25CA0178 Peo in Interest of JFJ 06-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0178 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 20JV1221 Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of J.F.J., a Child,
and Concerning J.J.F.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Freyre and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025
Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 J.J.F. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-
child legal relationship with J.F.J. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Denver Department of Human Services filed a petition in
dependency or neglect because the then-five-month-old child
suffered serious bodily injury as a result of suspected physical
abuse by mother’s boyfriend. The petition included the child’s older
sister, A.G. The Department placed both children with maternal
grandmother where they remained for the duration of the case.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated both children dependent and
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. The
Department subsequently moved to terminate mother’s parental
rights as to J.F.J. Following a hearing held over four years after the
case opened, the juvenile court granted the motion and terminated
mother’s parental rights.
II. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶4 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there were no less drastic alternatives to termination, such as an
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to maternal
grandmother. We disagree.
1 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶5 We review a juvenile court’s findings regarding less drastic
alternatives for clear error. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021
CO 14, ¶¶ 15, 44. It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to
determine the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the
evidence and to assess witness credibility. People in Interest of
A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).
¶6 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶7 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-
604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.
In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); see L.M., ¶ 29.
2 ¶8 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic
alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. If
the court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that
termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the less
drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.
¶9 In deciding whether a relative placement is a viable less
drastic alternative to termination, a juvenile court may consider,
among other things, (1) whether an ongoing relationship with the
parent would benefit the child, People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA
195M, ¶ 38; and (2) whether the caregiver favors adoption over an
APR, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App.
2011).
¶ 10 Additionally, when a child is under six years old, as here, the
juvenile court must consider the expedited permanency planning
(EPP) provisions, which require that the child be placed in a
permanent home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-
102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
3 B. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother argues that an APR would have been appropriate
because she maintained a strong bond with the child throughout
the case. But the juvenile court found that there were no less
drastic alternatives to termination, in part because mother’s lack of
protective capacity presented significant child safety concerns.
Additionally, the court found that the child needed permanency
because this case had been open “way beyond the guidelines
anticipated by the [EPP] statute.” The record supports the court’s
findings.
¶ 12 The child had multiple fractures, bruising, and a hematoma
resulting from the incident that started the proceeding. The
caseworker testified that the injuries were so severe that the child
was “in a cast and harness [for] weeks after.” When the caseworker
discussed the injuries with mother, she claimed it was a “freak
accident” and “she would always defend [her boyfriend].”
¶ 13 While this case was pending, mother married her boyfriend
and had two children with him. Nearly four years after the case
opened, mother’s youngest child died as a result of injuries suffered
because of suspected abuse by mother’s now husband. The
4 injuries included facial bruising and multiple fractures. Mother
again claimed that the injuries and resulting death were a “freak
accident” and that she and her husband “would remain a family.”
The caseworker opined that mother lacked the capacity to be a
protective parent and that she could not put the child’s needs above
her own or her husband’s.
¶ 14 Mother next argues that although maternal grandmother did
not testify at the termination hearing, she “made clear in earlier
proceedings that she would accept an APR.” But the record shows
that at this earlier proceeding, when the juvenile court inquired
whether maternal grandmother would consider an APR, she
responded “yes” but then said “I would love to adopt [if] the Court
allows that” but “if the court does not allow that” then she would
consider an APR. And mother concedes in her opening brief that
maternal grandmother “preferred to adopt the children, but she
would accept an APR.” Additionally, the caseworker testified that
mother and maternal grandmother “had a pretty tumultuous . . .
relationship” and that they did not have consistent contact.
Notably, when mother was asked about her desired outcome during
5 the termination hearing, she testified that she wanted the child to
be adopted by maternal grandmother.
¶ 15 Ultimately, the caseworker opined that an APR would not be in
the child’s best interest and that the child needed to be adopted
because he deserved permanency. In doing so, the caseworker
noted that the case was outside of the EPP provisions, and the child
was five months old when the case opened and over four and a half
years old on the date of the termination hearing.
¶ 16 Finally, mother argues that the juvenile court demonstrated
that there was a less drastic alternative to termination when it
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25CA0178 Peo in Interest of JFJ 06-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0178 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 20JV1221 Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of J.F.J., a Child,
and Concerning J.J.F.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Freyre and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025
Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 J.J.F. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-
child legal relationship with J.F.J. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Denver Department of Human Services filed a petition in
dependency or neglect because the then-five-month-old child
suffered serious bodily injury as a result of suspected physical
abuse by mother’s boyfriend. The petition included the child’s older
sister, A.G. The Department placed both children with maternal
grandmother where they remained for the duration of the case.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated both children dependent and
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. The
Department subsequently moved to terminate mother’s parental
rights as to J.F.J. Following a hearing held over four years after the
case opened, the juvenile court granted the motion and terminated
mother’s parental rights.
II. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶4 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
there were no less drastic alternatives to termination, such as an
allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to maternal
grandmother. We disagree.
1 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶5 We review a juvenile court’s findings regarding less drastic
alternatives for clear error. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021
CO 14, ¶¶ 15, 44. It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to
determine the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the
evidence and to assess witness credibility. People in Interest of
A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010).
¶6 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶7 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-
604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less
drastic alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.
In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); see L.M., ¶ 29.
2 ¶8 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic
alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27. If
the court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that
termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the less
drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.
¶9 In deciding whether a relative placement is a viable less
drastic alternative to termination, a juvenile court may consider,
among other things, (1) whether an ongoing relationship with the
parent would benefit the child, People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA
195M, ¶ 38; and (2) whether the caregiver favors adoption over an
APR, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App.
2011).
¶ 10 Additionally, when a child is under six years old, as here, the
juvenile court must consider the expedited permanency planning
(EPP) provisions, which require that the child be placed in a
permanent home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-
102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
3 B. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother argues that an APR would have been appropriate
because she maintained a strong bond with the child throughout
the case. But the juvenile court found that there were no less
drastic alternatives to termination, in part because mother’s lack of
protective capacity presented significant child safety concerns.
Additionally, the court found that the child needed permanency
because this case had been open “way beyond the guidelines
anticipated by the [EPP] statute.” The record supports the court’s
findings.
¶ 12 The child had multiple fractures, bruising, and a hematoma
resulting from the incident that started the proceeding. The
caseworker testified that the injuries were so severe that the child
was “in a cast and harness [for] weeks after.” When the caseworker
discussed the injuries with mother, she claimed it was a “freak
accident” and “she would always defend [her boyfriend].”
¶ 13 While this case was pending, mother married her boyfriend
and had two children with him. Nearly four years after the case
opened, mother’s youngest child died as a result of injuries suffered
because of suspected abuse by mother’s now husband. The
4 injuries included facial bruising and multiple fractures. Mother
again claimed that the injuries and resulting death were a “freak
accident” and that she and her husband “would remain a family.”
The caseworker opined that mother lacked the capacity to be a
protective parent and that she could not put the child’s needs above
her own or her husband’s.
¶ 14 Mother next argues that although maternal grandmother did
not testify at the termination hearing, she “made clear in earlier
proceedings that she would accept an APR.” But the record shows
that at this earlier proceeding, when the juvenile court inquired
whether maternal grandmother would consider an APR, she
responded “yes” but then said “I would love to adopt [if] the Court
allows that” but “if the court does not allow that” then she would
consider an APR. And mother concedes in her opening brief that
maternal grandmother “preferred to adopt the children, but she
would accept an APR.” Additionally, the caseworker testified that
mother and maternal grandmother “had a pretty tumultuous . . .
relationship” and that they did not have consistent contact.
Notably, when mother was asked about her desired outcome during
5 the termination hearing, she testified that she wanted the child to
be adopted by maternal grandmother.
¶ 15 Ultimately, the caseworker opined that an APR would not be in
the child’s best interest and that the child needed to be adopted
because he deserved permanency. In doing so, the caseworker
noted that the case was outside of the EPP provisions, and the child
was five months old when the case opened and over four and a half
years old on the date of the termination hearing.
¶ 16 Finally, mother argues that the juvenile court demonstrated
that there was a less drastic alternative to termination when it
accepted a stipulated APR for the child’s sister, who “was in the
same position” as this child. But the juvenile court found that the
children were differently situated because the children had different
fathers and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1963, which requires a higher burden of proof for
termination, applied to sister due to her father’s tribal heritage. See
People in Interest of K.C. v. K.C., 2021 CO 33, ¶ 26 (prior to
terminating parental rights in an ICWA case, a court must hear
expert testimony and make findings beyond a reasonable doubt as
6 opposed to by clear and convincing evidence as in non-ICWA
proceedings).
¶ 17 At the beginning of the termination hearing, the court
accepted a stipulated APR for the child’s sister, which involved
placement with maternal grandmother. The guardian ad litem
(GAL) told the court that she did not believe an APR was in the
sister’s best interest. Nonetheless, the GAL agreed to the stipulated
APR because she “recognize[d] the burden of proof in an ICWA case,
and [she] recognize[d] that the tribe is not going to agree . . . to a
termination, no matter what the facts are.” During the termination
hearing, the caseworker testified that had the sister’s case not been
an ICWA case, she would have recommended termination.
Furthermore, the court noted that had the case proceeded to a
hearing, there was a “strong likelihood” termination would have
been granted as to the sister.
¶ 18 Ultimately, the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion
that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. Because
the record supports the court’s findings, we must affirm its
judgment. See People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.
7 III. Disposition
¶ 19 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.