24CA0408 Peo v Barron 11-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0408 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CR3865 Honorable A. Bruce Jones, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Tony A. Barron,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Joseph Chase, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Tony A. Barron, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Barron asks us
to reverse his conviction and require the prosecution to re-extend a
previous plea offer because he detrimentally relied on the
prosecutor’s promise to hold that offer open. We conclude that
Barron waived this argument by pleading guilty pursuant to a later
plea agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 In July 2022, following an armed robbery at a McDonald’s,
Barron was charged with one count of aggravated robbery as a
crime of violence and one count of third degree assault.
¶3 Barron’s case was initially set for a preliminary hearing in
August 2022 before the county court. On the scheduled hearing
date, Barron’s public defender asked to continue the hearing and
waived Barron’s right to have the hearing within thirty-five days of
his request for a hearing. See Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(I); Crim. P. 7(h)(2).
Defense counsel explained at the time that she needed additional
time to look into the cases Barron had pending in other
jurisdictions. The court granted her request and reset the hearing.
1 ¶4 Although there was no mention of a plea offer during the
colloquy before the court, the parties agree that the prosecutor
extended an offer that day for Barron to plead guilty to one count of
aggravated robbery with a sentencing range of ten to sixteen years.
They also seem to agree that the prosecutor said she would hold the
offer open until the next hearing date. Defense counsel later
indicated that she conveyed the offer to Barron at that time but that
he didn’t accept it then because they hadn’t yet had a chance to
discuss it and hadn’t yet received all the discovery from the
prosecution. She also later said that she had waived the thirty-five-
day rule in order “to keep the offer open on the table.”
¶5 At the next scheduled hearing date in September, defense
counsel again asked to continue the preliminary hearing and
reiterated that Barron had already waived the thirty-five-day rule.
Defense counsel explained that she had just learned that the
prosecutor was filing additional charges and that this had
“change[d] the calculus that [Barron] needs to make regarding a
waiver or moving forward.” She further explained that she “would
also like to do additional work on the case” before the preliminary
hearing. The court granted that request and reset the hearing.
2 ¶6 Again, there was no mention of a plea offer during the
discussion with the court. But defense counsel later indicated that
while the parties were there, she discussed the plea offer with the
prosecutor and with Barron. She specified that the prosecutor had
said the original offer would remain open until the next hearing
date and that she and Barron needed more time to discuss it.
¶7 That same day, the prosecutor filed an amended complaint
and information adding another count of aggravated robbery
against a second victim.
¶8 A few days before the next hearing date in October, Barron
apparently discussed the case with his counsel and decided to
accept the prosecutor’s offer. But before his counsel communicated
his acceptance to the prosecutor, the prosecutor revoked the offer.
Accordingly, on the October hearing date, defense counsel sought
and obtained a continuance to determine how to proceed.
¶9 In November, Barron requested a hearing under People v.
Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686 (Colo. 2010), to replace his public defender
with alternate defense counsel. Barron cited the public defender’s
failure to communicate his acceptance of the plea offer before the
prosecutor’s revocation as the main reason for their “extreme
3 differences.” The court found a conflict between Barron and his
public defender and appointed alternate defense counsel.
¶ 10 After taking some time to get up to speed on the case, Barron’s
newly appointed alternate defense counsel moved to enforce the
original plea offer. Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor’s
original offer had to be enforced because Barron detrimentally relied
on the prosecutor’s promise to hold it open when he waived his
right to a preliminary hearing within thirty-five days. The county
court held a hearing, at which it heard testimony from the originally
appointed public defender and argument from both sides. It then
found that Barron had not waived his right to a preliminary hearing
within thirty-five days in reliance on the prosecutor’s promise to
hold the plea offer open, reasoning that Barron “waived [the thirty-
five-day rule] a number of times” and “nothing before th[e] court
necessarily strongly implicates that there was in fact that
detrimental reliance, even on the [October hearing date].” The court
explained that there was no mention at the time of the waivers of
any promises to keep a plea offer open; rather, Barron’s counsel
had articulated other reasons — like waiting for discovery and
4 taking time to discuss the added charge with his counsel — for his
waivers. Accordingly, the court denied the motion.
¶ 11 Eventually, the case was bound over to the district court.
Then, in November 2023, Barron pleaded guilty to a count of
aggravated robbery with a stipulated sentence of twenty-five years
in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The district court
accepted the plea and sentenced Barron accordingly.
