22CA1978 Peo v Campos 02-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA1978 Arapahoe County District Court No. 21CR1380 Honorable Eric B. White, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jose Gonzalez Campos,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE LUM Fox and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 20, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Sue Kim, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Dilyn K. Myers, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jose Gonzalez Campos, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving
while ability impaired — fourth or subsequent offense (felony DWAI)
and a taillight violation. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Background
¶2 On the night of June 18, 2021, Campos was pulled over by
Deputy Brady Wood for driving with his vehicle’s rear taillights off.
While interacting with Campos, Deputy Wood noticed that Campos
smelled of alcohol. Campos admitted to Deputy Wood that he had
been driving home from a bar and had consumed more than one
beer that night.
¶3 Throughout his encounter with Deputy Wood, Campos showed
signs of intoxication, including swaying while upright, glassy and
watery eyes, and slurred speech. He struggled to produce
identification and vehicle documents when Deputy Wood requested
them and had difficulty recalling his own phone number. After
Campos refused to take any sobriety tests, he was arrested.
¶4 Campos was charged with driving under the influence —
fourth or subsequent offense (felony DUI), failure to present a law
enforcement officer with proof of vehicle insurance, and a taillight
1 violation. After trial, a jury found Campos guilty of felony DWAI (a
lesser included offense of felony DUI) and a taillight violation.1
Campos was sentenced to three years of probation and ninety days
in jail.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶5 Campos argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict
him of felony DWAI because the prosecution failed to prove his prior
convictions. We agree.
A. Additional Facts
¶6 At trial, the prosecution presented conviction records allegedly
showing that Campos had previously been convicted of three DUI
offenses. The records each contained the offender’s name and birth
date, and one of them showed identifying characteristics, such as
height, weight, and eye color.
¶7 Deputy Wood testified about the documentary evidence of the
prior DUI convictions:
Q. Deputy Wood, when you were interacting with the defendant during the initial contact, did you view the defendant’s driver’s license?
1 The charge relating to proof of insurance was eventually
dismissed.
2 A. I did.
Q. Were you aware of the defendant’s full name?
A. I was.
Q. Were you aware of the defendant’s date of birth?
Q. When you’re looking at the documents in front of you . . . do those documents have the defendant’s full name on them?
A. Yes, they do.
Q. Does it also have the defendant’s date of birth?
Q. During your interaction with the defendant, did you also review the defendant’s criminal history?
A. I did.
Q. Based on your interaction with the defendant, as well as your review of the documents in front of you, are you aware of whether or not the defendant has three prior convictions for driving under the influence or driving while ability impaired?
A. Yes, I am.
¶8 Defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal with
respect to felony DWAI, arguing that a name and birth date match
3 was insufficient to prove prior convictions. Defense counsel added
that Deputy Wood lacked personal knowledge of Campos’s alleged
prior convictions:
[The prosecution] asserted that Deputy Wood’s knowledge of these convictions came from the certified convictions in front of [the court], not that he has any additional knowledge. While Deputy Wood stated he reviewed Mr. Campos’ criminal history, he did not testify that in that review he discovered these three DUI convictions.
The court concluded that the records provided “more than a
modicum of relevant evidence” from which the jury could draw
reasonable inferences that Campos had three prior convictions, and
it denied the motion.
B. Standard of Review
¶9 We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. McCoy v.
People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63. We examine the evidence as a whole to
determine whether the evidence is substantial and sufficient for a
reasonable mind to find the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id.
¶ 10 “This analysis requires us to ‘give the prosecution the benefit
of every reasonable inference which might be fairly drawn from the
4 evidence.’” People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 25 (quoting People v.
Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 128 (Colo. 1983)). However, “there must
be a logical and convincing connection between the facts
established and the conclusion inferred.” Clark v. People, 232 P.3d
1287, 1292 (Colo. 2010). “If the evidence is such that reasonable
jurors must necessarily have a reasonable doubt, then the evidence
is insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction.” Id.
C. Applicable Law
¶ 11 As relevant here, a conviction for DWAI is a felony “if the
violation occurred after three or more prior convictions . . . for DUI,
DUI per se, or DWAI.” § 42-4-1301(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. Because
prior convictions are an element of a felony DWAI, a prosecutor
must prove those prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v. Herold, 2024 COA 53, ¶ 19.
