23CA1696 Peo v Delafuente 09-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1696 Weld County District Court No. 18CR402 Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Catalina Delafuente,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Freyre and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, John P. Finnegan, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Catalina Delafuente, appeals the district court’s
order revoking and reinstating her probation. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2018, Delafuente pleaded guilty to driving under the
influence (fourth or subsequent), a class 4 felony. She was
sentenced to nine months in jail, plus an additional one year in jail
suspended on the successful completion of a three-year probation
term.
¶3 Delafuente had completed her nine-month jail sentence but
was still serving her probation when, in February 2020, her
probation officer filed a probation revocation complaint. The
probation officer alleged that Delafuente had failed to comply with
the following four conditions of her probation:
• Condition No. 6: “I will not use alcohol (to excess) or use
or possess any illegal, dangerous, or abusable drugs or
controlled substances without a prescription . . . .”
• Condition No. 7: “I will submit to drug and alcohol testing
as directed by Probation. . . .”
• Condition No. 8: “I will actively participate in, cooperate
with, and successfully complete any referral, evaluation,
1 assessment or recommended program. These programs
may include, but are not limited to: . . . counseling or
treatment for drugs or alcohol . . . .”
• Condition No. 9: “I will report to my probation officer for
appointments, as directed by the Court or the Probation
office. . . .”
¶4 Following a hearing, the district court found that Delafuente
had violated these four conditions of her probation. The court
therefore revoked and reinstated her probation for a two-year term.
The court also ordered ninety days of electronic home monitoring,
allowing Delafuente to leave her home during that time only for her
own treatment or her mother’s medical needs. The court made
clear that its decision to revoke Delafuente’s probation was based
largely on her violation of Condition No. 8, stating that, if only the
violations of Condition Nos. 6, 7, and 9 were at issue, it would have
been unlikely to revoke Delafuente’s probation.
¶5 On appeal, Delafuente contends that her due process rights
were violated because the prosecution didn’t establish that any
failure to comply with Condition No. 8 resulted from her own
willfulness or lack of adequate bona fide efforts to obtain the
2 resources needed to comply with that condition, as opposed to
merely resulting from her indigency. And, more broadly, she
contends that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence
to establish that she violated Condition No. 8 by not “actively
participat[ing] in, cooperat[ing] with, and successfully complet[ing]”
treatment. We reject both contentions.
II. Discussion
¶6 We first set out the relevant legal standards and then turn to
Delafuente’s arguments.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 “Probation is a privilege, not a right.” People v. Howell, 64
P.3d 894, 896 (Colo. App. 2002). Probation may be revoked if a
probationer violates any condition of probation. Id. Where, as here,
probation violations don’t involve the commission of criminal
offenses, the prosecution must establish the violations by a
preponderance of the evidence. See § 16-11-206(3), C.R.S. 2025;
Sharrow v. People, 2019 CO 25, ¶¶ 47-48.
¶8 Whether a probation condition has been violated is a question
of fact for the district court. People v. Fair, 2013 COA 41, ¶ 12.
3 Once the court finds a violation, it has discretion to decide whether
to revoke the probationer’s probation. Id.
¶9 Delafuente challenges only the district court’s finding that she
violated the conditions of her probation — not the court’s decision,
after finding the violations, to revoke her probation.
¶ 10 We apply de novo review in assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the district court’s finding of a violation of the
conditions of probation. See McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 34.
We consider whether the evidence is sufficient in quality and
quantity to satisfy the prosecution’s burden of establishing a
probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. See People
v. Moses, 64 P.3d 904, 908 (Colo. App. 2002); People in Interest of
C.J.W., 727 P.2d 870, 872 (Colo. App. 1986); see also People v.
Ortiz, 2016 COA 58, ¶ 26 (applying this standard to a sufficiency
challenge to a restitution award). In doing so, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See People v. Donald,
2020 CO 24, ¶ 18. If the evidence sufficiently supports a finding of
a violation, “we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court.” Moses, 64 P.3d at 908; accord People v. Trujillo, 539 P.2d
1234, 1236 (Colo. 1975) (declining to disturb a finding of a
4 probation violation because the district court that had “heard the
testimony of all the witnesses [wa]s in a far better position to weigh
the evidence than this court on review”). Nor will we disturb a
finding of a violation “merely because there is a conflict in the
evidence.” Howell, 64 P.3d at 897.
