25CA0517 Peo in Interest of MSL 08-21-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0517 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV40 Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of M.S.L. and J.M.L, Children,
and Concerning G.S.W.,
Appellant,
and B.D.L.,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025
Ron Carl, County Attorney, Kiley Schaumleffel, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee The People of the State of Colorado
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
James West, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Appellee B.D.L. *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, G.S.W. (mother)
appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental
responsibilities for M.S.L. and J.M.L. (the children) to B.D.L.
(father). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the
Department) received a referral that J.M.L. had tested positive for
methamphetamines at birth. Mother entered into a safety plan with
the Department, agreeing to (1) remain sober around the children;
(2) submit to random drug testing; and (3) have supervised contact
with the children. Three months later, after additional concerns
arose regarding mother’s sobriety and protective capacity, the
Department sought and was granted temporary custody. The
Department then filed a petition in dependency or neglect and
placed the children with father. Shortly thereafter, the juvenile
court granted father temporary custody. The children remained in
father’s custody throughout the case except for a four-week period
when he was incarcerated.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Mother’s
1 treatment plan required that she (1) work with the Department; (2)
obtain and maintain housing and financial stability; (3) complete a
mental health assessment and follow all treatment
recommendations; (4) complete a substance use evaluation, follow
all recommendations, and cooperate with random drug testing; (5)
demonstrate protective parenting capacity; and (6) participate in
consistent visitation with the children.
¶4 All parties agreed to set a contested hearing regarding an
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR). Following the hearing,
the juvenile court granted father sole decision-making responsibility
and primary residential care and awarded mother two days of
supervised parenting time per month.
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 The Colorado Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to
enter an APR when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a
dependent or neglected child. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2024;
People in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA 118, ¶ 10, 472 P.3d 1115,
1118. When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency
and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court must consider the
purposes of the Children’s Code articulated in section 19-1-102,
2 C.R.S. 2024. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo.
App. 2005). The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to
protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through
which the child’s best interests can be served. L.G. v. People, 890
P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). As a result, when allocating parental
responsibilities, the juvenile court must do so consistent with the
child’s best interests. L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d
1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996).
¶6 An APR is committed to the juvenile court’s discretion. See In
re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15,
280 P.2d 78, 81. A juvenile court abuses its discretion “when its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it
misapplies or misconstrues the law.” People in Interest of E.B.,
2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. 521 P.3d 637, 639. It is for the juvenile court,
as the trier of fact, to determine the sufficiency, probative effect,
and weight of the evidence, and to assess the credibility of
witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo.
2010). When the juvenile court’s findings have record support, its
resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15,
280 P.3d at 81. But whether the court applied the correct legal
3 standard in making its findings is a question of law that we review
de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10, 459 P.3d
664, 667.
III. Insufficient Findings
¶7 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
did not make adequate factual findings under the Children’s Code
to support the order. We disagree.
A. Preservation
¶8 The Department and guardian ad litem assert that we should
decline to address mother’s appellate claim because it is
unpreserved. However, we need not determine whether mother
preserved her argument, or was required to do so, because even if
we assume she did, we discern no basis for reversal.
B. Analysis
¶9 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by not making
adequate findings or reference to the purposes of the Children’s
Code in the APR judgment. Specifically, citing L.A.G., mother
asserts that the court was required to make findings that the APR
order would “best serve each child’s welfare and the best interests
of society” and “preserve and strengthen family ties.” See § 19-1-
4 102(1)(a)-(b). However, mother’s reliance on L.A.G. is misplaced.1
In that case, “[t]he juvenile court relied solely on a limited number
of the purposes” articulated in the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
Act (UDMA) and did not “consider any purposes of the [Children’s]
Code.” L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1392. In contrast, here, the juvenile
court did not rely on, or even mention, the UDMA.
¶ 10 When entering an APR judgment, the juvenile court must “be
guided by the underlying purposes of the Code.” Id. at 1391.
Although the court must allocate parental responsibilities to best
serve “the interests of the child and the public,” § 19-3-507(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2024, the Children’s Code does not prescribe factors the
court must consider — or recite — in making its decision, C.M., 116
P.3d at 1281.
¶ 11 Here, the juvenile court found that, pursuant to sections 19-1-
104 and 19-3-702, C.R.S. 2024, of the Children’s Code, the APR
was in the children’s best interests. In so finding, the court focused
1 Mother’s reliance on Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), is
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25CA0517 Peo in Interest of MSL 08-21-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0517 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24JV40 Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of M.S.L. and J.M.L, Children,
and Concerning G.S.W.,
Appellant,
and B.D.L.,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025
Ron Carl, County Attorney, Kiley Schaumleffel, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee The People of the State of Colorado
Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
James West, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Appellee B.D.L. *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, G.S.W. (mother)
appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental
responsibilities for M.S.L. and J.M.L. (the children) to B.D.L.
(father). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the
Department) received a referral that J.M.L. had tested positive for
methamphetamines at birth. Mother entered into a safety plan with
the Department, agreeing to (1) remain sober around the children;
(2) submit to random drug testing; and (3) have supervised contact
with the children. Three months later, after additional concerns
arose regarding mother’s sobriety and protective capacity, the
Department sought and was granted temporary custody. The
Department then filed a petition in dependency or neglect and
placed the children with father. Shortly thereafter, the juvenile
court granted father temporary custody. The children remained in
father’s custody throughout the case except for a four-week period
when he was incarcerated.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Mother’s
1 treatment plan required that she (1) work with the Department; (2)
obtain and maintain housing and financial stability; (3) complete a
mental health assessment and follow all treatment
recommendations; (4) complete a substance use evaluation, follow
all recommendations, and cooperate with random drug testing; (5)
demonstrate protective parenting capacity; and (6) participate in
consistent visitation with the children.
