Peo v. Hall

Opinion

22CA1829 Peo v Hall 11-21-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1829 City and County of Dever District Court No. 21CR7224 Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Charles Hall,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Freyre and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 21, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, John Patrick Galligan, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Charles Hall, appeals the judgment of conviction

entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of third degree

assault. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Hall and the victim had an on-again-off-again relationship for

several years before they married in September 2021. They lived

together with the victim’s eleven-year-old developmentally delayed

daughter.

¶3 According to the victim, she and Hall had an altercation one

evening in December 2021. The victim’s daughter was in her room

while the victim and Hall watched television together in their

bedroom. While the victim was trying to find a picture of her sister

on her phone, Hall saw a photo of the victim’s “butt” and

“immediately went off,” accused her of being a “whore and a trick,”

and “sending [the photo] to other men.” Hall was yelling, holding

the victim’s phone, and then left their bedroom. When he returned,

he “strangled” the victim by “put[ting] his hands on [her] neck” and

“threw [her] down on the bed.” She felt a “sharp pain” and urinated

on herself.

1 ¶4 After “at least . . . a minute,” the victim was able to push Hall

away, and she went into the kitchen. Hall followed her and

“grabbed [her] by [her] arm and dr[agged] [her] through the kitchen,

back through the hallway and into the bedroom.” The victim’s

daughter saw them, said “Mommy,” and began crying; the victim

told her to go back to sleep. Back in the bedroom, Hall and the

victim went to sleep. Hall kept the victim’s phone and his “leg and

foot [was] on her the entire night.”

¶5 In the morning, the victim woke up with her alarm, grabbed

her phone, and went to work. When she returned to the apartment,

she noticed Hall was there and called the police.

¶6 The victim’s daughter corroborated her mother’s account of

what happened by testifying that when she woke up, she heard Hall

and her mother fighting and saw Hall dragging her mom “in the

ground.” The remainder of the victim’s daughter’s testimony was

limited due in large part to her inability to remember much of what

happened that evening.

¶7 Hall’s account of the incident was different. He testified at

trial that while watching a movie he saw a “nude picture . . . of [the

victim’s] breasts” on her phone. In response to seeing the photo he

2 gave her a “45-day ultimatum” because they had “just gotten

married,” and she “got irate.” He testified that he never raised his

voice. They finished the movie and started a second movie, and

during this time the victim’s daughter was going back and forth

between where they were in the living room and her bedroom.

Without finishing the second movie, everyone went into their

respective bedrooms to go to bed. In their bedroom, Hall and the

victim had sex, and the victim became upset when Hall told her this

would be their last time. She got up and went into the hallway,

where she was “loud, crying,” and the victim’s daughter woke-up.

Hall testified that he never raised his voice and told the victim’s

daughter that the victim had “a headache” and to go back to sleep,

which she did. Hall denied that he or the victim were ever in the

kitchen. He denied ever applying pressure to the victim’s neck,

dragging her, or taking her phone. And he denied doing anything

that would have caused the victim pain or injury or having any

physically violent confrontation in front of the victim’s daughter.

¶8 Hall was charged with second degree assault, third degree

assault, and child abuse. At trial, the prosecution presented

3 testimony from the victim, her daughter, an officer who spoke to the

victim when she called the police, and a strangulation expert.

¶9 Hall also testified. His theory of defense was that the victim

fabricated the assault because she was upset that he wanted to end

their relationship.

¶ 10 The jury convicted Hall of third degree assault but acquitted

him of the remaining charges. The district court sentenced Hall to

probation.

II. Discussion

¶ 11 Hall challenges the district court’s admission of out-of-court

statements the victim made to law enforcement, arguing that the

statements were inadmissible hearsay that improperly bolstered her

credibility. Because we conclude that the statements were

admissible under the common law as prior consistent statements

for rehabilitative purposes, we perceive no error.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 12 We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Elie, 148 P.3d 359, 362 (Colo. App. 2006). A

court abuses its discretion if its decision was manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or based on an erroneous understanding or

4 application of the law. People v. Pernell, 2014 COA 157, ¶ 30, aff’d

on other grounds, 2018 CO 13.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 13 Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the person

testifying, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. CRE

801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls under one of the

exceptions to the hearsay rule. CRE 802.

¶ 14 A statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies . . . and

is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the

statement is . . . consistent with his testimony and is offered to

rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication

or improper influence or motive.” CRE 801(d)(1)(B). When admitted

under this rule, prior statements are substantive evidence. People

v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 20 (Colo. 1999).

¶ 15 Prior consistent statements may also be admissible under the

common law — not for their truth, but to rehabilitate a witness

whose credibility has been attacked. Id. at 21 (“Rule 801(d)(1)(B)

was not intended to provide the exclusive avenue for the

introduction of prior consistent statements.”); see People v. Clark,

5 2015 COA 44, ¶ 124. Statements admitted for this purpose need

not comply with the requirements of CRE 801(d)(1)(B).