¶ 12 To prove the identity of the defendant in prior conviction
records, “the prosecution must establish an essential link between
the prior conviction and the defendant, and this requires the
prosecution to present some documentary evidence combined with
specific corroborating evidence of identification.” Gorostieta v.
People, 2022 CO 41, ¶26. “[T]he mere fact that the defendants in
5 the present and prior cases have the same name and date of birth,
without more, will generally be insufficient.” Id. at ¶ 28; see also
Herold, ¶ 18 (applying Gorostieta to a felony DUI conviction).
Specific corroborating evidence includes but is not limited to
(1) evidence specifically identifying the defendant; (2) unique identifiers such as a driver license, prison identification number, or social security number; (3) photographs or fingerprints from the prior case that link that case to the current defendant; (4) a physical description from the prior case that can be compared to the defendant in the present case; (5) distinguishable features of the defendant such as tattoos; or (6) testimony of probation officers or others with personal knowledge positively identifying the defendant as being the same person who had previously been convicted.
Gorostieta, ¶ 27.
D. Analysis
¶ 13 We agree with Campos that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he had three prior alcohol-related convictions beyond
a reasonable doubt. Other than providing the offender’s name and
birth date, two of the three prior conviction records don’t have any
“unique identifiers” or any other information that could be used to
link Campos to the convictions. Id. Thus, the records alone are
6 insufficient. See id. at ¶ 26. That one of the three records
contained a physical description doesn’t matter; the prosecution
needed to prove all three convictions beyond a reasonable doubt to
convict Campos of felony DWAI. See § 42-4-1301(1)(a).
¶ 14 We reject the People’s contention that Deputy Wood
established the necessary link because his testimony didn’t
demonstrate that he had “personal knowledge positively identifying
the defendant as being the same person who had previously been
convicted.” Gorostieta, ¶ 27. During the first part of the
questioning, Deputy Wood simply compared Campos’s name and
birth date to the conviction records that had been admitted into
evidence. Then, the prosecutor asked Deputy Wood, “are you
aware of whether or not the defendant has three prior convictions
for [DUI] or [DWAI]?.” (Emphasis added.) Deputy Wood responded,
“Yes I am.” While that answer communicates that Deputy Wood
believed he knew “whether or not” Campos had previously been
convicted of DUI or DWAI, it doesn’t demonstrate that Campos
actually had three prior convictions for those crimes. The
prosecution didn’t ask any additional questions that might have
clarified what Deputy Wood knew about Campos’s conviction
7 history or the source of his knowledge (and whether it was based on
anything other than the records already admitted into evidence).
Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to link
Campos to the prior convictions. See id. at ¶ 26. As a result,
Campos cannot be retried for the felony DWAI conviction. See
People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910, 916 (Colo. 1985).
¶ 15 The parties agree, as do we, that the appropriate remedy is to
reverse Campos’s felony DWAI conviction and remand for entry of a
judgment of conviction for misdemeanor DWAI. See Herold, ¶ 27.
III. Juror Challenge
¶ 16 Campos contends that the court erred when it denied his
challenge for cause to Juror R and his request for additional time
for voir dire. We disagree.
¶ 17 At the beginning of trial, the court informed the parties that
they each had thirty minutes for voir dire and that additional time
would not be granted. During voir dire, the prosecution asked the
prospective jurors if they had any past DUI-related experiences that
might affect their ability to judge the case. Defense counsel
followed up with jurors who had raised their hands in response to
8 the prosecutor’s question, including Juror R. Juror R told defense
counsel, “I did have a DUI. And so it would not prevent me from
listening to the case, I don’t think. And I don’t know that it would
make it more or less difficult for me.” Defense counsel further
questioned Juror R:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right. And do you think your personal experiences are going to mean that, even if the district attorney meets that beyond a reasonable doubt standard, you’re not going find [sic] a guilty verdict?
JUROR R: No, I quit drinking after that DUI. So —
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.
JUROR R: So kind of overall positive for me.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And do you think, essentially, will you hold [the prosecutor] to a lesser standard, that even if he doesn’t meet that beyond a reasonable doubt threshold, you know, it’s almost there but you do have some reasonable doubt, do you think you still might render a guilty verdict.
JUROR R: No, I don’t think so. I would like to think that I would be able to separate out my, you know, biases, you know, whatever they may be —
JUROR R: — and just listen to the facts.
9 ...
