24CA2192 Peo in Interest of GS 11-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2192 Crowley County District Court Nos. 21JV14, 22JV6, & 23JV30012 Honorable Mark A. MacDonnell, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of G.S., E.S., Ji.S., Jas.S., Je.S., Jay.S., D.S., and Z.S., Children,
and Concerning Ja.S. and Jo.S.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 26, 2025
Josi McCauley, Special County Attorney, Superior, Colorado, for Appellee
Debra W. Dodd, Counsel for Youth, Berthoud, Colorado, for G.S.
Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem for E.S., Ji.S., Jas.S., Je.S., Jay.S., D.S., and Z.S.
R. Jordan Edmondson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Arvada, Colorado, for Appellant Ja.S.
Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant Jo.S. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, Jo.S. (mother) and
Ja.S. (father) appeal the judgments terminating their parent-child
legal relationships with G.S., E.S., Ji.S., Jas.S., Je.S., Jay.S., D.S.,
and Z.S. (the children). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In August 2021, the Crowley County Sheriff’s Department
responded to the family home based on a call that the parents’
eight-month-old son, Joh.S., had been found unresponsive and not
breathing. Joh.S. was later pronounced dead.
¶3 The Crowley County Department of Human Services initiated
Crowley County Case No. 21JV14, a dependency and neglect action
concerning the six children living at the time, G.S., E.S., Ji.S.,
Jas.S., Je.S., and Jay.S. The Department alleged that the children
were dependent and neglected based on the condition of the family
home, which was described as “similar to hoarding conditions with
trails and paths located throughout the house [and] debris, clothes
and items stacked up that were an obvious hazard for the children,”
and the parents’ neglect of the children, who were found dirty and
malnourished. The children were removed from the home and
1 placed in foster care. Following a jury trial, they were adjudicated
dependent and neglected.
¶4 The parents appealed, and a division of this court reversed the
judgment adjudicating the children due to the erroneous admission
of highly prejudicial evidence regarding Joh.S.’s death during the
jury trial. People in Interest of G.S., (Colo. App. No. 22CA1044,
March 30, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶5 While the appeal was pending, mother gave birth to D.S. The
Department opened Crowley County Case No. 22JV6 concerning
that child, she was placed in foster care, and the court adjudicated
her dependent and neglected based on stipulations by the parents,
which the court accepted.
¶6 In April 2023, while the cases were pending, both parents were
criminally charged with offenses concerning Joh.S.’s death and with
child abuse offenses concerning the six older children.1
1 The juvenile court took judicial notice of the charges filed in the
criminal cases against the parents in Crowley County Case Nos. 2023CR32, 2023CR33, and 2023CR34. Similarly, we take judicial notice of the existence — and the resolution — of those charges. See People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A court may take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related proceeding.”).
2 ¶7 The Department later amended its petition in the original case,
adding further allegations of physical and emotional abuse,
starvation, deprivation of basic hygiene, unsafe sleeping
environments, and a lack of understanding of the children’s basic
needs. Then mother gave birth to Z.S., and the Department opened
a third case (Crowley County Case No. 23JV30012) regarding that
child, who was also placed in foster care.
¶8 Not long after, in October 2023, the court adjudicated the six
older children and Z.S. dependent and neglected based on the
parents’ stipulations, which the court accepted. The court adopted
a consolidated treatment plan for both parents that pertained to all
eight children in all three cases.
¶9 The treatment plans required the parents to
• participate in cognitive behavioral therapy to “recognize
how their actions or inactions made the children unsafe
previously and accept responsibility”;
• address their individual mental health concerns;
• participate in family therapy when their individual
therapists deemed the parents ready;
• engage in family time;
3 • maintain a safe home environment;
• engage in nutritional education and create a nutritional
plan that ensures the children’s individual needs are met
and allows them adequate access to appropriate food;
• complete the Nurturing Parenting Program;
• complete a psychological evaluation and a parent-child
interactional evaluation and follow all recommendations;
and
• understand the children’s developmental stages and
promote prosocial growth in each child at their given
stages.
¶ 10 In July 2024, the Department moved to terminate the parents’
parent-child legal relationships with all eight children. Soon
thereafter, on August 1, 2024, the prosecution dismissed the child
abuse charges against the parents regarding the six older children,
leaving only the charges relating to Joh.S.’s death. Following a
four-day hearing in late October 2024, the court terminated the
parents’ parent-child legal relationships with all the children.
