Peo in Interest of GSLB

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1958
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1958 Peo in Interest of GSLB 04-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1958 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30257 Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of G.S.L.B., a Child,

and Concerning A.B.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Fox and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 3, 2025

Katie McLoughlin, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Joel M. Pratt, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.B. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with G.S.L.B. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Denver Department of Human Services initiated this case

shortly after the child’s birth due to concerns about mother’s

substance abuse and mental health. The child was soon placed

into kinship care with a friend of mother’s. At the time, a separate

dependency and neglect action was pending regarding one of

mother’s other children, who is not at issue in this appeal. The

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected.

¶3 The court then adopted a treatment plan for mother. The

treatment plan required mother to (1) engage in family time;

(2) address her substance use; (3) provide the child with a safe

environment where her basic needs are met; (4) address her

pending criminal cases and refrain from further criminal activity;

and (5) address her mental health issues.

¶4 A year and a half after it filed the case and a year after

mother’s treatment plan was adopted, the Department moved to

terminate mother’s parental rights. Following a hearing, the court

1 terminated the parent-child legal relationship between mother and

the child.

¶5 Mother now appeals.

II. Motion to Continue

¶6 Mother first contends that the juvenile court abused its

discretion when it denied her motion to continue the termination

hearing. We perceive no basis for reversal.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with

all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best

interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024. When ruling

on a motion to continue a termination hearing, the juvenile court

should balance the need for orderly and expeditious administration

of justice against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s

need for permanency. People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4,

¶ 11. Moreover, because the child was under the age of six when

the petition was filed, the expedited permanency planning (EPP)

provisions applied. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2024.

Under those provisions, the court couldn’t delay or continue the

termination hearing unless good cause was shown and the delay

2 was in the child’s best interests. See §§ 19-3-508(3)(a), 19-3-602(1),

C.R.S. 2024.

¶8 We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to continue

for an abuse of discretion. R.J.B., ¶ 13. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in

Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.

B. Analysis

¶9 At the start of the termination hearing, mother’s counsel

requested a “brief” continuance. Counsel stated that mother had

the opportunity to complete an intake with a treatment provider

that day and thus sought a continuance so she could engage in

treatment and reunify with the child “if at all possible.” The

Department and guardian ad litem objected, arguing that this was

an EPP case and that it was not in the child’s best interests to delay

permanency. The court denied the continuance, reasoning, “I

cannot find good cause to extend the EPP guidelines any further,”

but noted that mother was “welcome to present that evidence within

the trial.”

3 ¶ 10 We disagree with mother that the court was required to make

specific findings showing that it “explicitly engage[d] in the

balancing test.” See People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136,

¶ 51 (division noting it was “aware of no authority that requires

courts to make such specific findings on the record”). Although

brief, the court’s ruling indicated that it could not find good cause

to grant mother’s request, yet such good cause was required to

delay this EPP case that had already been open for eighteen months

by the time of the hearing. See §§ 19-3-508(3)(a), 19-3-602(1). In

addition, mother’s request to continue made no showing that

delaying the hearing would be in the child’s best interests. See

§§ 19-3-508(3)(a), 19-3-602(1).

¶ 11 Therefore, the court didn’t abuse its discretion when it denied

the motion to continue.

III. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 12 Mother next contends that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite her with the child.

We disagree.

4 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 13 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds,

by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent and neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t reasonably complied

with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan

hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 14 In determining whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department of human services

made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the

family. See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; People in

Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011).

“Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care” for

children who are in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114),

C.R.S. 2024; see also S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. Services provided in

accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy the

reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 15 Under section 19-3-208, a department must provide

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

5 provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information about and referral services to available public and

private assistance resources; family time services; and placement

services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). And if funding is available, section 19-3-

208 requires a department to provide transportation to services;

diagnostic and mental health services; and drug and alcohol

treatment services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶ 16 In deciding whether a department has satisfied its reasonable

efforts obligation, the juvenile court should consider whether the

provided services were appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan. S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. The parent is ultimately

responsible for using those services to obtain the assistance needed

to comply with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259

P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a

parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining

whether a department made reasonable efforts. See People in

Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶ 17 Whether a department of human services satisfied its

obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and

law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the

6 court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal

determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

¶ 18 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother. As pertinent here, the

court found that those services included efforts to engage mother

and “provide opportunities to meet with providers and her support

team to strategize how to overcome barriers.” And the court found

that the Department made efforts to help mother repair her phone

to increase communication, gave her bus passes, and met with her

at least twenty times.

¶ 19 Relatedly, the court found that mother’s “lack of consistent

engagement in services that would address the child protection

concerns” left the Department unable to effectuate the goal of

rehabilitating her.

¶ 20 The record supports the court’s findings. The court heard

testimony that:

7 • the Department connected mother to two dual diagnosis

providers for substance abuse and mental health treatment,

but mother was discharged from both;

• when mother reported that she wasn’t in favor of talk therapy,

the Department referred her to an alternative provider, but

there was no indication that mother ever reached out to that

provider;

• the Department provided bus passes;

• the Department provided gift cards for mother to get a phone

and later attempted, without success, to obtain funding from

community partners to repair the phone when mother

reported the screen had broken;

• at the time of the termination hearing, the Department was

unable to verify mother’s sobriety or engagement in any

mental health treatment; and

• mother didn’t consistently attend supervised, therapeutic, or

kinship-supervised family time.

