¶ 10 We review de novo whether a trial court complied with the
restitution statute. See Weeks, ¶ 24. However, when a court has
discretion to decide an issue, we review that decision under an
abuse of discretion standard. People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033
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24CA0617 Peo v Hall 06-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0617 El Paso County District Court No. 23CR1351 Honorable Samuel A. Evig, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Harris Hall,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Welling and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kimberly J. Davis, Deputy State Public Defender, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Harris Hall, appeals the district court’s order
imposing $1,287.66 in restitution. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Hall, his girlfriend, L.M., and their son were staying at a motel.
One morning, the couple got into an argument that led to a physical
altercation during which Hall choked L.M. and she twisted her
ankle. Hall was charged with second degree assault, harassment,
and child abuse.
¶3 Hall entered into a plea agreement for deferred judgment and
sentencing. As part of the agreement, he pleaded guilty to
harassment as an act of domestic violence. This guilty plea would
be vacated once he successfully completed probation. He also
agreed to pay L.M. restitution for all pecuniary losses arising from
the charges against him, including those that were dismissed under
the plea agreement, and stipulated “to causation for restitution
purposes.” The agreement outlined the restitution procedure:
The Court will order restitution, the People will submit the proposed amount within 42 days of sentencing, and the Defendant is provided 21 days to object to the final determination of the amount. The Parties stipulate to a sufficient showing of “good cause” under section 18-1.3- 603(l)(b)[, C.R.S. 2024,] and “extenuating
1 circumstances” under section 18-1.3-603(2) allowing the Court to reserve its right to order additional restitution beyond the 91 day period but not to exceed 180 days unless the Court makes additional findings prior to the expiration of 180 days. ¶4 A timeline of subsequent relevant events follows:
• On September 25, 2023, the trial court accepted the plea
agreement. There is no transcript of the providency
hearing in the appellate record.
• Thirty-nine days later, on November 3, 2023, the
prosecution filed the proposed restitution amount:
$1,287.66.
• Forty-one days after sentencing, on November 5, the
court entered the restitution order, which provided that
the restitution funds would be paid to the Colorado
Department of Health Care Policy and Financing. The
order included a “Notice to Defendant,” which stated as
follows:
If you object to the restitution amount you shall file a written objection before this Court within 14 days to set a hearing date. Failure to request a timely hearing will result in a final order for the full amount of restitution requested, and the order will not be subject to review.
2 • On December 4, 2023 — seventy days after sentencing
and twenty-nine days after the November 5 restitution
order — Harris filed an objection to the amount of
proposed restitution. The motion did not mention
Harris’s failure to comply with the deadlines set forth in
the plea agreement or in the district court’s subsequent
restitution order. Neither party contacted the court to
request a hearing after Harris filed his objection.
• Due to an administrative error, the court did not receive
Hall’s objection until February 2, 2024, well beyond the
expiration of the ninety-one-day statutory deadline to
determine restitution. Upon receipt, the court set the
matter for a hearing for February 20, 2024, 150 days
after sentencing.
¶5 At the hearing, Hall objected to the restitution order’s finality,
arguing that the order was invalid because the court had not
provided him with a hearing to object to the restitution amount
before the statutory deadline expired. Additionally, he asserted, the
court lacked the authority to shorten the ninety-one-day deadline.
The prosecution responded that, because Hall failed to file an
3 objection to the restitution order within fourteen days of its
issuance, the amount of restitution became final before the ninety-
one-day statutory deadline expired.
¶6 The court agreed with the prosecution, finding that its
November 5 restitution order became final when Hall failed to object
within the fourteen-day deadline that the order set. The court
noted that the deadline was “specifically designed to comply with
the” ninety-one-day statutory deadline and the supreme court’s
holding in People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75. Alternatively, the court
found it had authority to set a hearing outside the statutory
deadline because Hall’s untimely objection amounted to a waiver of
the deadline. Thus, it declined to disturb the award of restitution.
II. Analysis
¶7 Hall contends that the restitution order must be vacated
because (1) he objected to the restitution order before the expiration
of the statutory deadline and the court failed to set a hearing prior
to that deadline and (2) the court failed to find good cause to extend
the deadline beyond ninety-one days. We are not persuaded.
