Peo v. Becker

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 2, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0627
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0627 Peo v Becker 07-02-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0627 Larimer County District Court No. 00CR206 Honorable Joseph D. Findley, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Joel Howard Becker,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Yun and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Joel Howard Becker, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Defendant, Joel Howard Becker, appeals the postconviction

court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction

relief. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Becker pleaded guilty to first degree sexual assault and second

degree burglary. He was sentenced to the custody of the

Department of Corrections (DOC) for an indeterminate term of

forty-eight years to life for the sexual assault and a consecutive,

determinate term of twelve years for the burglary. A division of this

court affirmed the sentences. See People v. Becker, (Colo. App. No.

01CA0151, May 23, 2002) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).

The mandate issued in October 2002.

¶3 Years later, the prosecution gave Becker written notice of

potential impeachment information regarding a Colorado Bureau of

Investigations (CBI) forensic scientist endorsed as a trial witness in

his case. The notice stated that “the District Attorney ha[d] NOT

been advised by [the] CBI that in [Becker’s] case any anomalies

were found in [the scientist’s] work product,” but provided the

information pursuant to Colo. RPC 3.8(d) because it “would affect a

defendant’s decision about whether to accept a plea disposition.”

1 The notice indicated that it would be accompanied by a CBI internal

affairs report.

¶4 In February 2025, Becker filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion

challenging the validity of his guilty plea. Liberally construing the

motion, we determine that he effectively asserted that, because he

had no recollection of the underlying incident, his decision to plead

guilty was based on DNA evidence linking him to the sexual assault

— a connection he now claims is undermined by the new

impeachment information. Becker also alleged that the prosecution

failed to provide him with the CBI internal affairs report and that he

needs the report and a hearing to substantiate his claim.

Additionally, Becker argued that his plea counsel was ineffective for

misadvising him regarding his parole eligibility and his sentencing

exposure if convicted after a trial. Lastly, Becker acknowledged that

his motion was untimely but argued that the recently discovered

impeachment information constituted justifiable excuse or

excusable neglect for the untimely filing.

¶5 In March 2025, the postconviction court summarily denied

Becker’s motion, finding that he had not established any exception

2 to the timeliness procedural bar and had provided no evidence of

anomalies in the forensic scientist’s work done on his case.

II. Legal Authority and Standard of Review

¶6 “[A] challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually

limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent.” Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo.

2011). As relevant here, a defendant can challenge the validity of

their guilty plea based on newly discovered evidence, see People v.

Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 761-62 (Colo. 2001), or allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel, see People v. Stovall, 2012 COA

7M, ¶ 13.

¶7 A challenge to the validity of a defendant’s plea is properly

brought under Crim. P. 35(c). People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410,

414 (Colo. 2005). A defendant need not set forth the evidentiary

support for their allegations in a Crim. P. 35 motion but instead

need only assert facts that if true would provide a basis for relief.

White v. Denv. Dist. Ct., 766 P.2d 632, 635 (Colo. 1988). A Crim. P.

35(c) motion for postconviction relief may be denied without an

evidentiary hearing only where the motion, files, and record clearly

3 establish that the defendant’s allegations are without merit and do

not warrant relief. Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003).

¶8 Further, a defendant must file a Crim. P. 35(c) motion within

three years of their conviction for an offense other than a class 1

felony. § 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025; Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I). As relevant

here, a conviction becomes final when the mandate is issued

following a direct appeal. People v. Prendergast, 2024 COA 127,

¶ 28.

¶9 But a postconviction claim shall be excluded from the

three-year time limitation period if a court finds that the “failure to

seek relief within the applicable time period was the result of

circumstances amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable

neglect.” § 16-5-402(2)(d). Newly discovered evidence can

constitute justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for an untimely

filed motion. People v. Clouse, 74 P.3d 336, 340 (Colo. App. 2002).

¶ 10 We review de novo the summary denial of a Crim. P. 35(c)

motion. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14. Also, “[w]hether a

defendant has demonstrated justifiable excuse or excusable neglect

is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court.” People v.

Shepherd, 43 P.3d 693, 698 (Colo. App. 2001). “If the record

4 supports the trial court’s findings, we will not disturb them on

appeal.” Id.

III. Analysis

¶ 11 We conclude that the postconviction court did not err by

denying Becker’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See People v. Hamm, 2019

COA 90, ¶ 23 (“[W]e will affirm a district court’s denial of a Rule 35

motion on any ground supported by the record . . . .”); see also

People v. Hartkemeyer, 843 P.2d 92, 92 (Colo. App. 1992) (a court’s

failure to make findings of fact or conclusions of law in denying a

Crim. P. 35(c) motion does not require reversal if the error was

harmless).