¶ 11 Delafuente’s related due process argument presents a question
of law, which we review de novo. See People v. Calderon, 2014 COA
144, ¶ 23.
B. Due Process
¶ 12 First, we reject Delafuente’s argument that the revocation of
her probation violated her due process rights.
¶ 13 Delafuente contends that, because she presented evidence
that she was unable to comply with the conditions of her probation
due to financial difficulties, the prosecution was required to show
that she willfully failed to comply with her probation conditions or
that she failed to make adequate bona fide efforts to obtain the
resources she needed to be able to comply with those conditions.
Her argument is premised on the rule articulated by our supreme
court in Sharrow, ¶ 42:
5 [W]hen a probationer defends against an alleged violation of a nonpayment condition of probation based on [their] lack of financial means, the trial court cannot revoke probation and impose imprisonment without first determining whether [they] failed to comply with probation willfully or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire resources to comply with probation. If the trial court finds that the defendant willfully refused to comply with probation or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire resources to do so, it may revoke probation and impose imprisonment.
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23CA1696 Peo v Delafuente 09-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1696 Weld County District Court No. 18CR402 Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Catalina Delafuente,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Freyre and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, John P. Finnegan, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Catalina Delafuente, appeals the district court’s
order revoking and reinstating her probation. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2018, Delafuente pleaded guilty to driving under the
influence (fourth or subsequent), a class 4 felony. She was
sentenced to nine months in jail, plus an additional one year in jail
suspended on the successful completion of a three-year probation
term.
¶3 Delafuente had completed her nine-month jail sentence but
was still serving her probation when, in February 2020, her
probation officer filed a probation revocation complaint. The
probation officer alleged that Delafuente had failed to comply with
the following four conditions of her probation:
• Condition No. 6: “I will not use alcohol (to excess) or use
or possess any illegal, dangerous, or abusable drugs or
controlled substances without a prescription . . . .”
• Condition No. 7: “I will submit to drug and alcohol testing
as directed by Probation. . . .”
• Condition No. 8: “I will actively participate in, cooperate
with, and successfully complete any referral, evaluation,
1 assessment or recommended program. These programs
may include, but are not limited to: . . . counseling or
treatment for drugs or alcohol . . . .”
• Condition No. 9: “I will report to my probation officer for
appointments, as directed by the Court or the Probation
office. . . .”
¶4 Following a hearing, the district court found that Delafuente
had violated these four conditions of her probation. The court
therefore revoked and reinstated her probation for a two-year term.
The court also ordered ninety days of electronic home monitoring,
allowing Delafuente to leave her home during that time only for her
own treatment or her mother’s medical needs. The court made
clear that its decision to revoke Delafuente’s probation was based
largely on her violation of Condition No. 8, stating that, if only the
violations of Condition Nos. 6, 7, and 9 were at issue, it would have
been unlikely to revoke Delafuente’s probation.
¶5 On appeal, Delafuente contends that her due process rights
were violated because the prosecution didn’t establish that any
failure to comply with Condition No. 8 resulted from her own
willfulness or lack of adequate bona fide efforts to obtain the
2 resources needed to comply with that condition, as opposed to
merely resulting from her indigency. And, more broadly, she
contends that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence
to establish that she violated Condition No. 8 by not “actively
participat[ing] in, cooperat[ing] with, and successfully complet[ing]”
treatment. We reject both contentions.
II. Discussion
¶6 We first set out the relevant legal standards and then turn to
Delafuente’s arguments.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 “Probation is a privilege, not a right.” People v. Howell, 64
P.3d 894, 896 (Colo. App. 2002). Probation may be revoked if a
probationer violates any condition of probation. Id. Where, as here,
probation violations don’t involve the commission of criminal
offenses, the prosecution must establish the violations by a
preponderance of the evidence. See § 16-11-206(3), C.R.S. 2025;
Sharrow v. People, 2019 CO 25, ¶¶ 47-48.
