25CA1671 Peo in Interest of NKS 04-23-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1671 Rio Blanco County District Court No. 23JV1 Honorable Anne K. Norrdin, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of N.K.S. and W.J.S., Children,
and Concerning I.R.S,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Román, C.J., and Ashby*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 23, 2026
Rose Pugliese, County Attorney, Meeker, Colorado; BTR Law, LLC, Benjamin T. Rehbein, Grand Junction, Colorado for Appellee
Cassie L. Coleman, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, I.R.S. (father)
appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal
relationships with N.K.S. and W.J.S. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In November 2022, the Rio Blanco County Department of
Human Services received a report of domestic violence and
substance use in the parents’ home. For approximately three
months, the parents worked with the Department on a voluntary
basis. However, when the parents did not comply with the
agreed-upon safety plan, the juvenile court granted the
Department’s request to remove the children and place them in
foster care.
¶3 Shortly thereafter, the Department filed a petition in
dependency and neglect concerning the then-three-year-old and
one-year-old children. Father admitted the allegations in the
petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent
or neglected. The court later adopted a treatment plan for father
that required him to (1) engage in substance abuse treatment and
demonstrate sobriety; (2) maintain stable employment and housing;
(3) gain an understanding of the children’s needs and demonstrate
1 appropriate parenting skills; (4) address his mental health issues;
(5) engage in domestic violence treatment; and (6) refrain from
further involvement in the criminal justice system.
¶4 In August 2024, the Department moved to terminate the
father’s parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
After a three-day hearing, the juvenile court denied the
Department’s motion, finding that the Department failed to prove
that father could not become fit within a reasonable time and that
no less drastic alternatives to termination existed.
¶5 Thereafter, the guardian ad litem (GAL) moved to terminate
father’s parental rights and the juvenile court held a second
termination hearing. After considering the evidence, the court
found that in the six months after the first termination hearing,
father had not improved or addressed the issues that brought the
family to the Department’s attention. Specifically, the court found
that despite the Department’s efforts to rehabilitate father, he (1)
had admitted to using methamphetamine a month before the
hearing; (2) was not engaged in substance abuse treatment; (3) had
not obtained stable housing; (4) had not completed his domestic
violence classes; (5) still struggled to regulate himself and act
2 appropriately during family time; and (6) refused to allow his
probation officer to speak to the Department about his probation
compliance. The court further found that father was unlikely to
become fit in a reasonable time and that there were no less drastic
alternatives to termination. Consequently, the court terminated
father’s parental rights approximately two and a half years after the
filing of the petition.
II. Motion to Continue
¶6 Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to continue the termination hearing so he
could obtain an expert witness. We are not persuaded.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 An indigent parent has a statutory right to the appointment of
an expert witness of his or her own choosing at state expense. See
§ 19-3-607(1), C.R.S. 2025. A request for the appointment of an
expert witness must be made within a reasonable time prior to the
termination hearing. People in Interest of K.T., 129 P.3d 1080, 1082
(Colo. App. 2005).
¶8 In ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court should
balance the need for orderly and expeditious administration of
3 justice against the facts underlying the motion, while considering
the child’s need for permanency. People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019
COA 136, ¶ 44. When a child is under six years old at the time the
petition in dependency and neglect is filed, the expedited
permanency planning (EPP) provisions apply, and the juvenile court
cannot delay or continue the termination hearing absent a showing
of good cause and a finding that the delay would serve the best
interests of the child. §§ 19-3-602(1), 19-3-104, 19-1-123, C.R.S.
2025.
¶9 We review a ruling on a motion to continue for an abuse of
discretion. People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 908 (Colo.
App. 2005). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is
manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable or when it misapplies
or misconstrues the law. People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55,
¶ 14. “The totality of the circumstances is relevant when
determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion by denying a continuance.” Id. (quoting People in Interest
of D.J.P., 785 P.2d 129, 131 (Colo. 1990)).
4 B. Additional Facts
¶ 10 Approximately three weeks after the GAL moved to terminate
father’s rights, which was one month before the second termination
hearing, father filed a motion to continue the hearing. He argued
that without a continuance, he would be “deprived of any
meaningful opportunity to utilize the expert to which he [was]
entitled” under section 19-3-607. Specifically, he asserted that the
expert he had selected (the same expert mother had retained for the
first termination hearing) was unable to complete her evaluation
and report before the hearing date. The Department and GAL
objected to a continuance, arguing that a delay would not be in the
children’s best interests.
