24CA1653 Peo in Interest of AR 05-29-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1653 El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30848 Honorable Jayne Candea-Ramsey, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of A.R., D.C.L, and H.L., Children,
and Concerning K.L.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Lipinsky and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 29, 2025
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County Attorney, Melanie Douglas, Contract Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for A.R.
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem, for D.C.L. and H.L.
Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency or neglect action, K.L. (mother) appeals the
judgment entered on a jury’s verdict adjudicating A.R., D.C.L., and
H.L. (the children) dependent or neglected. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The El Paso Department of Human Services (the Department)
received a referral with concerns about mother’s “erratic behavior.”
At the time, four-year-old H.L. and seven-year-old D.C.L. resided
with mother and her husband, Je.L., who was not the legal father of
any of the children who are the subject of this case. Je.L. had two
children with a former partner. Eleven-year-old A.R. resided
primarily with mother’s previous husband, J.R. (father). During the
Department’s assessment, mother represented that she was
planning to move to Arizona. The caseworker informed mother that
she had concerns about the children’s safety and, if mother chose
to relocate with the children, the Department would make a
“courtesy report” to the other state.
¶3 Approximately three weeks after the initial referral, the
Department received additional referrals from (1) H.L.’s applied
behavioral analysis (ABA) provider in Colorado, who reported they
were unable to reach mother; and (2) a school district in Alabama,
1 which reported mother was trying to enroll her stepchildren (Je.L.’s
children) in school. After the caseworker confirmed with mother
that she was in Alabama, the Department made a courtesy report to
that state’s department of human resources (the Alabama
department). A few days later, the Alabama department took
temporary custody of D.C.L. and H.L. and opened a dependency or
neglect case.
¶4 The Department, however, did not close its assessment in
Colorado because A.R. remained in Colorado with father, and
mother frequently traveled back and forth between the two states.
Almost two weeks after the Alabama department opened its
dependency or neglect case, mother called the police and reported
that father had “pulled a gun” during a parenting time exchange at
a Colorado police station.
¶5 The Department then filed a petition in dependency or neglect
for A.R., alleging concerns about mother’s mental health and
domestic violence between mother and father. The Department also
alleged that mother had a prior dependency or neglect case and
that mother and her husband were likely to flee Colorado with A.R.
The Department later amended its petition to include H.L. and
2 D.C.L., and the Alabama department transferred its ongoing
dependency case to the Colorado court.
¶6 Mother requested an adjudicatory jury trial. After a three-day
trial, the jury returned special verdicts finding that all three
children were dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(a),
(b), and (c), C.R.S. 2024.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶7 Mother first contends that the Department failed to meet its
burden at the adjudicatory hearing. We construe mother’s
argument as an assertion that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain an
adjudication of dependency or neglect, we review the record in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we draw every
inference “fairly deducible” from the evidence in favor of the jury’s
decision. People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo. App.
2009); see also People in Interest of T.T., 128 P.3d 328, 331 (Colo.
App. 2005).
3 ¶9 We will not reverse the jury’s verdict even if reasonable people
might arrive at different conclusions based on the same facts.
S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583.
¶ 10 The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to determine the
child’s status as dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102
and whether that status warrants governmental intervention.
People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 39; see also K.D. v.
People, 139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006) (noting that the adjudication
is not made as to the parents but relates only to the child’s status).
¶ 11 As relevant here, a child is dependent or neglected when (1) a
parent has subjected them to mistreatment or abuse or has allowed
another to mistreat or abuse the child; (2) the child lacks proper
parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent; or (3)
the child’s environment is injurious to their welfare. § 19-3-
102(1)(a)-(c). An adjudication may be based on current, past, or
prospective harm. See People in Interest of G.E.S., 2016 COA 183,
¶ 15. Section 19-3-102 requires proof of only one condition for an
adjudication. See People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 29
(a department need only prevail on one adjudicatory element), aff’d
4 on other grounds sub nom. People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO
31.
¶ 12 An adjudication may not enter without proof, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the child is dependent or
neglected. People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶¶ 15, 53. The
preponderance standard allows for some uncertainty in the
determination of dispositive facts. See People in Interest of A.M.D.,
648 P.2d 625, 634 (Colo. 1982).
¶ 13 The credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative
effect, and weight of the evidence, as well as the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are within the purview of the
jury. Id.
