Peo v. Garringer

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1982
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1982 Peo v Garringer 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1982 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CR5092 Honorable Alex C. Myers, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Joshua J. Garringer,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by JUDGE BERGER* Román, C.J., and Graham*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado for Plaintiff-Appellee

Muhaisen & Muhaisen, LLC, Wadi Muhaisen, Scott C. Hammersley, Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Defendant, Joshua J. Garringer, appeals the district court’s

order denying his sentence reduction motion. We affirm.

I. The Charges, Plea, and Sentencing

¶2 The People charged Garringer with ten counts of second

degree burglary, seven counts of first degree criminal trespass, and

three counts of theft. The charges stemmed from allegations that

Garringer broke into ten different residential garages over the

course of roughly a month and stole various items.

¶3 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Garringer pleaded guilty to two

counts of second degree burglary in exchange for the dismissal of

the remaining counts. The parties agreed to sentencing in the

aggravated range of eight to twenty-four years on each count

because Garringer was on parole at the time he committed the

charged offenses. They also stipulated to an overall sentencing cap

of thirty years.

¶4 At sentencing, the prosecutor asked the court to impose the

thirty years permitted by the plea agreement, referencing

Garringer’s “100% recidivism rate” and noting that Garringer was

on parole at the time of the instant offenses. The prosecutor further

noted that, although Garringer had “experienced a great deal of

1 trauma in his life,” he had an extensive criminal history including

numerous prior felonies and at least one violent crime. The

prosecutor acknowledged that, due to the “one continuous sentence

rule,” Garringer had only served six months of a previous six-year

sentence before being paroled.

¶5 Defense counsel asked for concurrent sentences of eight years

on each count. She argued that Garringer’s criminal history was

not violent and asserted that, although he broke into garages, he

did “not enter these people’s homes” and was stealing to fuel his

drug addiction, which he was working to overcome. Garringer

asked the court not to “view [him] as a lost cause” and expressed

remorse for his actions, for which he accepted responsibility. He

further detailed his efforts to maintain sobriety and “be a productive

person . . . in society,” including completing jail-based programs

aimed at addressing substance abuse and building healthy

relationships. And he asked the court not to take away “the next 20

years of [his] life” and allow him to use his time in prison to become

a better person and be a part of his young son’s life. Several friends

and family members also spoke on Garringer’s behalf, including his

sister.

2 ¶6 The court indicated that it had reviewed the presentence

investigation report along with mitigation information including

letters of support from Garringer’s friends and family and a report

from a social worker who detailed Garringer’s social history. The

court acknowledged that there were a number of people who

described Garringer as a “good provider, a family man, [and a] good

father.” It was apparent, the court said, that Garringer cared about

his child. But, the court noted, it was not “here to judge [Garringer]

as good person or a bad person”; rather, the court’s role was to

“find a sentence that fits [the] circumstances” and complies with the

various “considerations I have to think about when I sentence

someone.”

¶7 Recognizing punishment as one of those considerations, the

court said that it didn’t think “throwing the book at” Garringer was

appropriate. But the court also acknowledged Garringer’s lengthy

criminal history and the violative and calculated nature of the

instant crimes — that they were not simply crimes of opportunity,

but rather targeted crimes committed in concert with others and

involving the destruction of property to avoid detection. With all of

this in mind, the court imposed eighteen-year sentences on each

3 count, concurrent with each other but consecutive to Garringer’s

parole matters. The court noted that it elected to impose the

sentences consecutive to the parole matters in recognition of the

harm caused to the victims in this case, “rather than lumping

[th]em in” with Garringer’s other cases.

II. The Crim. P. 35(b) Motion and Ruling

¶8 Garringer filed a timely Crim. P. 35(b) motion seeking a

three-year reduction on his sentences and asking that his parole

sentences run concurrently with the sentences in this case. He

noted his community support, that he is intent on taking advantage

of prison programming for personal growth, and that —

notwithstanding his ineligibility for certain programs and classes

due to his sentence length — he is making progress in available

programs and is focused on his own rehabilitation. He noted that,

if his sentence was reduced, he would be eligible to enroll in

additional programs. In support of his motion, he attached both

the sentencing hearing transcript and a letter from his sister.

¶9 The district court denied the motion in a written order, finding

that its original sentencing decision was “appropriate for all the

reasons stated at sentencing.” The court found that “the mitigating

4 circumstances” and the “continued community support” presented

by the motion did not warrant modification of the sentence “in light

of the seriousness of the offenses, Mr. Garringer’s recidivism and

prior felony record, and that these offenses occurred while Mr.

Garringer was on parole.” The court also noted that, given that

Garringer was serving multiple sentences from multiple

jurisdictions, the “[Department of Corrections (DOC)] indicates that

he will be parole eligible . . . just 8 years into the 18-year sentences”

in this case.

III. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion

¶ 10 Garringer contends that the district court abused its

discretion in denying his Crim. P. 35(b) motion. The thrust of his

argument is that, instead of focusing “only on the factors and

arguments” he made in his motion, the court instead unreasonably

placed undue emphasis on his parole eligibility date. We perceive

no abuse of discretion.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 11 Crim. P. 35(b) permits a district court to review a sentence to

ensure that it is fair in light of the purposes of Colorado’s

sentencing laws. People v. Dunlap, 36 P.3d 778, 780 (Colo. 2001);

5 see also People v. Arnold, 907 P.2d 686, 687 (Colo. App. 1995)

(Crim. P. 35(b) is intended “to give the court the opportunity to

reconsider the sentence in light of further information about the

defendant or the case which is presented after the initial

sentencing.”). In doing so, the court may consider all relevant and

material factors, including new evidence and evidence it knew when

it imposed the original sentence. Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 780. A court

need not make detailed findings of fact when ruling on a Crim. P.

35(b) motion but must state the basic reasons in support of its

ruling. Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 782.

¶ 12 Whether to reduce a sentence under Crim. P. 35(b) is within

the court’s sound discretion. Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 780. A court

abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or if its ruling is based on an erroneous

view of the law. Hoang v. People, 2014 CO 27, ¶ 12.

B. Analysis

¶ 13 The district court’s order indicates that it reviewed both the

information in Garringer’s Crim. P. 35(b) motion along with the

attachments, court file, and the relevant and material facts of the

case. Noting Garringer’s evidence in mitigation and “continued

6 community support,” the court implicitly found that the requested

sentence reduction was based largely on the same factors the court

had considered when it originally sentenced him. Indeed, the letter

attached in support of Garringer’s community support argument

came from his sister, who also spoke in support of Garringer at the

sentencing hearing. And, notwithstanding Garringer’s continued

participation in programming aimed at self-improvement once

sentenced to prison, he testified at sentencing that it was his goal to

do so, evidenced by such participation in jail programs. See People

v. Busch, 835 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. App. 1992) (no abuse of

discretion where the evidence in support of defendant’s Crim. P.

35(b) motion was nearly identical to that presented at the

sentencing hearing, and the trial court considered relevant evidence

in denying defendant’s motion); People v. Barnett, 2020 COA 167, ¶

33 (no abuse of discretion in denial of defendant’s Crim. P. 35(b)

motion where district court noted that it had reviewed the motion

and stated that it was “well familiar with this case and finds that

the original sentence imposed is appropriate to the circumstances

of this case”).

7 ¶ 14 Nor are we persuaded by Garringer’s assertion that the court

unreasonably placed undue emphasis on his parole eligibility date.

As the People point out, the court’s comment about parole eligibility

came after it had explained the basic reasons for its denial of

Garringer’s sentence reduction request. In any event, the court’s

observation did not unduly emphasize Garringer’s parole eligibility

but rather was, at most, one among several factors in the court’s

analysis. Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 780.

¶ 15 Garringer also appears to assert that consideration of parole

eligibility was wholly improper because (1) parole is determined by

the DOC and not the court, and there is no guarantee that he will

be granted parole; and (2) the court should have focused “only on

the factors and arguments” raised in Garringer’s Crim. P. 35(b)

motion. However, contrary to Garringer’s suggestion, the court did

not imply that he would be granted parole; it only observed the

DOC’s determination of when he might first be eligible for parole.

And caselaw directly contradicts Garringer’s suggestion that the

court was required to focus “only” on the factors he raised in his

motion: in resolving a Crim. P. 35(b) motion, a court may consider

all relevant and material factors. Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 780.

8 ¶ 16 Likewise, we are not persuaded by Garringer’s fleeting

assertion that the district court failed to address his Crim. P. 35(b)

request that the court run his sentences concurrent to his parole

matters. Although the court did not expressly reference Garringer’s

request for concurrent sentencing in its order, this does not mean

the court failed to consider it. See Barnett, ¶ 35 (a court is not

required to make overt findings about every argument raised in a

Crim. P. 35(b) motion). Instead, the court stated its basic reasons

for denying Crim. P. 35(b) relief, which is all that is required.

Barnett, ¶¶ 33, 36 (By stating that it was “well familiar with this

case” and “find[ing] that the original sentence imposed [wa]s

appropriate to the circumstances of this case,” the court provided

its “basic reasons in support of its [Crim. P. 35(b)] ruling,” which

were not “overridden” by the defendant’s claims about the

COVID-19 pandemic.)

IV. Disposition

¶ 17 The order is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.