Peo in Interest of QAL

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 20, 2025
• Docket: 25CA1085
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1085 Peo in Interest of QAL 11-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1085 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV30662 Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Q.A.L., a Child,

and Concerning K.L.L.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Fox and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 20, 2025

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, K.L.L. (father)

appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal

relationship with Q.A.L. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Denver Department of Human Services (the Department)

filed a petition in dependency or neglect raising concerns about the

child’s mother’s drug use and ability to care for him. When the

case began, father was incarcerated for life without the possibility of

parole and was not actively involved with the child. Father

remained incarcerated throughout the case.

¶3 Father disclosed that he was an enrolled member of the

Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma. Based on this

information, the Department sent notice pursuant to the Indian

Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963. The

Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes confirmed that the child was eligible

for enrollment. The court found that the child was an “Indian child”

and that ICWA applied to this case. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)

(defining “Indian child” for purposes of ICWA).

¶4 Following father’s no-fault admission, the juvenile court

adjudicated the child dependent or neglected and adopted a

1 treatment plan for father. Father’s treatment plan required him to

work with the Department to schedule and attend regular parenting

time, refrain from engaging in further criminal activity, and

maintain a working relationship with the Department.

¶5 Thirteen months later, the Department moved to terminate

father’s parental rights, and father moved for a finding that the

Department failed to make active efforts. The juvenile court held a

contested hearing addressing both motions. But after maternal

great-grandmother testified that she had Apache heritage, the court

held its order in abeyance until additional ICWA notice could be

sent. Almost a year after the contested termination hearing, the

juvenile court issued its order finding that the Department made

active efforts, granting the Department’s motion, and terminating

father’s parental rights.

II. Active Efforts

¶6 Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court

erred by finding that the Department made active efforts to prevent

the breakup of the Indian family as required by ICWA. We disagree.

2 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 ICWA establishes “minimum Federal standards” for an “Indian

child” involved in a “child custody proceeding.” 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902,

1903(1), (4); People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42, ¶ 2.

Under ICWA, any party seeking termination of parental rights to an

Indian child must “satisfy the court that active efforts have been

made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs

designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these

efforts have proved unsuccessful.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). Active

efforts require “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts

intended primarily to maintain or reunite an Indian child with

[their] family.” 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2025). Federal regulations include

nonexhaustive examples of active efforts, including identifying and

actively assisting the parents in obtaining appropriate services;

inviting tribal representatives to participate in providing support

and services to the family; contacting extended family members;

offering culturally appropriate family preservation strategies;

supporting regular family time; identifying community resources;

and monitoring progress and participation in services. Id.

3 ¶8 Still, “there is no one-size-fits-all formula,” and active efforts

“should be ‘tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case.’”

People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 32 (quoting 25

C.F.R. § 23.2). As a result, a department has “discretion to

prioritize certain services or resources to address a family’s most

pressing needs in a way that will assist the family’s overall

completion of the treatment plan.” Id. at ¶ 33.

¶9 To that end, “[c]ourts should analyze an agency’s active efforts

by considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for

all services and resources provided to a parent” and measure the

department’s efforts “holistically rather than in isolation with

respect to specific treatment plan objectives.” Id. at ¶¶ 33-35. The

active efforts standard does not require an agency to persist in futile

efforts. People in Interest of T.E.R., 2013 COA 73, ¶ 33; People in

Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12. And a court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment or engage with a

resource as part of its active efforts inquiry. A.V., ¶ 12.

¶ 10 Whether a department satisfied ICWA’s active efforts

requirement presents a mixed question of fact and law. My.K.M.,

¶ 20. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error

4 but review de novo whether those factual findings satisfy ICWA’s

active efforts requirement. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made active

efforts but that the efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. The court

found that the Department made parenting time referrals for father

but the rules and limitations of the prison facilities, along with

father’s mid-case facility transfer, were barriers to the Department’s

ability to establish family time.

¶ 12 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that she started the process to make a family time referral, but she

needed father’s prison case manager’s information before it could be

submitted. While the caseworker tried to get that information,

father was transferred to a different facility. The new facility

required a court order for family time. And the caseworker still

needed father’s new case manager’s information before she could

submit a family time referral — the information provided by father’s

counsel was incorrect. Once the caseworker obtained the correct

contact information, she submitted the referral for family time. She

5 also called and left voicemails for father’s case manager but

received no response.