B. Analysis
¶ 14 Mother contends that four of the concerns raised by the
Department were not individually sufficient to meet the threshold
for state intervention into the family. Specifically, mother asserts
that none of the following Department-identified issues
“constitute[d] a child protection concern”: (1) mother’s statements
that she died and was reborn a prophet and was lucky to be alive;
(2) the caseworker’s communications with the Alabama department
5 about mother’s activity in Alabama; (3) mother’s communication
with A.R. regarding moving to Alabama; and (4) the incident
between mother and father at the police station.
¶ 15 First, as to mother’s statements about being reborn as a
prophet, she contends that the Department failed to present
evidence that these statements were “an actual sign of mental
illness constituting a child protection concern.” She argues that the
Department failed to present the text messages in which she
purportedly made these statements to her mother, and that all the
witnesses who testified about mother making these statements were
biased against her.
¶ 16 Although the jury did not receive the text messages, it heard
directly from mother about the events leading up to the filing of the
petition. She denied many of the Department’s allegations,
including the allegation that she sent the caseworker a text
message saying mother was a prophet. While mother denied most
of the allegations or disputed the Department’s and witnesses’
versions of events, it was the jury’s role as fact finder — and not the
role of the juvenile court or this court — to make credibility
assessments and weigh the evidence. S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583. And
6 the jury was appropriately instructed that, as fact finder, it could
believe all, part, or none of the witnesses’ testimony — including
mother’s.
¶ 17 In addition, mother did not extensively cross-examine the
witnesses she says were biased against her, despite having the
opportunity to do so. For example, counsel asked the maternal
grandmother and a maternal aunt questions about their positions
that mother had “betrayed the whole family” by testifying in another
maternal aunt’s domestic relations case, which they believed
resulted in the maternal aunt losing custody of her son. But
mother did not cross-examine the other witnesses who she alleges
were biased against her as to why those witnesses were upset with
her or motivated to testify against her.
¶ 18 The caseworker also testified that, in the six weeks between
the first referral and the filing of the petition, mother’s behavior
became more erratic and unpredictable around the children. For
example, the caseworker testified that mother told her that she was
worried someone was following her and put a tracker in her car, but
when the caseworker asked for further details, mother could not
provide specifics. The caseworker explained this was a concern
7 because she believed this type of erratic behavior could place the
children “in harm’s way,” especially with respect to mother possibly
fleeing.
¶ 19 Second, mother challenges certain statements the caseworker
made to the Alabama department about the Department’s concerns
and the status of the Department’s case. Specifically, she contends
that the caseworker told the Alabama department that (1) mother
left the state during the pendency of the Colorado case; (2) Je.L.
had not seen the children for over a year; and (3) mother had tested
positive for marijuana. But none of these statements was presented
to the jury. Despite appearing in the Department’s notes and
records, those documents were not admitted at trial. And contrary
to mother’s arguments, the evidence presented to the jury showed
that H.L. and D.C.L. came to the Alabama department’s attention
before the Department made its courtesy report.
¶ 20 Third, mother contends that the evidence regarding her
communications with A.R. about Alabama were insufficient to
support an adjudication because the Department admitted into
evidence only one text message in which she talked about A.R.
possibly moving to Alabama, she never took A.R. across state lines,
8 and her asking A.R. if she wanted to move to be with the family did
not warrant the Department’s intervention. The caseworker
acknowledged that only one text message had been entered into
evidence, but the caseworker also testified that A.R. showed her
other text messages in which A.R. felt pressured by mother because
mother repeatedly asked her whether she wanted to move to
Alabama. The caseworker further testified that she was not in
possession of the other text messages A.R. showed her because A.R.
had not sent them to the caseworker. Finally, the caseworker
testified that, because the parents had 50-50 custody, mother could
not take A.R. out of Colorado without father’s permission,
suggesting that mother not taking A.R. over state lines did not
discount the caseworker’s concerns that mother still posed a flight
risk.
¶ 21 Fourth and finally, mother contends that the police incident
between her and father did not involve a risk of child
endangerment. Mother and father dispute what occurred at the
police station. But the caseworker testified that she observed
concerning interactions between mother and A.R. after the incident,
including mother pressuring A.R. to endorse the story that father
9 pointed a gun at A.R., despite A.R.’s distress and insistence that
she did not see a gun.
¶ 22 And the Department’s presentation of evidence to the jury was
not limited to the incidents mother now contends were insufficient.
