Peo v. Eaves

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 9, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1281
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1281 Peo v Eaves 10-09-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1281 El Paso County District Court No. 15CR1188 Honorable Samuel A. Evig, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Rodney Eaves,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 9, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rodney Eaves, Pro Se ¶1 Rodney Eaves appeals the postconviction court’s order denying

his 2023 Crim. P. 35(c) motion. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Following a trial at which Eaves elected to represent himself, a

jury convicted him of aggravated robbery, theft, felony menacing,

and possession of a weapon by a previous offender (POWPO). The

trial court imposed a controlling sentence of thirty years in the

custody of the Department of Corrections, and a division of this

court affirmed the judgment of conviction. People v. Eaves, (Colo.

App. No. 16CA1557, Aug. 2, 2018) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)) (Eaves I).

¶3 In 2020, Eaves filed a postconviction motion (the 2020 motion)

in which he asserted two claims. He said in the 2020 motion that

he was seeking relief under Crim. P. 35(a).

¶4 A division of this court affirmed the postconviction court’s

order denying the 2020 motion, concluding that, notwithstanding

Eaves’s reference to Crim. P. 35(a), the relief Eaves sought fell

“squarely under Crim. P. 35(c).” People v. Eaves, slip op. at ¶¶ 5-6,

11 (Colo. App. No. 21CA0563, June 2, 2022) (not published

pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Eaves II). Thus, the division concluded

1 that the single claim Eaves reasserted on appeal (concerning the

constitutionality of his POWPO conviction and sentence) was

successive because he could have raised it in his direct appeal. Id.

at ¶ 13.

¶5 Eaves then filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion in which he

challenged the trial court’s restitution order. The postconviction

court denied that motion, and a division of this court affirmed.

People v. Eaves, (Colo. App. No. 22CA1361, Nov. 9, 2023) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Eaves III).

¶6 In March 2023, Eaves filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion (the 2023

motion) in which he asserted numerous claims for relief. He argued

myriad ways that he allegedly received ineffective assistance of

counsel before he decided to represent himself at trial (claim 1).

¶7 In addition, he asserted claims of trial error in the 2023

motion. In particular, he contended that the prosecution presented

insufficient evidence and committed misconduct (claims 13-15 and

claim 22) and that the affidavit supporting the arrest warrant was

faulty because police officers illegally obtained evidence from his

Facebook account (claim 17). Further, he argued that the trial

court erred by:

2 • failing to advise him at sentencing of his right to counsel

on direct appeal (claim 2);

• failing to conduct a proportionality review of his sentence

and imposing a sentence based on “vengeance” rather

than on “justice” (claim 4);

• denying his motions to hire expert witnesses (claim 5);

• failing to address his bond reduction motion (claim 6);

• disregarding his request for a competency evaluation

(claim 7);

• failing to suppress recordings of inculpatory phone calls

he made from jail (claim 8);

• forcing him to choose between proceeding to trial without

advisory counsel or waiving his speedy trial right

(claim 9);

• denying his motion for a new trial (claim 10);

• denying his motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and proceeding to trial without a probable

cause affidavit or a preliminary hearing (claim 11);

3 • denying or failing to address several pretrial motions

(claim 12);

• failing to hold a “Franks hearing” to address allegedly

false statements in the search warrant and probable

cause affidavits (claim 16);

• denying his motion for a mistrial (claim 18);

• rejecting his theory of the case instruction (claim 19);

• failing to give a “missing witness instruction” (claim 20);

• violating his right to a public trial by improperly closing

the courtroom during jury selection (claim 21); and

• entering judgment of conviction for POWPO in violation of

his constitutional rights (claim 23).

¶8 Lastly, Eaves asserted that the Eaves I division made two

errors in his direct appeal (claims 2 and 3).

¶9 The postconviction court took no action on the 2023 motion

because Eaves’s appeal in Eaves III was still pending. Nearly a year

after Eaves filed the 2023 motion, but before the postconviction

court ruled on it, Eaves filed what he characterized as an

amendment to the 2023 motion. He conceded that the amendment

was time barred but presented several reasons why the time bar

4 should not apply. The amendment did not address any other

procedural bar but added another substantive claim — that Eaves

was denied certain constitutional rights at his restitution hearing

(claim 24).

¶ 10 After the Eaves III mandate issued, the postconviction court

denied the 2023 motion, concluding that it was successive and time

barred.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 11 We review de novo a postconviction court’s decision to deny a

Crim. P. 35(c) motion without an evidentiary hearing. People v.

Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14, 459 P.3d 516, 519. We also review de novo

whether a Crim. P. 35(c) motion is time barred or successive.

People v. Bonan, 2014 COA 156, ¶ 16, 357 P.3d 231, 234; People v.

Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 42, 485 P.3d 566, 573.

