Peo in Interest of ME

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 5, 2024
• Docket: 23CA1972
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

23CA1972 Peo in Interest of ME 09-05-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1972

Arapahoe County District Court No. 21JV246

Honorable Victoria E. Klingensmith, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.E., a Child,

and Concerning D.E.,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE KUHN

Tow, J., concurs

Taubman, J., dissents

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 5, 2024

Ronald Carl, County Attorney, Jordan Lewis, Assistant County Attorney,

Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for

Appellant

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¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect action, D.E. (mother) appeals

the juvenile court’s allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) for

M.E. (the child) to a kin placement. We affirm and remand with

directions.

I. Background

¶ 2 In early May 2021, mother contacted Arapahoe County

Human Services Department caseworker Bridget Grimaldi and

informed her that mother had called 911 after the then-four-year-

old child had trouble breathing. Emergency services took the child

to the hospital, where tests revealed a low blood sugar level of forty

milligrams per deciliter, indicating that she had not eaten in

approximately two days. At mother’s request, the hospital

discharged the child to her former foster parent.

¶ 3 That same day, an Arapahoe County Sheriff’s deputy

contacted Grimaldi and told her that the first responders completed

a walkthrough of the home and noted that there was no food inside

the house. Grimaldi then spoke with mother, and the two agreed

on a voluntary placement agreement. However, when the two met

the next day, mother’s behavior became erratic, and she no longer

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wanted to proceed with the placement. The Department filed a

petition in dependency and neglect two days later.

¶ 4 While the case was pending, mother participated in visits with

the child that went well, including unsupervised and consistent

overnight visits. Visitation progressed to a weeklong stay in March

2023; however, after that, mother stopped participating in

parenting time. The child’s therapist testified that the child began

to experience behavioral struggles and attributed this to anxiety

about visits with her mother. Similarly to visitation, mother

engaged in family therapy for five months before also stopping in

March 2023. Mother did not reengage in therapy or parenting time

during the remainder of the case.

¶ 5 Subsequently, the Department and guardian ad litem (GAL)

requested an APR to kin providers. Mother objected, and the

juvenile court conducted a hearing in October 2023, after which the

court issued an order that granted an APR to the kin providers and,

as relevant here, included a provision that addressed mother’s

compliance with components of her treatment plan. Additionally,

the juvenile court required its order to be certified into a Douglas

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County domestic relations case and noted that its jurisdiction

would then terminate.

II. Analysis

¶ 6 On appeal, mother contends, and the Department concedes,

that the juvenile court erred by conditioning modification of the APR

order on her compliance with certain components of her treatment

plan.

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We disagree with the parties’ reading of the juvenile court’s

order. See Martin v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 186 P.3d 61, 66 (Colo.

App. 2007) (“[A]n appellate court is not bound by concessions of the

parties.”), rev’d on other grounds, 209 P.3d 185, 186 (Colo. 2009).

Thus, we affirm.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 7 We will not disturb a juvenile court’s factual findings when

they are supported by the record. People in Interest of J.G., 2021

COA 47, ¶ 17. However, whether the juvenile court applied the

correct legal standard in reaching its decision is a question of law

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It is uncontested that mother objected to the proposed APR order

at the hearing and requested, in its place, a resumption of visitation

and a transition plan to return the child home.

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that we review de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6,

¶ 25.

¶ 8 The provisions of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act

(UDMA) apply when the juvenile court enters an APR order that is

to be certified into a domestic relations case. See id. at ¶ 26; see

also § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2024 (addressing procedure for

certifying a custody award or an order allocating parental

responsibilities between a district court and a juvenile court).

B. The Juvenile Court’s Order

Doesn’t Limit Modification

¶ 9 Mother contends, and the Department and GAL concede, that

the juvenile court’s order unilaterally conditioned future

modification of the APR on her compliance with certain aspects of

her treatment plan. Mother reads the order as limiting both her

ability to petition for a modification and the district court from

granting one. We disagree with that reading and determine that the

relevant provision of the juvenile court’s order doesn’t limit future

modifications of parenting time but instead provides a roadmap for

mother’s success. See People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161, ¶ 39 (noting

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that an appellate court may affirm a lower court’s decision on any

ground supported by the record).

¶ 10 Mother’s argument is premised first on her understanding that

under the juvenile court’s order, she “could not petition the

domestic relations court for any modification of parenting time until

[mother] completed various requirements as outlined by the juvenile

court.” We acknowledge that the court’s inclusion of this language

could create confusion. But, in our view, a close examination of the

language supports a different reading. The portion of the juvenile

court’s order that mother references says, “Prior to any modification

of this order, Respondent Mother will comply with the following

components of her treatment plan.” The order then lists five

components of the treatment plan.

¶ 11 “[W]e do not read a trial court order’s statements in isolation;

instead, we view them in their totality.” People v. Gonzalez-

Quezada, 2023 COA 124M, ¶ 60 n.3. Viewed in context, we read

the disputed language as expressing the juvenile court’s expectation

that mother would comply with specific components of her

treatment plan to progress in visitation. In other words, that

section provided mother with steps that could help her succeed

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with her rehabilitation and, potentially, with a modification of the

order.

¶ 12 Mother next argues that the juvenile court also erred by

restricting the district court’s ability to modify the APR order later.

Again, we don’t read the juvenile court’s order as attempting to

proactively limit the district court from making a later modification

in the domestic relations case. But even if it did, as mother notes

in her brief, the APR order had to be certified into a domestic

relations case and the UDMA would control later modifications in

the district court. See N.G.G., ¶ 26. The UDMA makes explicit that

“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(b)(I) of this section,

the court may make or modify an order granting or denying

parenting time rights whenever such order or modification would

serve the best interests of the child.” § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.

