25CA1997 Peo in Interest of JC 05-07-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1997 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV289 Honorable Shay Whitaker, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of Je.C. and Ja.C., Children,
and Concerning T.W. and L.C.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by JUDGE ASHBY* Román, C.J., and Bernard*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 7, 2026
Ron Carl, County Attorney, Tamra White, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado for Appellee
Sheena Knight, Counsel for Youth, Brighton, Colorado, for Je.C. and Ja.C.
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado for Appellant T.W.
Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado for Appellant L.C.
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, L.C. (father) and
T.W. (mother) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child
legal relationships with Je.C. and Ja.C. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In April 2023, the Arapahoe County Department of Human
Services (the Department) received a referral that father had
dementia, believed that mother and the children were strangers
holding him against his will, and physically harmed the children
when they tried to stop him from leaving the home. As a result, the
Department provided ongoing support to the family. During a
meeting with the caseworker in August 2023, the children reported
concerns about mother’s substance use, anger, and physical
aggression. After receiving a report that mother had threatened the
children’s lives, the Department filed a petition in dependency or
neglect and sought temporary custody of the children. The juvenile
court granted temporary custody to the Department, who placed the
children with maternal grandmother. But three weeks later, based
on concerns about grandmother’s substance use, the Department
transferred the children to foster care where they remained.
1 ¶3 The juvenile court then adjudicated the children dependent
and neglected and adopted treatment plans for mother and father.
In December 2024, the Department moved to terminate both
parents’ parental rights. Following a multi-day hearing spanning
several months, the juvenile court granted the motion and
terminated mother’s and father’s legal relationships with the
children.
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶4 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the children were
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied
with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has
not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶5 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.
T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022
COA 146, ¶ 8 (applying the same standard of review to whether a
department of human services satisfied its obligation to make
2 reasonable efforts). We review the court’s factual findings for clear
error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on those
facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶6 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the
children when the Department failed to make reasonable
accommodations for his disability. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶7 Before a court may terminate parental rights under section
19-3-604(1)(c), the county department of human services must
make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunite families.
§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.
2025. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and
care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.
§ 19-1-103(114).
¶8 Appropriate services provided in accordance with section
19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).
The services that “must be available and provided” as determined
by individual case planning include, among others, screenings,
3 assessments, home-based family and crisis counseling, information
and referral services to available assistance resources, family time,
and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).
¶9 Additionally, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, requires a public entity, such as
a county department of human services, to make reasonable
accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities. See
People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶¶ 11-12. Thus,
departments and juvenile courts must account for and, if possible,
make reasonable accommodations for a parent’s disability when
providing rehabilitative services. People in Interest of S.K., 2019
COA 36, ¶ 34. And, a juvenile court must consider whether a
department made reasonable accommodations under the ADA in
determining if it made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent.
Id.
¶ 10 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability
under the ADA is a case-by-case determination. Id. at ¶ 21. Before
a department can be required to provide reasonable
accommodations under the ADA, it must know that the individual
has a qualifying disability, either because that disability is obvious
4 or because someone has informed the department of the disability.
Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, while a department must provide appropriate
screenings and assessments of a parent, the parent is responsible
for disclosing information regarding his disability. Id. at ¶ 21. And
a parent should also identify any modifications that he believes are
necessary to accommodate his disability. Id.
¶ 11 A parent is ultimately responsible for utilizing the services
provided by a department to obtain the assistance needed to comply
with their treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d
1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). In determining whether a
department made reasonable efforts, a juvenile court should
consider the totality of the circumstances and account for all
services and resources provided to a parent, measuring them
holistically rather than in isolation with respect to specific
treatment plan objectives. See People in Interest of My.K.M. v.
V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.
B. Additional Background
¶ 12 In October 2023, father filed a notice asserting that the ADA
applied based on his diagnoses of vascular dementia and multiple
myeloma cancer. At that time, father did not request any specific
5 accommodations, stating only “[s]hould [he] require any
accommodations or modifications, [his] counsel [would] confer . . .
and motion the [c]ourt.” Two months later, father moved to a
nursing home facility where he stayed for the remainder of the case.
¶ 13 In March 2024, the Department moved the juvenile court for a
finding that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised for
father, asserting that “[d]ue to [father’s] diagnosis and inability to
care for himself and the minor children, [the Department did] not
believe that an appropriate treatment plan [could] be [de]vised to
address [his] unfitness as a parent.” In response, father’s counsel
moved for a finding that the Department failed to make reasonable
efforts to develop a treatment plan and explore reasonable
accommodations for his disability.
¶ 14 The court set a contested hearing to resolve the motions.