¶ 21 On this record, we perceive no error in the court’s conclusion

that the Department’s efforts were reasonable. See People in

Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35 (in determining

8 whether a department made active efforts (a higher standard than

the reasonable efforts standard), a court should consider the

totality of the circumstances and measure the services and

resources provided holistically rather than in isolation); People in

Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶¶ 11-12 (applying a similar analysis

under the reasonable efforts standard, and explaining that a court

may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment in

its reasonable efforts determination).

¶ 22 We also reject mother’s argument that the Department didn’t

make reasonable efforts because it didn’t accommodate her

disability as required under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA). See People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 34 (when a

parent has a qualifying disability under the ADA, the Department

must account for and, if possible, make reasonable

accommodations for the parent’s disability when providing

rehabilitative services). Assuming without deciding that the ADA

applied, mother doesn’t identify what accommodations the

Department should have provided to her. The caseworker testified

that, in an effort to accommodate mother’s mental health and other

concerns, mother was afforded an appropriate amount of time to

9 process information, was permitted to take breaks to help her

control her emotions during difficult meetings, and was given

directions that were not overly wordy. Nonetheless, mother argues

that the services provided to her weren’t “tailored to her disability.”

But she doesn’t articulate what her alleged disability is, how the

services provided to her should’ve been tailored to that disability, or

what was lacking from the services she was provided.

¶ 23 We also disagree with mother’s assertion that the

Department’s efforts were deficient because it didn’t provide

domestic violence victim services. She alludes to the kinship

provider’s testimony that one of the family time sessions mother

had missed, two months before the termination, was the result of

injuries mother had sustained during a fight with her boyfriend.

But domestic violence wasn’t a focus of the case: it wasn’t part of

the basis for the petition and wasn’t an objective in mother’s

treatment plan. See People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 11 (a

treatment plan’s purpose is to preserve the parent-child

relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the problems

that required intervention into the family). Mother doesn’t cite any

part of the record where she indicated that she needed services

10 relating to domestic violence or that domestic violence concerns

were affecting her ability to engage with her treatment plan. See In

re E.R.S., 2019 COA 40, ¶ 3 (declining to consider issues that

weren’t preserved by being raised in the juvenile court). And the

record suggests only that mother missed a single parenting time

visit due to the alleged abuse, out of several visits mother missed

for various reasons. Nonetheless, the record suggests that the

Department engaged with mother on the issue, as the termination

report, which the court admitted at the hearing, indicated that the

caseworker and mother discussed safety-related concerns following

the incident with her boyfriend.

¶ 24 Lastly, we reject mother’s arguments that the Department’s

efforts were deficient because it didn’t provide her with

transportation outside of bus passes or repair her phone screen by

the time of the hearing. The Department’s provision of bus passes

complied with its statutory obligation. See § 19-3-208(2)(d)(I). And

although mother contends that her “trauma history complicated her

ability to use certain transit solutions,” she doesn’t identify what

other options the Department should have (or could have) offered.

Furthermore, even though providing a cell phone to a parent is not

11 a service required for reasonable efforts under the Children’s Code,

the Department submitted a funding request to community

partners in an effort to help repair mother’s broken phone screen.

See § 19-3-208(2).

¶ 25 Because we perceive no error in the court’s reasonable efforts

determination, we decline to disturb it. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.

IV. Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 26 Finally, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

determining that no less drastic alternative to termination existed.

In particular, she asserts that the record doesn’t support that

determination and suggests instead that an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) to the kinship provider was a viable less

drastic alternative. We disagree.

¶ 27 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 24.

In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); see also L.M., ¶ 29. As part of

12 that analysis, the court may consider the child’s need for

permanency, L.M., ¶ 29, and whether the alternative placement

option favors adoption rather than an APR, People in Interest of

Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 31.

¶ 28 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. People in Interest

of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27. If a juvenile court considers a

less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32. And under those circumstances, we must

affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

¶ 29 The juvenile court determined that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination and that termination was in the child’s

best interests. Specifically, the court found that it was in the

child’s best interests to have the permanency that adoption can

provide for her, “particularly given her very young age and the

evidence that this has been the only home [where] she has resided.”

13 See A.M., ¶ 32; S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 920 (“Permanent placement is

not a viable less drastic alternative if the child needs a stable,

permanent home that can only be assured by adoption.”).

¶ 30 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker

testified that the child was eighteen months old at the time of the

termination hearing and that the kinship provider’s home was the

only home she had known. The kinship placement testified that

she preferred adoption, as she wanted the child to have a

permanent option. See Z.M., ¶ 31. The caseworker opined that an

APR would not be in the child’s best interests due to the child’s age,

her comfort in the kinship placement’s home, and her need for

permanency.

¶ 31 Because the record supports the court’s findings, we must

affirm its determination. See B.H., ¶ 81.

V. Disposition

¶ 32 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE LUM concur.