¶ 12 First, regarding justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Becker baldly asserted that

he could not have previously raised his ineffective assistance claims

without the new impeachment information. Because he does not

adequately explain how this information related to the sufficiency of

counsel’s plea advisements, we conclude that Becker failed to

demonstrate that his delay in asserting the ineffective assistance

claims was due to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect. See

Clouse, 74 P.3d at 340 (“A defendant must allege in a Crim. P. 35

5 motion facts that, if true, would establish justifiable excuse or

excusable neglect for a belated filing.”); see also People v. Houser,

2020 COA 128, ¶ 24 (we will not consider a bald legal proposition

presented without argument or development).

¶ 13 Notably, Becker acknowledged that he knew his counsel’s

parole eligibility advisement was purportedly deficient in, at the

latest, 2019 when his challenge to the DOC’s parole eligibility

calculation was rejected. Yet he did not assert the ineffective

assistance claim until nearly six years later. See People v.

Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 441 (Colo. 1993) (“In making th[e]

determination [regarding the applicability of the justifiable excuse

or excusable neglect exception,] we believe it appropriate to consider

the circumstances existing throughout the entire period from the

inception of the conviction in question.”); see also People v. Cordova,

199 P.3d 1, 4 (Colo. App. 2007) (In determining whether a

defendant established justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, the

court must consider, among other things, “whether a defendant

who had reason to question the constitutionality of a conviction

investigated its validity and took advantage of avenues of relief that

were available.”).

6 ¶ 14 Therefore, because Becker filed his ineffective assistance

claims more than three years after his conviction became final and

failed to establish an exception to the time limitation, we conclude

that the claims were properly denied because they were untimely.

§ 16-5-402(1), (1.5); Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I).

¶ 15 Next, we are persuaded that the recent discovery and notice of

the new impeachment information would constitute justifiable

excuse or excusable neglect for Becker’s untimely challenge to his

guilty plea on that basis. Nonetheless, we ultimately conclude that

the court did not err even though it denied the claim without a

hearing.

¶ 16 Initially, we note that the record does not definitively confirm

what the DNA testing revealed or what DNA evidence would have

been presented at trial. Indeed, in their pretrial filings contesting

the admissibility of the DNA evidence, the parties acknowledge only

that the CBI tested DNA collected from the scene of the sexual

assault to determine whether it matched Becker’s DNA. Becker’s

effort to exclude the DNA evidence suggests that the testing

indicated that his DNA matched the DNA collected from the scene of

the sexual assault to some statistical degree. But, without knowing

7 the actual DNA testing results, we are hampered in our ability to

evaluate what effect the new impeachment evidence regarding the

CBI forensic scientist would have had on the DNA evidence.

¶ 17 Nevertheless, the motion, files, and record establish that

Becker is not entitled to relief even if the new impeachment

evidence completely negates the DNA evidence. See Ardolino, 69

P.3d at 77.

¶ 18 The affidavit in support of warrantless arrest contained the

following facts: (1) the sexual assault occurred around 2 a.m., and

the victim described the perpetrator as a “white male, 18-25 years

of age, wearing a red coat, blue jeans, and a stocking cap,” with a

“bar bell” piercing through his tongue; (2) at 1:37 a.m., a Colorado

State University police officer reported that “he made a pedestrian

contact with a subject identified as Joel Becker” who “was wearing a

red coat and matched the physical description of the [sexual

assault] suspect”; (3) during an initial interview, officers observed

that “Becker had a bar bell type piercing in his tongue” and “closely

matched the physical description and composite drawing of the

sexual assault suspect”; and (4) in a follow-up interview, “Becker

8 admitted to entering the victim’s apartment without her consent

and forcing her to have sex with him.”

¶ 19 Further, Becker’s pretrial motion to suppress contained the

following allegations: (1) “Becker allegedly admitted his involvement

with the sexual assault” to a detective; (2) during a police interview,

Becker “not only provided inculpatory information, but agreed to

ride with officers to areas where Mr. Becker claimed he had

discarded evidence, and also provided information about other

areas in which officers later discovered evidence”; (3) “upon the

conclusion of the interview at the police station, other detectives

took Mr. Becker to areas around the scene to search for additional

evidence”; and (4) “[d]uring Mr. Becker’s statement, he provided [the

detective] with information that led to the recovery of other

evidence.” In its order denying this motion, the court found that

“[i]t [wa]s uncontested that [Becker] engaged in a lengthy interview

with [the detective] wherein he made incriminating statements.”

