Peo in Interest of SRC

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 10, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0134
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0134 Peo in Interest of SRC 07-10-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0134 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV30600 Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.R.C., a Child,

and Concerning R.A.C. and J.R.C.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Harris and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 10, 2025

Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Michael Kovaka, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant R.A.C.

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for Appellant J.R.C. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, J.R.C. (father) and

R.A.C. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with S.R.C. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Denver Department of Human Services (the Department)

received a referral that the newborn child had been exposed to

fentanyl and that the parents had not been visiting her in the

neonatal intensive care unit “very frequently.” The Department

then filed a petition in dependency or neglect.

¶3 Both mother and father entered into deferred adjudications,

agreeing to (1) abstain from consuming nonprescribed, controlled

substances; (2) maintain stable housing; (3) comply with any

visitation or parenting time schedule; and (4) cooperate with the

Department. Five months later, the juvenile court revoked the

deferred adjudications and adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected. The court then adopted treatment plans that mirrored

the terms of the parents’ deferred adjudications and added a mental

health component for father.

¶4 The Department later moved to terminate the parents’ legal

relationships with the child. Twenty-six months after the petition

1 was filed, the juvenile court held a contested hearing and granted

the termination motion.

II. Continuance

¶5 Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

by denying his request to continue the termination hearing. We are

not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 In ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court should

balance the need for orderly and expeditious administration of

justice against the facts underlying the motion while considering

the child’s need for permanency. People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019

COA 136, ¶ 44. When a child is under six years old when the

petition in dependency and neglect is filed, the expedited

permanency planning (EPP) provisions apply, and the juvenile court

cannot delay or continue the termination hearing absent good

cause and a finding that the delay would serve the best interests of

the child. §§ 19-3-104, 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2024.

¶7 We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to continue

for an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d

905, 908 (Colo. App. 2005). A court abuses its discretion when its

2 ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in Interest of E.B., 2022

CO 55, ¶ 14.

B. Analysis

¶8 At the start of the termination hearing father’s counsel joined

mother’s request for a continuance, seeking additional time to

demonstrate his sobriety and engagement after his recent release

from incarceration. In denying father’s request, the juvenile court

determined that there was no evidence that a continuance was in

the child’s best interests.

¶9 The record supports this finding. At the time of the

termination hearing, the case had been open for twenty-six months,

the child had been out of the home for the entire length of the case,

and neither parent had seen the child in over eight months.

¶ 10 We perceive no abuse of discretion because the juvenile court

properly weighed the reasons proffered for the continuance against

the need for prompt resolution of the proceeding and the child’s

best interests. See § 19-3-104; T.M.S., ¶ 44.

¶ 11 Furthermore, at the conclusion of the caseworker’s testimony,

the juvenile court continued the termination hearing for nearly one

3 month. The court did so, in part, to give father’s counsel time to

contemplate additional evidence considering father’s recent change

of circumstance. Therefore, even if the juvenile court had abused

its discretion by initially denying father’s request, any effect was

mitigated by the subsequent continuance. See Bly v. Story, 241

P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010) (“An error affects a substantial right only

if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the error substantially

influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of

the trial itself.’”) (citation omitted).

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 12 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding

that the Department made reasonable efforts, arguing that the

Department failed to provide various services and resources. We

disagree.

¶ 13 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds,

by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

4 or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 14 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the county department of human services

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the

family. See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; People in

Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011).

“Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care” for

children who are in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114),

C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 15 Appropriate services provided in accordance with section 19-3-

208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-

103(114). Among the services required under section 19-3-208 are

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information and referral services to available public and private

assistance resources; family time services; and placement services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b). Other services — including transportation

assistance, diagnostic and mental health services, and drug and

5 alcohol treatment services — must be provided if the government

has sufficient funding. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶ 16 In assessing a department’s efforts, the juvenile court should

consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support

the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915, by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. But the parent is ultimately

responsible for using those services to comply with the treatment

plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.

2011).

¶ 17 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate a parent and reunify the family is

a mixed question of law and fact. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for

clear error but review de novo its legal determination whether the

Department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

6 B. Housing Assistance

¶ 18 Both mother and father assert that the Department failed to

provide adequate housing support or services, which inhibited their

ability to comply with their treatment plans.

¶ 19 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents, including providing

information about housing voucher lotteries and housing

opportunities. But, the court found, the efforts were unsuccessful

through no fault of the Department.

¶ 20 The record supports the court’s conclusions regarding the

Department’s efforts. The ongoing caseworker testified that both

she and a prior caseworker provided mother and father with “a lot

of information via email with housing resources,” as well as one or

two Denver housing lotteries. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285 (holding

that the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that a

department met its reasonable efforts obligation “by providing

[mother] with information that she could have used to find

housing”). The caseworker also expressed that a lack of

communication from the parents impeded her ability to assist them

to overcome housing barriers.