III. Claims Not Cognizable Under Crim. P. 35(c)

¶ 12 In claims 2 and 3 of the 2023 motion, Eaves asserted that the

Eaves I division erred in two ways. He argued that the division (1)

failed to advise him that he had a right to request appellate counsel

and (2) improperly denied his request to file an oversized brief.

These are not proper grounds for a collateral attack under

5 Crim. P. 35(c). See Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I)-(VII). Rather, allegations that

a division of this court erred must be raised in a petition for

rehearing or a petition for certiorari. See C.A.R. 40; C.A.R. 52.

IV. Eaves’s Remaining Claims Are Successive

¶ 13 As an initial matter, we agree with Eaves that the 2023 motion

was, “[o]n its face,” time barred. We need not reach whether an

exception to timeliness applies, however, because we also conclude

that the 2023 motion was successive.

¶ 14 Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings “provide defendants with an

opportunity to argue that constitutional errors associated with their

trials, guilty pleas, or sentences should result in convictions or

sentences being set aside” and “to bring finality to judgments.”

People v. Valdez, 178 P.3d 1269, 1279 (Colo. App. 2007). To that

end, a postconviction court is required to deny as successive any

Crim. P. 35(c) claim that was raised and resolved, or could have

been presented, in a prior appeal or postconviction proceeding.

Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)-(VII). The language of these rules is mandatory;

thus, a postconviction court “shall” deny any such claims. Id.; see

Willhite v. Rodriguez-Cera, 2012 CO 29, ¶ 17, 274 P.3d 1233, 1238

(“The word ‘shall’ connotes a mandatory requirement.”). For this

6 reason, Crim. P. 35(c) claims cannot be raised more than once, and

they are also successive if not raised at the first opportunity.

¶ 15 Eaves could have raised all his claims of trial error (part of

claim 2 and all of claims 4-23) in his direct appeal. Thus, the

postconviction court appropriately denied those claims as

successive.

¶ 16 Only two of the claims in the 2023 motion — claims 1

and 24 — were not successive to Eaves’s direct appeal. This is so

because in claim 1 Eaves asserted ineffective assistance of counsel,

which is not properly raised on direct appeal. People v. Vondra, 240

P.3d 493, 495 (Colo. App. 2010); Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VIII). And in

claim 24, Eaves asserted a constitutional challenge to restitution,

which the trial court had not yet imposed at the time of Eaves’s

direct appeal. However, these claims are successive to the 2020

motion, the substance of which “[fell] squarely under Crim. P.

35(c).” Eaves II, slip op. at ¶ 11.

¶ 17 Eaves argues for the first time on appeal that none of his

claims are successive to the 2020 motion because he claimed in

that motion he was seeking relief under Crim. P. 35(a) and the

postconviction court failed to return it to him for compliance with

7 Form 4 (which is used for Crim. P. 35(c) motions). Eaves cites

Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(a) and (e) in support of his argument that the

“conversion” of the 2020 motion into a Crim. P. 35(c) motion

occurred after he filed the motion and “made raising any of the

claims in the current 35(c) motion impracticable.”

¶ 18 We note that Eaves did not argue in the 2023 motion or in the

amendment to such motion that any of his claims fell within the

exceptions enumerated in Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(a) and (e). We need

not consider this argument because Eaves raises it for the first time

on appeal. See DePineda v. Price, 915 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Colo. 1996)

(“Issues not raised before the district court in a motion for

postconviction relief will not be considered on appeal of the denial of

that motion.”); People v. Goldman, 923 P.2d 374, 375 (Colo. App.

1996) (“Allegations not raised in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion . . . and

thus not ruled on by the trial court are not properly before this

court for review.”); see also People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 251

(Colo. 1996) (rejecting attempts to use appellate briefing to “fortify”

issues “inadequately raised or supported by [a postconviction]

motion”).

8 ¶ 19 In any event, we agree with the People that the nature of

Eaves’s claims, and not the Eaves II opinion, made the 2020 motion

a Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670

(Colo. App. 2006) (“The substance of a postconviction motion

controls whether it is designated as a Crim. P. 35(a) or 35(c)

motion.”). Eaves’s assertion of these claims was neither an event

that occurred after Eaves initiated the 2020 postconviction

proceeding, Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(a), nor an objective factor, external

to the defense and not attributable to the defendant,

Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)(e). Likewise, we agree with the People that,

from a policy perspective, the mandatory successiveness bars would

be rendered meaningless if a defendant could avoid them merely by

claiming that a postconviction motion sought relief under a rule

other than a Crim. P. 35(c). See Home Improvement, Inc. v. Villar,

2022 COA 129, ¶ 12, 524 P.3d 329, 332 (concluding that, in

construing procedural rules, we avoid interpreting them in a way

that will “render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to

illogical or absurd results”) (citation omitted).

9 ¶ 20 Accordingly, we agree with the postconviction court’s

determination that the claims Eaves asserted in the 2023 motion

were successive and were therefore procedurally barred.

V. Disposition

¶ 21 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.