¶ 11 This appeal followed. While the appeal was pending, the
prosecution dismissed the remaining charges brought against
4 father, and mother pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide
in exchange for a deferred judgment and sentence and dismissal of
the other charges brought against her.
II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶ 12 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was
adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t
reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment
plan or the plan hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and
(4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 13 A juvenile court’s judgment terminating parental rights
presents a mixed question of fact and law involving application of
the termination statute to the evidentiary facts. People in Interest of
A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. The credibility of the witnesses and
the sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence, as well
as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are all within
the juvenile court’s discretion. Id. We review the juvenile court’s
factual findings for clear error and, thus, will set them aside only if
they lack any support in the record. Id. at ¶¶ 15, 48. But we
5 review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions based on those
facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 14 Both parents contend that the Department failed to make
reasonable efforts to reunite them with the children — specifically
that the Department didn’t make necessary referrals, rejected the
services they participated in without providing timely alternatives,
delayed starting family therapy, and failed to offer sufficient family
time. We are not persuaded.
A. Mootness
¶ 15 As a preliminary matter, we address the issue of potential
mootness — an issue the Department and the guardian ad litem
(GAL) raised in a joint objection to mother’s request for oral
argument — as it affects our jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
See People in Interest of K.A., 155 P.3d 558, 560 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 16 “A case is moot when a judgment would have no practical legal
effect on the existing controversy.” Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70,
¶ 10. When issues become moot as a result of subsequent events,
appellate courts will decline to render an opinion on the merits
unless an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. See id.
6 ¶ 17 The Department and GAL suggest that the issue of reasonable
efforts with respect to mother is “likely moot.” Relying on section
19-3-604(1)(b)(IV), they assert that “[r]easonable efforts are no
longer required for termination” of mother’s parental rights in light
of her guilty plea to criminally negligent homicide. We disagree.
¶ 18 The issue of reasonable efforts as to mother is not moot, as
her guilty plea is not tantamount to the juvenile court finding that
(1) she is unfit because her proven parental abuse or neglect
resulted in serious bodily injury or death of the children’s sibling
and (2) an appropriate treatment plan cannot be devised to address
such unfitness. See § 19-3-604(1)(b)(IV). Nor has the juvenile court
made any such findings. To the contrary, the court found that an
appropriate treatment plan could be — and was — devised for
mother. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I). So even if the first element might
be satisfied by the plea, the second one is not.
¶ 19 Therefore, we conclude that this issue is not moot.
B. Preservation
¶ 20 The Department and the GAL argue that father failed to
establish that he preserved this issue for our review because he
directed us to one of the other proposed orders (mother’s) presented
7 to the juvenile court rather than his own. We agree that father’s
opening brief doesn’t meet C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A)’s requirement to
provide “the precise location in the record where the issue was
raised and where the court ruled.” But father provided the correct
citation in his reply brief, and it is clear that he raised this issue in
the juvenile court.
¶ 21 The Department and the GAL further note that divisions of
this court have split as to whether a parent must challenge a
department’s reasonable efforts before a termination hearing to
preserve the issue for review. Compare People in Interest of S.N-V.,
300 P.3d 911, 913 (Colo. App. 2011) (the issue didn’t have to be
raised before the termination hearing), with People in Interest of
D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 355 (Colo. App. 2007) (the issue had to be
raised before the termination hearing). But the Department and the
GAL don’t detail each parent’s attempts (or lack thereof) to raise the
issue of reasonable efforts before the termination hearing, and they
don’t ask us to find that either parent failed to preserve the issue on
this basis. Accordingly, we don’t address the issue of preservation
further, and we will presume that the parents’ arguments were
preserved. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo.
8 App. 2004) (declining to address an issue where a party didn’t
“make specific arguments” in support of it).
C. Relevant Law
¶ 22 To determine whether a parent is unfit at a termination
hearing, the juvenile court must consider whether the department
of human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the
parent and reunite the family. See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h),
C.R.S. 2025; S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. “Reasonable efforts” means
the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in out-of-
home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025. Services provided
in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, satisfy the
reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 23 Among other services, section 19-3-208 requires assessments
and individual case plans for the provision of services, information
and referral services to available public and private assistance
resources, family time services, and placement services. § 19-3-
208(2)(b). Other services, such as transportation assistance and
diagnostic and mental health services, must be provided if they are
determined to be “necessary and appropriate” and if the state has
sufficient funding for them. § 19-3-208(2)(d).
