Peo in Interest of JC

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 26, 2024
• Docket: 24CA0282
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0282 Peo in Interest of JC 12-26-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0282 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV30734 Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of J.C. III and T.C., Children,

and Concerning J.A.C. II,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Bernard* and Richman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 26, 2024

Kerry Tipper, City Attorney, Christina R. Kinsella, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

John F. Poor, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 J.A.C. II (father) appeals the judgment terminating his

parent-child legal relationships with his children, J.C. III and T.C.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In November 2022, law enforcement officers performed a

welfare check on father’s mobile home and discovered the children

locked in a bathroom. The children had untreated second-degree

burns and tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl.

Based on this information, the Denver Department of Human

Services (Department) removed the children, placed them with

foster parents, and filed a petition in dependency and neglect.

¶3 In January 2023, father admitted that the children were in an

injurious environment, and the juvenile court adjudicated the

children dependent and neglected. A month later, the court

adopted a treatment plan for father that required him to address his

substance abuse issues, meet the children’s needs, communicate

with the Department, and attend family time with the children.

¶4 In December 2023, the Department moved to terminate

father’s parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary

hearing in January 2024. After hearing the evidence, the court

1 granted the Department’s motion and terminated the parent-child

legal relationships between father and the children.

II. Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

¶5 Father first asserts that the juvenile court erred by

determining that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform

Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). We

agree with the juvenile court that it had jurisdiction under the

UCCJEA.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 The UCCJEA aims to avoid jurisdictional competition in

child-custody matters. Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 19; see also

People in Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, ¶ 23 (noting that every

state has adopted the UCCJEA except for Massachusetts). To

effectuate this purpose, it establishes a comprehensive framework

to determine whether a court may exercise jurisdiction in a

child-custody matter or whether it must defer to a court of another

state. People in Interest of A.B-A., 2019 COA 125, ¶ 9.

¶7 The UCCJEA prescribes two ways for a Colorado court to issue

an initial child-custody determination: temporary emergency

jurisdiction, § 14-13-204, C.R.S. 2024, and non-emergency

2 jurisdiction, § 14-13-201, C.R.S. 2024. Because it is undisputed

that the juvenile court could not terminate the parents’ parental

rights under the temporary emergency jurisdiction provision of the

UCCJEA, our analysis focuses only on non-emergency jurisdiction.

S.A.G., ¶ 35 (“[S]ection 14-13-204(2)’s reference to final

determinations does not permit courts to terminate parental rights

pursuant to temporary emergency jurisdiction in the absence of a

continuing abandonment or emergency.”).

¶8 A court may exercise non-emergency jurisdiction in one of four

ways: (1) home-state jurisdiction; (2) significant-connection

jurisdiction; (3) more-appropriate-forum jurisdiction; and (4)

last-resort jurisdiction. See § 14-13-201(1); S.A.G., ¶ 26. Because

the UCCJEA prioritizes home-state jurisdiction, a Colorado court

must first determine whether it or another state has home-state

jurisdiction before it considers any of the other forms of

jurisdiction. § 14-13-201(1)(a); see People in Interest of C.L.T., 2017

COA 119, ¶ 26; see also Madrone v. Madrone, 2012 CO 70, ¶ 11.

¶9 Under the UCCJEA, a Colorado court has home-state

jurisdiction if Colorado was “the home state of the child on the date

of the commencement of the proceeding.” § 14-13-201(1)(a). As

3 relevant here, “home state” is defined as “the state in which a child

lived with a parent . . . for at least one hundred eighty-two

consecutive days immediately before the commencement of a

child-custody proceeding.” § 14-13-102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

“Commencement” refers to “the filing of the first pleading in a

proceeding.” § 14-13-102(5).

¶ 10 Whether a juvenile court has jurisdiction over a child-custody

proceeding under the UCCJEA presents a question of law that we

review de novo. Brandt, ¶ 18. But any factual dispute upon which

the existence of jurisdiction may turn is for the juvenile court to

resolve, and an appellate court may not disturb the juvenile court’s

factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. S.A.G., ¶ 21.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 Father maintains that the record does not definitively

establish that Colorado was the children’s home state and therefore

the juvenile court erred by exercising home-state jurisdiction under

the UCCJEA. We are not persuaded.

