26CA0222 Peo in Interest of NAJB 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 26CA0222 Weld County District Court No. 23JV144 Honorable Allison J. Esser, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, In the Interest of N.A.J.B., a Child, and Concerning N.B., Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFRIMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Grove and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 27, 2026
No Appearance for Petitioner Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Ainsley E. Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, N.B. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental responsibilities for N.A.J.B. (the child) to S.M. (aunt) and R.M. (uncle). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services received a referral about the family and provided services on a “non-court” basis. At the time, the eight-year-old child was living with his mother, K.I. (mother). Not long after, the Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect alleging that mother had emotionally abused the child and admitted to using methamphetamine. The Department also had concerns about father’s mental health. At the time it filed the petition, the Department didn’t believe a return home to father was appropriate due to the lack of a parent-child bond. Father had been incarcerated for about seven years of the child’s life and hadn’t had any contact with the child during that time.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan for father requiring that he, among other things, address his mental health and “learn
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and use additional parenting skills” to provide the child with appropriate supervision and care.
¶4 Father exercised supervised family time during most of the case but transitioned to monitored sessions, a reduced level of supervision, about two years into the case.
¶5 A few months later, the court held an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) hearing on the motion of the child’s guardian ad litem. Father’s counsel argued that the case was not “ripe for closure” for various reasons. In its oral ruling, the court rejected that argument and determined that it was appropriate to close the case by entering an APR. The court thus granted an APR to aunt and uncle and allocated father supervised family time.
II. Discussion
¶6 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) closing the case prematurely and (2) ordering supervised rather than monitored family time. We are not persuaded.
A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
¶7 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency or neglect proceeding, a juvenile court must consider the legislative purposes of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S.
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2025. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through which the child’s best interests can be served. Id. at ¶ 19. Thus, if a court allocates parental responsibilities, it must do so in accordance with the child’s best interests, People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011); § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, and must focus on the protection and safety of the child, People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13.
¶8 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and to assess the credibility of witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We will not disturb the court’s findings if they are supported by the record. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10. But whether
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the court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
B. Case Closure
¶9 Father contends that the juvenile court erred in prematurely closing the case and entering an APR. To get there, he principally argues that certain findings were not supported by competent evidence. Namely, he challenges the court’s findings that (1) he didn’t take advantage of the resources offered throughout the case, and (2) there was “no reasonable likelihood of continued improvement” if the case were to be kept open. He argues that these findings were unsupported because his lack of progress on his treatment plan was “substantially attributable” to a lack of reasonable efforts by the Department. We’re not persuaded.
1. The Juvenile Court’s Findings and Closure of the Case
¶ 10 Contrary to father’s assertion, the juvenile court’s findings are supported by the record. Father, who testified that he had received “many” mental health diagnoses, didn’t engage in the treatment recommended by the mental health evaluation he completed, except for attending one individual therapy session shortly before the APR hearing. Father also didn’t participate in parenting skills courses
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during the case, even though one of the course providers offered him transportation. The caseworker testified that father had made little to no progress on his treatment plan and was in a similar position as he had been when the case opened more than two years before.. The court found the caseworker’s testimony on this point credible. The caseworker, who testified as an expert in child safety and risk assessment, opined that given father’s lack of progress, case closure was appropriate. Because the findings that father challenges were supported by the record, we defer to them. See id.
¶ 11 The court also provided other reasons for closing the case. Crucially, reasoning that the case had already been open for over two years, the child had been consistent in his desire for permanency, and the parties were “not anywhere close to something like a return home,” the court determined that it was not in the child’s best interests to keep the case open any longer. See § 19-1- 102(1)(c) (legislative declaration directing juvenile courts to “proceed with all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best interests of the child”).
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¶ 12 In light of these considerations and the court’s well-supported findings, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to close the case. See E.B., ¶ 14.
2. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 13 We also decline to disturb the juvenile court’s APR ruling on the basis that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts.
¶ 14 As the parties recognize, the juvenile court didn’t make an express determination concerning reasonable efforts. But that doesn’t preclude our review of the issue. See People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 15 (concluding that although the juvenile court didn’t expressly address the issue, the record demonstrated that the department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation); People in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121, ¶ 37 (same).
¶ 15 A department of human services has a statutory obligation to provide reasonable efforts to reunify a family and avoid out-of-home placement. See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208(1), C.R.S. 2025; see also People in Interest of I.J.O., 2019 COA 151, ¶ 8, (recognizing this obligation). Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy this standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the services required by section 19-3-208 are screenings,
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assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral services to available resources; and family time services. § 19-3- 208(2)(b). In analyzing reasonable efforts, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances and account for all resources provided to a parent to ensure completion of the treatment plan. See People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33 (noting this with respect to active efforts, a higher standard than reasonable efforts).
¶ 16 Whether a department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation is a mixed question of fact and law. A.S.L., ¶ 8. To the extent that the juvenile court made factual findings relating to this issue, we review those findings for clear error, but we consider de novo the ultimate legal question of whether the department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. See id. at ¶¶ 8, 15.
