24CA1659 Peo in Interest of RCML 06-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1659 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 21JV92 Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of R.C.M.L. and R.M.L., Children,
and Concerning R.P.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Gomez and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025
Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Christina R, Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for R.C.M.L.
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem, for R.M.L.
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, R.P.M. (mother)
appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for
R.C.M.L. (the youth) and R.M.L. (the child) to the maternal
grandmother. She contends that the juvenile court erred because it
granted permanent custody of the youth and the child over her
objection and “largely due to [her] residential and employment
instability.” We disagree and affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 Denver Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in
dependency and neglect, alleging concerns about substance use
and domestic violence in mother’s home. The juvenile court
adjudicated the youth and the child dependent and neglected and
adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring her to address
substance dependence, mental health, and domestic violence.
¶3 The Department later moved to close the dependency and
neglect action with an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to
the maternal grandmother, with whom the youth and child had
lived for three years. Three and a half years after the petition was
filed, the juvenile court awarded physical custody and
decision-making to the maternal grandmother and awarded mother
1 unsupervised family time for four weeks during the school year and
daily unsupervised virtual contact.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶4 The juvenile court has exclusive authority to determine the
legal custody of, or enter an APR judgment with respect to, a child
within its jurisdiction. § 19-1-104(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; L.A.G. v.
People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo. 1996).
¶5 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the
sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair. M.A.W. v. People, 2020 CO 11, ¶ 32. “In
weighing sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party and draw every inference
fairly deducible from the evidence in favor of the court’s decision.”
People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011).
When there is record support for the juvenile court’s findings, its
resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15.
2 III. Restriction of Parenting Time
¶6 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by
restricting her parenting time. However, mother does not provide
any reference to her own case in her recitation of the law related to
this issue. Because mother’s claim is “merely a bald assertion
without argument or development,” we will not consider it. People
in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 35.
IV. Custody and Decision Making
A. The Juvenile Court’s Grant of Custody and Decision-Making was Based on Mother’s Failure to Engage in Services
¶7 Mother next contends that the juvenile court vested
decision-making to the maternal grandmother “largely due to
mother’s residential and employment instability.”
¶8 But the juvenile court’s oral ruling makes clear this was not
the case. The court told mother, “your housing and stability [are]
not the hugest concern in this case for me. We have kids who live
with parents in shelters all across Denver.” The court went on to
tell mother that its “biggest concern today and the compelling
reason that I am granting the Department’s motion for [an] APR is I
3 don’t know what treatment you have done. I don’t know that you
have addressed” the issues that required the court’s intervention.
¶9 The juvenile court granted an APR to the maternal
grandmother and found, with record support, that mother failed to
complete ordered treatment to address mental health, substance
dependance, and domestic violence. At the hearing, the caseworker
testified that in the three years she had worked with the family,
mother was not consistently engaged in services. The caseworker
testified that mother was discharged from three mental health and
substance dependence treatment centers for non-attendance and
disruptive behaviors. The caseworker further testified that, to the
best of her knowledge, mother had never engaged in any services for
domestic violence treatment, which were required under the terms
of mother’s probation.
¶ 10 The caseworker acknowledged that the youth and child did not
want to return to mother’s care because of her lack of stable
housing. Mother also testified that she believed the Department’s
main concern was her lack of stable housing.
¶ 11 However, the caseworker opined that an APR was in the best
interest of the youth and child not because of mother’s housing
4 instability, but because of the Department’s ongoing concerns
about mother’s untreated mental health and substance
dependence. The caseworker testified that, although services had
been established for mother through the Department and
probation, mother had been discharged for “not being consistent”
and for “her behaviors” with staff. The caseworker testified that she
had not been able to confirm what was going on for mother recently
in her treatment or services. Mother testified that she met with an
individual therapist only three times in the year before the APR
hearing, and that her meetings with clinical caseworkers and other
service providers were “fluctuating with different people.” Mother
testified that she had not completed any domestic violence
treatment.
¶ 12 Given this record, the juvenile court’s decision to grant
custody and decision-making to the maternal grandmother is not
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair
B. Mother Was Not Entitled to the Troxel Presumption
¶ 13 Mother next contends that the juvenile court’s judgment
granting custody and decision-making to a non-parent over her
objection was “improper under Troxel.”
5 ¶ 14 Generally, a fit parent is presumed to act in the child’s best
interests. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). However,
this presumption is overcome by an order adjudicating a child or
youth dependent and neglected. People in Interest of N.G., 2012
COA 131, ¶ 33.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24CA1659 Peo in Interest of RCML 06-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1659 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 21JV92 Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of R.C.M.L. and R.M.L., Children,
and Concerning R.P.M.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Gomez and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025
Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Christina R, Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for R.C.M.L.
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem, for R.M.L.
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, R.P.M. (mother)
appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for
R.C.M.L. (the youth) and R.M.L. (the child) to the maternal
grandmother. She contends that the juvenile court erred because it
granted permanent custody of the youth and the child over her
objection and “largely due to [her] residential and employment
instability.” We disagree and affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 Denver Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in
dependency and neglect, alleging concerns about substance use
and domestic violence in mother’s home. The juvenile court
adjudicated the youth and the child dependent and neglected and
adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring her to address
substance dependence, mental health, and domestic violence.
¶3 The Department later moved to close the dependency and
neglect action with an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to
the maternal grandmother, with whom the youth and child had
lived for three years. Three and a half years after the petition was
filed, the juvenile court awarded physical custody and
decision-making to the maternal grandmother and awarded mother
1 unsupervised family time for four weeks during the school year and
daily unsupervised virtual contact.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶4 The juvenile court has exclusive authority to determine the
legal custody of, or enter an APR judgment with respect to, a child
within its jurisdiction. § 19-1-104(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024; L.A.G. v.