¶ 20 Also, in a pretrial motion for discovery, Becker noted that, on a

recording of his police interview, he told the detective that “he . . .

couldn’t live with himself because of what he had done.” Further, a

pretrial court order denying a motion to suppress indicated that,

9 when Becker was arrested and the police found a bus ticket on his

person, Becker told officers, “now I can’t run.”

¶ 21 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated, “Joel Becker

was interviewed . . . two weeks after the sexual assault and

recounted details of the sexual assault to [the detective]. He

admitted he had raped [the victim]. He described it with quite a bit

of detail.” The prosecutor further noted that, before his arrest,

Becker “had a one-way bus ticket in his pocket to, I believe it was

Las Vegas, but he had already cashed it in and gotten a bus ticket.

He had a duffel bag full of his worldly possessions and was about to

flee this jurisdiction.”

¶ 22 During his sentencing argument, defense counsel made the

following remarks:

• “[P]lanning Mr. Becker’s defense . . . hasn’t been easy

given the evidence the prosecution has marshalled.”

• “[Becker] confessed. When confronted by [the detective]

. . . , he hung his head, he was quiet, and appeared to

her [to be] depressed. He appeared to her as somebody

who couldn’t wait to talk. It was obvious to her he was

10 carrying the weight of guilt on his shoulders. And when

she had him alone, he did not hesitate to admit his guilt.”

• “[Becker] admit[ted] in the course of this investigation to

everything he is accused of except oral sex. He admitted

the casing, scissors, vaginal and anal penetration,

remembered details, asking [the victim] her name. He

volunteered details that [the detective] hadn’t asked

about. Every detail was a nail in his coffin, but he gave it

up anyway.”

• “[Becker] never covered his face. He doesn’t change his

clothes, even though he had been hanging out with a

bunch of people immediately prior to committing this act.

This offense, in fact, was committed within an hour or

two of contact with a Colorado State University police

officer. And despite that, Mr. Becker doesn’t even change

the sweatshirt he was wearing at the time of this offense.”

¶ 23 Finally, during his statement to the court, Becker said, “I

would like to apologize to [the victim] for everything that I’ve put

you through” and acknowledged, “I know that I have done a terrible

thing.”

11 ¶ 24 The above record belies Becker’s assertion that he did not

recall the underlying incident and that he pleaded guilty because

the DNA evidence linked him to the charged offenses. In light of

this overwhelming non-DNA evidence of Becker’s criminal

culpability, we are not persuaded that the newly discovered

impeachment information relevant to the DNA evidence undermines

the validity of Becker’s guilty plea. See Schneider, 25 P.3d at 762

(In order to withdraw a guilty plea based on newly discovered

evidence, a defendant must prove, in part, that “the charges that

the People filed against the defendant, or the charge(s) to which the

defendant pleaded guilty were actually false or unfounded; and . . .

the newly discovered evidence would probably bring about a verdict

of acquittal in a trial.”).

¶ 25 We note Becker’s claim that he has still not received the CBI

internal affairs report. The record appears to show that the report

was provided to Becker on a compact disc, but he was dissatisfied

with that format and requested the report in paper format. Even

assuming Becker’s assertion is correct that the report would

extensively detail the CBI forensic scientist’s misconduct, we are

12 not persuaded that such impeachment evidence would alter our

conclusions above.

¶ 26 Finally, Becker argues that he is entitled to relief under the

recently enacted Colorado Forensic Science Integrity Act, see

§§ 16-12-301 to -312, C.R.S. 2025. However, “[t]his act applies to

claims for relief filed on or after the effective date of this act that are

based on knowing misconduct or a significant event, as defined in

this act, that occurred before, on, or after the effective date of this

act.” Ch. 352, sec. 5, 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1906-07. Because

Becker’s February 2025 Crim. P. 35(c) motion was filed before the

Act’s June 2025 effective date, he cannot convert his Crim. P. 35(c)

motion into a petition for relief under the Act. Ch. 352, sec. 6, 2025

Colo. Sess. Laws 1907; see also § 16-12-310(1), C.R.S. 2025 (“[A]

defendant who was convicted of a criminal offense who receives a

notice of reported wrongful action pursuant to section 16-12-306

. . . has a right to petition for relief pursuant to this part 3.”).

¶ 27 We do not address any claim not reasserted on appeal, see

People v. Brooks, 250 P.3d 771, 772 (Colo. App. 2010), or any

argument asserted for the first time in a reply brief, see People v.

Grant, 174 P.3d 798, 803 (Colo. App. 2007).

13 IV. Disposition

¶ 28 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.