¶ 16 Under either theory, the admissibility of such statements is

contingent on a showing of their relevance and probative value.

CRE 401-403; Clark, ¶ 125.

C. Analysis

¶ 17 At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce statements the

victim made to a law enforcement officer about what had happened

as excited utterances or as prior consistent statements under CRE

801(d)(2)(B). The district court overruled defense counsel’s

objections in part. The court reasoned that while the statements

did not meet the requirements of an excited utterance, they were

admissible as prior consistent statements under CRE 801(d)(2)(B)

because they were statements made “prior to her interrogation at

trial and prior to her opportunity or motive to fabricate her

testimony.”

¶ 18 On appeal, Hill challenges the admissibility of the statements

under CRE 801(d)(2)(B). But even assuming without deciding that

the district court erred by admitting the statements under this rule,

the statements were admissible under the common law as prior

6 consistent statements for rehabilitation purposes. See People v.

Garcia, 2012 COA 79, ¶ 62 (noting that appellate courts may affirm

a district court’s evidentiary rulings on any ground supported by

the record, even if not articulated or even considered by the district

court); cf. Pernell, ¶¶ 35-37 (holding that, although the district court

erred by admitting the statements as excited utterances, reversal

was not required because they were admissible as prior consistent

statements to rehabilitate a witness’s credibility).

¶ 19 Hall’s theory of the case — which put the victim’s credibility at

the heart of the issues to be decided at trial — was that he never

choked, dragged, or hurt the victim, and that her claims to the

contrary were fabricated. To this end, defense counsel made efforts

throughout the trial to attack the victim’s credibility. For example,

during opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that the

evidence would show that the victim “was extremely upset that

[Hall] wanted to end the relationship” and accused him “of these

horrible things, putting hands on her, choking her and pulling her,”

but “[t]here will be zero evidence presented that supports any of

that.” Defense counsel asserted, “[Hall] is an innocent man who is

here today because someone who he had been in a relationship

7 with and had trusted became upset that he wanted to end that

relationship.”

¶ 20 While cross-examining the victim, defense counsel questioned

her extensively regarding the events at issue, asking her to

“describe exactly what you’re saying happened as far as the —

you’ve called it dragging,” and saying, “I’m just trying to understand

exactly how — how you’re saying this happened.” Defense counsel

also attempted to undermine the victim’s credibility on cross-

examination based on some of the statements she made during

direct examination:

You told us all [during direct examination] that [Hall] did work [that day], and we know that he did not work. So is it your testimony here today that on days like that, days when he didn’t work but you did, that he would never drive [the victim’s child] anywhere?

¶ 21 Defense counsel’s attempts to undermine the victim’s

credibility extended to the cross-examination of other witnesses as

well. For example, after the expert said that “[l]oss of bladder

control suggests that someone had the flow of oxygen to their brain

interrupted for about 15 seconds,” defense counsel responded,

“But, again, that depends on the starting — starting point

8 assumption that they were strangled, and that’s — that is what

caused the loss of bladder control.” And counsel said, “I’m asking,

is there anything that you can look at that would suggest it’s less

likely, even to the slightest degree, that that reported strangulation

did not occur.” Moreover, during counsel’s cross-examination of

the victim’s daughter, defense counsel insinuated that her

testimony was contrived, asking, “Have you talked to your mom

before about what you were going to talk about in court today?”

¶ 22 Given these thematic attacks on the victim’s credibility, the

statements the victim made to law enforcement were admissible as

prior consistent statements to rehabilitate her. See Eppens, 979

P.2d at 22-23; see also People v. Miranda, 2014 COA 102, ¶¶ 18-20

(concluding that victim’s consistent statements to a forensic

interviewer were admissible as prior consistent statements where

defense counsel “generally attacked her credibility and motivation”).

Allowing the challenged statements gave the jury an appropriately

complete picture of the victim’s credibility as a witness given the

breadth of Hall’s claims that she fabricated her allegations against

him. See Eppens, 979 P.2d at 22. For this reason, the statements

had probative value beyond the mere fact that the victim had said

9 the same thing on a prior occasion. See id. at 23. And the

prosecution did not rely on the statements the victim made to the

officer as substantive evidence. Rather, the prosecution relied on

the victim’s own trial testimony and argued her consistency across

her statements, both at trial and to the officer on scene, was

probative of her credibility.

¶ 23 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district

court would have acted well within its discretion had it admitted all

the challenged statements as prior consistent statements for

rehabilitative purposes. And we can affirm on this alternative

basis, which is supported by the record. See Pernell, ¶ 36 (noting

that reversal is not required where statements are admissible on an

alternative basis).

III. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE LUM concur.