25CA2186 Peo in Interest of SP 06-18-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA2186 Weld County District Court No. 24JV21 Honorable Troy Hause, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner,
In the Interest of S.P., a Child,
and Concerning M.P. and Z.K.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE LUM Welling and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 18, 2026
No Appearance for Petitioner
Josie Burt, Guardian Ad Litem
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant M.P.
Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Z.K. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, M.P. (mother) and Z.K.
(father) appeal the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for
S.P. (the child) to father’s sister and her husband (aunt and uncle).
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency or neglect after receiving reports that mother
tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of birth and that
the newborn child was exhibiting symptoms of drug withdrawal.
The court granted temporary legal custody of the child to the
Department, who placed her with aunt and uncle.
¶3 With respect to mother, the juvenile court adjudicated the
child dependent or neglected. The court later adopted a treatment
plan for mother by agreement of the parties. Father admitted the
petition, and the court adopted a treatment plan for him, as well.
¶4 The parents’ treatment plans required them, as relevant here,
to (1) address substance abuse by completing evaluations,
developing treatment goals, and submitting to substance abuse
monitoring; (2) participate in parenting time and demonstrate
appropriate parenting skills; and (3) address any mental health
1 issues by completing evaluations and following any
recommendations.
¶5 The guardian ad litem (GAL) later moved to allocate parental
responsibilities to aunt and uncle, who had served as the child’s
placement provider since birth. The Department supported the
GAL’s motion.
¶6 Over twenty months after the petition was filed, and after a
contested hearing, the juvenile court entered an allocation of
parental responsibilities (APR) and closed the dependency and
neglect action.
¶7 Both parents appeal. Mother contends that the court erred by
(1) awarding custody to aunt and uncle in the absence of evidence
that mother was an unfit parent or that the child’s health and
safety would be at risk in her care; and (2) qualifying the ongoing
caseworkers as expert witnesses. Father contends the court erred
by (1) finding that he was unfit; (2) awarding custody to aunt and
uncle because father had substantially complied with his treatment
plan and father’s proposal to return the child to him and mother
was in the child’s best interest; and (3) denying his motion to
2 continue the APR hearing. We consider and reject each of these
contentions in turn.
II. Continuance
¶8 First, we disagree with father’s contention that the juvenile
court erred by denying his motion to continue the APR hearing.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶9 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with
all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best
interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, when
ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court “should balance
the need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice
against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for
permanency.” People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 11.
When, as here, a case is subject to expedited permanency planning
(EPP) standards, the court must not delay or continue any hearing
“unless good cause is shown and unless the court finds that the
best interests of the child will be served by granting a delay or
continuance.” § 19-3-104, C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 10 We review a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to continue for
an abuse of discretion. R.J.B., ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion
3 “when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,
or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law.” People in Interest of
E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.
B. Additional Background
¶ 11 Two months before the APR hearing, new counsel substituted
into the case to represent father. At the pretrial readiness
conference, held two weeks before the APR hearing, counsel
declared “ready to proceed” with the hearing, but noted that “the
Department still has their twenty-one-day window to provide us
with our initial discovery request.” The Department responded that
it did not have a discovery request from father.
¶ 12 Two days later, father filed a motion to continue the APR
hearing, arguing that “[c]ounsel’s communication to the court that
he was prepared to move forward with the hearing was based on
this belief that he would have access to discovery prior to the APR
hearing.” Father’s counsel noted that he was “mistaken” in his
belief that discovery had been requested and said that he requested
discovery as soon as he realized this mistake. The Department
objected to father’s continuance request. The Department noted
that father’s counsel had fifty-three days to request discovery
4 following the substitution of counsel and prior to the pretrial
readiness conference and argued that a continuance was not in the
child’s best interest. The juvenile court denied father’s request,
finding “that discovery was not timely requested and a continuance
[was] not in the child’s best interests.”
¶ 13 Father renewed his request at the beginning of the APR
hearing, arguing that counsel received the requested discovery less
than twenty-four hours before the hearing and did not have
adequate time to review it. The Department and GAL objected to
father’s request, and the GAL noted that this EPP case had been
open almost seventeen months. The court again denied the
request, finding that it was not in the child’s best interests to
continue the matter and that the discovery request was not made
timely.