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So similar to what I asked [Juror S], you don’t think it will impact your decision-making . . . . [C]an you be sure it’s not going to affect how you hold the district attorney to their burden of proof?
JUROR R: I think so, yeah.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Thank you.
JUROR R: That’s the short answer.
¶ 18 Defense counsel then asked the prospective jurors, by a show
of hands, whether evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions
increased the likelihood of guilt in the present case:
You all did hear that there are allegations that there are past DUI convictions. . . . [I]f you hear evidence in this case that . . . there are past DUI convictions, does . . . that make it more likely that Mr. Campos would be guilty of this DUI?
Juror R was among the eleven prospective jurors who raised their
hands. After questioning one juror about why they raised their
hand, defense counsel then explained, “[E]ven though . . . you
might hear evidence of past convictions of driving under the
influence, you actually can’t use that as evidence that it’s more
likely Mr. Campos is driving under the influence in this case. . . .
10 Does anyone have trouble with that rule?” Five jurors raised their
hands in response to that question, but Juror R did not.
¶ 19 Time ran out before defense counsel could question Juror R
individually regarding his views on prior convictions. Defense
counsel moved to exclude Juror R because he agreed with the
statement, “[I]f someone has past DUI convictions, it means they’re
more likely to be guilty now.” The court denied the challenge,
concluding,
I think [Juror R] is particularly balanced in light of his statement that he had received a DUI, that he made some decisions regarding not drinking and how important that was. So I think that actually reflects a great deal of balance in his ability to be fair. I don’t think he crossed the threshold for not being entrenched in a particular position.
¶ 20 Defense counsel then requested additional time to question
the jurors who had earlier raised their hands “to really reveal
whether or not they are biased.” The court denied the request.
Juror R served on the jury.
¶ 21 A trial court’s denial of a juror challenge for cause and
restrictions on voir dire are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
11 People v. Oliver, 2020 COA 97, ¶ 7; People v. Reaud, 821 P.2d 870,
871 (Colo. App. 1991). A trial court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v.
Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 122 (Colo. 2002). To determine whether an
abuse of discretion occurred, we review the entire voir dire of the
prospective juror in question. Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486
(Colo. 1999).
¶ 22 “The abuse of discretion standard gives deference to the trial
court’s credibility assessments, recognizing that court’s unique
perspective in evaluating the demeanor and body language of live
witnesses, and it serves to discourage an appellate court from
second-guessing the trial court’s assessments based on a cold
record.” People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 13.
¶ 23 Allowing a biased or incompetent individual to serve on a jury
violates the defendant’s right to an impartial jury and requires
reversal. People v. Marciano, 2014 COA 92M-2, ¶ 10.
¶ 24 The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee
criminal defendants the right to a trial by an impartial jury. U.S.
12 Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. A trial court
must sustain a challenge for cause if it finds
a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state; however, no person summoned as a juror shall be disqualified by reason of a previously formed or expressed opinion with reference to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if the court is satisfied, from the examination of the juror or from other evidence, that he will render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial.
§ 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 25 “[W]here a potential juror’s statements compel the inference
that he or she cannot decide crucial issues fairly, a challenge for
cause must be granted in the absence of rehabilitative questioning
or other counter-balancing information.” People v. Maestas, 2014
COA 139M, ¶ 18 (quotation omitted). However, a prospective juror’s
“expression of concern,” “preconceived belief as to some facet of the
case,” or misunderstanding of the law is not automatically
disqualifying. People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1243 (Colo. 1988);
People v. Clemens, 2017 CO 89, ¶ 17. If the prospective juror is
willing to apply the law as instructed after the trial judge explains
13 the correct legal principles during voir dire, the prospective juror is
rehabilitated and may serve. People v. Lopez, 2018 COA 119, ¶ 8.
¶ 26 To determine whether a juror has been rehabilitated, the court
may consider the juror’s own statements that they can serve
impartially on the case. People v. Gilbert, 12 P.3d 331, 334 (Colo.
App. 2000). Additionally, a juror’s silence in response to questions
posed to the venire may indicate rehabilitation when the context
shows that the juror will render an impartial verdict in accordance
with the law and evidence presented at trial. Clemens, ¶¶ 12, 19.
¶ 27 Campos contends that the trial court erred by failing to excuse
Juror R because he agreed that a prior DUI conviction makes the
defendant more likely to be guilty in a present DUI case. We
disagree.