7 ¶ 21 Nevertheless, mother and father assert that, because no

member of the Department had “specialized knowledge” related to

housing resources, the Department did not have meaningful

information to provide the “diligence and care” necessary to assist

them. But they do not point us to any law requiring a department

to have specialized expertise in the resources being provided, and

we are aware of none. See § 19-3-208(2)(b)(III) (requiring

departments to provide “[i]nformation and referral services to

available public and private assistance resources” as part of

reasonable efforts); see also J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285. Nor does

either parent assert that, had the Department possessed this

specialized knowledge, any additional resources would have been

available or provided to them.

¶ 22 Finally, we are unpersuaded by father’s argument that the

Department failed to make reasonable efforts by not offering

financial assistance. Section 19-3-208(2)(d) requires the

Department to provide specific services “based upon the state’s

capacity to increase federal funding or any other money

appropriated” for those services. § 19-3-208(2)(d). Financial

housing assistance is not one of the enumerated services. Father

8 cites section 19-3-208(2)(d)(VIII) — related to the provision of

financial services to prevent out-of-home placement — in support of

his argument. But, when mother and father lost their housing, the

child had already been in out-of-home placement for one year. And

the caseworker testified that the Department was unable to provide

financial housing assistance because the child was not in the care

of the parents.

¶ 23 For these reasons, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s

determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parents.

C. Efforts During Father’s Incarceration

¶ 24 Father also asserts that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to assist him with substance abuse and mental

health treatment while he was incarcerated.

¶ 25 Although the juvenile court did not make specific findings

about the Department’s efforts during father’s incarceration, the

court generally concluded that the Department made reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parents.

¶ 26 The record supports this conclusion. Father was incarcerated

twice during the case, for a total of approximately three months of

9 the twenty-six-month-long case. The caseworker testified that,

before father’s incarceration, he completed a substance abuse

evaluation which recommended ongoing treatment. But father

expressed an unwillingness to engage in the recommended

treatment.

¶ 27 The caseworker also testified that she met with father during

his first incarceration and discussed his mental health, sober living,

and inpatient treatment. At that time, the caseworker explained,

father had access to jail-based treatment services, so she placed a

referral for community mental health treatment. But, following his

release, father failed to communicate with the treatment provider.

See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285.

¶ 28 During father’s second incarceration, shortly before the

termination hearing, the caseworker met with him again, and they

discussed his efforts to reengage with the jail-based mental health

provider. At that time, father informed the caseworker that he was

on medication and believed it was helping his mental health.

¶ 29 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile

court’s determination that the Department made reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate father.

10 IV. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 30 Father next contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that he could not become fit within a reasonable time. We disagree.

¶ 31 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a

treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates his parental

rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.

2007). What constitutes a reasonable time to comply with a

treatment plan is necessarily fact specific and may vary from case

to case. Id. But a reasonable time is not an indefinite time; it must

be determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 25.

¶ 32 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change and whether the parent can become fit within a

reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider, among other

things, whether any change occurred during the dependency and

neglect proceeding, the parent’s social history, and the chronic or

long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition. K.D. v.

People, 139 P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006). When a child is under six

11 years old, as in this case, the juvenile court must also consider the

EPP provisions, which require that the child be placed in a

permanent home as expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6),

19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024; see also S.Z.S., ¶ 25.

¶ 33 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights is

a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. Thus, we review the court’s factual findings for

clear error but review de novo its legal conclusions based on those

facts. Id.

¶ 34 The juvenile court considered whether father could become fit

within a reasonable time but ultimately concluded that he could

not. The court found that “[t]here continue[d] to be concerns

regarding sobriety and an ability to meet the minor child’s basic

needs,” and father had “been involved with the Department and the

[c]ourt for over [two] years and no progress ha[d] been made.”

¶ 35 The record supports the court’s findings. At the beginning of

the case, the Department alleged concerns about father’s substance

use. But, at the time of termination, the caseworker testified that

father’s substance use was even more concerning. The caseworker

12 also described the cyclical nature of the case where father would

engage for a short time followed by months with no contact. The

caseworker did not believe this would change if father had more

time.

¶ 36 Furthermore, the caseworker testified that father did not have

a relationship with the child and had not seen her in over a year.

The caseworker expressed concern that having the child reengage

with father could be detrimental to her development.

¶ 37 We acknowledge that the caseworker testified that father did

not have any pending criminal cases and appeared to be sober and

in a family home during the termination hearing. But father did not

present any evidence that he had the ability to remain stable and

sober long-term.

¶ 38 In determining that father could not become fit within a

reasonable time, the juvenile court properly considered the lack of

progress made during the case, the long-term nature of father’s

conduct, and the child’s needs. And because the record supports

the court’s findings, we will not disturb them.

V. Disposition

¶ 39 The judgment is affirmed.

13 JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.