9 ¶ 24 In assessing a department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile
court should consider whether the services provided were
appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d
at 915, measuring the services and resources provided holistically
rather than in isolation, People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11,
¶ 11. But the parent is ultimately responsible for using those
services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the
treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285
(Colo. App. 2011). Accordingly, a court may consider a parent’s
unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether
a department made reasonable efforts. E.D., ¶ 12.
¶ 25 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make
reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in
Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the court’s factual
findings for clear error but review de novo its legal determination,
based on those findings, as to whether the department satisfied its
reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
10 D. Analysis
1. Mother’s Contentions
¶ 26 Mother contends that the Department’s efforts were deficient
because the Department (1) failed to make necessary referrals;
(2) delayed starting family therapy; and (3) never expanded or
liberalized her family time with the older children. We consider —
and reject — each contention in turn.
a. Failure to Make Referrals
¶ 27 Mother first contends that the Department “roundly” failed to
make referrals for needed services, forcing the parents to
independently identify providers. In support, mother points to her
testimony that she didn’t recall receiving any referrals from the
Department, as well as father’s testimony that the only referral or
resource the Department provided was a life skills services referral.
¶ 28 But the juvenile court found this testimony “unconvincing”
and credited the caseworker’s testimony that the Department sent
multiple referrals on the majority of the treatment plan objectives,
though the parents opted to pursue their own treatment providers
rather than work with the referral sources provided by the
Department. To that end, the caseworker testified about initiating
11 referrals to several services, including cognitive behavioral
therapy, Early Head Start home visitor services for child
development education, life skills services to help establish a safe
home environment, a facility and supervisor for therapeutic family
time, and a nutrition course.
¶ 29 Mother’s assertions about the Nurturing Parenting Program —
the only referral she specifically discusses in this part of her brief —
don’t convince us otherwise. The treatment plans required the
parents to complete “no less than [sixteen] weeks” of the program.
Mother claims that the Department didn’t submit a referral for such
a program. She also claims that she and father first took a shorter
version of the course, were told it was insufficient, and then
“doubled up” classes at another agency and had “no way” to know
the Department would deem this modality improper.
¶ 30 The record reveals, however, that the parents took the courses
in the opposite order: they first “doubled up” the sixteen-session
course to complete it online in eight weeks with one agency and
then took an eight- to ten-week course with a second agency. As to
the first course the parents took, the parent-child interactional
evaluator, who testified as an expert on nurturing parenting, opined
12 that it wasn’t proper to take the course virtually, with doubled
sessions over a short period of time. And, as to the second, shorter
course, the court heard evidence that a course satisfying the
treatment plan requirement was offered to the parents before they
started their separate course, the caseworker and an employee of
the second agency reminded the parents before they started their
separate course of the treatment plan requirement that the course
be sixteen weeks, and the shorter course didn’t contain all the
information the version required in their treatment plan contained.
¶ 31 Based on this and other evidence, the juvenile court
appropriately found that the parents were offered — but did not
engage in — a course that met the family’s needs.
b. Delayed Family Therapy
¶ 32 Next, mother contends that the Department substantially
delayed the parents from beginning family therapy due to its failure
to secure a family therapist until two and a half months before the
termination hearing.
¶ 33 Under the treatment plan applicable to both parents, family
therapy was to commence when both parents’ individual therapists
deemed the parents ready for it. And it is true that once the first of
13 the two parents (father) was deemed ready to participate in family
therapy, the Department had some difficulty securing and
coordinating with family therapy providers. However, the record
reveals that most of the delay in starting family therapy was caused
by the lack of confirmation from individual therapists that family
members were ready to participate.
¶ 34 About a year into the case, the juvenile court resolved a
dispute about which family therapy provider to use. But even then,
the parents’ and the children’s therapists were all indicating that
the family members weren’t yet ready for family therapy, as they
had more work to do first in individual therapy.
¶ 35 About six months later, the criminal charges were filed against
the parents. At that point, the parents revoked most of their
releases of information, including those allowing access to mental
health information, and they didn’t sign new releases until several
months later, in January 2024. Still, the record shows that father’s
individual therapist didn’t recommend family therapy until May
2024. And mother’s individual therapist didn’t recommend family
therapy until August 2024.