Father’s witness, qualified as an expert in treatment planning and
accommodations for individuals with disabilities, testified that, even
though father would not be able to become a custodial parent
because of his medical conditions, he could participate in services
at his nursing home, attend family time, and maintain an ongoing
relationship with the caseworker through continued monthly
6 contact. The court found it undisputed that a treatment plan could
not be devised to rehabilitate father and render him a primary
parent. But the court found that there could be a treatment plan
which allowed father continued contact with the children while the
case proceeded. Thus, the court adopted a treatment plan for
father requiring him to (1) maintain caseworker contact; (2) attend
family time and interact with the children in a nurturing and
affectionate manner; (3) sign releases of information pertaining to
his medical care; and (4) participate in physical therapy as
recommended by his nursing home facility. Father’s counsel did
not request any modifications to the treatment plan or any specific
C. Analysis
¶ 15 The juvenile court concluded that, understanding father’s
condition, status, and treatment plan terms, the Department made
reasonable efforts.
¶ 16 The record reflects that the Department (1) provided
supervised family time for father at his nursing home and
scheduled phone contact for the children and father; (2) spoke to
two of father’s medical social workers and their director;
7 (3) investigated dementia-specific resources for the children;
(4) offered the children the opportunity to speak to father’s medical
social worker about father’s condition; (5) investigated
transportation options for father to attend family time in the
community; (6) remained in communication with father and his
team; (7) enrolled the children in therapy; and (8) encouraged the
children to attend therapy specific to father’s condition.
¶ 17 Nevertheless, father asserts that the Department failed to
make reasonable efforts and reasonably accommodate his disability
because the caseworker did not provide mechanisms to enhance his
relationship with the children, engage in more frequent contact with
him, or proactively reach out to his providers. But, as detailed
above, the record reflects that the caseworker maintained contact
with father and his team and made resources available to the
children to maintain a relationship with father and process his
illness. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that, had the
caseworker communicated with father more frequently or provided
the children with additional dementia-specific resources, it would
have made a difference in the outcome of the case — particularly
considering father’s diagnosis and its undisputed impact on his
8 ability to parent the children. Following the termination hearing,
father acknowledged, through his counsel’s closing argument, that
father’s treatment plan “was never designed to rehabilitate him as a
parent, because he cannot be, based on terminal illness.” See
People in Interest of C.C., 2022 COA 81, ¶ 20 (“An error affects a
substantial right only if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the
error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired
the basic fairness of the trial itself.’”) (citation omitted); see also
§ 19-3-507(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (“If one or both of the parents have a
disability, reasonable accommodations and modifications, as set
forth in the [ADA] . . . , are necessary to ensure the treatment plan
components are accessible.”); People in Interest of B.J.D., 626 P.2d
727, 730 (Colo. App. 1981) (“The sole purpose of the treatment
plan . . . is to reunite a parent and child in the kind of relationship
which will be beneficial to both, under conditions which are
designed to eliminate those factors which necessitated society’s
intrusion into the family in the first instance.”).
¶ 18 Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, we discern
no error in the juvenile court’s conclusion that the Department
made reasonable efforts.
9 IV. Fit Within a Reasonable Time
¶ 19 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that
she could not become a fit parent within a reasonable time because,
in her view, she made substantial progress in her treatment plan
objectives. We are not persuaded.
¶ 20 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders him
or her unable to give a child reasonable parental care. People in
Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). Reasonable
parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide
nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the
child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs. People in
Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). A parent’s
noncompliance with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a
lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore,
may also be considered in determining unfitness.” People in Interest
of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 21 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is
likely to change within a reasonable time, “the court may consider
whether any change has occurred during the proceeding, the
10 parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the
parent’s conduct or condition.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022
COA 133, ¶ 24. What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific
and must be determined by considering the physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs of each particular child. Id. at
¶ 25. But a “reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id.
B. Analysis
¶ 22 Mother’s treatment plan required her to (1) maintain
caseworker contact; (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation to
determine the most appropriate course of treatment; (3) cooperate
with all requested urinalysis (UA) tests; (4) maintain and budget
legal income to meet her financial obligations; (5) complete a mental
health evaluation and comply with all treatment recommendations;
(6) attend family time; and (7) provide a safe, stable, and suitable
residence for the children.
¶ 23 The juvenile court found that, although mother had made
some progress on her treatment plan, she did not reasonably
comply with the plan overall and continued to exhibit the same
concerns that originally necessitated the Department’s involvement
with the family. Therefore, the court found mother to be unfit. The
11 court further determined that mother could not become fit within a
reasonable time because she had not progressed beyond supervised
family time or demonstrated her sobriety or the ability to manage
her anger over the course of the two-year-long case.