People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo. 1996).
¶5 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the
sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair. M.A.W. v. People, 2020 CO 11, ¶ 32. “In
weighing sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party and draw every inference
fairly deducible from the evidence in favor of the court’s decision.”
People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011).
When there is record support for the juvenile court’s findings, its
resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15.
2 III. Restriction of Parenting Time
¶6 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by
restricting her parenting time. However, mother does not provide
any reference to her own case in her recitation of the law related to
this issue. Because mother’s claim is “merely a bald assertion
without argument or development,” we will not consider it. People
in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 35.
IV. Custody and Decision Making
A. The Juvenile Court’s Grant of Custody and Decision-Making was Based on Mother’s Failure to Engage in Services
¶7 Mother next contends that the juvenile court vested
decision-making to the maternal grandmother “largely due to
mother’s residential and employment instability.”
¶8 But the juvenile court’s oral ruling makes clear this was not
the case. The court told mother, “your housing and stability [are]
not the hugest concern in this case for me. We have kids who live
with parents in shelters all across Denver.” The court went on to
tell mother that its “biggest concern today and the compelling
reason that I am granting the Department’s motion for [an] APR is I
3 don’t know what treatment you have done. I don’t know that you
have addressed” the issues that required the court’s intervention.
¶9 The juvenile court granted an APR to the maternal
grandmother and found, with record support, that mother failed to
complete ordered treatment to address mental health, substance
dependance, and domestic violence. At the hearing, the caseworker
testified that in the three years she had worked with the family,
mother was not consistently engaged in services. The caseworker
testified that mother was discharged from three mental health and
substance dependence treatment centers for non-attendance and
disruptive behaviors. The caseworker further testified that, to the
best of her knowledge, mother had never engaged in any services for
domestic violence treatment, which were required under the terms
of mother’s probation.
¶ 10 The caseworker acknowledged that the youth and child did not
want to return to mother’s care because of her lack of stable
housing. Mother also testified that she believed the Department’s
main concern was her lack of stable housing.
¶ 11 However, the caseworker opined that an APR was in the best
interest of the youth and child not because of mother’s housing
4 instability, but because of the Department’s ongoing concerns
about mother’s untreated mental health and substance
dependence. The caseworker testified that, although services had
been established for mother through the Department and
probation, mother had been discharged for “not being consistent”
and for “her behaviors” with staff. The caseworker testified that she
had not been able to confirm what was going on for mother recently
in her treatment or services. Mother testified that she met with an
individual therapist only three times in the year before the APR
hearing, and that her meetings with clinical caseworkers and other
service providers were “fluctuating with different people.” Mother
testified that she had not completed any domestic violence
treatment.
¶ 12 Given this record, the juvenile court’s decision to grant
custody and decision-making to the maternal grandmother is not
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair
B. Mother Was Not Entitled to the Troxel Presumption
¶ 13 Mother next contends that the juvenile court’s judgment
granting custody and decision-making to a non-parent over her
objection was “improper under Troxel.”
5 ¶ 14 Generally, a fit parent is presumed to act in the child’s best
interests. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). However,
this presumption is overcome by an order adjudicating a child or
youth dependent and neglected. People in Interest of N.G., 2012
COA 131, ¶ 33. After an adjudication, a parent may regain the
Troxel presumption if the court finds that the parent complied with
their treatment plan and demonstrated an ability to safely parent
the children. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶¶ 18-19.
¶ 15 But here, the juvenile court did not find that mother complied
with her treatment plan, and did not find that mother regained
fitness. Instead, the court found that, despite having a treatment
plan in place “for a significant period of time,” — more than three
years — the court did not have a clear understanding of what
mother had done to complete the treatment plan. In other words,
the court found that mother had not completed her treatment plan
or addressed the safety concerns that required state intervention.
Under these circumstances, mother was not entitled to the Troxel
presumption.
6 C. The Juvenile Court Made Sufficient Findings
¶ 16 Finally, citing L.A.G., mother contends that the juvenile court
erred by failing to make adequate findings or reference the purposes
of the Children’s Code in the APR judgment. But mother’s reliance
on L.A.G. is misplaced. In that case, “[t]he juvenile court relied
solely on a limited number of the purposes” as articulated in the
domestic relations code and did not “consider any purposes of the
[Children’s] code.” L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1392. In contrast, here, the
juvenile court did not rely on or even mention the domestic
relations code.
¶ 17 When entering an APR judgment, the juvenile court must “be
guided by the underlying purposes of the Code.” Id. at 1391.
Although the court must allocate parental responsibilities to best
serve “the interests of the child and the public,” § 19-3-507(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2024, the Children’s Code does not prescribe any specific
factors the court must consider — or recite — in making its
decision. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo.
App. 2005).
¶ 18 The court found that granting an APR to the maternal
grandmother was in the youth and child’s best interests. The court
7 made extensive oral findings explaining the compelling reasons why
the youth and child could not be returned to mother’s care and
custody. While best practice would have incorporated these
findings into the written order, the court’s remarks, along with the
written APR judgment, provide a sufficient articulation of the
court’s reasoning to permit appellate review as contemplated under
L.A.G. C.f. L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1392 (concluding that reversal was
required where the juvenile court “fail[ed] to articulate sufficient
facts to permit appellate application of the appropriate legal
standard”).
¶ 19 We therefore discern no error.
V. Disposition
¶ 20 The APR judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.