¶ 12 In its petition, the Department noted that the “family

report[ed] being from Upstate New York,” but mother told the

Department that the family had come to Colorado “just over a year”

4 before the filing of the petition. However, at an advisement hearing

a few weeks later, mother said that they had arrived in Colorado

“around tax time.” The court clarified that mother meant April and

stated that “if they’ve been here since April, then that would put

them here at six months.” The court then asked mother whether

she meant “April of this year,” and mother responded, “Yeah. It was

after Easter.”

¶ 13 At the adjudicatory hearing in January 2023, father’s counsel

stated on the record that the family had “been in Colorado for over a

year” and that father “consider[ed] Colorado to be their

residence . . . or home state.” Based on this information, the

juvenile court found that it could exercise home-state jurisdiction

under the UCCJEA. In ruling on the termination motion, the court

again found it could exercise home-state jurisdiction, noting that

the children had lived with a parent in Colorado for more than 182

consecutive days before the commencement of the proceeding.

¶ 14 Notwithstanding his own concession that the family had lived

in Colorado since at least January 2022, father now asserts that,

based on mother’s statements at the November 2022 hearing, the

record is unclear whether the family had been in Colorado for more

5 than 182 days when the Department filed its case. The Department

and the guardian ad litem contend that other evidence in the

record, including the parents’ criminal histories, shows that they

had been in Colorado for several years.

¶ 15 However, we need not decide whether the record shows that

the family had been in Colorado for several years because mother’s

statements support the court’s determination that the children had

lived with a parent in Colorado for more than 182 consecutive days

immediately before the commencement of this case. See

§ 14-13-102(7)(a). Therefore, Colorado was the children’s home

state, and the juvenile court properly exercised home-state

jurisdiction. See § 14-13-201(1)(a).

¶ 16 We are not convinced by father’s attempt to suggest that

mother’s statement may have placed the family’s arrival sometime

later in the spring of 2022. To be sure, the juvenile court did

mention “spring” in its conversation with mother. But mother never

suggested that the family arrived any later than April. Indeed,

mother described two events that occurred in April and answered in

the affirmative to whether the family arrived “around April of this

year.” Therefore, even if the family arrived in Colorado on the last

6 day of April 2022, they had still lived in Colorado for more than 182

consecutive days.

¶ 17 In sum, because there is nothing in the record to indicate that

the family had arrived in Colorado any later than April 2022, we

discern no error in the juvenile court’s determination that it had

non-emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

III. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 18 Father next contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We

disagree.

¶ 19 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024. The party moving for termination

has the burden to prove the statutory criteria by clear and

7 convincing evidence. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 8.

¶ 20 In addition to the termination criteria in section

19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must also consider and eliminate

less drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108,

1122-23 (Colo. 1986). The consideration of a less drastic

alternative is not a separate criterion but “is implicit in, and thus

intertwined with, the statutory criteria for termination.” People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.

¶ 21 When considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give

primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); People in Interest of Z.P., 167

P.3d 211, 214 (Colo. App. 2007). In doing so, the court may

consider, among other things, whether (1) an ongoing relationship

between the parent and child would be beneficial, People in Interest

of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38; and (2) an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) provides adequate permanence and stability

for the child, People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910-11

(Colo. App. 2005).

8 ¶ 22 To aid the juvenile court in determining whether there is a less

drastic alternative to termination, the department must evaluate a

reasonable number of people the parent identifies as placement

options. People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App.

2004). But the department is not obligated to “independently

identify and evaluate other possible placement alternatives.” Z.P.,

167 P.3d at 215; see also People in Interest of M.T., 121 P.3d 309,

314 (Colo. App. 2005) (“[T]he department of social services is not

responsible for ferreting out and investigating relatives who have

not been identified as placement alternatives.”).