C. Analysis
¶ 14 Father argues that he was prejudiced by not having discovery
until the day before the hearing because it did not allow counsel to
“comprehensively plan and prepare for the case.” But father does
not explain what specific discovery he required from the
Department to “comprehensively plan and prepare” to rebut the
5 GAL’s APR motion. And he does not identify how additional time to
review discovery would have changed the juvenile court’s
assessment of whether the requested APR was in the child’s best
interest.
¶ 15 Additionally, the case had been open for over twenty months
by the time the juvenile court issued its judgment, the EPP
provisions applied, and mother’s counsel did not provide any reason
for finding that a delay would serve the child’s best interests. See
§ 19-3-104.
¶ 16 Thus, father has failed to establish that the juvenile court
abused its discretion by finding that a continuance was not in the
child’s best interest and denying his request.
III. Expert Testimony
¶ 17 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by qualifying the
Department’s caseworkers as expert witnesses because the GAL
and Department failed to establish that their testimony was based
upon reasonably reliable principles and methods. We disagree.
A. Preservation
¶ 18 The GAL argues that mother did not preserve this issue,
because one party is “not allow[ed] . . . to take advantage of the
6 objection of another party to preserve an issue for appeal.” Mother
did not object to the caseworkers’ expert testimony. But father
objected, and the court ruled on the issue as to each caseworker.
Only mother claims on appeal that the court erred in admitting this
testimony.
¶ 19 To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must alert
the juvenile court to the issue so that the court has an adequate
opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 21. However, we have not
addressed whether one party’s objection can preserve an issue for
the other party. See People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50, ¶ 15 n.2 (noting
that we have not addressed “whether a defendant’s objection alone
can preserve an issue for appellate review for a co-defendant,” and
other jurisdictions are divided). We need not decide this issue
because, even if we assume father’s objection preserved mother’s
claim, we discern no reversible error.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 20 People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001), and CRE 702 govern
the admissibility of experience-based expert testimony, including
expert testimony offered by department of human services
7 caseworkers. People in Interest of A.F., 2025 COA 76, ¶ 16. To be
admissible, the testimony must be reliable and relevant, and its
probative value must not be “substantially outweighed by any of the
countervailing considerations contained in CRE 403.” Kutzly v.
People, 2019 CO 55, ¶ 10.
¶ 21 Upon objection, the juvenile court must “make specific
findings as to the four Shreck factors — reliability, qualifications,
usefulness, and CRE 403 — before admitting such testimony.”
A.F., ¶ 20. “The proponent of the expert testimony bears the
burden of showing that the testimony satisfies each of those
requirements.” Id. The court need not hold an evidentiary hearing,
but its findings must be explicit and supported by the record. Id.
¶ 22 We review a juvenile court’s admission of expert testimony for
an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of M.W., 140 P.3d 231,
233 (Colo. App. 2006). A court abuses it discretion by admitting
expert testimony without specific findings “unless the record not
only supports admission of the contested testimony, but virtually
requires it, or if Colorado has already properly accepted the basis of
the expert’s testimony.” Kutzly, ¶ 11.
8 C. Analysis
¶ 23 The GAL offered both caseworkers as experts in “child
protection casework.” Regarding the first caseworker, father
objected, arguing that the caseworker’s qualifications were “limited
to her ability to assess the successes and failures of a parent based
on the different aspects of a treatment plan.” Father also argued
that “the methodology lacks reliability” and that the caseworkers’
expert testimony unfairly prejudiced father. Regarding the second
caseworker, father objected generally, asking that the caseworker
not be accepted as an expert pursuant to Shreck and A.F. Father
asked the court to make specific findings as to the four Shreck
factors for both caseworkers.
¶ 24 Regarding the first caseworker, the county attorney addressed
the four Shreck factors, arguing that (1) the caseworker’s
qualifications had been demonstrated; (2) the “the methods and
principles that she relie[d] on in forming her opinions [were]
reliable;” (3) her opinions were helpful to the court as the fact
finder; and (4) the testimony was not prejudicial under CRE 403.
The juvenile court then recognized the caseworker as an expert in
child protection casework without making any findings.
9 ¶ 25 We agree with mother that the court erred when it accepted
the first caseworker as an expert without making specific findings
as required by A.F. However, we ultimately conclude that this error
was harmless because the court made findings when it accepted the
second caseworker’s substantially similar expert testimony. See
People in Interest of C.C., 2022 COA 81, ¶ 20 (an error is harmless
unless “it can be said with fair assurance that the error
substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the
basic fairness of the trial itself”) (citation omitted).