Specifically, the jury also heard about referrals made by H.L.’s ABA
provider expressing concerns about a decline in H.L.’s hygiene and
mother’s lack of participation in H.L.’s ABA services. The
caseworker testified that each of the children was vulnerable: D.C.L.
because of his medical history, H.L. because of her communicative
delays related to an autism diagnosis, and A.R. because she
reported that she was “easily manipulated” by mother, leading to
A.R. cutting off contact with mother.
¶ 23 And mother and the caseworker testified that mother was only
participating in virtual family time with the children at the time of
the adjudicatory trial. The caseworker testified that after D.C.L.
and H.L.’s Alabama case was moved to Colorado, mother stopped
coming to Colorado and asked to stop all in-person family time.
From the above-described evidence, the jury could reasonably infer
that the children were each dependent or neglected under one or
10 more of the statutory criteria presented. See § 19-3-102(1)(a)-(c).
Accordingly, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict.
III. Evidentiary Matters
A. Unpreserved or Conclusory Contentions
¶ 24 Mother contends that the juvenile court should have
conducted an analysis under People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318
(Colo. 1990), before admitting evidence concerning mother’s first
dependency or neglect action. But mother did not ask the juvenile
court to conduct a Spoto analysis. True, mother objected during
cross-examination to the Department’s attorney questioning her
about her own testimony regarding the first case, on the grounds
that information about that case was not disclosed in discovery.
And mother asserted that testimony about the first case would be
unfairly prejudicial because her children had not been adjudicated
in that case (which was untrue). But these objections are not
sufficient for us to review mother’s contention that a Spoto analysis
should have been conducted. People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37
(An issue is unpreserved for review when, among other things, “an
objection or request was made in the trial court, but on grounds
different from those raised on appeal or on unspecific grounds
11 which would not have alerted the trial court to the issue of which
the defendant now seeks review.”) (citation omitted).
¶ 25 Similarly, mother contends that the juvenile court improperly
allowed her sister to testify about mother’s character for
truthfulness. Although mother lodged a foundation-based objection
to her sister’s testimony, the issue she raises now is fundamentally
different from what she raised below. Thus, we will not address it.
Id.
¶ 26 Finally, mother contends that the juvenile court’s evidentiary
rulings admitted “highly prejudicial and irrelevant evidence,” thus
violating her rights to a fair and impartial jury and due process. To
the extent mother is attempting to argue a separate due process
claim, we do not see that mother raised any such challenge for the
juvenile court’s determination. Regardless, mother’s appellate
argument on this basis is conclusory and underdeveloped and,
therefore, we decline to address it. People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021
COA 4, ¶ 35 (we won’t consider claims which are “merely a bald
assertion without argument or development”).
12 B. Standard of Review
¶ 27 We review evidentiary rulings, including whether to allow or
prohibit witness testimony, for an abuse of discretion. People in
Interest of M.V., 2018 COA 163, ¶ 52, overruled on other grounds by
People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42. A court abuses
its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous
understanding or application of the law or is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair. Id.
C. Hearsay Statements
¶ 28 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred by
permitting the caseworker to testify about statements mother made
to the caseworker, and about A.R.’s and D.C.L.’s statements that
they did not feel safe with mother.
1. Applicable Law
¶ 29 Colorado Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a
statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. Hearsay is generally not admissible. CRE 802.
However, exceptions to the hearsay rule include, as relevant here,
“[a] statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind,
13 emotion, sensation, or physical condition.” CRE 803(3). And prior
statements by witnesses subject to cross-examination, along with
admissions by party-opponents, are not hearsay under the rule.
CRE 801(d)(1)-(2).
2. Analysis
¶ 30 Mother contends that the juvenile court improperly admitted
her hearsay statements, along with hearsay statements made by
D.C.L. and A.R., as the basis of the caseworker’s expert opinion.
But the record reveals otherwise.
¶ 31 After mother lodged objections to D.C.L.’s and A.R.’s
statements, they were admitted under the exceptions for “then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition.”
See CRE 803(3). Mother does not contend that applying this
exception to the hearsay rule constituted error. And mother’s own
statements to the caseworker offered against her during the
caseworker’s testimony are expressly not hearsay, as they are
statements of a party-opponent under CRE 801(d)(2).
¶ 32 We therefore discern no basis for reversal based on the court’s
admission of alleged hearsay statements.
