25CA1527 Peo in Interest of FSRS-S 07-09-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1527 Montrose County District Court No. 22JV30011 Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of F.S.R.S-S., a Child,
and Concerning N.S. and R.S.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE TOW Harris and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 9, 2026
Julie R. Andress, County Attorney, Ryan J. Dunn, Assistant County Attorney, Montrose, Colorado, for Appellee
Robert G. Tweedell, Guardian Ad Litem
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant N.S.
James West, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Appellant R.S. ¶1 N.S. (mother) and R.S. (father) appeal the judgment
terminating their parent-child legal relationships with F.S.R.S-S.
(the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In May 2022, the Department filed a petition in dependency
and neglect regarding the then-newborn child based on concerns
about mother’s and father’s substance use, criminal histories, and
living environment.
¶3 Following the parents’ admissions that, through their actions
or omissions, the child lacked proper parental care, the juvenile
court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and adopted
treatment plans for the parents. Acknowledging father’s argument
that his incarceration impeded his ability to accomplish some of his
treatment plan objectives, the court ordered father to complete the
objectives available to him while in custody. The court also noted
that if father remained in custody his treatment plan could be
amended.
¶4 More than two years after filing the petition, the Department
moved to terminate mother’s and father’s parent-child legal
relationships with the child. After a nine-day hearing spanning five
1 months, the juvenile court granted the Department’s motion and
terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an
appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not
been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct
or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶6 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.
T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022
COA 146, ¶ 8 (applying the same standard of review to whether a
department of human services satisfied its obligation to make
reasonable efforts). We review the court’s factual findings for clear
error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on those
findings. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.
2 ¶7 Relying on People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603 (Colo.
1982), the Department and the child’s guardian ad litem (GAL)
assert that we review the juvenile court’s reasonable efforts
determination for clear error. This argument misstates the holding
of C.A.K., in which the supreme court was reviewing not a
reasonable efforts determination but, rather, the juvenile court’s
determination concerning whether the parent in that case had a
“mental deficiency and whether that deficiency was of such
duration and nature as to render her unlikely, with a reasonable
time, to care for the physical, mental, and emotional needs” of her
child. Id. at 613. Instead, we review de novo the juvenile court’s
assessment of whether the Department satisfied its reasonable
efforts obligation. A.S.L., ¶ 8.
B. Appropriate Treatment Plan
¶8 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that his
treatment plan was appropriate. We disagree.
1. Applicable Law
¶9 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child
legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the
problems that required the government’s intervention. K.D. v.
3 People, 139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006). A treatment plan is
appropriate if it is reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to
provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time
and relates to the child’s needs. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 10 We measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its
likelihood of success in reuniting the family, “which must be
assessed in light of the facts existing at the time of the plan’s
approval.” People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo.
App. 2005). As relevant here, a parent’s incarceration does not
“prohibit the creation and implementation” of an appropriate
treatment plan, but it may “render more difficult the crafting of a
meaningful and workable plan.” People in Interest of M.C.C., 641
P.2d 306, 309 (Colo. App. 1982) (noting additional considerations
for the court, such as the length of the parent’s incarceration and
nature of the criminal conduct, when approving a treatment plan
for an incarcerated parent).
2. Analysis
¶ 11 Father’s treatment plan addressed eight areas: parenting time,
substance use, stability, parenting education, communication,
mental health, criminal activity, and domestic violence. About six
4 weeks after the juvenile court adopted father’s treatment plan, he
was released on bond. But less than two months later, father was
arrested again and remained incarcerated through the termination
hearing.
¶ 12 Father asserts that because his treatment plan was not
amended following his reincarceration and could not be
substantially completed during his incarceration, it was “not
specifically tailored to [his] particular situation” and, thus, the court
erred by finding the treatment plan “reasonable” and “designed to
rehabilitate” him.
¶ 13 But father has not asserted that any of the eight main
objectives of his treatment plan were unnecessary or that the
treatment plan should have addressed something else. See, e.g.,
People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶¶ 22-23 (directing the
juvenile court to consider, on remand, whether the parent’s
treatment plan was inappropriate because it did not include a
component addressing domestic violence). Indeed, during the
dispositional hearing, father’s counsel indicated that father agreed
to the treatment plan objectives and had already planned to
complete many of the objectives. The only change father requested
5 was the addition of the language “to the effect of as much as [father
was] able to complete while incarcerated.” In other words, father
does not dispute that he needed to address the eight main
objectives for him to become a fit parent.
