Peo in Interest of PM

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 19, 2024
• Docket: 23CA1760
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

23CA1760 Peo in Interest of PM 09-19-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1760 Arapahoe County District Court No. 21JV229 Honorable Don J. Toussaint, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of P.M., Child-Appellant,

and L.M-J., a Child,

and Concerning A.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Welling and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 19, 2024

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Sarah Simchowitz, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Counsel for Youth, Brighton, Colorado, for P.M.

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem for L.M-J.

Harald Van Gaasbeek, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 A.M. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationships with her children, P.M. and L.M-J. The

older child, P.M., through counsel for youth (CFY), also appeals the

termination judgment as to her. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2020, the Pueblo County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging, among

other things, physical abuse of P.M., neglect of the children, and

substance abuse and mental health concerns for mother. Several

months later, the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent

and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Soon

thereafter, the court granted mother’s request to change venue to

Arapahoe County.

¶3 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services

(Department) developed and submitted an amended treatment plan

to the juvenile court, which the court adopted in December 2021.

The amended treatment plan required mother to (1) communicate

with the Department; (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation

and participate in substance abuse treatment; (3) maintain

1 employment or a legal form of income; (4) participate in a mental

health evaluation; (5) provide a safe and stable home environment

for the children; (6) demonstrate protective parenting; and (7)

abstain from further criminal activity and comply with her criminal

cases.

¶4 The Department initially moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights in October 2022 before refiling the motion in January 2023.

The juvenile court then held a termination hearing over three days

between March and September 2023. After hearing the evidence,

the court took the matter under advisement before entering a

written order terminating mother’s parental rights.

II. Mother’s Appeal

¶5 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by terminating her

parental rights for the following reasons: (1) the Department didn’t

make reasonable efforts; (2) the juvenile court judge should have

recused himself from the case; (3) mother’s counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion for recusal; (4) the

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it improperly

advised mother at the adjudicatory stage of the proceeding; and (5)

2 counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to address the

improper advisement. As explained in detail below, we disagree

with each of mother’s contentions.

A. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred by failing to

consider whether the Department made reasonable efforts. In the

alternative, she contends that the evidence was insufficient for the

court to find that the Department made reasonable efforts. We

disagree with both contentions.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶8 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), the county department of human services

must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunite 3 families. §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208,

19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024. Reasonable efforts means the

“exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents with their

children. § 19-1-103(114).

¶9 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the

services required under section 19-3-208 are screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶ 10 The juvenile court should consider whether the services

provided were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan,

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. The parent is ultimately

responsible for using the services to comply with the plan, People in

4 Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011), and the

court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in

treatment in determining whether the department made reasonable

efforts, see People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶ 11 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its

legal determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

2. Analysis

¶ 12 Mother first argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to

make an express finding that the Department had made reasonable

efforts. But section 19-3-604 doesn’t require an express finding.

Instead, section 19-3-604(2) directs the court to consider a

nonexhaustive list of factors to determine whether a parent is unfit,

including whether “[r]easonable efforts by child-caring agencies

[were] unable to rehabilitate the parent.” In other words, while a

consideration of reasonable efforts is required, a court must only

5 make findings as to the criteria in section 19-3-604(1)(c) to

terminate parental rights. See People in Interest of T.L.B., 148 P.3d

450, 457 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that the court’s findings are

adequate as long as they conform to the termination criteria in

section 19-3-604).

¶ 13 The juvenile court made findings as to each of the criteria for

termination in section 19-3-604(1)(c). The court’s written ruling

also recounted evidence related to the services provided by the

Department and discussed the specific arguments that mother

advances on appeal and which we address below (i.e., caseworker

contact and the psychological evaluation). We therefore discern no

basis to reverse the court’s judgment because of its lack of an

express reasonable efforts finding. See Foster v. Phillips, 6 P.3d

791, 796 (Colo. App. 1999) (“When the ruling, in the context of the

record, is sufficient to determine its basis, and the record is

sufficient to support the award, a failure to make express findings

does not require reversal.”); see also A.S.L., ¶ 15 (“Failure of the

court to make express findings, on its own, does not establish a

6 failure by the court to ensure that the Department made reasonable

efforts.”).

¶ 14 We also reject mother’s assertion that the evidence wasn’t

sufficient to establish that the Department made reasonable efforts.