¶ 11 Following a hearing, the juvenile court denied father’s motion.
The court noted that it was required to be “particularly mindful of
[the] child[ren’s] need for stability and the potential harm caused by
delays” because the children were under six years old, which was a
“critical bonding and attachment period.” It then found that a
continuance was not in the children’s best interests because their
“dire need for permanency” was “present and obvious” to the court
at the time of the first termination hearing, and that need still
5 existed. The court further found that father had not established
good cause for a continuance, noting that the expert witness father
selected had already “become acquainted with this particular
family” because she had completed an evaluation and testified at
the first termination hearing.
¶ 12 Nonetheless, the juvenile court stated that it “understood
[father’s] statutory right to an expert witness” and that it would
appoint the requested expert if father wanted to utilize her “in some
other capacity” that would allow her to complete a report and testify
at the already-scheduled hearing.
C. Analysis
¶ 13 The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that a
continuance was not in the children’s best interests. Indeed, when
the motion to continue was filed, the case had been open for over
two years and the children had been in foster care the entire time.
Moreover, at the first termination hearing — approximately five
months before father’s motion to continue the second termination
hearing — the caseworker testified that the children already had
“severe attachment issues” and opined that they needed
permanency “sooner than later.”
6 ¶ 14 Further, the juvenile court made specific findings, supported
by the record, that continuing the second termination hearing was
not in the children’s best interests. After making these findings, the
court could not continue the hearing regardless of whether father
established good cause to continue it. See § 19-3-104 (a
termination hearing in an EPP case “must not be delayed or
continued” unless there is a showing of good cause and the court
finds that the continuance is in the children’s best interests).
¶ 15 To the extent that father argues that the denial of the
continuance deprived him of his statutory right to an expert
witness, which made the proceedings fundamentally unfair, we
disagree. First, the record does not indicate that the juvenile court
denied father’s request for an expert witness. Rather, the court
denied his motion to continue but still offered to appoint the
requested expert in a different capacity, such as a consultant, so
that she could complete a report and testify at the
already-scheduled hearing. In other words, the court determined
that the scope of the expert’s opinion would need to be limited
because the children’s “dire” need for permanency required quick
resolution of the proceedings. See People in Interest of E.S., 49 P.3d
7 1221, 1224 (Colo. App. 2002) (a parent’s “statutory right to an
expert witness may be limited in scope” if necessary to meet the
child’s needs because a parent’s right to due process is “subject to
the power of the state to act in the best interests of the child”).
¶ 16 Second, even assuming without deciding that father’s due
process rights were violated by the denial of the continuance, father
has not demonstrated actual prejudice. See E.B., ¶ 17 (a parent
arguing that a denial of a continuance violated due process must
demonstrate actual prejudice). Father claims that the expert
witness was necessary to present an “effective” and “zealous”
defense, and states in general terms what the witness might have
said had she completed her evaluation. However, father does not
explain how that testimony would have changed the outcome of the
case, particularly in light of the juvenile court’s findings that father
failed to comply with nearly all of the objectives of his treatment
plan. See C.R.C.P. 61; C.A.R. 35(c); People in Interest of C.C.,
2022 COA 81, ¶ 20 (an appellate court may disregard any error if it
can be said with fair assurance that the error did not substantially
influence the outcome of the case or impair the basic fairness of the
trial).
8 ¶ 17 Based on the foregoing, we perceive no abuse of discretion
because the juvenile court properly weighed the reason proffered for
the continuance with the need for prompt resolution of the
proceeding and the children’s best interests.
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 18 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him and
reunite him with the children. Specifically, he argues that the
Department failed to provide adequate family time. We disagree.
¶ 19 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not
been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct
or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 20 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether the department of human services made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
9 See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest
of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts”
means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in
out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025. Services
provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, satisfy
the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 21 As relevant here, a department must provide family time
services for parents with children in out-of-home placement if those
services are determined to be necessary and appropriate by the
individual case plan. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV); People in Interest of
E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 14. The children’s health and safety are the
paramount concerns in determining whether, and what type of,
family time services are necessary and appropriate. See People in
Interest of A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 17. Family time services shall be
designed to promote the children’s health, safety, and well-being;
facilitate the speedy reunification of a parent and their children;
and promote the children’s best interests. Id.; see § 19-3-208(2)(a).
¶ 22 The juvenile court should analyze a department’s efforts by
considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the
10 completion of the entire treatment plan. People in Interest of
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. A parent is ultimately
responsible for using the services to obtain the assistance needed to
comply with their treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259
P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 23 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make
reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in
Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Therefore, we review the
juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its
legal determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate the parent. Id.