¶4 All parties agreed to set a contested hearing regarding an
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR). Following the hearing,
the juvenile court granted father sole decision-making responsibility
and primary residential care and awarded mother two days of
supervised parenting time per month.
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 The Colorado Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to
enter an APR when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a
dependent or neglected child. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2024;
People in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA 118, ¶ 10, 472 P.3d 1115,
1118. When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency
and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court must consider the
purposes of the Children’s Code articulated in section 19-1-102,
2 C.R.S. 2024. People in Interest of C.M., 116 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo.
App. 2005). The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to
protect a child’s welfare and safety by providing procedures through
which the child’s best interests can be served. L.G. v. People, 890
P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). As a result, when allocating parental
responsibilities, the juvenile court must do so consistent with the
child’s best interests. L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d
1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996).
¶6 An APR is committed to the juvenile court’s discretion. See In
re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15,
280 P.2d 78, 81. A juvenile court abuses its discretion “when its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it
misapplies or misconstrues the law.” People in Interest of E.B.,
2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. 521 P.3d 637, 639. It is for the juvenile court,
as the trier of fact, to determine the sufficiency, probative effect,
and weight of the evidence, and to assess the credibility of
witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo.
2010). When the juvenile court’s findings have record support, its
resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15,
280 P.3d at 81. But whether the court applied the correct legal
3 standard in making its findings is a question of law that we review
de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10, 459 P.3d
664, 667.
III. Insufficient Findings
¶7 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
did not make adequate factual findings under the Children’s Code
to support the order. We disagree.
A. Preservation
¶8 The Department and guardian ad litem assert that we should
decline to address mother’s appellate claim because it is
unpreserved. However, we need not determine whether mother
preserved her argument, or was required to do so, because even if
we assume she did, we discern no basis for reversal.
B. Analysis
¶9 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by not making
adequate findings or reference to the purposes of the Children’s
Code in the APR judgment. Specifically, citing L.A.G., mother
asserts that the court was required to make findings that the APR
order would “best serve each child’s welfare and the best interests
of society” and “preserve and strengthen family ties.” See § 19-1-
4 102(1)(a)-(b). However, mother’s reliance on L.A.G. is misplaced.1
In that case, “[t]he juvenile court relied solely on a limited number
of the purposes” articulated in the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
Act (UDMA) and did not “consider any purposes of the [Children’s]
Code.” L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1392. In contrast, here, the juvenile
court did not rely on, or even mention, the UDMA.
¶ 10 When entering an APR judgment, the juvenile court must “be
guided by the underlying purposes of the Code.” Id. at 1391.
Although the court must allocate parental responsibilities to best
serve “the interests of the child and the public,” § 19-3-507(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2024, the Children’s Code does not prescribe factors the
court must consider — or recite — in making its decision, C.M., 116
P.3d at 1281.
¶ 11 Here, the juvenile court found that, pursuant to sections 19-1-
104 and 19-3-702, C.R.S. 2024, of the Children’s Code, the APR
was in the children’s best interests. In so finding, the court focused
1 Mother’s reliance on Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), is
similarly misplaced. Troxel relates to proceedings between a fit parent and a nonparent, see People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶¶ 14-15, 459 P.3d 664, 667-68, whereas this case involved a fit parent and a parent the court determined was unfit.
5 on mother’s inconsistent exercise of family time and its impact on
the children. These findings are supported by the record.
¶ 12 The caseworker testified that she was concerned about
mother’s inconsistent contact with the children and her ability to
meet their basic needs. The caseworker opined that ongoing
supervision of mother’s family time was necessary because mother
(1) did not complete any drug testing in the caseworker’s eleven
months on the case; (2) admitted “continual” drug use a few months
before the hearing; (3) failed to demonstrate sobriety or protective
parenting capacity; and (4) did “not put any effort . . . into
completing the components of her treatment plan that would be
necessary for [the caseworker] to see [mother] as a fit and proper
parent.”
¶ 13 The court’s oral ruling, along with the written APR judgment,
sufficiently articulated the court’s reasoning to permit appellate
review. Cf. L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1392 (concluding that reversal was
required where the juvenile court “fail[ed] to articulate sufficient
facts to permit appellate application of the appropriate legal
standard”).
6 ¶ 14 To the extent mother asserts that the APR was a “near-total
restriction on [her] parental rights and responsibilities,” and that
the juvenile court did not make sufficient findings supporting such
a restriction, we are not persuaded. Mother bases her argument
solely on section 14-10-129, C.R.S. 2024 (governing modifications
of parenting time in domestic relations cases). In so arguing,
mother implies that the juvenile court was required to make
endangerment findings before “restricting” her parenting time.
However, Title 19, not Title 14, governs the juvenile court’s
allocation of parental responsibilities in a dependency and neglect
proceeding. See L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1390 (“[T]he exclusive authority
of a juvenile court to determine issues of child custody arising in
the course of dependency and neglect proceedings is established by
the [Children’s] Code.”). Endangerment findings are not required
for the entry of an APR under Title 19. See People in Interest of L.B.,
254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Because the adjudication
of [the child] as dependent and neglected provided the predicate for
the disposition entered, no finding concerning either unfitness or
endangerment was necessary.”).
¶ 15 We therefore discern no error.
7 IV. Disposition
¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.