¶ 28 Though Juror R had prior experiences with DUI and indicated
that he viewed his conviction as a “positive” because it motivated
him to become sober, nothing about his initial responses to
questioning evinced any unwillingness or “hesitation to follow [the
law]” or indicated that he could not evaluate the case fairly.
Clemens, ¶ 23. In fact, Juror R made assurances to the contrary,
14 saying, “I would like to think that I would be able to separate out
my . . . biases . . . and just listen to the facts.” And he twice
answered affirmatively when asked if he was sure that his prior
experiences would not interfere with his ability to hold the
prosecution to its burden of proof. See Gilbert, 12 P.3d at 334 (the
court may consider a juror’s assurances that they can serve
impartially). To the extent Campos contends that Juror R’s initial
statements were too equivocal for the court to consider them
assurances of impartiality, we disagree. See Carrillo, 974 P.2d at
487 (“[T]he trial judge is . . . ‘able to assess fully the attitudes and
state of mind of a potential juror by personal observation of the
significance of what linguistically may appear to be . . . self-
contradictory responses to difficult questions.’” (quoting People v.
Sandoval, 733 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo. 1987))).
¶ 29 We agree that Juror R indicated a bias (or perhaps a
misunderstanding of the law) when he raised his hand in response
to defense counsel’s question about prior convictions. However,
Juror R was rehabilitated when he heard defense counsel explain
the rule that past DUI offenses cannot be used to determine
Campos’s guilt and then was silent in response to defense counsel’s
15 question asking whether any juror had “trouble with” that rule.
Juror R’s silence indicated that he understood the rule and would
follow it, and it was consistent with his earlier statements that he
would set biases aside, consider the facts, and require proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, Juror R had previously been
forthcoming when counsel asked the venire about DUI-related
experiences and biases, indicating that his silence was not
attributable to a fear of speaking up or general lack of participation.
See Clemens, ¶ 2 (a “juror has been rehabilitated when, in light of
the totality of the circumstances, the context of that silence
indicates that the juror will render an impartial verdict according to
the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial”).
Though the trial court did not rely on Juror R’s rehabilitation-by-
silence in denying the challenge for cause, we may affirm for any
reason supported by the record. See People v. Heisler, 2017 COA
58, ¶ 44.
¶ 30 We reject Campos’s assertion that Juror R’s silence wasn’t
rehabilitative because defense counsel (rather than the court)
explained the rule and conducted the questioning. Rehabilitation
need not be conducted by the court; defense counsel’s legal
16 explanation and rehabilitative questioning regarding the prior
conviction rule was sufficient to rehabilitate Juror R in this case.
Cf. Clemens, ¶ 24 (rehabilitative questioning conducted by the court
and defense counsel).
¶ 31 Finally, to the extent Campos contends that the court abused
its discretion by not providing additional time to question Juror R,
we disagree. “The right to an impartial jury does not . . . require
that counsel be granted unlimited voir dire examination.” People v.
O’Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 169 (Colo. 1990). “In recognition of the
undue length of time consumed by some counsel in their voir dire
examination and the possibility of abuse of the right granted by
Crim. P. 24(a)(2), the trial court is vested with considerable
discretion in limiting both the length of the questioning, and its
nature.” Reaud, 821 P.2d at 871.
¶ 32 We don’t perceive the court’s time limit as an abuse of
discretion in this case. On multiple occasions at the beginning of
trial, the court informed the parties that voir dire examination
would be restricted to thirty minutes per side. Moreover, the length
of the voir dire gave defense counsel sufficient time to identify Juror
R’s potential biases or misunderstandings, obtain assurances from
17 Juror R that his past experiences wouldn’t affect his ability to fairly
decide the case, and — as described above — conduct adequate
rehabilitative questioning about Juror R’s views of prior convictions.
See People v. Rodriguez, 786 P.2d 472, 474 (Colo. App. 1989) (time
restriction on voir dire was reasonable and did not “impinge upon
defendant’s intelligent exercise of [juror] challenges” where counsel
had “sufficient opportunity to examine the prospective jurors in a
manner that would reveal any improper bias”).
IV. Disposition
¶ 33 Campos’s felony DWAI conviction is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the district court for entry of conviction for
misdemeanor DWAI and resentencing. The taillight conviction is
unaffected by this appeal and remains undisturbed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.