¶8 Whether a probation condition has been violated is a question
of fact for the district court. People v. Fair, 2013 COA 41, ¶ 12.
3 Once the court finds a violation, it has discretion to decide whether
to revoke the probationer’s probation. Id.
¶9 Delafuente challenges only the district court’s finding that she
violated the conditions of her probation — not the court’s decision,
after finding the violations, to revoke her probation.
¶ 10 We apply de novo review in assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the district court’s finding of a violation of the
conditions of probation. See McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 34.
We consider whether the evidence is sufficient in quality and
quantity to satisfy the prosecution’s burden of establishing a
probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. See People
v. Moses, 64 P.3d 904, 908 (Colo. App. 2002); People in Interest of
C.J.W., 727 P.2d 870, 872 (Colo. App. 1986); see also People v.
Ortiz, 2016 COA 58, ¶ 26 (applying this standard to a sufficiency
challenge to a restitution award). In doing so, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See People v. Donald,
2020 CO 24, ¶ 18. If the evidence sufficiently supports a finding of
a violation, “we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court.” Moses, 64 P.3d at 908; accord People v. Trujillo, 539 P.2d
1234, 1236 (Colo. 1975) (declining to disturb a finding of a
4 probation violation because the district court that had “heard the
testimony of all the witnesses [wa]s in a far better position to weigh
the evidence than this court on review”). Nor will we disturb a
finding of a violation “merely because there is a conflict in the
evidence.” Howell, 64 P.3d at 897.
¶ 11 Delafuente’s related due process argument presents a question
of law, which we review de novo. See People v. Calderon, 2014 COA
144, ¶ 23.
B. Due Process
¶ 12 First, we reject Delafuente’s argument that the revocation of
her probation violated her due process rights.
¶ 13 Delafuente contends that, because she presented evidence
that she was unable to comply with the conditions of her probation
due to financial difficulties, the prosecution was required to show
that she willfully failed to comply with her probation conditions or
that she failed to make adequate bona fide efforts to obtain the
resources she needed to be able to comply with those conditions.
Her argument is premised on the rule articulated by our supreme
court in Sharrow, ¶ 42:
5 [W]hen a probationer defends against an alleged violation of a nonpayment condition of probation based on [their] lack of financial means, the trial court cannot revoke probation and impose imprisonment without first determining whether [they] failed to comply with probation willfully or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire resources to comply with probation. If the trial court finds that the defendant willfully refused to comply with probation or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire resources to do so, it may revoke probation and impose imprisonment. On the other hand, if the trial court finds that the defendant could not comply with probation despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire resources to do so, it must consider alternatives to imprisonment. Only if alternate measures are not adequate to fulfill the State’s sentencing interests, including in punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, and community safety, may the court imprison an indigent defendant who, notwithstanding sufficient bona fide efforts to comply with probation, nevertheless failed to do so.
(Emphases added) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). Sharrow,
in turn, relied on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Bearden v. Georgia, which established a similar rule for the
revocation of probation and imposition of a prison sentence for
failure to pay a fine or restitution. 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
6 ¶ 14 But the requirements set forth in Bearden and Sharrow apply
only when a court imposes imprisonment upon revoking probation.
See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672; Sharrow, ¶¶ 6, 42; see also State v.
Bell, 331 P.3d 1062, 1063 (Ore. Ct. App. 2014) (“Bearden
unequivocally does not apply to situations in which a probationer’s
failure to pay fines or restitution results in some sanction less
onerous than imprisonment.”); State v. Pickett, 2015-Ohio-972, ¶ 19
(distinguishing Bearden on the basis that the probationer at issue
wasn’t imprisoned for failing to make required payments).
