25CA1659 Peo in Interest of KW 03-05-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1659 Jefferson County District Court No. 24JV30076 Honorable Lindsay VanGilder, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of K.W., a Child,
and Concerning B.W.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026
Kimberly S. Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee
Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem
Elizabeth A. McClintock, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, B.W. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with K.W. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth, and
Families (Division) opened this case because the child was born
exposed to methamphetamine and fentanyl. Mother’s whereabouts
were unknown following her departure from the hospital, and the
Division served her by publication.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or
neglected. It also adopted a treatment plan for mother, which
required her to address substance use, participate in family time,
and meet the child’s needs in a safe and stable environment.
Mother, however, never exercised any family time and did not
participate in monitored sobriety or demonstrate that she was
engaged in substance use treatment during the pendency of the
case.
¶4 Mother’s only appearance occurred virtually at the scheduled
termination hearing. Mother said that she planned to start
inpatient treatment and requested a continuance and the
1 appointment of counsel, which the court granted. Mother later
appeared at her first family engagement meeting by video, where
she expressed her desire to start family time before beginning
treatment.
¶5 Around the same time, the Division again moved for
termination. The court held a hearing on the motion at which
mother’s counsel appeared, but mother did not. Following the
hearing, the court terminated mother’s parental rights under
subsections (1)(a) and (1)(c) of section 19-3-604, C.R.S. 2025.
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶6 Section 19-3-604 sets forth “three separate bases under which
the [juvenile] court may terminate the parent-child legal
relationship.” People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 19. Two
of those grounds are relevant to this appeal.
¶7 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected and has been abandoned by their parent.
§ 19-3-604(1)(a). As relevant here, abandonment occurs if a parent
has (1) surrendered physical custody of the child for six months or
more and (2) “not manifested during such period the firm intention
2 to resume physical custody of the child or to make permanent legal
arrangements for” the child’s care. § 19-3-604(1)(a)(I).
¶8 Another basis for termination is the juvenile court finding, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably complied
with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has
not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c).
¶9 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M.
v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. The credibility of the witnesses and the
sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence, as well as
the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are all within
the juvenile court’s discretion. Id. We review the juvenile court’s
factual findings for clear error and, thus, will set them aside only if
they lack any support in the record. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 48. But we
review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions based on those
facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
3 III. Abandonment
¶ 10 Mother contends that the court erred by determining that she
abandoned the child. She does not challenge the court’s conclusion
that she had surrendered physical custody of the child for at least
six months. See § 19-3-604(1)(a)(I). Rather, she asserts only that
the court erroneously concluded that she did not show an intent to
resume physical custody or make permanent legal arrangements for
the child’s care. See id.
¶ 11 The Division disputes preservation because mother did not
specifically assert that the elements of abandonment had not been
met. However, mother’s attorney asserted in closing argument that
mother had actively participated in the latest family engagement
meeting and that she was interested in and willing to attend
inpatient treatment. Counsel also asked the court to deny the
motion to terminate to give mother more time to show that she
could engage in her treatment plan. Given these general
statements, we will treat her argument as preserved. Cf. In re
Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 68 (“[R]aising the ‘sum and
substance’ of an argument is sufficient to preserve it.” (citation
omitted)). And regardless of preservation, we discern no error.
4 ¶ 12 Abandonment is primarily a question of intent and may be
determined by the parent’s actions as well as her words. People in
Interest of A.D., 56 P.3d 1246, 1248 (Colo. App. 2002). In
determining whether a child has been abandoned, the
circumstances must be viewed in light of the child’s best interests.
Id.
¶ 13 Mother concedes that she did not participate in the case “for
most of the time it was open.” But, relying on her participation in
one hearing and one family engagement meeting, she asserts that
she did “not demonstrate an intention to abandon [the child].”
¶ 14 True, mother expressed at the family engagement meeting that
she wanted to be the child’s mother and that she desired to start
family time before beginning inpatient treatment. Mother also made
similar statements at the hearing, where she expressed her desire
to be a part of the child’s life. Yet a parent’s desire to visit the child
and “perhaps someday assume custody” does not amount to a
manifestation of a firm intention to resume custody. Id. at 1249.
Further, a parent’s participation in an involuntary termination
proceeding, standing alone, is insufficient to preclude termination
based on abandonment. See id. at 1248.
5 ¶ 15 Moreover, the juvenile court found that mother’s last contact
with the child was at the hospital before the child’s discharge and
that she did not engage in any family time during the sixteen-
month pendency of the case. And it found that mother’s
whereabouts remained unknown at the time of the termination
hearing. While acknowledging testimony about mother’s
statements at the family engagement meeting, the court
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25CA1659 Peo in Interest of KW 03-05-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1659 Jefferson County District Court No. 24JV30076 Honorable Lindsay VanGilder, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of K.W., a Child,
and Concerning B.W.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026
Kimberly S. Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee
Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem
Elizabeth A. McClintock, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, B.W. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with K.W. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth, and
Families (Division) opened this case because the child was born
exposed to methamphetamine and fentanyl. Mother’s whereabouts
were unknown following her departure from the hospital, and the
Division served her by publication.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or
neglected. It also adopted a treatment plan for mother, which
required her to address substance use, participate in family time,
and meet the child’s needs in a safe and stable environment.
Mother, however, never exercised any family time and did not
participate in monitored sobriety or demonstrate that she was
engaged in substance use treatment during the pendency of the
case.
¶4 Mother’s only appearance occurred virtually at the scheduled
termination hearing. Mother said that she planned to start
inpatient treatment and requested a continuance and the
1 appointment of counsel, which the court granted. Mother later
appeared at her first family engagement meeting by video, where
she expressed her desire to start family time before beginning
treatment.