¶ 14 We recognize that father could not complete some of the action
steps listed in his treatment plan while he was incarcerated. For
example, the treatment plan required father to attend parenting
time with appropriate snacks and activities and to maintain
employment sufficient to support the home and family. He
obviously could not do those things while incarcerated. We
disagree with father, however, that this necessarily rendered the
treatment plan inappropriate because he has not explained how he
could have addressed the safety concerns identified in this case
without completing the action steps listed in the treatment plan,
nor did he seek amendment of the treatment plan following his
release and subsequent reincarceration. Indeed, father does not
explain how the treatment plan could have been amended to
address his concerns yet still render him a fit parent in a
reasonable time. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did
not err by finding that father’s treatment plan was appropriate.
6 C. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 15 Both father and mother contend that the juvenile court erred
by concluding that the Department made reasonable efforts. We
disagree.
¶ 16 “One of the goals of the Children’s Code is to preserve the
parent-child relationship whenever possible.” People in Interest of
A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 5. To that end, before a juvenile court may
terminate parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), it must
consider the department’s reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the
parents and reunify the family. See §§ 19-3-100.5(1),
19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025; People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d
911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). As relevant here, “reasonable efforts”
means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in
out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 17 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S.
2025, are generally deemed sufficient to meet the reasonable efforts
standard. § 19-1-103(114). Under that statute, services that “must
be available and provided” as determined by individual case
planning include, among others, screenings, assessments, home-
7 based family and crisis counseling; information and referral services
to assistance resources; family time services; and placement
services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Additional services may be required if
funding is available, including transportation, childcare, diagnostic
and mental health services, drug and alcohol treatment, and family
support services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).
¶ 18 A department must provide family time services for parents
and children when such services are determined to be necessary
and appropriate by individual case plans. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV);
B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070. In determining whether and what family
time services are necessary and appropriate, the health and safety
of the child is paramount. See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070. Services,
including family time services, should further the purposes of the
Children’s Code, including the preservation of familial ties whenever
possible. § 19-1-102(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 19 In assessing a department’s efforts, the juvenile court should
consider whether the services provided were sufficient to support
the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915, by
“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the
8 completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. After a treatment plan is
adopted, a department “is obligated to provide the services
envisioned in the plan.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133,
¶ 37.
2. Additional Background
¶ 20 As noted, father was reincarcerated about three months after
the court adopted his treatment plan. At that time, mother was
also arrested and incarcerated. Mother and father agreed to limit
their parenting time to one twenty-minute video visit per week while
they were incarcerated. Nearly six months later, in July 2023,
mother was released on probation, but father was sentenced to the
Department of Corrections (DOC) where he remained through the
termination hearing.
¶ 21 After mother’s release, her in-person supervised parenting
time resumed, and she gave birth to the child’s sibling, G.S., who
remained in her care. By the fall of 2023, mother’s parenting time
had increased to unsupervised community visits. But following
G.S.’s death in November 2023, the Department restricted mother’s
parenting time back to supervised visits. Once the Department
9 confirmed the accidental nature of G.S.’s death, mother resumed
unsupervised parenting time, which continued to increase in length
and frequency until the Department agreed to return the child
home to mother on a trial basis on July 1, 2024.
¶ 22 That same day, before returning the child to mother’s care, the
Department took the child for a hair follicle test. Eleven days later,
the Department again removed the child from mother’s care after
receiving the child’s test result, which was positive for
methamphetamine. The Department then requested, and the
juvenile court granted, a restriction of mother’s parenting time to
supervised visits. During the last year of the case, mother’s
parenting time increased from four hours to six hours per week, but
it remained supervised.
3. Father’s Contentions
¶ 23 Father first asserts that the Department did not make
reasonable efforts because it did not provide him with parenting
time for approximately one year during the case. The caseworker
acknowledged that father did not have parenting time for the
majority of 2024. But the caseworker detailed his efforts to
establish parenting time for father, including multiple
10 communications with the incarceration facility, and the barriers
that he faced. Specifically, the facility did not allow father to have
in-person visits with the child, and it did not have the technology
for video visits until late-summer 2024. And once the facility had
video visit capability, it did not respond to the caseworker’s
communications to set up father’s visits. Consequently, the
caseworker enlisted the help of a parenting time supervision facility,
which established parenting time for father beginning December
2024.