Recall that mother’s treatment plan required, among other things,

that she address her substance abuse and mental health issues,

attend family time, and demonstrate parental protective capacity.

The record shows that the Department referred mother for a dual

diagnosis evaluation, individual therapy, monitored sobriety testing,

supervised family time services, and a parenting class. The

caseworker testified that mother completed the evaluation, but she

inconsistently participated in the therapy and continued to test

positive for methamphetamine. The record also shows that,

although mother attended family time, her visits remained at the

supervised level after more than two years. Finally, the caseworker

said that she offered mother parenting classes through the

Department, as well as an online option, but mother didn’t

complete a class.

7 ¶ 15 In sum, the record shows that the Department provided

mother with the necessary resources for her to complete her

treatment plan, but she didn’t take advantage of those resources to

become a fit parent. See A.V., ¶ 12; J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285.

Nevertheless, mother asserts, for the following two reasons, that the

Department failed to make reasonable efforts.

¶ 16 First, mother asserts that the Department didn’t make

reasonable efforts because the caseworker “failed to communicate

with [her] for the majority of the case.” However, the caseworker

testified that, although she didn’t properly document every contact

with mother during the case, she attempted to contact mother every

month during the case and mother was often unresponsive. And

although the caseworker admitted that she wasn’t able to arrange

one-on-one meetings with mother for extended periods, the

caseworker still met with mother in person at team meetings and

court hearings during those times. Ultimately, mother hasn’t

pointed us to anything in the record suggesting that these issues

prevented her from receiving the services that she needed to

complete her treatment plan. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. Thus,

8 under these circumstances, we can’t say that the Department failed

to make reasonable efforts because of any alleged failure of

communication. See My.K.M., ¶ 33.

¶ 17 Second, mother contends that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because the caseworker didn’t timely refer her to

a psychological evaluation. To begin, we note that mother’s

treatment plan didn’t require her to complete a psychological

evaluation, and the mental health evaluation that she completed

didn’t recommend one. Nevertheless, the record shows that,

around April 2022, mother agreed to submit to a psychological

evaluation. The caseworker made a referral by filling out an online

form in June 2022, but after mother’s attorney contacted the

caseworker to ask about the psychological evaluation in October

2022, the caseworker resubmitted the form. Thereafter, mother

completed the evaluation in November 2023.

¶ 18 Mother maintains that, if the caseworker had completed the

psychological evaluation referral sooner, she could have become fit.

But the psychological evaluation included recommendations, such

as abstinence from substances and engagement in outpatient

9 substance abuse therapy, that mother was already required to do.

And the record shows that mother never demonstrated sobriety and

didn’t consistently participate in therapy during the case. What’s

more, mother’s therapist testified that he didn’t need the

psychological evaluation to address mother’s most “pressing”

issues. Therefore, under these circumstances, we aren’t convinced

that a short delay in completing the referral for mother resulted in a

lack of reasonable efforts from the Department.

B. Disqualification for Actual Bias

¶ 19 Mother next asserts that the juvenile court judge was biased

in favor of the Department and should have recused himself from

the case. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law, Preservation, and Standard of Review

¶ 20 “Basic to our system of justice is the principle that a judge

must be free of all taint of bias and partiality.” People v. Jennings,

2021 COA 112, ¶ 18. A judge may be disqualified from presiding

over a matter based on (1) an appearance of impropriety or (2)

actual bias. People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 26.

¶ 21 The Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to

recuse himself from a case based on the appearance of impropriety 10 when “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

C.J.C. 2.11(A); see also People in Interest of A.G., 262 P.3d 646, 650

(Colo. 2011) (even if a judge may be able to act impartially, “the

judge is disqualified nonetheless because a reasonable observer

might have doubts about the judge’s impartiality”). “The purpose

behind disqualifying a judge who has the appearance of partiality is

to protect public confidence in the judiciary.” Jennings, ¶ 19.

¶ 22 “Actual bias, on the other hand, exists when, in all probability,

a judge will be unable to deal fairly with a party . . . .” A.P., ¶ 28. A

claim of actual bias focuses on the “subjective motivations of the

judge,” Jennings, ¶ 20, and requires disqualification when a judge

“has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s

lawyer,” C.J.C. 2.11(A)(1). Unlike provisions prohibiting a judge

from presiding over a case involving an appearance of impropriety,

the purpose behind disqualifying a judge for actual bias is to ensure

that the parties to a case receive a fair and impartial trial. A.P.,

¶ 28; A.G., 262 P.3d at 651. “Only when a judge was actually

biased will we question the reliability of the proceeding’s result.”