B. Additional Facts
¶ 24 When the case opened, the juvenile court ordered the
Department to provide supervised family time for father. The
Department arranged for the children to have in-person family time
with father three times per week in Rangely, Colorado (where father
lived). However, because the children’s foster home was in Meeker,
Colorado, the Department became concerned that traveling to and
from Rangely three times per week was too much for the children —
the children were spending about two hours in a car every time they
11 had a visit. Consequently, the Department changed father’s family
time to one visit per week in Rangely and two visits per week in
Meeker. At that point, the Department was transporting the
children to their family time in Rangely and providing father with
gas vouchers to drive to Meeker for the family time there. But
father made it to only four out of thirty-five sessions scheduled in
Meeker. Thus, starting in August 2023, the Department changed
the family time schedule to one in-person visit in Rangely and two
virtual visits every week.
¶ 25 In January 2024, the Department and the GAL moved the
juvenile court to order that the level of family time supervision
increase to a therapeutic setting. After a contested hearing, the
court found that the children were “not doing well emotionally in
connection with visits” and that their attachment to the parents
was “growing more disorganized rather than improving.” The court
then ordered that father’s family time decrease to one in-person
therapeutic visit per week.
¶ 26 Thereafter, the Department provided one therapeutic visit per
week until the first termination hearing in January 2025. Shortly
after that hearing, the therapeutic family time provider resigned
12 because, according to the caseworker, there were scheduling issues
and the provider did not believe father was willing to implement her
recommendations. Within five weeks, the Department had
arranged therapeutic family time with a new provider.
Consequently, from April 2025 until the second termination
hearing, the new provider facilitated weekly in-person therapeutic
visits for father and the children.
¶ 27 In its oral termination ruling, the juvenile court found that the
Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father by
“providing screenings, assessments, individual case plans,
information and referral services, visitation services, transportation
assistance, placement services for the children and case
management.” It found that “despite those efforts,” father was still
unfit.
¶ 28 Father challenges the court’s reasonable efforts finding only as
it relates to family time. He does not assert that the Department
wholly failed to provide family time services, as required under
section 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). Rather, he asserts that the family time
provided by the Department was inadequate because (1) the virtual
13 visits did not provide father with an opportunity to maintain his
connection with the children; (2) when the children began acting
out after family time, the Department sought to restrict father’s
family time instead of providing more supportive in-person family
time; and (3) the Department failed to provide any family time for
five weeks after the first therapeutic family time provider terminated
her services. We reject all three arguments.
¶ 29 First, the record indicates that the Department’s decision to
convert two of father’s weekly visits from in-person to virtual was
based, at least in part, on father’s failure to attend the in-person
visits in Meeker. In fact, around the time the visits were converted
to virtual, the caseworker reported that the Department made that
decision “in hopes of more participation” from father. It was also
based on the oldest child’s educational needs (her preschool
schedule). Even after the Meeker visits were converted to virtual
visits, the Department was still transporting the children to Rangely
for weekly in-person visits with father.
¶ 30 Second, the Department’s decision to move for an increase of
family time supervision level does not show that it failed to make
reasonable efforts. Rather, the Department moved for therapeutic
14 family time because it was concerned that the supervised visits with
father had become emotionally harmful to the children. See
§ 19-3-217(d), C.R.S. 2025 (a court may restrict family time if it is
necessary to protect a child’s safety or mental, emotional, or
physical health). Moreover, the level of supervision for family time
is within the juvenile court’s purview, not the Department’s. People
in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070-71 (Colo. App. 2005) (family
time orders are always “subject to the continuing supervision and
review by the trial court, which, in the final analysis, retains
ultimate decision-making authority in the case”). Here, based on
the evidence presented at a contested family time hearing, the
juvenile court found that an increase to therapeutic supervision
and a decrease to one visit per week were necessary to protect the
children’s emotional well-being. Thereafter, the Department
provided the type and frequency of family time ordered by the court.