II. Appellate Review Following a Guilty Plea
¶ 12 Barron argues that the county court erred by finding that he
didn’t detrimentally rely on the prosecutor’s promise to hold the
plea offer open. More fundamentally, he argues that his due
process rights were violated when the prosecutor rescinded the plea
offer after he had detrimentally relied on that offer when he waived
his right to a preliminary hearing within thirty-five days. See People
v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356, 359 (Colo. 1988) (as a matter of due
process, governmental promises, such as those made in plea
negotiations, are enforceable to the extent that a defendant
detrimentally relied on them). We conclude that Barron waived this
claim when he later pleaded guilty pursuant to a different plea offer.
5 ¶ 13 A guilty plea generally precludes review of any issues that
arose before the plea. Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8. Thus,
“[a] ‘guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events [that] has
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24CA0408 Peo v Barron 11-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0408 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CR3865 Honorable A. Bruce Jones, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Tony A. Barron,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Joseph Chase, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Tony A. Barron, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Barron asks us
to reverse his conviction and require the prosecution to re-extend a
previous plea offer because he detrimentally relied on the
prosecutor’s promise to hold that offer open. We conclude that
Barron waived this argument by pleading guilty pursuant to a later
plea agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 In July 2022, following an armed robbery at a McDonald’s,
Barron was charged with one count of aggravated robbery as a
crime of violence and one count of third degree assault.
¶3 Barron’s case was initially set for a preliminary hearing in
August 2022 before the county court. On the scheduled hearing
date, Barron’s public defender asked to continue the hearing and
waived Barron’s right to have the hearing within thirty-five days of
his request for a hearing. See Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(I); Crim. P. 7(h)(2).
Defense counsel explained at the time that she needed additional
time to look into the cases Barron had pending in other
jurisdictions. The court granted her request and reset the hearing.
1 ¶4 Although there was no mention of a plea offer during the
colloquy before the court, the parties agree that the prosecutor
extended an offer that day for Barron to plead guilty to one count of
aggravated robbery with a sentencing range of ten to sixteen years.
They also seem to agree that the prosecutor said she would hold the
offer open until the next hearing date. Defense counsel later
indicated that she conveyed the offer to Barron at that time but that
he didn’t accept it then because they hadn’t yet had a chance to
discuss it and hadn’t yet received all the discovery from the
prosecution. She also later said that she had waived the thirty-five-
day rule in order “to keep the offer open on the table.”
¶5 At the next scheduled hearing date in September, defense
counsel again asked to continue the preliminary hearing and
reiterated that Barron had already waived the thirty-five-day rule.
Defense counsel explained that she had just learned that the
prosecutor was filing additional charges and that this had
“change[d] the calculus that [Barron] needs to make regarding a
waiver or moving forward.” She further explained that she “would
also like to do additional work on the case” before the preliminary
hearing. The court granted that request and reset the hearing.
2 ¶6 Again, there was no mention of a plea offer during the
discussion with the court. But defense counsel later indicated that
while the parties were there, she discussed the plea offer with the
prosecutor and with Barron. She specified that the prosecutor had
said the original offer would remain open until the next hearing
date and that she and Barron needed more time to discuss it.
¶7 That same day, the prosecutor filed an amended complaint
and information adding another count of aggravated robbery
against a second victim.
¶8 A few days before the next hearing date in October, Barron
apparently discussed the case with his counsel and decided to
accept the prosecutor’s offer. But before his counsel communicated
his acceptance to the prosecutor, the prosecutor revoked the offer.
Accordingly, on the October hearing date, defense counsel sought
and obtained a continuance to determine how to proceed.
¶9 In November, Barron requested a hearing under People v.
Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686 (Colo. 2010), to replace his public defender
with alternate defense counsel. Barron cited the public defender’s
failure to communicate his acceptance of the plea offer before the
prosecutor’s revocation as the main reason for their “extreme
3 differences.” The court found a conflict between Barron and his
public defender and appointed alternate defense counsel.