A.P., ¶ 29.

11 ¶ 23 To establish a claim for actual bias, a party must show that a

judge had a “substantial bent of mind against him or her,” People v.

Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1249 (Colo. 1988), or a “deep-seated

favoritism . . . that would make fair judgment impossible,” A.P.,

¶ 31 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

The record must clearly demonstrate the judge’s actual bias.

Jennings, ¶ 28. “Bare assertions and speculative statements are

insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof.” A.P., ¶ 30. Indeed,

disqualification for an actual bias is exceedingly rare. See, e.g.,

Jennings, ¶ 30 (no actual bias when the judge told the defendant’s

attorney that “when I saw you enter in this case I knew there were

going to be issues because there are almost always issues with

you”); People v. Dobler, 2015 COA 25, ¶ 12 (“While the judge’s

statements that he would be ‘haunt[ed]’ by his decision to grant

probation showed the judge was affected by his prior decision to be

lenient with defendant, it is not enough to establish that the judge

was unable to sentence defendant fairly.”).

¶ 24 Under C.R.C.P. 97, a party may move to disqualify a judge

who is “interested or prejudiced” for or against a party. See Bocian

12 v. Owners Ins. Co., 2020 COA 98, ¶ 13; see also C.R.J.P. 1 (when a

matter is not covered by the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure

or the Colorado Children’s Code, then the Colorado Rules of Civil

Procedure apply). Mother’s counsel didn’t file a motion to disqualify

the judge in this case, and therefore mother concedes that this

issue isn’t preserved for appeal. She asserts that we should

nevertheless address her argument under one of the exceptions to

the preservation rule. See, e.g., People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA

13, ¶ 21 (recognizing that appellate courts may review unpreserved

errors to avert a miscarriage of justice).

¶ 25 However, we don’t need to consider the exceptions to the

preservation rule to reach the merits of her claim. Although a

parent may waive an argument that a judge should recuse himself

based on an appearance of partiality by failing to file a timely

motion to disqualify in the juvenile court, a claim of actual bias

can’t be waived and therefore a party may raise an actual bias claim

for the first time on appeal. See Jennings, ¶ 21; A.G., 262 P.3d at

651-53; see also Dobler, ¶ 7. We don’t read mother’s argument to

raise an appearance of partiality issue; rather, the argument is that

13 the judge demonstrated actual bias. Therefore, her counsel didn’t

need to preserve her argument for us to review it on appeal.

¶ 26 We review de novo a claim for disqualification based on actual

bias. Dobler, ¶ 8; see also Jennings, ¶ 27.

¶ 27 At a hearing in January 2023, P.M.’s CFY mentioned that she

had emailed the judge because P.M. wanted to meet with the judge

“in person.” The CFY said that she could “settle that off-record

once everybody goes.” A few weeks later, the judge conducted an in

camera interview with P.M., at which the caseworker and CFY were

also present. At the end of the interview, the judge invited P.M. to

“come back and talk” further.

¶ 28 About two months later and after the first day of the

termination hearing, the judge met with P.M. again. The CFY and

caseworker also attended the follow-up interview, as did a

Department intern.

¶ 29 Before the interview formally began, the caseworker left the

room to let the CFY into the building, and a conversation occurred

between the judge, P.M., and the intern. P.M. asked the judge

14 whether he knew the caseworker, to which the judge responded

that he had “known her for two years,” she “appear[ed] before [him]

all the time,” and she was “one of [his] favorite caseworkers believe

it or not.” The intern also expressed her opinion that the

caseworker knew “how to do her job professionally.” The judge

added, “And I actually, I trust her 100 percent. So usually,

(indiscernible) and she makes her report and she makes

recommendations (indiscernible). I believe she knows what she’s

talking about.” The intern then said, “So you’ve got to listen to her,

[P.M].”

¶ 30 Mother maintains that the judge’s statement that he trusted

the caseworker “100 percent” establishes that the judge was biased

in favor of the caseworker and, by extension, the Department.

Specifically, she contends that, because the judge trusted the

caseworker “100 percent,” he would necessarily believe all her

testimony without any thought to whether it was credible. As a

result, mother asserts, she couldn’t receive a fair and impartial

trial.