14 ¶ 36 The family therapist started treatment that same month with
separate sessions with the parents and the three oldest children.
However, as of the time of the termination hearing, the therapist
didn’t believe the family members were ready to attend joint
sessions all together.
¶ 37 Thus, there is no indication in the record that the Department
failed to provide reasonable efforts relating to family therapy.
c. Family Time with the Older Children
¶ 38 Finally, mother contends that the Department didn’t satisfy its
reasonable efforts obligation because it never liberalized or
expanded her family time with the six older children beyond one
supervised three-hour session per week.
¶ 39 Mother relies on section 19-3-217(1.5)(d), C.R.S. 2025, which
went into effect on January 1, 2024. See Ch. 284, sec. 4, § 19-3-
217, 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws 1677-78. Under this new statutory
provision, when a court is making decisions about family time for a
child placed outside the home, it may restrict or deny family time
only when doing so is necessary to protect a child’s safety or
mental, emotional, or physical health, and it must order family time
15 at the least restrictive setting and supervision level to satisfy the
child’s mental, emotional, or physical health. § 19-3-217(1.5)(d).
¶ 40 Here, the court initially ordered that family time be supervised,
and the parents had only supervised family time throughout the
case, as provided for in their treatment plans. That transitioned to
therapeutic family time in September 2022 based on the parent-
child interactional evaluator’s recommendation from her
assessment of the family’s needs.
¶ 41 Nothing in the record suggests that the juvenile court entered
any further orders regarding family time after section 19-3-
217(1.5)(d) went into effect at the beginning of 2024 — and,
certainly, mother hasn’t pointed us to any such orders. Nor has
mother pointed us to any place in the record where she requested a
change to the modality or the amount of her parenting time based
on this statute. See Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d
567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010) (an issue is preserved when it is brought
to the court’s attention and the court has an opportunity to rule on
it). Thus, mother’s reliance on the statute now is inapposite. Cf.
E.D., ¶¶ 32-33 (rejecting a parent’s arguments based on a different
subsection of section 19-3-217 because the juvenile court hadn’t
16 amended its orders regarding parenting time after that subsection
went into effect and the parent hadn’t raised the issue to the
juvenile court); see also People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13,
¶ 14 (an appellate court generally only reviews matters presented to
and ruled on by the juvenile court).
¶ 42 More generally, mother asserts that the Department prioritized
the children’s connections with their foster parents over their
reunification with the parents. Mother relies on People in Interest of
D.G., a case in which a department failed to satisfy its reasonable
efforts obligation when it prohibited any face-to-face visitation
between the parent and the children in the months preceding
termination based on the caseworker’s and other professionals’ view
that it was more important for the children to develop strong ties
with the foster parents. 140 P.3d 299, 302-06 (Colo. App. 2006).
No such facts are present here. Mother had visits with the children,
and neither the caseworker nor anyone else expressed a desire to
cut off the parents’ contact with the children in favor of the foster
parents. And, as noted, the family transitioned to therapeutic
supervised family time based on the recommendation of the parent-
child interactional evaluator following her evaluation of the family.
17 ¶ 43 Because we reject mother’s contentions of error, and because
the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, we discern no
error in its conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts
with respect to mother. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.
2. Father’s Contentions
¶ 44 Father contends that the Department rejected the services he
independently identified and participated in without providing any
timely alternatives. He cites three services in particular.
¶ 45 First, father points to the nutrition course he and mother took.
But the record shows that the parents declined to participate in the
nutrition course the Department had referred them to and instead
took a course with another provider before signing releases,
resulting in the provider being unaware of the family’s needs. The
caseworker — whose testimony the court found “credible and
reliable” — opined that the course the parents took wasn’t adequate
to address their nutrition issues, as it was too short and wasn’t
tailored to the family’s needs.
¶ 46 Second, father cites the Nurturing Parenting Program. But, as
discussed above, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding
that the parents were offered an appropriate course but elected to
18 take other courses that didn’t adequately meet their needs. Father
also argues, for the first time in his reply brief, that the court erred
by relying on the caseworker’s “seventeen-year-old expertise”
regarding the appropriate length of the Nurturing Parenting
Program. However, we don’t consider arguments raised for the first
time in a reply brief. In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.
