Peo in Interest of TT

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 9, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0851
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0851 Peo in Interest of TT 10-09-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0851 Adams County District Court No. 23JV30149 Honorable Kelley R. Southerland, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of T.T., a Child,

and Concerning T.G.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 9, 2025

Heidi M. Miller, County Attorney, Chelsea Kancilia, Assistant County Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 T.G. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationship with T.T. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In July 2023, the Adams County Human Services Department

received a report that mother had given birth to a substance-

exposed child. Mother agreed to a safety plan, but she didn’t

comply with the plan, so the Department filed a petition in

dependency or neglect, removed the child from mother’s care, and

placed the child with kin.

¶3 Mother admitted to the petition, and the juvenile court

adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The court then

adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶4 Nearly a year later, in September 2024, the Department moved

to terminate mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court held an

evidentiary hearing in April 2025, at which the current caseworker

and a previous caseworker testified. After hearing the evidence, the

court granted the Department’s motion and terminated the parent-

child legal relationship between mother and the child.

1 II. Discussion

¶5 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by admitting the

current caseworker’s termination report under section 19-3-604(3),

C.R.S. 2025. For the reasons set forth below, we discern no

reversible error.

¶6 We review a juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 32.

A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law.

People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 9.

¶7 Section 19-3-604(3) provides that “[f]or the purpose of

determining termination of the parent-child legal relationship,

written reports and other materials relating to the child’s mental,

physical, and social history may be received and considered by the

court along with other evidence.” If a party makes a request, the

court “shall require that the person who wrote the report or

prepared the material appear as a witness and be subject to both

direct and cross-examination.” Id.

¶8 At the start of the termination hearing, the juvenile court

noted that it had received the termination report and asked whether

2 there was a “stipulation to admit [it] as Exhibit 1.” The county

attorney stated that she didn’t intend to offer the report into

evidence and would “just go through it today.”

¶9 However, at the close of witness testimony, the court asked

whether there was any “reason why [it] could not admit” the report,

“given that the two persons present have appeared and testified and

have been available for cross-examination [under] section 19-3-

604(3).” Mother’s counsel objected on the basis that “the court

report contains hearsay, and even hearsay within hearsay.” The

court overruled the objection, noting that it could “identify the

hearsay” and would not “accept the [hearsay] statements” for the

truth of the matter asserted. The court indicated that it would

otherwise “apply appropriate weight and consideration to the

statements within the report that may be considered hearsay.”

¶ 10 On appeal, mother reasserts her argument that the

termination report was inadmissible under section 19-3-604(3)

3 because it contained hearsay.1 But divisions of this court have

rejected identical arguments under other statutes that provide for

the admission of reports under circumstances similar to those in

section 19-3-604(3). See People in Interest of R.D.H., 944 P.2d 660,

664-65 (Colo. App. 1997) (considering social study and similar

reports admitted under section 19-1-107(2), C.R.S. 2025); People in

Interest of A.R.S., 502 P.2d 92, 94-95 (Colo. App. 1972) (considering

reports admitted under previous statutory provisions concerning

social study and similar reports). In those circumstances, the

divisions concluded that the fact that the reports may contain

hearsay becomes a matter concerning their weight and probative

value, rather than their admissibility. R.D.H., 944 P.2d at 664;

A.R.S., 502 P.2d at 95. Because we are persuaded by these cases,

1 The Department and guardian ad litem ask us to dismiss mother’s

appeal because she didn’t ensure that the challenged Exhibit 1 was included in the appellate record. See Knoll v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins., 216 P.3d 615, 617 (Colo. App. 2009) (“It is the appellant’s job to ensure that the reviewing court has an adequate record.”). Although the appellate record doesn’t contain a document labeled as Exhibit 1, it is clear from the record that the document the juvenile court admitted as Exhibit 1 was the termination report filed by the Department on March 25, 2025, and that document is in the record. Therefore, there is no basis to dismiss the appeal.

4 we conclude that the juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion by

admitting the report under section 19-3-604(3).

¶ 11 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred by admitting

the report because section 19-3-604(3) only applies to reports and

materials relating to the child’s mental, physical, and social history,

yet much of the content of the report related to her mental,

physical, and social history. We aren’t convinced that information

in the report relating to mother’s compliance with the treatment

plan didn’t relate to the child’s mental, physical, and social history

because this information was directly relevant to mother’s

relationship with the child and her ability to provide appropriate

care for her. See R.D.H., 944 P.2d at 664-65 (rejecting a similar

argument and concluding that a termination report is the kind of

report “contemplated as admissible under [section] 19-1-107”). We

therefore reject mother’s assertion.

¶ 12 In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of

argument, that the juvenile court erred by admitting all or portions

of the report for either of the reasons discussed above, we conclude

that any putative error is harmless. See CRE 103(a); C.R.C.P. 61.

Mother identifies hearsay statements in the report, but she doesn’t

5 direct us to anything in the record to indicate that the juvenile

court relied on those hearsay statements in terminating her

parental rights. Still, we recognize that the court referred to the

termination report three times in its oral ruling. Specifically, the

court referred to the report in finding that mother (1) submitted

only three drugs screens; (2) didn’t complete a nurturing parenting

class; and (3) attended only two family engagement meetings. But

the previous caseworker testified to those same subjects, providing

an independent basis for the court’s decision. See R.D.H., 944 P.2d

at 664 (concluding that any error in admitting evidence that is

cumulative of other evidence is harmless). We therefore perceive no

III. Disposition

¶ 13 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.