15 ¶ 31 Because the record doesn’t clearly establish actual bias on the

judge’s part, we reject mother’s argument. See Jennings, ¶ 28. In

our opinion, the judge’s statement that he “trust[ed]” the

caseworker “100 percent” was not an indication that he had

prejudged the case or the caseworker’s credibility. Rather, we think

that the judge’s comments were an attempt to convince P.M. to

trust the caseworker, so that the caseworker could assist the child

in the case. And other comments made by the judge in his

conversation with P.M. indicate that he hadn’t prejudged the case.

See A.P., ¶ 37 (comments made by the judge during the case

indicated “compassion” rather than bias). For example, he told P.M.

that he didn’t “make a decision until after everything comes in,” had

“no idea where [he was] leaning to,” and would take all the witness

testimony “into consideration.”

¶ 32 As noted above, a determination that a judge has actual bias

is rare. In fact, mother doesn’t cite any case in which an appellate

court reversed a judgment for actual bias, and we were hard-

pressed to find one. One example from over thirty years ago

involved a judge in a criminal case who held the defendant’s

16 attorneys in contempt based on unsupported allegations and then

arbitrarily denied the prosecution’s motion to dismiss charges

against the defendant. Brewster v. Dist. Ct., 811 P.2d 812, 814

(Colo. 1991). We see “nothing so egregious” in the record of the

present case. Jennings, ¶ 31.

¶ 33 Mother submits that the judge exhibited his bias for the

caseworker when he (1) “agreed with [the] caseworker’s arguments

and assertions about [mother’s] unfitness and ability to become fit”

and (2) didn’t consider her argument that the caseworker failed to

make reasonable efforts for mother. As to the former, the

caseworker’s opinions were based on mostly uncontroverted

evidence that mother continued to actively use substances more

than two years after the juvenile court adopted a treatment plan for

her. As to the latter, we have already concluded that the court

didn’t have an obligation to make a finding of reasonable efforts, it

did consider mother’s argument about reasonable efforts, and the

evidence was sufficient to establish that the Department made

reasonable efforts. In sum, we aren’t convinced that the court’s

factual findings and legal conclusions demonstrate that the judge

17 was biased. See A.P., ¶32 (“[A]dverse legal rulings by a judge are

unlikely to provide grounds for a bias claim, as they are proper

grounds for appeal, not for recusal.”).

C. Ineffective Assistance for Failing to Move for Recusal

¶ 34 Because mother’s assertion that the judge exhibited actual

bias against her is without merit, her assertion that her counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to move the juvenile court

judge to recuse from the case necessarily fails. See Gray v.

Bowersox, 281 F.3d 749, 756 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002) (where the

underlying claim is without merit, a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel in not making it isn’t viable).

D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶ 35 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court improperly advised

her that it had to enter an adjudication judgment before it could

grant her motion for a change of venue. As a result, mother

maintains, the court erroneously adjudicated the child dependent

and neglected. And because the court erred by entering the

adjudication, mother asserts that the court didn’t acquire continued

subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

18 ¶ 36 “Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to

deal with the class of cases in which it renders judgment.” People

in Interest of E.H., 837 P.2d 284, 290 (Colo. App. 1992). The

juvenile court has “exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings . . .

[c]oncerning any child who is neglected or dependent.” § 19-1-

104(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024. Thus, in a dependency and neglect

proceeding, the court’s jurisdiction rests on the status of the child

as dependent and neglected. People in Interest of J.W. v. C.O., 2017

CO 105, ¶ 20.

¶ 37 A judgment entered by a juvenile court lacking subject matter

jurisdiction is void. People in Interest of T.W., 2022 COA 88M, ¶ 25.

The issue of subject matter jurisdiction can’t be waived, and it can

be raised for the first time on appeal. People in Interest of N.D.V.,

224 P.3d 410, 414 (Colo. App. 2009). However, a timely appeal is a

jurisdictional prerequisite for an appellate court to hear an appeal.

See People in Interest of M.R.M., 2021 COA 22, ¶ 42.

¶ 38 Although mother characterizes her appellate claim as a

challenge to the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction to

terminate her parental rights, the basis of mother’s contention is

19 that the court erred by adjudicating the child dependent and

neglected. We can’t consider mother’s challenge to the adjudication

because her appeal of that issue is untimely.