¶ 47 And third, father points to his progress in individual therapy
and his participation in a few initial sessions with the family
therapist. But he doesn’t indicate that the Department refused to
acknowledge his participation in therapy, nor does he develop any
argument about the Department’s failure to assist him in locating a
therapist. In other words, father doesn’t connect his participation
in these services to the Department’s reasonable efforts obligation.
¶ 48 On this record, we discern no error in the court’s
determination that the Department made reasonable efforts with
respect to father. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.
IV. Fitness within a Reasonable Time
¶ 49 Arguing that they made substantial progress on their
treatment plans, mother and father both contend that the juvenile
19 court erred by finding that they were unlikely to become fit within a
reasonable time. We disagree.
A. Preservation
¶ 50 The Department and the GAL again point out that father’s
statement of preservation directed us to one of the other proposed
orders (the Department’s) to the juvenile court rather than his own.
Again, while we agree that father’s opening brief doesn’t satisfy
C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A)’s requirements, it’s clear that he raised this issue
in the juvenile court. And even if he hadn’t, the outcome would be
the same. Cf. L&R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 536
(Colo. App. 2011) (declining to resolve an issue where the outcome
wouldn’t change); People in Interest of R.R., 607 P.2d 1013, 1015
n.2 (Colo. App. 1979) (same). Thus, we address the merits of
father’s argument.
B. Relevant Law
¶ 51 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders
them unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.
D.P., 160 P.3d at 353. Reasonable parental care requires, at a
minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and safe parenting
adequate to meet a child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs
20 and conditions. People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152
(Colo. App. 2006). A juvenile court can also consider a parent’s
noncompliance with a treatment plan in determining unfitness.
People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 52 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is
likely to change in a reasonable time and, thus, whether the parent
can become fit in a reasonable time, the juvenile court may
consider, among other things, whether any change has occurred
during the proceeding. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584,
588-89 (Colo. App. 2003).
¶ 53 When children are under six years old, the juvenile court must
also consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions,
which require that they be placed in permanent homes as
expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-
702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
C. Analysis
1. Treatment Plan Compliance and Fitness Findings
¶ 54 In determining the parents were unfit, the juvenile court found
that, while the parents were compliant with some of the objectives
of their treatment plans, they weren’t successful with the treatment
21 plans. See E.S.V. v. People, 2016 CO 40, ¶ 20 (a parent’s partial or
even substantial compliance may not result in a successful
treatment plan that renders the parent fit).
¶ 55 Specifically, the juvenile court found that the parents hadn’t
“successfully internalize[d]” their treatment, “ma[d]e sustained
changes in their behavior,” or “correct[ed] the conduct and
conditions that led to the [Department’s] intervention.” The court
also found that the trauma the children had endured, “stemming
from their home environment,” was “ongoing and severe.” And it
found that for the parents to make sustained change, they needed
to recognize the trauma the children had experienced and change
their parenting. Yet the court found that, although the parents
eventually “superficially acknowledge[d] some accountability, they
were either [i]ncapable of or unwilling to take accountability for the
children’s circumstances and experiences in a way that evidenced
acknowledgment of the need for change.” And while the court
didn’t make express findings about whether the parents’ conduct or
condition was likely to change in a reasonable time, see section
19-3-604(1)(c)(III), it determined that “there [we]re myriad issues
and barriers with the parents suggesting the[] children may never
22 be appropriately returned to their parents’ care and custody
regardless of how much time the parents are given to rehabilitate”
and that “these children cannot afford to wait any longer for
permanency.”
¶ 56 It was undisputed that the parents had made some progress
during the pendency of the case, particularly in the few months
leading up to the termination hearing. For instance, the
therapeutic family time facilitator testified that in the three months
before the hearing, the parents showed progress in engaging with
the children when the children became dysregulated. And
according to the caseworker, the parents were “starting to engage in
more feedback than they ha[d] before.”
¶ 57 However, the record contains ample support for the court’s
findings that the parents didn’t internalize their treatment or make
sustained changes in their behavior in a way that suggested they
might become fit within a reasonable time.
¶ 58 For instance, the court observed that the family home at the
start of the case was “completely untenable as a residence for the
children,” noting that “[i]t was filled with debris to the point that
movement was severely restricted” and “[t]he various places where
23 the children slept were so cluttered and filthy as to be shocking to
the conscience.” The court further found, with record support, that
the parents hadn’t demonstrated their ability to maintain a healthy
and safe environment that could meet the children’s needs and
hadn’t acknowledged that their home at the start of the case was
unsafe for the children.