¶ 10 After taking some time to get up to speed on the case, Barron’s
newly appointed alternate defense counsel moved to enforce the
original plea offer. Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor’s
original offer had to be enforced because Barron detrimentally relied
on the prosecutor’s promise to hold it open when he waived his
right to a preliminary hearing within thirty-five days. The county
court held a hearing, at which it heard testimony from the originally
appointed public defender and argument from both sides. It then
found that Barron had not waived his right to a preliminary hearing
within thirty-five days in reliance on the prosecutor’s promise to
hold the plea offer open, reasoning that Barron “waived [the thirty-
five-day rule] a number of times” and “nothing before th[e] court
necessarily strongly implicates that there was in fact that
detrimental reliance, even on the [October hearing date].” The court
explained that there was no mention at the time of the waivers of
any promises to keep a plea offer open; rather, Barron’s counsel
had articulated other reasons — like waiting for discovery and
4 taking time to discuss the added charge with his counsel — for his
waivers. Accordingly, the court denied the motion.
¶ 11 Eventually, the case was bound over to the district court.
Then, in November 2023, Barron pleaded guilty to a count of
aggravated robbery with a stipulated sentence of twenty-five years
in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The district court
accepted the plea and sentenced Barron accordingly.
II. Appellate Review Following a Guilty Plea
¶ 12 Barron argues that the county court erred by finding that he
didn’t detrimentally rely on the prosecutor’s promise to hold the
plea offer open. More fundamentally, he argues that his due
process rights were violated when the prosecutor rescinded the plea
offer after he had detrimentally relied on that offer when he waived
his right to a preliminary hearing within thirty-five days. See People
v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356, 359 (Colo. 1988) (as a matter of due
process, governmental promises, such as those made in plea
negotiations, are enforceable to the extent that a defendant
detrimentally relied on them). We conclude that Barron waived this
claim when he later pleaded guilty pursuant to a different plea offer.
5 ¶ 13 A guilty plea generally precludes review of any issues that
arose before the plea. Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8. Thus,
“[a] ‘guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events [that] has
preceded it in the criminal process,’ after which a defendant may
not raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty
plea.” People v. Jennings, 2021 COA 112, ¶ 8 (quoting Neuhaus,
¶ 8); accord Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973).
¶ 14 On appeal, Barron doesn’t contend that his claim implicates
any of the limited exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., People
v. McMurtry, 122 P.3d 237, 240 (Colo. 2005) (a guilty plea doesn’t
waive a challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, which
may be raised at any time); Patton v. People, 35 P.3d 124, 128 (Colo.
2001) (a guilty plea doesn’t waive a claim that double jeopardy
precludes the State’s prosecution of the defendant); Jennings, ¶ 26
(a guilty plea doesn’t waive a claim of actual judicial bias).
¶ 15 Rather, Barron asserts that his claim can proceed because it
“relate[s] directly to the constitutionality of the plea process itself.”
But he doesn’t in any way challenge the adequacy of his later guilty
plea. Nor does he assert that his alleged detrimental reliance earlier
6 in the proceedings somehow affected the voluntary, knowing, or
intelligent character of that eventual plea. See Patton, 35 P.3d at
128 (“Because a guilty plea effectuates such an extensive waiver, a
challenge to the conviction entered thereon is normally limited to
whether the plea itself was voluntary and intelligent.”). Instead, his
argument is based on a different plea-negotiation process, with a
different counsel, that preceded his guilty plea by more than a year.
¶ 16 Because Barron is challenging an earlier plea-negotiation
process and because he hasn’t directly linked that process to his
eventual guilty plea, we conclude that just like other alleged
constitutional violations that precede a guilty plea, the claim of
detrimental reliance was waived as a result of Barron’s guilty plea.
See Jennings, ¶ 8; Neuhaus, ¶ 8; see also People v. Brooks-Singh,
849 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364 (App. Div. 2008) (the “defendant’s right to
appellate review” of any issues relating to the withdrawal of an
earlier plea offer “was forfeited by his subsequent plea of guilty”).
¶ 17 And because Barron doesn’t raise any other challenge to his
conviction — particularly whether his guilty plea was knowing,
voluntary, or intelligent — his plea must stand. See People v.
Smith, 2017 COA 12, ¶ 12 (appellate courts presume the validity of
7 a judgment entered pursuant to a guilty plea); see also Mabry v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-10 (1984) (the defendant couldn’t
challenge the withdrawal of an earlier plea offer because he didn’t
show that his later guilty plea pursuant to a different plea offer was
not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent), overruled in part on other
grounds by, Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009).
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.