¶ 39 In a dependency and neglect case, a judgment of adjudication

becomes final and appealable upon entry of the initial dispositional

order, see People in Interest of H.T., 2019 COA 72, ¶ 16, and a

parent has twenty-one days from the entry of that dispositional

order to file an appeal, see C.A.R. 3.4(b)(1). A challenge to an

adjudication judgment must be raised in a timely appeal from that

stage of the dependency and neglect proceeding, and the parent

may not wait until the termination judgment is entered to challenge

the adjudication judgment. See People in Interest of C.B., 2019 COA

168, ¶ 18.

¶ 40 Mother didn’t timely file a notice of appeal of the adjudication

judgment after entry of the dispositional order. Therefore, because

mother’s appeal of the adjudication is now untimely, we lack

jurisdiction to reach the merits of her claim, including her assertion

that an error at the adjudicatory phase deprived the juvenile court

of subject matter jurisdiction going forward. See People in Interest

20 of A.E., 994 P.2d 465, 467 (Colo. App. 1999); see also C.B., ¶ 22

(“Because [the parent’s] challenge to the adjudication is untimely,

we cannot consider whether or how a flawed adjudication might

have affected the later termination.”).

E. Ineffective Assistance by Not Challenging the Advisement

¶ 41 Finally, mother asserts that her counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to address the juvenile court’s inaccurate

advisement. We discern no basis to remand for an evidentiary

hearing.

¶ 42 In evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we

employ the same test that we would employ when evaluating an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case. See A.R.

v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶¶ 48, 60. Under this test, the parent must

establish that (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range

of professionally competent assistance and (2) the parent was

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance — that is, there is a

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at

¶ 60.

21 ¶ 43 In dependency and neglect cases, an appellate court must

remand for an evidentiary hearing if the parent’s allegations are

sufficiently specific and compelling to constitute a prima facie

showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at ¶ 63. However,

if the parent’s allegations lack sufficient specificity, the court may

summarily deny the ineffective assistance claim. Id.

¶ 44 Section 19-3-201(2), C.R.S. 2024, allows a juvenile court to

grant a change of venue “to the court in the county where the

child’s legal parent or guardian resides” if the court has

(1) adjudicated the child dependent and neglected or (2) entered a

deferred adjudication under section 19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2024.

Mother asserts that the court improperly advised her that it could

not change venue until the child was adjudicated dependent and

neglected. In other words, she maintains that the court didn’t

advise her that it could also change venue after entering a deferred

adjudication. Mother maintains that her attorney provided

ineffective assistance by not knowing the requirements to change

venue and by failing to correct or object to the incorrect statements.

¶ 45 We disagree with mother for the following reasons:

22 1. Because the record doesn’t indicate that a deferred

adjudication was ever an option for mother, her counsel

couldn’t have provided ineffective assistance by failing to

challenge the court’s advisement. See § 19-3-505(5)(a) (the

parties must “consent” to a deferred adjudication before the

court enters one).

2. Even if mother knew about the deferred adjudication option

and such an adjudication was an option for her, she would

still have been required to waive her right to a trial and admit

to the allegations for the court to change venue. See § 19-3-

505(5), (7)(a) (requiring the court to first find that the

allegations in the petition are supported by a preponderance of

the evidence before entering a deferred adjudication).

3. Mother doesn’t assert that the outcome of the adjudication

proceeding would have been different if she would have

proceeded to trial. See A.R., ¶ 60. Rather, she only asserts, at

most, that, but for counsel deficient performance, she wouldn’t

have admitted to an adjudication. But mother was also

required to allege that she would have prevailed at a trial if she

23 had exercised her right to a trial, and she hasn’t done so. And

it is undisputed that mother was using substances and that

her substance use placed the children at risk of harm, such

that there is no reasonable probability that the children would

not have been adjudicated dependent or neglected under

section 19-3-102, C.R.S. 2024.

III. P.M.’s Appeal

¶ 46 P.M. asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that

mother was unfit and unlikely to become fit within a reasonable

time. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 47 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 48 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the juvenile court may 24 consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70

P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003). Where a parent has made little

to no progress on a treatment plan, the court isn’t required to give

the parent additional time to comply. See People in Interest of

R.B.S., 717 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Colo. App. 1986); see also People in

Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting

that even “increased compliance” over the course of a case may not

justify additional time).

¶ 49 A “reasonable time” isn’t an indefinite time, and it must be

determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. A.J., 143 P.3d at 1152. What

constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and varies from case to

case. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.

2007).