¶ 59 The court also found it “unacceptable” that the parents weren’t
forthcoming about their living situation during the case, including
showing the Department homes where they were supposedly living
that bore “little evidence that the parents were residing there” and
(in at least one instance) didn’t appear to contain “several of the
items the parents brought to family time.” Thus, it wasn’t clear
where the parents were living, what home they intended to bring
the children home to, and whether that home was appropriate for
the children. And the caseworker testified that the home the
parents said they intended to return the children to (a two-
bedroom, one-bathroom house) was a “small, tight environment”
that wouldn’t have allowed the children to use the coping
mechanism at least one of them uses of “tak[ing] space when they’re
feeling dysregulated to keep them from biting or pinching or hitting
24 each other.” As the court explained, “these particular children as a
result of prior trauma struggle with small spaces in a way that
other children may not.”
¶ 60 The court also observed that malnourishment was another
initial concern in the case, as “there was food in the home but the
children were not always allowed to eat it.” And while the parents
had completed a nutrition course, mother was later seen eating food
out of the trash can and hiding her food, suggesting to the
caseworker that food may have been used as a source of control.
¶ 61 Other evidence indicated that the parents struggled to
implement change around ensuring the children’s access to an
appropriate quantity and quality of food. The parents often brought
meals for the children during visits, but they repeatedly brought too
little food or brought expired food and spoiled milk, including in the
months immediately preceding the termination hearing. The
caseworker testified that there was no indication that financial
constraints were preventing the parents from providing adequate
food for the children. She also said the Department’s concern was
“less about [the parents] . . . [not] hav[ing] any understanding about
25 nutrition and more about [whether they] were . . . choosing to feed
their kids or choosing not to.”
¶ 62 As to family time, which was provided separately for the six
older children and the two younger children, the court found that
the parents had missed some of their visits with the older children
and had displayed “inconsistent attendance” and “lack of attention”
in visits with the younger children. The caseworker opined that
when visiting with the six older children at once, the parents
weren’t able to recognize and meet all of the children’s needs,
leading the children to become dysregulated; seek out other
providers to meet their needs; and leave visits angry, anxious,
worked up, and scared. She also opined that the parents struggled
to implement feedback they learned in one family time setting and
apply it to similar settings with the other children. For instance,
the parents received support in making more of a connection with
one of the children, such as through more meaningful greetings and
physical contact, but they didn’t use those same strategies with the
other children. The caseworker further said that father slept during
nearly every single visit with the two younger children and often left
for long periods of time during the visits.
26 ¶ 63 As to family therapy, as indicated, the parents and the three
oldest children had begun the process in separate sessions a few
months before the termination hearing but were not yet ready to
attend joint sessions together. The family therapist, testifying as an
expert in family therapy and counseling, opined that before those
joint sessions could occur, “the children need[ed] to be able to feel
safe and they need[ed] accountability with details and specifics of
their [traumatic] experiences and if they don’t feel safe, it just
disrupts their development.” But according to the family therapist
and her clinical supervisor, the parents hadn’t yet taken
accountability for the trauma the children had experienced in the
home, aside from some generic statements of accountability. The
court also found that “the children’s continued feelings that they
lack safety” were a “barrier” to progress in family therapy. Indeed,
the three oldest children — who the court found credible — testified
that they didn’t feel safe returning home to the parents.
¶ 64 More broadly, the caseworker opined that the parents didn’t
successfully complete the treatment plans and didn’t display
substantial enough growth to make the children safe. The
caseworker also said she was concerned that the parents wouldn’t
27 be able to sustain the progress they had made shortly before the
¶ 65 Finally, as the court noted, the EPP provisions applied to the
children in all three cases.2 And by the time of the termination
hearing, the six older children had spent over three years in foster
care and the two younger children had spent their entire lives in
foster care.
2. Mother’s Contentions
¶ 66 Despite these well-supported findings, mother contends that
she was either fit or capable of becoming fit within a reasonable
period. We are not persuaded.