¶ 31 Third, although the caseworker admitted that father did not
have any family time in the five weeks after the first therapeutic
family time provider resigned, the record indicates that the
Department made significant efforts to provide family time during
that period. Specifically, the caseworker testified that when she
15 found out that the first therapeutic family time provider would be
resigning, she asked that provider for recommendations of other
providers who could facilitate therapeutic family time. The provider
gave “a couple” of recommendations, and the caseworker contacted
them. The caseworker then “researched and reached out” to “more
than eight, if not upwards of twelve” additional providers to find a
new therapeutic supervisor. Eventually, after speaking to one of
the providers three times, the caseworker “begged and pleaded
enough” to convince that provider to take the referral. Thereafter,
father’s weekly therapeutic visits resumed and continued through
the second termination hearing. Thus, the record belies father’s
assertion that the five-week lapse in family time showed a lack of
reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children.
¶ 32 Moreover, even if the Department’s efforts were lacking during
the time period in which father did not have family time, father does
not explain how five weeks without family time in a two-and-a-half
year case rendered the Department’s overall efforts unreasonable.
In light of the ample evidence showing that the Department
provided numerous services (including family time services) to
father throughout the case, we do not see how the five weeks
16 without family time rendered the juvenile court’s reasonable efforts
finding erroneous. See My.K.M., ¶ 33 (to analyze reasonable efforts,
the court must look at the totality of the circumstances).
¶ 33 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile
court’s determination that the Department made reasonable efforts
to rehabilitate father and reunite him with the children.
IV. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 34 Last, father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding
that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. He
asserts that an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) between
him and mother was a viable permanency option. We discern no
error.
¶ 35 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives
are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. People in
Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. In considering less
drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,
¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider, among other things, (1)
17 whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial
to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for the
child’s needs, see People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38,
and (2) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see People in
Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009).
¶ 36 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best
interests. A.M., ¶ 27. Long-term or permanent placement with a
family member, short of termination, may not be in the child’s best
interests if it does not provide the permanence that adoption would
provide or otherwise meet the child’s needs. A.R., ¶ 41. If a
juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead
that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the
alternative and order termination. A.M., ¶ 32.
¶ 37 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings
for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.
Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but
instead finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, we are
bound to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its
findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.
18 B. Analysis
¶ 38 As a threshold matter, the Department and GAL argue that
father failed to preserve his less drastic alternatives argument
because father offered no evidence and made no argument about an
APR at the termination hearing. Because we discern no error, we
do not find it necessary to determine whether this argument must
be preserved and, if so, whether father preserved it.
¶ 39 The juvenile court considered several less drastic alternatives
to termination — an APR between the foster parents and father, an
APR between mother and father, long-term foster care, and a
guardianship. But it found that none of those options would be in
the children’s best interests. The court’s conclusion was based on
its consideration of “the children’s age[s], their developmental
needs, [and] . . . the length of time they [had] been placed outside of
the home.”
¶ 40 Regarding the possibility of permanent foster care, the juvenile
court found that the children’s needs suggested a “secure form of
permanency,” and that, “[p]ermanent foster care would be a limbo
state that would be confusing to them and undermine their feeling
of security, safety and permanency.” The court concluded that,
19 “[a]ny APR agreement between the child's caregiver and father
would likely result in conflict that would be emotionally unsafe,
potentially physically unsafe, and threatening to the girls'
permanency”.
¶ 41 As relevant to father’s appellate argument, the court found
that an APR between father and mother was not a viable option
because “the domestic violence between the parents [had] not been
remedied” and because “denying termination for father and hoping
that an APR . . . could be devised” would cause further delay, which
was not in the children’s best interests.
¶ 42 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The
caseworker, who testified as an expert in child welfare and case
management, opined that termination was in the children’s best
interests because throughout the case the children had become
increasingly dysregulated and escalated before, during, and after
their family time with father. The caseworker testified that even if
mother became fit at some point in the future, an APR between the
parents would not be in the children’s best interests because, at the
time of the hearing, father was still “demonstrating domestic
violence behaviors” toward mother. For example, the caseworker
20 testified that father had posted “belittling and demeaning” things
about mother on his social media page just a few days before the
hearing. The caseworker further testified that father had not
completed his domestic violence treatment or classes.
¶ 43 To the extent father argues that termination was not in the
children’s best interests because he had a good relationship with
them, we note that a child’s bond to a parent is just one factor for
the court to consider in analyzing whether any less drastic
alternatives are viable. Here, even after considering the testimony
about the children’s bond with father, the juvenile court still
concluded, based on the children’s needs, that termination was in
their best interests. We cannot reweigh this evidence. See People in
Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.
¶ 44 Therefore, because the record supports the juvenile court’s
finding that termination, not an APR, was in the children’s best
interests, we discern no basis for reversal. See B.H., ¶ 80.
V. Disposition
¶ 45 The judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE ASHBY concur.