¶ 24 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The
Department asked mother to submit to random, weekly UAs. But
mother submitted only a small percentage of her required UAs
during the last year of the case. Mother’s therapist expressed
concern that mother was not complying with required UA testing
and that mother had sent a threatening email to Ja.C.’s guardian
ad litem one week before the final day of the termination hearing.
The therapist agreed that mother “still ha[d] a lot of work to do”
regarding impulse control, coping skills, and anger management.
¶ 25 The caseworker testified that, over the course of the
two-year-long case, mother had not maintained stable employment,
shown sustained sobriety, or demonstrated the ability to use coping
skills or tools to manage her anger. Therefore, the caseworker
opined that mother was unlikely to become fit if given more time.
¶ 26 Even so, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred because
she made “significant improvements” in managing her mental
12 health needs, consistently attended family time, and had a strong
relationship with the children. To be sure, the court recognized
that mother had done some work during the case, and it
commended her ongoing participation in mental health treatment
and family time. Nevertheless, the court found, with record
support, that mother was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable
time based, in large part, on her lack of progress in the key areas of
substance use and anger management. It is not our role to reweigh
the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile
court. See id. at ¶ 29. And because the record supports the court’s
findings, we have no basis to disturb them. See id. We therefore
reject mother’s assertion.
V. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 27 Both parents contend that the juvenile court erred by finding
that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. We are
not persuaded.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 28 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives
are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. A.M., ¶ 40. In
considering less drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give
13 primary consideration to the children’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020
COA 3M, ¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider, among other
things, (1) whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be
beneficial to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to
care for the child’s needs, see People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA
195M, ¶ 38; (2) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see
People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009);
and (3) whether an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR)
provides adequate permanence and stability for the child, see
People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910-11 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 29 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than
adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best
interests. A.M., ¶ 27. If a juvenile court considers a less drastic
alternative but finds instead that termination is in the children’s
best interests, it must reject the alternative and order termination.
Id. at ¶ 32.
¶ 30 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings
for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.
Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but
14 instead finds that termination is in the children’s best interests, we
are bound to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its
findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.
¶ 31 The juvenile court considered less drastic alternatives to
termination but found that none of them would meet the children’s
physical, emotional, and mental health needs. In so finding, the
court considered the foster parents’ preference for adoption, the
children’s wishes, mother’s ongoing struggles with substance use
and anger management, and any benefit to the children of
continuing their relationships with the parents.
¶ 32 The record supports these findings. The caseworker reported
that visiting father was difficult for the children, in part, due to his
declining short-term memory and lack of consistent engagement
with the children during visits. And mother continued to involve
the children in inappropriate conversations during family time. The
caseworker testified that she and the children’s guardian ad litem
discussed the option of an APR with the children several times over
the course of the proceedings. But the children consistently
expressed feeling unsafe when discussing an APR and potential
15 return to mother’s home. And, due to his dementia and terminal
illness, father acknowledged throughout the case that he could not
be a custodial parent for the children. Overall, the caseworker
opined that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination
and that termination was in the children’s best interests.
¶ 33 Moreover, the caseworker testified that she had discussed
various permanency options with the foster parents on multiple
occasions, and the foster parents preferred termination and
eventual adoption over an APR. See People in Interest of S.N-V., 300
P.3d 911, 920 (Colo. App. 2011); see also People in Interest of P.D.,
580 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo. App. 1978) (noting that a court cannot
enter an APR to an unwilling party who is not the child’s parent).
Contrary to mother’s arguments, the lack of direct testimony from
the foster parents and there being no evidence that the foster
parents would have had “the children removed from their home if
they were not immediately allowed to adopt” do not, on their own,
require the court to find that an APR was a viable less drastic
alternative. Rather, as detailed above, in assessing whether an APR
was viable the court properly considered numerous factors together
with the foster parents’ preference for adoption. See Z.M., ¶ 29.
16 ¶ 34 True, as both parents point out, an APR would have preserved
the children’s relationships with the parents. But that is just one
factor for the court to consider in analyzing whether any less drastic
alternatives are viable. See A.R., ¶ 38. And after considering the
evidence presented, including testimony from the family time
supervisor regarding the children’s bond and relationship with both
parents and father’s two expert witnesses regarding the benefits of
an APR over termination and adoption, the juvenile court
determined that termination was in the children’s best interests.
The parents’ arguments essentially ask us to reweigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we
cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
¶ 35 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that
there was no less drastic alternative to termination, which was in
the children’s best interests, we must accept its determination. See
B.H., ¶ 80.
VI. Disposition
¶ 36 The judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.