14 D. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
¶ 33 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred by
permitting mother (a lay witness) and the caseworker (a qualified
expert) to opine that the children were in an injurious environment.
¶ 34 “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” CRE 704. However, a
witness may not “tell the jury what result to reach or form
conclusions for the jurors that they are competent to reach on their
own.” People in Interest of J.R., 2021 COA 81, ¶ 21 (citation
omitted).
¶ 35 During the adjudicatory trial, the Department questioned
mother about the incident at the police station, asking her
repeatedly if A.R. was in an injurious environment during that
event. Mother objected on the basis that the questioning called for
a legal conclusion, and she denied that the child was in an
injurious environment. The cross-examination continued,
culminating with the Department asking mother whether she
15 “agree[d] that [A.R.] was in an injurious environment through no
fault of your own” on that day.
¶ 36 Later, the caseworker opined “that the children . . . were in an
injurious environment” and she “thought that they were in danger.”
And she agreed that she was “asking the jury to make that finding
legally at the end of the trial.”
¶ 37 Even assuming impropriety in the Department’s questioning,
we conclude that any error was harmless. Because of our
assumption, mother urges us to apply the constitutional harmless
error standard of review used in criminal cases. But the supreme
court has not expressly determined whether that standard of
reversal applies in dependency or neglect cases. People in Interest
of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136, ¶¶ 26-27. We need not decide whether
constitutional or nonconstitutional harmless error applies because,
in this situation, the error would not have affected the outcome
under either standard of review.
¶ 38 The jury returned a special verdict finding that each child was
in an injurious environment. But the jury also determined that the
children were all subjected to mistreatment or abuse and lacked
proper parental care because of mother’s acts or failures to act,
16 which are independent grounds for adjudicating the children. S.M-
L., ¶ 29. Because the jury found two other grounds for adjudicating
each of the children dependent or neglected, we cannot say that
mother’s and the caseworker’s opinion testimony regarding
injurious environment substantially influenced the outcome of the
children’s adjudications.
IV. Jury Instructions
¶ 39 Finally, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by
instructing the jury (1) that it could consider the way mother
treated other children and (2) “as to what constituted an injurious
environment.” We discern no basis for reversal.
¶ 40 A juvenile court must correctly instruct the jury on applicable
law but “retains substantial discretion over the form and style of
jury instructions.” People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178,
¶ 17. We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether,
taken as a whole, they accurately informed the jury of the
applicable law. J.G., ¶ 33. However, we review a court’s decision to
give or not give a particular instruction for an abuse of discretion.
Id. A ruling on jury instructions is an abuse of discretion only
17 when the ruling results in a misstatement of the law or is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.
B. Treatment of Other Children
¶ 41 The Department proposed an instruction stating that the jury
“may consider the way [mother] treated other children in
determining whether [H.L.], [D.C.L.], and [A.R.] are dependent or
neglected — meaning whether [H.L.], [D.C.L.], and [A.R.] lack proper
parental care as the result of [mother]’s acts or failures to act, or
whether [H.L.], [D.C.L.], and [A.R.]’s environment is injurious to
their welfare.” The pattern instruction on which this instruction
was based states that the jury “may consider [description of
respondent]’s treatment of (another child)(other children) in
determining whether the child in this case lacks proper parental
care” and advises that the instruction defining “proper parental
care” also be given. CJI-Civ. 41:11 (2025).
¶ 42 Mother objected to this instruction on grounds that the
Department intended that the jury consider mother’s treatment of
her stepchildren, and that doing so had a “high risk of confusing
the jury.” Mother now extends that argument by asserting that the
case cited by the pattern instruction, People in Interest of D.L.R.,
18 638 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1981), limited its application to a parent’s
treatment of their other natural children. Even if we were
persuaded by such a distinction, the court’s instruction did not
specify which “other children” the jury was to consider when
determining whether any of the children in this case were
dependent or neglected, and it certainly did not direct the jury to
consider the treatment of mother’s stepchildren specifically. We
therefore conclude that the instruction accurately informed the jury
of the applicable law. J.G., ¶ 33.
¶ 43 We therefore discern no basis for reversal.
C. Injurious Environment
¶ 44 Mother also contends that the juvenile court improperly
instructed the jury on “what constituted an injurious environment.”
But mother does not provide a record citation to where the court
gave such an instruction, and we are unable to locate such an
instruction. We therefore decline to address this contention.
V. Conclusion
¶ 45 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.