¶ 26 Regarding the second caseworker, the county attorney argued
that the caseworker’s “qualifications have been established, the
methods and principles upon which her opinion is based have been
shown to be reliable by her testimony [and] most of [her] training is
based on methods and principles that are validated by scientific
studies.” The county attorney also argued that the testimony would
be helpful to the court as the fact finder and that it would not be
prejudicial. The juvenile court “agree[d] with the request from the
Department with regards to those findings” and stated that it “will
make those findings” pursuant to Shreck and CRE 702 “based upon
10 [the caseworker’s] education, knowledge, training, and experience in
the field of child protection casework.”
¶ 27 The court’s findings are not arbitrary or unreasonable because
the record supports them. The second caseworker testified about
the various bases for her expert testimony. The caseworker
attended the caseworker academy, which covered topics such as
child development, bonding and attachment, and the impact of
parental substance abuse and mental health on children. The
caseworker testified that the training methods used in the academy
are based on “methods and principles that are validated by
scientific studies.” The caseworker explained that her training was
designed in collaboration with the Kempe Center for the Prevention
of Child Abuse and Neglect, which uses “methods and principles
that are validated by scientific studies.”
¶ 28 Additionally, the caseworker received risk assessment training
based on “a validated tool that [is] used to determine risk
assessment scores for families.” She also received training in
“adverse childhood experience testing,” which is “based on a
long-term study involving adverse childhood experiences . . . and
how that will impact those children when they become adults.”
11 ¶ 29 Finally, the caseworker testified that Volume 7 guides a lot of
her casework and that it “was designed using methods and
principles that are validated by scientific studies.”1
¶ 30 While it is best practice to make express findings, we conclude
that by incorporating the Department’s record supported argument
into its findings, the juvenile court did not misapply A.F. and
appropriately addressed father’s objection by determining that the
witness’ opinions were based upon reasonably reliable principles
and methods. And the court informed the parties’ attorneys that if
they believed the caseworkers provided an opinion outside of their
expertise, it would address such a contention by contemporaneous
objection. See A.F., ¶ 23 (“If a witness is sufficiently qualified to
offer the proposed opinion, and the juvenile court so finds, any
challenges to the witness’s qualifications go to the weight of the
testimony, not its admissibility.”).
¶ 31 But even if the court erred in qualifying the caseworkers as
experts, mother has not established that she was prejudiced, and
1 Practitioners often refer to the Colorado Department of Human
Services’ administrative rules and regulations as “Volume 7.” The rules and regulations are codified in the Colorado Code of Regulations. See 12 Code Colo. Regs. 2509-1 to -9.
12 therefore any error was harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61 (an evidentiary
error is harmless if it does not affect the parties’ substantial rights).
Mother has not identified any statements made by the caseworkers
that would have been inadmissible had the caseworkers testified as
lay witnesses. See A.F., ¶ 21 (the court’s inquiry into the reliability
of the principles underlying the caseworker’s testimony must focus
on “the specific opinions offered rather than of casework in the
abstract”). And the court relied on facts, not expert opinions, to
conclude that an APR was in the child’s best interests.
IV. Determination of the APR
¶ 32 The Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to enter an
order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing parenting
time when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a child who
is dependent and neglected. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2025; People
in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA 118, ¶ 10. When allocating parental
responsibilities in a dependency and neglect proceeding, the court
must consider the legislative purposes of the Children’s Code under
section 19-1-102. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18.
“The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s
13 welfare and safety by providing procedures through which the
child’s best interests can be served.” Id. at ¶ 19. Consequently, the
court must allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the
child’s best interests. Id.
¶ 33 Although a juvenile court must sometimes find that a parent is
unfit before it may terminate parental rights, see
§ 19-3-604(1)(c)(II), C.R.S. 2025, no such finding is required before
a court may allocate parental responsibilities. While parental
unfitness “clearly constitutes a compelling reason not to return a
child home,” parental deficiencies less serious than unfitness can
provide a compelling reason to deny the child’s return when
considered in light of the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278,
1283 (Colo. App. 2005). Thus, whether a parent is fit or unfit is not
dispositive of whether an APR is in the child’s best interests. See
People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011)
(APR must be determined in accordance with the child’s best
interests; a finding of parental unfitness is not required for a child
who has been adjudicated dependent or neglected).
14 ¶ 34 Even so, parents maintain a fundamental liberty interest in
the care, custody, and control of their children. See Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). In Troxel, the Supreme Court
recognized that a parent who is adequately caring for their child —
a fit parent — is presumed to act in their child’s best interests. Id.
at 68-69. Thus, in a dependency and neglect proceeding, if the
court determines that a parent has become fit, it must apply the
Troxel presumption before awarding an APR to a nonparent. See
J.G., ¶¶ 21, 27; People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶¶ 18-19.
Applying the Troxel presumption requires the court to accord “at
least some special weight to the parent’s own determination”
regarding the child’s best interests. J.G., ¶ 21 (quoting Troxel, 530
U.S. at 70).
¶ 35 Nonetheless, the Troxel presumption may be rebutted if clear
and convincing evidence shows that the parent’s determination is
not in the child’s best interests and that the nonparent’s request is
in the child’s best interests. See N.G.G., ¶ 16; In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128, 1132 (Colo. 2010).
The court must also identify special factors that support entering
an order contrary to the parent’s wishes. J.G., ¶ 22; see also In
15 Interest of C.T.G., 179 P.3d 213, 226 (Colo. App. 2007) (overturning
a visitation order based on Troxel when the nonparent failed to
present evidence of special circumstances to justify an order
contrary to the parents’ wishes).
¶ 36 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the
juvenile court’s sound discretion. In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, or when it misapplies the law.” People in Interest of M.H-K.,
2018 COA 178, ¶ 60. Further, we will not disturb a court’s factual
findings unless they are unsupported by the record. See J.G., ¶ 17.
Whether a court applied the correct legal standard in making its
findings, however, is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
B. Father’s Fitness and Treatment Plan Compliance
¶ 37 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding him
unfit because he had addressed his mental health and substance
use.
¶ 38 Though not required, the juvenile court found father unfit
because he had not shown compliance with “two major components
of this treatment plan,” substance abuse and mental health
16 treatment. The court also found that the child would be in danger
returning home, because the court had “absolutely no information”
regarding the status of father’s substance abuse and mental health.
¶ 39 The record supports the court’s findings. The first caseworker
testified that at the time she stopped working on the case five
months before the APR hearing, father had not completed most of
his treatment plan. Although father completed an intake for
substance abuse treatment with a provider referred by the
Department, he never began treatment or sobriety monitoring.
Father told the caseworker that he was using a different treatment
provider, but he did not provide a release of information, so the
caseworker was unable to confirm his participation in treatment or
monitoring. The second caseworker testified that at the time of the
APR hearing, father still had not signed any releases of information,
so she was unable to confirm that father had participated “in
anything related to his substance abuse objective.”
¶ 40 Regarding father’s mental health, the first caseworker testified
that, early in the case, family time had to be suspended on four
separate occasions because father “became escalated while holding
[the child]” and threatened staff. Father did not provide any
17 releases of information to allow the caseworkers to confirm his
participation in treatment to address his mental health and related
escalations. The second caseworker testified that at the time of the
APR hearing she still had concerns regarding father’s mental
health. The caseworker worried about the child’s safety with father
because she had “a lack of knowledge of his escalation” and
“concerns . . . if it were to come up again.”
¶ 41 Additionally, the first caseworker testified that father was not
receptive to feedback from nurses and other medical professionals
regarding the child’s care. And the second caseworker testified that
father had not shown that he could care for the child for an
extended amount of time without supervision.
¶ 42 Even so, father asserts that based on mother’s fitness and his
treatment plan compliance, such as addressing his mental health
and substance abuse via “alternative methods,” the juvenile court
erred by not allocating parental responsibilities to him and mother.
But this argument essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence,
which we cannot do. People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56,
¶ 62. It is exclusively within the juvenile court’s purview to resolve
conflicting evidence. See B.R.D., ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of
18 A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo. 2010) (“[I]t is important to defer to
the [juvenile] court, particularly when it hears contradictory
testimony on material issues . . . .”). And the juvenile court’s
weighing of the evidence, including father’s partial treatment plan
compliance and mother’s fitness, led it to explicitly conclude that
“the child would be in danger in returning home.”
¶ 43 Moreover, a parent’s treatment plan compliance is not
determinative of how the court should allocate parental
responsibilities. See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208. Here, in entering its
orders, the juvenile court focused on the child’s best interests,
giving paramount consideration to her protection and safety. See
People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13.
C. Mother’s Fitness
¶ 44 Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion
because it awarded custody to aunt and uncle in the absence of
evidence that mother was unfit. We are not persuaded.