¶ 13 Approximately two months later, the caseworker received a

call from a family time facilitator indicating that he had been

assigned to the case. The caseworker continued to follow-up with

the facilitator, as well as the Department’s services navigator,

regarding the status of family time. Ultimately, due to a lack of

communication from the prison facility, the family time facilitator

was unable to establish family time for father. During this time, the

caseworker also tried to communicate with the prison but, despite

leaving multiple voicemails, never received a return call.

¶ 14 The tribal representative from the Cheyenne and Arapaho

Tribes, designated by the court as an ICWA qualified expert witness

(QEW), testified that the caseworker engaged in efforts to set up

family time for father, there was not more the caseworker should

have done, and there were no other active efforts the Department

should have made. See id. at ¶ 45 (affirming the juvenile court’s

decision that a department made active efforts and relying, in part,

on the QEW’s opinion that the department had made active efforts).

6 ¶ 15 Even so, father asserts that the juvenile court erred because

the caseworker (1) waited thirteen months before submitting the

family time referral; (2) waited three more months to reach out to

the family time facilitator; and (3) neglected to explore other ways to

connect father and the child before the termination hearing. In

support of his argument, father references the QEW’s testimony

that it should not take thirteen months to submit a family time

referral when active efforts are required.

¶ 16 True, the record reflects that the family time referral was not

formally submitted until thirteen months into the case. But as

described above, the caseworker engaged in efforts to establish

family time during those thirteen months. And when the QEW’s

statement is examined in context, it is clear that she was not

criticizing the caseworker’s efforts in this case. The QEW confirmed

that, under the circumstances, she believed the Department made

active efforts even though the family time referral was delayed. See

id. at ¶¶ 33, 35.

¶ 17 Additionally, as described above, once the caseworker

obtained the family time facilitator’s information, she remained in

contact to assess the progress of family time. The QEW opined that

7 the caseworker engaged in active efforts by submitting the family

time referral and following up multiple times. The caseworker also

attempted to communicate directly with the prison but never

received a response. It is unclear how father expected the

caseworker to arrange alternative family time when she was unable

to connect with the facility despite these efforts.

¶ 18 Father next claims that the Department’s efforts were

insufficient because the caseworker’s communication with him was

limited. Had the caseworker communicated more, father contends,

“she would have been able to facilitate visitation and the rebuilding

of [f]ather’s bond with [the child].” However, when a lack of

communication from the prison impeded family time, it is unclear

to us how additional communication with father would have

facilitated family time. And even though father had the placement’s

phone number and address, he never called her to speak to the

child before the termination hearing. See A.V., ¶ 12.

¶ 19 Finally, we reject father’s contention that the juvenile court

erred by not reopening the case. Father asserts that, before issuing

its order, the juvenile court should have required additional

evidence regarding the Department’s efforts during the year the

8 case remained open following the termination hearing. But father

never made this request of the juvenile court, so this issue is not

preserved. See People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134

(Colo. App. 1998) (declining to address an argument raised for the

first time on appeal); see also Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C.,

251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010) (to “properly” preserve an

argument, the party must have “presented to the trial court the

sum and substance of the argument it now makes on appeal”).

¶ 20 Furthermore, even if father’s argument was preserved, we see

no error. Essentially father contends that, if the juvenile court had

taken testimony about the “changes” that occurred after the

termination hearing — referring to his “semi-regular” calls with the

child through the placement provider — the court’s concerns about

his lack of contact with the child may have been alleviated and the

court “may have concluded that a less drastic alternative to

termination existed.” But father’s lack of contact with the child was

only one factor the court considered when finding that there was no

less drastic alternative to termination. The court also found it “not

highly probable” that an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR)

could provide the level of stability and consistency that the child

9 needed and noted that the placement would not accept an APR.

See People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910 (Colo. App. 2005)

(“[L]ong-term or permanent placement may not be appropriate when

it does not provide adequate permanence or otherwise meet the

child’s needs.”); People in Interest of P.D., 580 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo.

App. 1978) (holding that a court cannot enter an APR to an

unwilling party who is not the child’s parent). And father does not

contest these findings. Because the record supports the juvenile

court’s finding that there was no less drastic alternative to

termination, we cannot disturb it. People in Interest of B.H., 2021

CO 39, ¶ 80.

¶ 21 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude

that the juvenile court did not err by determining that the

Department’s efforts met the active efforts standard. See My.K.M.,

¶¶ 33, 47. Thus, we decline to disturb the court’s judgment.

III. Disposition

¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.