2024 (emphasis added). Any such attempt to prospectively limit a

modification would be of no effect since section 14-10-129(1)(a)(I)

allows for modification of an order if it is in the child’s best interest

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and certain statutory criteria are met.

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The APR order here does

not prevent the district court from modifying the APR if appropriate

and if the conditions in the statute are satisfied.

¶ 13 Thus, we conclude that the APR order does not prevent mother

from seeking — or the district court from granting, if appropriate —

a modification to the APR.

C. The Douglas County Domestic Relations Case

¶ 14 Finally, we note that the record contains a November 28,

2023, minute order reading “GAL CONFIRMS APR CERTIFIED INTO

DOUGLAS CASE 23DR610.” However, our review of court case

management records does not reveal a case matching that number,

nor do we see any indication that the domestic relations case was

created. See People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 55-56 (Colo. App. 2004)

(noting we may take judicial notice of the contents of court records

in a related proceeding).

¶ 15 The record shows that the juvenile court terminated its

jurisdiction based on the GAL’s representation that the APR had

2

The statute contains limitations on motions modifying parenting

time that do not appear applicable on this record. See § 14-10-129,

C.R.S. 2024.

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been certified into a domestic relations case. And as the APR order

correctly notes, it must be certified into a domestic relations case

under the relevant statutes. § 19-1-104(6)(b). On remand, the

juvenile court should ensure that certification of the APR order to

the district court occurs.

III. Disposition

¶ 16 The order is affirmed, and the juvenile court is directed to

ensure that the parties properly certify its APR order into a

domestic relations case.

JUDGE TOW concurs.

JUDGE TAUBMAN dissents.

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JUDGE TAUBMAN, dissenting.

¶ 17 Because I agree with the argument of mother, D.E., and the

concession by the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services

that the juvenile court erred in conditioning modification of its

allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) order on mother’s

compliance with certain components of her treatment plan in this

dependency and neglect case, I respectfully dissent.

I. Background

¶ 18 After holding a hearing in October 2023, the juvenile court

issued the APR order at issue here and directed that it be certified

into a Douglas County domestic relations case. The juvenile court’s

order stated, as relevant here, “Prior to any modification of this

order, Respondent Mother will comply with the following

components of her treatment plan.” The order then provided that

those components required mother (1) to maintain individual

therapy appointments and meet treatment plan goals and

objectives; (2) to actively meet with the minor child’s therapist and

follow the treatment provider’s recommendations; (3) to participate

in family therapy with kin providers and the minor child; (4) to meet

with the kin providers and discuss coparenting, family therapy, and

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the minor child’s needs; and (5) to sign a release of information for

the court and kin providers to ensure she was in compliance with

mental health objectives and treatment.

¶ 19 As the majority notes, the record does not indicate whether the

juvenile court’s order has been certified into a domestic relations

case.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 We review de novo whether a juvenile court correctly applied

the correct legal standard. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6,

¶ 25, 459 P.3d 664, 669.

¶ 21 When a juvenile court enters an APR order in a dependency

and neglect case, it must file a certified copy in the district court.

§ 19-1-104(6), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of M.R.M., 2021 COA

22, ¶ 19, 484 P.3d 807, 811. When it does so, it transfers

jurisdiction from the juvenile court to the district court, and the

provisions of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act apply. § 19-

1-104(5)-(6). The district court must then treat the juvenile court’s

APR order “as any other decree issued in a proceeding concerning”

APR. § 19-1-104(6)(b).

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B. Analysis

¶ 22 Mother contends, the Department concedes, and I agree that

the juvenile court erred when it imposed conditions on mother as a

prerequisite to seeking modifications of parenting time in the

district court.

¶ 23 It is, of course, true that we are not bound by a party’s

concessions. See People v. Schnorenberg, 2023 COA 82, ¶ 40 n.1,

541 P.3d 1, 9.

¶ 24 Nevertheless, in my view, the juvenile court overstepped its

bounds when it stated that before any modification of the juvenile

court’s order, mother must comply with five significant components

of her treatment plan. Section 19-1-104(6) requires that a juvenile

court’s APR order certified to a district court must be treated the

same as any other APR originating in the district court. However,

that was not the case here.

¶ 25 The juvenile court provided that mother “will” comply with five

components of her treatment plan “prior to any modification” of its

order. The plain meaning of the word “will” is mandatory, not

permissive. Igou v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2020 COA 15, ¶ 18, 459 P.3d

776, 781. Thus, once the juvenile court’s order was certified to the

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district court, it would tie the hands of the district court by

requiring it to ensure that mother had complied with these five

provisions of her treatment plan.

¶ 26 The juvenile court’s order thus exceeded the bounds of its

authority. The statutory scheme contemplates that once a juvenile

court’s APR order is certified to the district court, the district court

may make or modify any APR order to serve the best interests of the

child. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2024. A juvenile court may

not condition a district court’s ability to determine parental rights

on compliance with provisions of a treatment plan in the juvenile

court.

¶ 27 It may well be the case that once the juvenile court’s order is

certified into a district court case, the district court could impose

the same or similar conditions on mother in its discretion. On the

other hand, because circumstances may have changed when the

district court addresses the APR order, it may well determine that

different provisions should apply to mother.

¶ 28 Accordingly, I would reverse the juvenile court’s conditions

imposed on mother in its APR order. I would allow the part of the

juvenile court’s order certifying the case to the district court to

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remain in effect, but simply direct that the portion of its order

imposing conditions on mother be deleted.