Peo in Interest of MR

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 24, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0876
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0876 Peo in Interest of MR 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0876 Weld County District Court No. 24JV43 Honorable W. Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.R., a Child,

and Concerning B.E.S.,

Intervenor-Appellant,

and

T.R. and R.L.,

Intervenors-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Martinez* and Hawthorne*, J.J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 24, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greeley, Colorado for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Harwich Brickey, LLC, Kara M. Harwich, Fort Collins, Colorado for Intervenor- Appellant Ross Law, P.C., Joe Ward, Centennial, Colorado for Intervenors-Appellees

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, B.E.S. (maternal

aunt) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for M.R. (the child) to T.R. and R.L. (the godparents).

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Weld County Department of Human Services opened this

case because the child’s mother was tragically killed by her

boyfriend. The child, who was five years old at the time, witnessed

his mother’s death. The child had no relationship with his

biological father, T.C. (father). Shortly after the case opened, the

child was placed with his godparents, who are also his maternal

great aunt and uncle.

¶3 At the same time that the child was adjudicated dependent or

neglected, the court granted maternal aunt’s request to intervene.

Maternal aunt, who lived in Kansas throughout the case, later

requested that the child be placed with her. Around the same time,

the court permitted the godparents to intervene.

¶4 The court later held an evidentiary hearing concerning

placement and the allocation of parental responsibilities (APR).

Eleven months after the case opened, the court granted an APR to

1 the godparents. The court allocated maternal aunt one weekend

per month of parenting time during the school year, as well as two

one-week periods during the summer.

II. Discussion

¶5 Maternal aunt contends that the juvenile court misapplied the

law and abused its discretion by granting an APR to the godparents.

We are not persuaded.

A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶6 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and

neglect proceeding, a juvenile court must consider the legislative

purposes of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S.

2025. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. The overriding

purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and

safety by providing procedures through which the child’s best

interests can be served. Id. at ¶ 19. Thus, if a court allocates

parental responsibilities, it must do so in accordance with the

child’s best interests. People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203,

1208 (Colo. App. 2011); see § 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶7 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within

the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities

2 Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in

Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. The witnesses’ credibility, the

evidence’s probative effect and weight, and the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are within the juvenile

court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50

(Colo. 2010). When the record supports the juvenile court’s

findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on

review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. Whether the court applied the correct legal

standard is a question of law that we review de novo. People in

Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.

B. The Juvenile Court Made Sufficient Findings for Review

¶8 As a threshold matter, we reject maternal aunt’s claim that the

juvenile court made insufficient findings for appellate review. A

juvenile court must make sufficiently explicit factual findings to give

an appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of its order.

See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9. Such is the case

here. While the court made factual findings in both its oral and

written rulings, it made more exhaustive factual findings in its oral

3 ruling. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1

(recognizing that a court’s oral findings may supplement its written

order).

¶9 Yet, maternal aunt bases her argument solely on the court’s

written ruling. She does not address the court’s oral ruling, the

transcript of which was not made a part of the appellate record

until after the parties submitted their briefs. Maternal aunt did not

designate that transcript in her notice of appeal, despite an

appellant’s obligation to include in the record “transcripts of all

proceedings necessary” for deciding the appeal. See C.A.R. 10(d)(3).

On review of both the oral and written ruling, we clearly understand

the basis for the court’s judgment.

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Misapply the Law

¶ 10 Maternal aunt contends that the court misapplied the law

because it did not “mak[e] the specific . . . findings that Title 19 and

section 14-10-124, C.R.S. 2025 require.” We are not persuaded.

¶ 11 While the godparents dispute that maternal aunt preserved

this issue for review, we need not resolve this question because,

regardless of preservation, we perceive no error in the court’s

application of the law. Cf. L&R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d

4 530, 536 (Colo. App. 2011) (declining to resolve an issue where the

outcome wouldn’t change).

¶ 12 Maternal aunt first asserts that the court was required to

consider section 14-10-124(1.5) and make findings under the

factors in that statutory subsection. But the APR in this case arose

within a dependency and neglect proceeding, which is governed by

the Children’s Code, not the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act.