¶5 Around the same time, the Division again moved for
termination. The court held a hearing on the motion at which
mother’s counsel appeared, but mother did not. Following the
hearing, the court terminated mother’s parental rights under
subsections (1)(a) and (1)(c) of section 19-3-604, C.R.S. 2025.
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶6 Section 19-3-604 sets forth “three separate bases under which
the [juvenile] court may terminate the parent-child legal
relationship.” People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 19. Two
of those grounds are relevant to this appeal.
¶7 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected and has been abandoned by their parent.
§ 19-3-604(1)(a). As relevant here, abandonment occurs if a parent
has (1) surrendered physical custody of the child for six months or
more and (2) “not manifested during such period the firm intention
2 to resume physical custody of the child or to make permanent legal
arrangements for” the child’s care. § 19-3-604(1)(a)(I).
¶8 Another basis for termination is the juvenile court finding, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably complied
with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has
not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c).
¶9 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M.
v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. The credibility of the witnesses and the
sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence, as well as
the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are all within
the juvenile court’s discretion. Id. We review the juvenile court’s
factual findings for clear error and, thus, will set them aside only if
they lack any support in the record. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 48. But we
review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions based on those
facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
3 III. Abandonment
¶ 10 Mother contends that the court erred by determining that she
abandoned the child. She does not challenge the court’s conclusion
that she had surrendered physical custody of the child for at least
six months. See § 19-3-604(1)(a)(I). Rather, she asserts only that
the court erroneously concluded that she did not show an intent to
resume physical custody or make permanent legal arrangements for
the child’s care. See id.
¶ 11 The Division disputes preservation because mother did not
specifically assert that the elements of abandonment had not been
met. However, mother’s attorney asserted in closing argument that
mother had actively participated in the latest family engagement
meeting and that she was interested in and willing to attend
inpatient treatment. Counsel also asked the court to deny the
motion to terminate to give mother more time to show that she
could engage in her treatment plan. Given these general
statements, we will treat her argument as preserved. Cf. In re
Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 68 (“[R]aising the ‘sum and
substance’ of an argument is sufficient to preserve it.” (citation
omitted)). And regardless of preservation, we discern no error.
4 ¶ 12 Abandonment is primarily a question of intent and may be
determined by the parent’s actions as well as her words. People in
Interest of A.D., 56 P.3d 1246, 1248 (Colo. App. 2002). In
determining whether a child has been abandoned, the
circumstances must be viewed in light of the child’s best interests.
Id.
¶ 13 Mother concedes that she did not participate in the case “for
most of the time it was open.” But, relying on her participation in
one hearing and one family engagement meeting, she asserts that
she did “not demonstrate an intention to abandon [the child].”
¶ 14 True, mother expressed at the family engagement meeting that
she wanted to be the child’s mother and that she desired to start
family time before beginning inpatient treatment. Mother also made
similar statements at the hearing, where she expressed her desire
to be a part of the child’s life. Yet a parent’s desire to visit the child
and “perhaps someday assume custody” does not amount to a
manifestation of a firm intention to resume custody. Id. at 1249.
Further, a parent’s participation in an involuntary termination
proceeding, standing alone, is insufficient to preclude termination
based on abandonment. See id. at 1248.
5 ¶ 15 Moreover, the juvenile court found that mother’s last contact
with the child was at the hospital before the child’s discharge and
that she did not engage in any family time during the sixteen-
month pendency of the case. And it found that mother’s
whereabouts remained unknown at the time of the termination
hearing. While acknowledging testimony about mother’s
statements at the family engagement meeting, the court
nonetheless found that mother “ha[d] not taken any affirmative
action to sign the release, set up family time, or attempt to establish
any relationship or make arrangements for [the child’s] care.”
¶ 16 The record supports the court’s findings. Mother exercised no
family time with the child, including after she voiced her desire for
contact toward the end of the case. Mother does not argue in her
opening brief that she made permanent arrangements for the child’s
care, nor does the record reveal that she did so.
¶ 17 Additionally, the caseworker testified that she attempted to
reach mother weekly. Throughout the case, the caseworker called
mother, texted her, left her voicemails, sent her communications
through Facebook, and contacted her relatives for updated contact
information. But these efforts resulted only in “some sporadic
6 contact” with mother. And the caseworker’s affidavit concerning
the Division’s efforts to locate mother, admitted at the hearing,
indicated that efforts to locate mother had been unsuccessful. See
§ 19-3-603, C.R.S. 2025 (when termination is sought based on
abandonment and the parent’s location remains unknown, the
petitioner shall file an affidavit stating what efforts it made to locate
the parent). Lastly, mother did not appear at the termination
hearing.
¶ 18 In light of the court’s well-supported findings, including
mother not having any contact with the child or taking actions to
establish a relationship with him, we do not disturb its conclusion
that mother abandoned the child. See S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10; A.D., 56
P.3d at 1248.
IV. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 19 Mother also asserts that the court erred by determining that
the Division had engaged in reasonable efforts.
¶ 20 To determine whether a parent is unfit under section 19-3-
604(1)(c)(II), a court considers whether a department made
reasonable efforts that have been unable to rehabilitate the parent.
§ 19-3-604(2)(h); People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915
7 (Colo. App. 2011). Because we affirm the termination of mother’s
parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(a)(I), we do not address
whether termination was proper under section 19-3-604(1)(c). See
L.M., ¶ 19.
V. Disposition
¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.