¶ 23 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequate[ly]” meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be the “best”

option for the child. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14,

¶ 27. If the juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but

finds instead that termination is in the child’s best interests, it

must reject the less drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at

¶ 32. And under those circumstances, we must affirm the court’s

decision if its findings are supported by the record. People in

Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

9 B. Analysis

¶ 24 At the termination hearing, the caseworker testified that father

did not comply with his treatment plan, he was unfit, and his

conduct or condition was unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

Specifically, the caseworker reported that father was incarcerated

until June 2023 on charges related to the incident that began this

case, but he was released following a plea agreement that required

him to enter substance abuse treatment. However, the caseworker

could not confirm whether father entered treatment because he did

not communicate with her, except for a few text messages in August

and September 2023. Father was arrested on a warrant in

December 2023 for failure to comply with his probation sentence,

and the criminal court resentenced him to another term of

probation that again required him to enter a residential treatment

program. Father entered the program but left after a few days. He

did not have any contact with the children during the case.

¶ 25 The caseworker reported that the children had been placed in

a foster home, and they were doing well in that home. The

caseworker said that the Department also explored potential

relative placement options but did not discover any appropriate

10 placements. For example, she stated that the Department

contacted paternal relatives, but those relatives declined placement.

The caseworker said that mother did not ask the Department to

investigate any maternal relatives until shortly before the

termination hearing. The caseworker contacted a maternal aunt,

who said that she was “not in a position to take” the children;

however, the maternal aunt provided contact information for a

maternal cousin the day before the hearing. The caseworker said

that she had received a call from maternal cousin during the

hearing, but she had not “had a chance to have a very long

conversation” with her.

¶ 26 Ultimately, the caseworker opined that there were no less

drastic alternatives to termination based on the children’s young

ages, father’s inability to comply with his treatment plan, and his

lack of contact with the children. The caseworker further opined

that the children needed permanency and stability that could only

be achieved through adoption. Finally, the caseworker stated that,

even if maternal cousin (or some other relative) was an available

placement option, an APR would still not be in the children’s best

interests for the same reasons described above.

11 ¶ 27 Based on this evidence, the juvenile court found that the

Department had established the statutory criteria in section

19-3-604(1)(c) by clear and convincing evidence. The court also

specifically considered and rejected less drastic alternatives to

termination. In doing so, the court noted that (1) the Department

had adequately explored possible alternatives and (2) although the

cousin may still be a placement option post-termination, the

evidence established that termination and adoption was in the

child’s best interests. See, e.g., § 19-3-605(1) (noting a preference

for relatives when considering post-termination placement). All in

all, the court determined that it was in the children’s best interests

“to have the permanency that adoption can provide, particularly

given [their] young age.”

¶ 28 In sum, the record shows that the juvenile court properly

considered less drastic alternatives but rejected them because they

were not in the children’s best interests. See A.M., ¶ 32. And

because the record supports the court’s findings, we cannot disturb

them. See B.H., ¶ 80.

12 ¶ 29 Nevertheless, father asserts, for the following two reasons, that

the juvenile court committed reversible error when it terminated his

parental rights. We are not persuaded.

¶ 30 First, father argues that the juvenile court shifted the burden

of proof to him by “declin[ing] to consider the potential role of

kinship placements.” We disagree because the court’s ruling

properly recognized the difference between an available placement

option and a viable less drastic alternative to termination by

recognizing that, even if maternal cousin (or some other relative)

was an appropriate placement option, an APR to her would still not

be a viable less drastic alternative for the reasons described above.

In other words, the court did not necessarily need to consider

whether the maternal cousin would be an appropriate placement

option when a less drastic alternative — i.e., an APR to maternal

cousin or anyone else — would not be in the children’s best

interests. The record otherwise shows that the court held the

Department to its burden to prove the statutory criteria in section

19-3-604(1)(c). We therefore discern no error.

¶ 31 Second, father maintains that the juvenile court erred because

the record did not establish that the Department performed

13 “adequate and ongoing searches for potential kinship placement

options throughout the case.” But for purpose of the court’s less

drastic alternatives analysis, the Department only has a duty to

evaluate a reasonable number of people the parent identifies as

placement options. See D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532. And the record

supports the court’s finding that the Department adequately

investigated those parties timely identified as placement options.

Although the Department’s regulations may have required more, as

father asserts, we are not guided by those regulations. What’s

more, the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that, regardless

of the placement option, a less drastic alternative, such as an APR,

was not in the children’s best interests. Thus, even if the

Department needed to do more, we nevertheless discern no

reversible error.

IV. Disposition

¶ 32 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE RICHMAN concur.