See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208. Thus, the court was “not required to

apply the best interests factors specifically listed under section

14-10-124(1.5).” Id.

¶ 13 Relying exclusively on the court’s written order, maternal aunt

next asserts that the court failed to make findings required by the

Children’s Code. She also points out that the court did not explain

why its decision diverged from the guardian ad litem’s

recommendation in the juvenile court and contends that the court

“identified no concrete harms linked to” the child residing with her.

¶ 14 The Children’s Code does not require a court to make any

specific findings before entering an APR. Rather, as noted, a

juvenile court must designate an APR in accordance with the child’s

best interests. See id. The court did so here. After the court

5 indicated that it was guided by the Children’s Code and highlighted

certain legislative purposes underlying the Code, its ruling focused

on the child’s best interests and welfare. The court’s ruling reveals

that it considered the objective of preserving family ties, see section

19-1-102(1)(b), as it reasoned that most of the child’s supports,

“meaning the family and their supports,” were located in Colorado.

¶ 15 Nor are we persuaded by maternal aunt’s claim that the

court’s order “[fell] back on generalized ‘under six’ bonding notions.”

To the contrary, the court appropriately applied the expedited

permanency planning (EPP) provisions because the child was under

six when the petition was filed. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025. In doing so, the court acknowledged

that it was guided by the General Assembly’s recognition that

“children undergo a critical bonding and attachment process prior

to the time they reach six years of age.” See § 19-1-102(1.6).

¶ 16 Thus, the court correctly applied the law in determining the

APR.

D. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

¶ 17 Maternal aunt asserts that the court abused its discretion in

granting the APR to the godparents. We are unconvinced.

6 1. The Record Supports the Juvenile Court’s Findings

¶ 18 The court found, with record support, that the child was doing

well in his placement with the godparents and would do well with

maternal aunt, all parties were fit, and both homes were

appropriate. It was undisputed that the child had adjusted well to

his placement with the godparents and to his new school. And the

child’s therapist testified that he was “doing extremely well” in

therapy. The Department had no child protection concerns about

the child with either set of relatives and took no specific position

about the APR. And maternal aunt’s home was an approved

placement under the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children.

¶ 19 However, the court found that most of the child’s “supports”

were located in Colorado. And it found that the child’s ongoing

placement with the godparents was supported by father and B.G.,

who was mother’s “off and on” boyfriend for several years, and who

the court deemed the child’s psychological father. The court also

found that mother’s choice of the godparents “[a]s the future

custodians of the child should anything happen to [her]” was

deliberate, and that she promoted the godparents’ relationship with

the child while she was alive.

7 ¶ 20 The record supports these findings and shows that, during the

child’s placement with the godparents in Conejos County, the child

regularly visited with extended family nearby and with other loved

ones during their visits to the area. Also, the child attended school

with some of his cousins. Further, B.G. resided in Colorado and

maintained consistent contact with the child. Father, who was

working with a reunification therapist with the aim of establishing a

relationship with the child, also lived in Colorado. On the other

hand, the child did not have family members in Kansas, other than

maternal aunt and her children and husband.

¶ 21 In addition, B.G. testified that mother wanted the child to be

cared for by the godparents “if anything . . . ever happened to her.”

B.G. stated that is “what [he] wanted to[o]” and described the

godparents as the child’s “second home.” Father also supported the

child remaining in his placement with the godparents. And

multiple witnesses, such as mother’s long-time friend, testified that

the child and mother had a close relationship with the godparents

while mother was living.

8 2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Determining That Another Move Would Be “[D]etrimental” to the Child’s Best Interests

¶ 22 The court determined that “another move would be

detrimental to [the child’s] best interests,” and based the APR in

part on that determination. It elaborated in its oral ruling that

another move would be “an additional loss” and “difficult” for the

child. Maternal aunt contends that the court erred by making its

“detrimental” determination because the “record does not bear [it]

out.” We are not convinced.

¶ 23 The child had already lost his mother, and the court

referenced the trauma he had endured. The record shows that the

child had been in his placement with his godparents — whom he

had a long-term relationship with — for nearly a year at the time of

the APR hearing. Father testified that “to uproot [the child]

again . . . could be traumatizing to him . . . to have to start all over

again, when he is making ground out where he’s at now.” More

generally, one godparent (R.L.) testified that the child had started to

“blossom socially” and had been participating in extracurricular

activities.