¶ 67 Mother first asserts that the court’s fitness determination was
erroneous because of the “substantial” progress she had made on
her treatment plan, emphasizing in particular the treatment she
2 When the Department filed the petition in the initial case, several
of the children in that case were under six. Accordingly, the court had the discretion to apply the EPP provisions to all the children and appropriately exercised its discretion in doing so. See § 19-3- 104, C.R.S. 2025 (a dependency and neglect hearing conducted under the EPP provisions shall, if appropriate, include all other children residing in the same household); People in Interest of T.M., 240 P.3d 542, 546 (Colo. App. 2010) (the statutory scheme places discretion in the juvenile court to apply the expedited procedures to the older children when such application is appropriate).
28 undertook and the family time facilitator’s testimony about her
progress in the months before termination. Yet the juvenile court
considered the evidence favoring mother’s argument — such as her
treatment efforts and her progress in family time — and weighed
that against the contrary evidence in determining that mother was
unfit. Contrary to mother’s argument, the record supports the
court’s findings by the clear and convincing evidence standard, and
we do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that
of the juvenile court. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,
¶ 29; see also People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo.
2010) (“[I]t is important to defer to the [juvenile] court . . . when it
hears contradictory testimony on material issues.”).
¶ 68 Second, mother claims that her progress on the treatment
plan mitigated the child protection concerns that triggered the
Department’s intervention, such that the children’s need for
permanency was not a sufficient basis to terminate her parental
rights. See S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 60 (“Given that the evidence didn’t support
a finding that the parents were unfit, the need for permanency
alone wasn’t sufficient to terminate the parents’ constitutional
interest in the care and the custody of their children.”). But, unlike
29 in S.R.N.J-S., the evidence in this case supports the juvenile court’s
determination that mother remained unfit. And while the court
appropriately gave primary consideration to the children’s needs,
see § 19-3-604(3), as detailed above, their need for permanency was
not the sole basis upon which it rested its termination decision.
¶ 69 Third, mother contends that, even if termination was proper
with respect to the six older children, the court’s fitness
determination was in error as to the two younger children. She
asserts that the younger children are situated differently because
they didn’t experience any trauma in the family home (since they
never lived there) and they had lived in out-of-home placement for a
shorter time than the older children.
¶ 70 While mother correctly points out the divergence in
experiences among the two sibling groups, the juvenile court
explained that it was considering each child “separately” to reach a
resolution “in the child’s best interest.” See People in Interest of
J.L.M., 143 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo. App. 2006) (“Parental rights are
personal between each parent and each child.”). Indeed, the court
evaluated the family time objective as to the two younger children
separately from that as to the six older children, and it correctly
30 noted in its ruling that the younger children had never been placed
with the parents. And, contrary to mother’s claim that the court
“ignored” the different experiences of the younger children, the
court properly considered mother’s capacity to provide reasonable
parental care to each of the children, given their needs. See
S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 59 (“[A] determination of parental fitness is intertwined
with a determination of the child’s best interests.”).
¶ 71 Fourth, to the extent that mother contends the court erred
because it didn’t measure her progress from the time of the
stipulated adjudications about a year before the termination
hearing, we don’t address that issue because mother didn’t raise it
in the juvenile court. See M.B., ¶ 14 (we generally only reviews
matters presented to and ruled on by the lower court). Further,
mother didn’t develop her contention on the issue until her reply
brief. See Dean, ¶ 31 (we don’t consider arguments developed for
the first time in a reply brief).
¶ 72 Fifth, mother raises two constitutional contentions that she
didn’t fully preserve in the juvenile court. For her first contention,
she argues that the Department and the court unfairly punished
31 her for exercising her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, given the then-pending criminal charges.
¶ 73 In mother’s proposed order to the juvenile court, she briefly
noted the “impossible position” the parents faced of “having to
choose between their constitutional right to parent and their
constitutional right against self-incrimination,” but she stated that
“this concern is not the concern of the juvenile [c]ourt in deciding
the outcome for this termination hearing.” Thus, while mother
indicated that she was “concerned [about] sharing anything in
therapy with the children that may not be properly protected” under
section 19-3-207, C.R.S. 2025, she didn’t at any point ask the court
to address the issue. See Berra, 251 P.3d at 570.
¶ 74 Nonetheless, even assuming that mother preserved the issue
by alluding to her alleged constitutional dilemma, we perceive no
such dilemma. That’s because mother didn’t actually attend family
therapy sessions with the children, as the family therapist
determined the parties weren’t yet ready for such therapy as of the
time of the termination hearing. Thus, to the extent that the
caseworker and others expressed concern that mother wasn’t
taking accountability for her actions, it instead had to do with
32 mother not taking accountability in individual therapy sessions,
family therapy sessions not involving the children, and interactions
with service providers — all of which plainly were within the scope
of section 19-3-207’s protection. See § 19-3-207(2) (“No
professional shall be examined in any criminal case without the
consent of the respondent as to statements made pursuant to
compliance with court treatment orders . . . .”).