4 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶8 The restitution statute requires every order of conviction to
include one of four types of restitution orders. § 18-1.3-603(1). As
relevant here, section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires an order of
conviction to include “[a]n order that the defendant is obligated to
pay restitution, but that the specific amount of restitution shall be
determined within the ninety-one days immediately following the
order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the
time period by which the restitution amount shall be determined.”
In other words, the court must determine the amount of restitution
within ninety-one days of the judgment of conviction and may
extend this time period only if, before the deadline expires, it makes
an express finding of good cause to do so. Weeks, ¶¶ 4-5. Thus,
the statute places an obligation on the sentencing court to ensure
that restitution is resolved within ninety-one days from the entry of
the order of conviction. People v. Brassill, 2024 COA 19, ¶ 20.
¶9 Nevertheless, “district courts have the inherent authority to
manage their dockets through scheduling orders.” People v. Owens,
2014 CO 58M, ¶ 16; Brassill, ¶ 17; see also Redden v. SCI Colo.
Funeral Servs., Inc., 38 P.3d 75, 84 (Colo. 2001) (trial courts are
5 responsible for managing their dockets, moving cases toward
completion, and assuring that parties comply with deadlines);
People v. Kilgore, 2020 CO 6, ¶ 26 (trial courts have inherent
discretion to manage cases).
¶ 10 We review de novo whether a trial court complied with the
restitution statute. See Weeks, ¶ 24. However, when a court has
discretion to decide an issue, we review that decision under an
abuse of discretion standard. People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043
(Colo. 2002). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s
decision must be “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.”
Id. A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if its ruling is
based on an erroneous view of the law. People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d
932, 936 (Colo. 2004).
B. Discussion
¶ 11 At the heart of Hall’s appellate argument is his contention that
the district court did not enter a restitution order until the February
20 restitution hearing, but by then it was too late because the
statutory deadline had already expired without being extended for
good cause. This argument requires us to address a related
question: Does the court have the authority to impose restitution
6 before the expiration of the ninety-one-day statutory deadline? If
so, then its November 5 order — which stated in relevant part that
“[t]he Court orders, in accordance with the judgment entered
herein, that the Defendant make restitution, in the amount of
$1,287.66” — is dispositive because it was entered less than ninety-
one days after sentencing.
¶ 12 In Weeks, the supreme court stated that, “at a sentencing
hearing, the trial court judge should be prepared to put in place a
plan” that ensures the prosecution submits the restitution amount
and the court determines the restitution amount within the ninety-
one-day statutory period. Weeks, ¶ 8. The November 5 order,
which entered a restitution amount but gave Hall a fourteen-day
period to object, was exactly the type of order Weeks contemplated.
See also Brassill, ¶ 52 (noting that a trial court’s thirty-day deadline
set for the prosecution to turn in its restitution amount was also
the type of order Weeks contemplated). The deadline set in the
order, as the court explained in its oral findings at the restitution
hearing, gave the court sufficient time on a busy docket to schedule
a restitution hearing before the expiration of the statutory deadline,
7 while ensuring that the statutory deadline would still be met if Hall
did not file an objection.
¶ 13 Under these circumstances, we agree with the People’s
argument that the restitution order was entered before the
expiration of the ninety-one-day deadline, and that, as a result,
Hall’s objection is better characterized as a motion for
reconsideration. Because the court unquestionably had authority
to, and did, enter a restitution order before the statutory deadline
expired, we decline to disturb its ruling.1
III. Disposition
¶ 14 We affirm the district court’s order imposing $1,287.66 in
restitution.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.
1 In addition, Johnson v. People, 2025 CO 29, appears to foreclose
Hall’s appellate argument. In Johnson, which was issued after the close of briefing in this case, the supreme court held that the statutory restitution deadline “is not jurisdictional and can be waived.” Id. at ¶ 19. Here, as part of the plea agreement, the parties stipulated to good cause and extenuating circumstances that would “allow[] the Court to reserve its right to order additional restitution beyond the 91 day period but not to exceed 180 days.” Thus, even if the restitution order was not officially entered until the February 20 restitution hearing, the court still had authority to enter it because 180 days had not yet passed.