¶ 17 Father points to several alleged deficiencies in the Department’s efforts, such as its failure to establish family therapy, to provide visits during five months of the case, and to approve his requests for financial assistance for a vehicle or other bills. He also asserts that the Department didn’t approve his fiancée as a family
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time supervisor or the use of a phone he had obtained for the child to use to contact him. But he doesn’t provide legal authority to support his supposition that a department must approve a parent’s desired family time supervisor or device for communicating with a child to meet its statutory obligation, see § 19-3-208, nor did the court enter orders requiring such approval here.
¶ 18 Turning to a review of the Department’s overall efforts, the caseworker testified that she offered father housing resources, parenting courses, and transportation assistance. Though there was a five-month gap in father’s visits (seemingly related to the child’s wish to pause them), father was provided family time services during the majority of the case. The Department also submitted referrals for individual and family therapy. The caseworker testified, however, that family therapy hadn’t started before the APR hearing because of scheduling challenges, difficulty securing a provider due to a “lack of communication and collaboration,” and father’s “contribut[ion] to th[e] delay.” And, according to the caseworker, a family therapist engaged with the family had recommended that father attend individual therapy first to assess his “ability to participate” in family sessions.
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¶ 19 The caseworker testified that father was hostile and aggressive toward her, which at times hindered her ability to communicate with him. When asked whether he became “very demeaning and berating” in his communications, father agreed. The court also found that father’s demeanor during the APR hearing was “consistent with what was described by [the caseworker].”
¶ 20 While the court didn’t make express findings concerning reasonable efforts, we are bound by its finding that father didn’t take advantage of the resources offered to him. See People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011) (the parent is ultimately responsible for using the services provided to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the treatment plan); see also People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 12 (a juvenile court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining reasonable efforts). And, while the court noted that it had some “concern or confusion” as to why family therapy didn’t occur, it appeared to credit the caseworker’s explanation of the delay and description of father’s demeanor during the case.
¶ 21 In light of these findings, the considerable evidentiary support for the Department’s efforts, and the totality of the circumstances,
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we conclude that the Department met its reasonable efforts obligation. See My.K.M., ¶ 33; A.S.L., ¶ 15; M.D., ¶ 37.
3. Father’s Other Contentions
¶ 22 Father also argues that the case wasn’t ripe for closure because of a domestic violence incident in aunt and uncle’s home that occurred about two months before the APR hearing.
¶ 23 However, the juvenile court found that it was “not anywhere close” to the option of a return home and that the child’s best interests would be served by closing the case with an APR. The court also expressly considered two instances of domestic violence in aunt and uncle’s home before finding that the child was doing well there. In doing so, the court recognized that aunt and uncle had a safety plan in place, the Department didn’t have safety concerns, and the child was well-situated with his family members in the home. We do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249- 50; People in Interest of S.Z.S., ¶ 29; see also B.R.D., ¶ 15 (when the juvenile court’s findings made in deciding an APR have record support, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review).
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¶ 24 Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the APR and closing the case. See E.B., ¶ 14.
C. Supervised Family Time
¶ 25 Father additionally contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering his family time to be supervised instead of monitored. We are not persuaded.
¶ 26 The juvenile court found that father didn’t meet the child’s emotional needs and had spoken to the child in ways that were inappropriate on many occasions. The most recent incident of father doing so was shortly before the APR hearing, when father discussed the child’s stepfather’s death with him and showed him “every news booking” relating to the incident. This caused the child to become very upset. The court thus determined that monitored contact was not sufficient to ensure the child’s emotional safety.
¶ 27 On this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision, which prioritized the safety of the child. See H.K.W., ¶ 13.
¶ 28 Nonetheless, father argues that the court’s decision didn’t “reflect the circumstances existing at the time of the proceeding” because it didn’t maintain the monitored family time father enjoyed
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as of the time of the APR hearing. In doing so, father relies on In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27, which, after reversing and remanding an APR decision for failure to apply the correct standards, directed the district court to take additional evidence on remand because it “must determine [the child’s] best interests based on . . . circumstances existing at the time of remand proceedings.” Father seems to read this directive as a general requirement that a court maintain the status quo with respect to family time when entering an APR. But an APR in a dependency and neglect case must accord with the child’s best interests, L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208, and the court here determined that the APR was in the child’s best interests.
¶ 29 Father also claims that the court inappropriately relied on the child’s reported preference for supervised visits because the child — who was eleven years old by the time of the APR hearing — wasn’t “sufficiently mature to express reasoned and independent preferences” under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2025. See H.K.W., ¶ 13 (recognizing that the juvenile court may consider the section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) “best interest factors” when issuing an APR in a dependency and neglect case). But it was up to the court
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to assess the child’s maturity in determining how much weight to give his stated preferences. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-50. And, as we’ve indicated, the court cited other concerns — not merely the child’s preferences — in determining that family time should be supervised.
¶ 30 To the extent that father asserts the court premised the supervision requirement solely on his conversation with the child about the child’s stepfather, the court’s ruling shows otherwise. And father doesn’t persuade us that supervised family time was improper because the court didn’t impose comparable “restrictions” on mother after she discussed stepfather’s death with the child. Father overlooks that mother’s visits must also be supervised under the APR.
¶ 31 Because the court did not abuse its discretion in allocating family time, we do not disturb its decision. See E.B., ¶ 14.
III. Disposition
¶ 32 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.