¶ 15 Here, the district court didn’t impose imprisonment upon
revoking Delafuente’s probation. Rather, it imposed home
detention with ankle monitoring. See People v. Chavez, 122 P.3d
1036, 1038 (Colo. App. 2005) (distinguishing home detention with
electronic monitoring from confinement in a correctional facility,
particularly with regard to the differing restrictions on liberty and
privacy, in the context of presentence confinement credit). Thus,
the prosecution wasn’t required to show that Delafuente willfully
failed to comply with her probation conditions or failed to make
adequate bona fide efforts to obtain the resources she needed to be
able to comply with those conditions.
7 C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 16 Having determined that the heightened requirements of
Bearden and Sharrow don’t apply, we also reject Delafuente’s
argument that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to
establish a violation of her probation conditions.
¶ 17 Because the district court based its revocation on its finding
that Delafuente had violated Condition No. 8, our review is limited
to the sufficiency of evidence as to that particular violation. See
People v. Lientz, 2012 COA 118, ¶ 9 (“[W]e cannot affirm the
revocation based on the fact that the record shows that [the]
defendant violated other probation conditions . . . . Rather, we can
only affirm on that basis if ‘the record clearly shows the [district]
court would have reached the same result’ even without considering
the challenged conditions.” (quoting People v. Loveall, 231 P.3d 408,
416 (Colo. 2010))).
¶ 18 As indicated above, Condition No. 8 required Delafuente to
“actively participate in, cooperate with, and successfully complete”
recommended treatment.
¶ 19 The probation revocation complaint, filed in February 2020,
alleged that Delafuente had violated this condition in that she
8 hadn’t followed through with the requirements for her alcohol
treatment and had last attended that treatment in September 2019.
¶ 20 At the revocation hearing, the probation officer testified that in
September 2018, Delafuente was recommended to complete Level II
Four Plus alcohol treatment. According to the probation officer,
Delafuente initially complied with the recommended treatment by
completing her intake appointment and attending her classes.
However, the treatment agency notified the probation officer that,
although Delafuente hadn’t been formally discharged, as of the time
the revocation complaint was filed, she hadn’t complied with or
completed the treatment.
¶ 21 On cross-examination, the probation officer acknowledged that
Delafuente had reported having financial difficulties that led to
transportation challenges. Delafuente had indicated that she relied
on her sister for transportation to and from the treatment center,
which, at the time, was in Greeley, about eighteen miles from her
home in Platteville. Delafuente also had indicated that at times her
sister wouldn’t take her to treatment. And Delafuente had said in
September 2019 that she’d obtained a learner’s permit but that her
car wasn’t drivable and she didn’t have the money to fix it.
9 ¶ 22 The probation officer testified that she had attempted to assist
Delafuente in overcoming these transportation challenges. Initially,
the probation officer provided Delafuente with bus passes that
worked within Greeley to assist her in attending her treatment
there. Later, at Delafuente’s request, the probation officer switched
her from a treatment center in Greeley to one in Fort Lupton, where
she’d indicated she could access a working car.
¶ 23 Ultimately, the district court found that Delafuente had ceased
actively participating in her treatment and hadn’t successfully
completed that treatment. It also found that Delafuente’s failure to
complete her treatment wasn’t the result of her financial issues and
related transportation challenges.
¶ 24 While the record is thin, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence to support these findings by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Moses, 64 P.3d at 908; C.J.W., 727 P.2d at 872.
¶ 25 The prosecution presented evidence that, as of the time the
revocation complaint was filed, Delafuente hadn’t complied with or
completed the recommended treatment program. Delafuente didn’t
contest that allegation. Rather, she asserted that she lacked
reliable transportation to the treatment center due to her financial
10 difficulties. The prosecution, in turn, offered evidence that the
probation officer had provided Delafuente with accommodations in
an effort to ease her burdens relating to transportation. Even so,
there was no evidence that Delafuente took advantage of these
accommodations and was actively participating in her treatment,
particularly after the treatment was moved to a location where
Delafuente had indicated she had access to a car.
¶ 26 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, as we must, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient
to support the district court’s finding that Delafuente violated
Condition No. 8 of her probation. See Donald, ¶ 18; see also Moses,
64 P.3d at 908; Trujillo, 539 P.2d at 1236. Accordingly, we do not
disturb the court’s order revoking and reinstating her probation.
III. Disposition
¶ 27 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.