¶ 75 Moreover, any statements mother might have made in joint
therapy with the children likewise would have been protected from
disclosure. Under section 13-90-107(1)(g), C.R.S. 2025, no “person
who has participated in any psychotherapy . . . , including group
therapy sessions,” may be “examined concerning any knowledge
gained during the course of such therapy without the consent of the
person to whom the testimony sought relates.”
¶ 76 At any rate, as the juvenile court noted, even after the child
abuse charges relating to the six older children were dismissed a
few months before the termination hearing, the parents still didn’t
take accountability for the trauma the children had experienced.
¶ 77 Thus, it was appropriate for the juvenile court to rely in part
on the parents’ failure to “take full accountability for [their] prior
33 actions,” particularly given the court’s finding that “the evidence
overwhelmingly exhibits the children’s need for such accountability
if reunification [wa]s to occur.”
¶ 78 For her second constitutional contention, mother argues that
the Department and the court penalized her for living in accordance
with her religious beliefs, such as having a large family and letting
father play a dominant role in the family, in violation of her free
exercise rights under the First Amendment.
¶ 79 Instead of raising to the juvenile court the First Amendment
argument she now makes on appeal, mother raised only the vague
argument that “all families and parents can be rendered fit
regardless of their personal beliefs” and, thus, that “[p]eople’s
strongly held beliefs and faith are never a barrier to the successful
reunification of the family.” Therefore, mother’s assertion didn’t
adequately alert the juvenile court to consider and rule on the full
scope of the constitutional challenge she advances on appeal. See
Berra, 251 P.3d at 570.
¶ 80 With respect to the argument mother did preserve, the record
doesn’t suggest that the court based its conclusion that mother was
unfit on her religious beliefs. To the contrary, the court didn’t even
34 mention mother’s beliefs, and it based its findings of unfitness on
mother’s failure to correct the specific conduct and conditions that
had led to departmental intervention. See Part IV.C.1.
¶ 81 In sum, because the record supports the court’s findings
regarding mother’s fitness, we won’t disturb its conclusion that the
termination criteria were satisfied. See A.M., ¶¶ 15, 48; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
3. Father’s Contention
¶ 82 Father similarly maintains that he could become fit within a
reasonable period because he “substantially complet[ed] all aspects
of his treatment plan and ma[de] positive changes throughout th[e]
case.” Like mother, he cites the treatment he underwent and the
progress he made before the termination hearing. But the juvenile
court weighed that evidence along with contrary evidence in finding
that while father had complied with some of the treatment plan
objectives, the plan hadn’t been successful and father hadn’t been
rendered fit. See Part IV.C.1. And, as noted, we do not reweigh
that evidence. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29; A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 250.
¶ 83 Father also contends that he should’ve been provided
additional time to engage in individual and family therapy. Yet the
EPP provisions applied to these cases, the longest of which had
35 been open over three years, and the court concluded that expedited
permanency for the children was “critical.” And no witnesses could
predict a probable return home date for the children. The family
therapist testified that such a timeline was “impossible to predict”
but estimated (assuming cooperation by everyone) that the process
could take “several weeks working with [the] parents more” and
then “several months from that point forward with the children.”
See S.Z.S., ¶ 25 (a reasonable time is not an indefinite time and
must be determined by considering the children’s needs).
¶ 84 Father concedes that “some delay” in starting family therapy
arose from his unwillingness to take accountability, but, like
mother, he asserts that he was put in the “impossible position” of
having to choose between his constitutional rights to parent and
against self-incrimination. To the extent that father may have
preserved this constitutional argument by making statements
similar to those mother made in the juvenile court, we don’t
perceive any constitutional problem for the same reasons we
explained as it relates to mother.
¶ 85 Thus, as with mother, the juvenile court’s findings regarding
father’s fitness are appropriate and supported by the record.
36 Therefore, we won’t disturb the court’s conclusion that the
termination criteria were satisfied. See A.M., ¶¶ 15, 48; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
V. Disposition
¶ 86 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.