¶ 45 The juvenile court first found that mother had become fit
because she had successfully completed her treatment plan. Based
on that finding, the court recognized that the Troxel presumption
applied and that “there’s a higher standard with regards to
19 overcoming the presumption.” But the court concluded that the
presumption had been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
showing that the child living with mother was not in her best
interests. Specifically, the court found that because mother lived
with father, the child “would be in danger in returning home.”
¶ 46 The record supports the court’s findings. Recall the court’s
earlier findings that father was unfit and therefore a danger to the
child. Mother testified that she was living with father and that she
did not have “a lot of support outside of [father].” And the first
caseworker testified that mother planned on parenting with father.
The caseworker opined that because the Department had to “look at
[the parents] as a unit,” mother was not “able to demonstrate the
protective factors that were needed for [the child].” The second
caseworker testified that “[t]he only safety concerns regarding
[mother] would just be . . . the protectiveness of her if [father] was
to get escalated again.”
¶ 47 The second caseworker also testified that mother did not have
the ability “to care for [the child] for an extended amount of time
unsupervised.” Ultimately, the second caseworker opined that a
20 return to the parents was not in the child’s best interest and that
the GAL’s proposed APR to aunt and uncle was.
¶ 48 Accordingly, we reject mother’s argument that the juvenile
court should have granted her an APR simply because she was a fit
parent. See C.M., 116 P.3d at 1283 (“[P]arental deficiencies less
serious than unfitness may give rise to a compelling reason not to
return the child home when considered in light of the child’s
physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.”).
D. Endangerment
¶ 49 Next, citing section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025, mother
asserts that “in the domestic relations context, a court may not
restrict a parent’s time with his or her children unless parenting
time would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly
impair the child’s emotional development.” From that premise,
mother argues that the court erred in restricting her parental role
without a health and safety concern that justified such a
restriction, violating her constitutional right to parent.
¶ 50 But section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) is part of the Uniform
Dissolution of Marriage Act (UMDA). When a custody issue arises
in a dependency and neglect proceeding, the court is guided by the
21 Colorado Children’s Code, not the UMDA. See J.G., ¶ 18; L.B., 254
P.3d at 1208. Consequently, unlike a restriction of parenting time
in the domestic relations context, a court need not find
endangerment before allocating parental responsibilities in a
dependency and neglect case. See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208.
¶ 51 Accordingly, whether the child would be endangered if she
lived with mother was not dispositive of the juvenile court’s APR
determination. Even so, as examined above, the juvenile court
concluded that the child would be in danger if placed with mother.
E. Delegation
¶ 52 Finally, mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it
granted aunt and uncle discretion to require her to submit to
substance abuse testing; a provision that, in her view, amounted to
an improper delegation of parenting time.
¶ 53 To be sure, whether to suspend family time or require a parent
to complete certain tasks before family time can begin are not
decisions that a juvenile court may delegate to third parties. People
in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 302 (Colo. App. 2006); see also
People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005)
(stating that recommendations as to family time are subject to the
22 continuing supervision and review of the juvenile court, which
retains ultimate decision-making responsibility). But no such
delegation occurred here.
¶ 54 The APR order allows aunt and uncle to “at any time ask
[mother] to submit to substance abuse testing to prove ongoing
sobriety,” and, upon a positive or dilute test, to “file a motion to
restrict parenting time pursuant to [section] 14-10-129(4).” This
provision provides a mechanism for the juvenile court to review
family time in light of new substance abuse concerns. But the
court retains the ultimate decision-making responsibility.
¶ 55 Thus, we do not read this provision as improperly delegating
the juvenile court’s responsibility to make decisions about
parenting time. See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070-71.
¶ 56 To the extent mother argues generally that the record did not
support a conclusion that the substance abuse provision was in the
child’s best interests, we disagree. Recall that the case opened
because mother tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of
birth and the newborn child exhibited symptoms of drug
withdrawal. To be sure, mother successfully completed the
substance abuse component of her treatment plan. But upon
23 completion of her substance abuse treatment, she did not follow
recommendations to stay at a sober living house and instead
decided to live with father. And, as examined above, father did not
complete the substance abuse component of his treatment plan,
and the court found that the child would be in danger returning
home because, in part, the court had no information about father’s
substance use.
F. Conclusion
¶ 57 We conclude that the juvenile court applied the correct legal
standard for allocating parental responsibilities to a nonparent in a
dependency and neglect case and that the record supports its
determination that an APR to the parents was not in the child’s best
interests. Accordingly, we discern no error. See E.B., ¶ 14; B.R.D.,
¶ 15.
V. Disposition
¶ 58 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.