¶ 50 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for

25 clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on

those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

B. Analysis

¶ 51 The juvenile court found that mother was unfit primarily

because she continued to use methamphetamine and wasn’t able to

demonstrate that she could properly care for the children. See

§ 19-3-604(2)(e) (stating that a parent may be unfit based on

“[e]xcessive use of . . . controlled substances . . . , which affects the

ability to care and provide for the child”). Specifically, the court

noted that the evidence showed that mother (1) didn’t comply with

her treatment plan; (2) agreed to buy P.M. a marijuana vape pen,

even though the child was only thirteen years old; and (3) believed

that it was acceptable for her to continue to use methamphetamine

if she didn’t do so in the children’s presence. See People in Interest

of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008) (a parent’s

noncompliance with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a

lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore,

may also be considered in determining unfitness”).

26 ¶ 52 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that mother had tested positive for

methamphetamine multiple times throughout the case. In fact,

mother admitted to regularly using methamphetamine, including

just eight days before the final day of the termination hearing. The

record also shows that mother had unauthorized contact with P.M.

and that, during one of their conversations, mother agreed to buy

P.M. a marijuana vape pen. Mother admitted to offering to buy the

vape pen, but she claimed that she never intended to honor that

promise. Finally, mother testified that, if the children were

returned to her, and she were to use methamphetamine, she would

do so only when they were at school or sleeping.

¶ 53 The juvenile court also found that mother was unlikely to

become fit within a reasonable time, noting that the case had

“languished for over two years” with insufficient progress on

mother’s part. See R.B.S., 717 P.2d at 1006. The court noted that

mother had admitted that she was “an addict” and that “the

struggles in her life have impeded her ability to parent [the]

27 children.” The court believed that “the challenges” that mother

faced would be “long and arduous.”

¶ 54 The record supports these findings. Mother testified that she

used methamphetamine for several years before the case began and

continued to use it throughout the case. She also testified that she

hadn’t fully engaged in her substance abuse and mental health

treatment. Indeed, mother denied using substances in her dual

diagnosis evaluation. The caseworker opined that mother couldn’t

become fit until she completed her treatment plan, successfully

participated in her substance abuse treatment, and established a

pattern of sobriety. The caseworker further opined that, in the

“best-case scenario,” mother could complete those steps in a year.

But considering that the case was already two years old, the

caseworker didn’t think that leaving the case open would be in the

children’s best interests.

¶ 55 P.M. asserts that the juvenile court erred because the record

shows that mother demonstrated “significant change.” For

example, P.M. notes that mother engaged in therapy and displayed

positive changes in her behavior, started taking medications that

28 helped her to regulate and function, and had taken steps to engage

in sober living. But the court considered this evidence along with

the other evidence described above and still found, with record

support, that mother was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable

time. See V.W., 958 P.2d at 1134-35. We therefore reject P.M.’s

contention because it would require us to reweigh the evidence to

reach a different result, which we can’t do. See People in Interest of

S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

¶ 56 P.M. also maintains that the juvenile court erred because the

record establishes that mother could become fit within a year, and

when considering their needs, another year was a reasonable time.

However, the caseworker testified that it was a “best-case scenario”

that mother could become fit within in a year. In other words, if

mother started fully complying with her treatment plan and

abstained from using substances, then she might be able to become

fit in a year’s time. The caseworker testified that mother had not

given any indication that she was ready to do so.

¶ 57 Finally, P.M. asserts that the juvenile court erred in light of

the evidence showing that P.M. wasn’t in a permanent home and

29 wasn’t willing to consent to an adoption. See § 19-5-203(2), C.R.S.

2024 (requiring written consent to an adoption from a child who is

twelve years of age or older). P.M. notes that the record established

a need for stability, but termination could result in less stability,

not more. To be sure, the caseworker testified that P.M. needed

stability as soon as possible, considering the length of the case.

The caseworker also noted that P.M. had only recently objected to

adoption and that another change of mind wasn’t unforeseeable.

She also opined that P.M. was a good candidate for adoption,

despite being thirteen years old, and once a termination judgment

was entered there would be more possibilities for adoptive homes.

The court considered this information and still determined that

termination was in P.M.’s best interests because reunification with

mother wasn’t possible in a reasonable time. Therefore, the record

shows that the court considered P.M.’s specific needs when it

reached its decision, and as a result, we can’t say that the court

erred by finding that mother couldn’t become fit within a reasonable

time.

30 IV. Disposition

¶ 58 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.