9 ¶ 24 We are not persuaded by maternal aunt’s reliance on the

caseworker’s testimony that she didn’t believe that the child

changing therapists in the event of a move would be “detrimental.”

While maternal aunt accurately describes that portion of the

caseworker’s testimony, the caseworker also testified that “it’s

generally better . . . for children to have a consistent service team.”

The child’s therapist, who had been working with him for ten

months at the time of the APR hearing, would not have been able to

continue working with him if he moved to another state.

¶ 25 Moreover, the court was required to place the child as

expeditiously as possible in this EPP case. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6),

19-3-702(5)(c).

¶ 26 Maternal aunt also summarily states that the court “treated

general ‘stability’ as if it were dispositive.” The court’s ruling reveals

no such treatment by the court; instead, the court appropriately

rendered its APR decision based on the child’s best interests. See

Part C. Because maternal aunt has not developed any specific

argument on this issue, we don’t address it further. See People in

Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to

10 address an issue where a party didn’t “make specific arguments” in

support of it).

3. The Juvenile Court’s Allocation of Decision-Making Responsibility Was Not an Abuse of Discretion

¶ 27 Maternal aunt next contends that excluding her “entirely from

decision-making, without factor-tied reasons [under section

14-10-124(1.5)(b)], is an abuse of discretion.” This argument fails

because, as explained, the court did not have to make findings

under section 14-10-124(1.5). See Part C.

4. The Juvenile Court Did Not Delegate the Determination of Maternal Aunt’s Parenting Time

¶ 28 Maternal aunt argues that the court erroneously delegated the

determination of her parenting time to the godparents. See People

in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299, 302 (Colo. App. 2006) (the juvenile

court must make decisions about parenting time and may not

delegate this function to third parties). While maternal aunt’s

argument is unclear, she challenges the specific provision in the

court’s order that states, “if the Child is off of school on a Friday

and/or a Monday, the Parties shall work to secure longer weekend

visits with” maternal aunt. The scenario maternal aunt discusses is

11 one in which the child has an extended weekend that happens to

fall on her monthly weekend of parenting time.

¶ 29 The court did not delegate to the godparents the decision of

whether maternal aunt receives additional time on these specific

days but, rather, instructed the parties that maternal aunt shall

receive longer visits when the child’s extended weekends off school

fall on her parenting time.

¶ 30 Moreover, the caseworker testified that, while she “had to

intervene frequently” with respect to scheduling parenting time, the

parties had “cooperated; the family time ha[d] always been

facilitated.” Likewise, while the court acknowledged the “high

conflict and division of the family, which predated [mother’s] tragic

death,” the parties stipulated that, during the case, the child had

video visits with maternal aunt three times a week, as well as ten

multi-day, in-person visits. Cf. In re Marriage of Tibbetts, 2018 COA

117, ¶ 25 (noting that a general parenting time order that leaves the

specifics to the parents to work out may be permissible in cases

where the evidence indicates the parents are willing and able to

cooperate on parenting time).

12 ¶ 31 Accordingly, we need not reach the godparents’ and the

Department’s arguments that the delegation doctrine does not apply

in this case because maternal aunt is not the child’s parent.

5. We Don’t Reweigh the Evidence

¶ 32 Several times throughout her brief, maternal aunt essentially

requests that we reweigh the evidence and reach a different result.

But we do not reweigh the evidence, nor do we substitute our

judgment for the juvenile court’s. See People in Interest of S.Z.S.,

2022 COA 133, ¶ 29; see also A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 250 (“[I]t is

important to defer to the [juvenile] court . . . when it hears

contradictory testimony on material issues.”).

¶ 33 Because the court rested its determination on findings that are

supported by the record, its resolution of the evidence is binding on

review. See B.R.D., ¶ 15. Based on these findings, the court

concluded that an APR to the godparents was in the child’s best

interests. On this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in its

decision. See E.B., ¶ 14.

III. Disposition

¶ 34 The judgment is affirmed.

JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.