¶ 24 In sum, the record indicates that the Department attempted to
provide father with parenting time services throughout the case,
and any lack of parenting time was attributable to the facility’s
nonresponsive communication and technological limitations. See
§ 19-3-507(1)(f)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2025 (requiring a department, as part
of its reasonable efforts obligation for incarcerated parents, to
“communicate with the facility or jail regarding the facility’s or jail’s
ability to facilitate family time between the child and parent through
audio-visual communication technology and arrange for available
virtual family time” if in-person family time is not “reasonably
practicable” (emphasis added)).
11 ¶ 25 To the extent father contends that the juvenile court’s
restriction of mother’s parenting time following the child’s positive
hair follicle test “wrongly denied” him of parenting time, we are
unpersuaded. Father’s argument is premised on the assumption
that had the juvenile court allowed the child to remain in mother’s
care, father would have received additional parenting time. In
support, father relies on the juvenile court’s finding that his
parenting time typically occurred during a portion of mother’s time.
But his reliance on this finding is misplaced because the parents’
overlapping visits occurred during mother’s periods of supervised
parenting time. There is no evidence in the record that father
requested or received additional time during mother’s unsupervised
visits or that the Department or juvenile court authorized mother —
as opposed to a professional supervisor — to supervise father’s
visits.
¶ 26 Father next asserts that the Department did not make
reasonable efforts because it did not attempt to find outside service
providers or determine if the services available to him during his
incarceration met the Department’s standards. True, the
caseworker did not contact any therapists directly or inquire if any
12 providers were willing to provide in-person services to father during
his incarceration. But the caseworker remained in communication
with father’s case managers to learn about the services available to
father during his incarceration, including substance abuse and
mental health treatment. Though father’s failure to provide a
signed release impeded the caseworker’s ability to obtain
information about the status of father’s mental health treatment,
father’s case managers confirmed that he engaged in some services
during his incarceration at the jail and was on the waitlist for
substance abuse treatment while in DOC custody. Father also told
the caseworker about his participation in substance use and
parenting classes, as well as his therapy waitlist status.
¶ 27 Based on the totality of the circumstances, we discern no error
in the juvenile court’s conclusion that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father and reunite him with the
child.
4. Mother’s Contentions
¶ 28 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by concluding that
the Department engaged in reasonable efforts when the Department
“did not make any effort to reunify [the] family after the child’s hair
13 follicle test in July of 2024.” But, citing section 19-1-115(7), C.R.S.
2025, the Department and GAL assert that the Department was not
required to provide reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Under
the circumstances presented here, we agree with the Department
and GAL.
¶ 29 Section 19-1-115(7) carves out three exceptions to a
department’s obligation to provide reasonable efforts “to prevent the
child’s removal from the home or to reunify the child and the
family.” As relevant here, a department is not required to make
such efforts “[w]hen the parental rights of the parent with respect to
a sibling of the child have been involuntarily terminated.”
§ 19-1-115(7)(b).
¶ 30 In January 2023, mother’s parental rights to four of her older
children — the child’s half-siblings — were terminated. Therefore,
under the plain language of section 19-1-115(7)(b), the Department
was not required in this case to provide reasonable efforts to reunify
mother and the child. See Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12 (“[I]f
the language in a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect
to its plain meaning and look no further.”). Thus, we discern no
14 reversible error in the juvenile court’s reasonable efforts
determination.
¶ 31 We note that our analysis addresses only the argument
sufficiently developed on appeal. See Brubaker v. Colo. Sun, 2026
CO 18, ¶ 52 (noting that the party presentation principle “holds
parties responsible for framing the issues to be resolved and calls
upon courts to be neutral arbiters as they consider any matters
raised”). Because mother does not develop any argument on the
point, we express no opinion about the interplay between
section 19-1-115(7) and a department’s duty to provide reasonable
efforts to rehabilitate a parent or to provide services pursuant to
section 19-3-208 to support a parent’s treatment plan. See S.N-V.,
300 P.3d at 915.
D. Fitness
¶ 32 Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by determining
that she was unfit. We disagree.
¶ 33 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the
parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.
People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 74. Reasonable parental
15 care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and
safe parenting sufficient to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and
mental health needs and conditions. Id. A parent’s noncompliance
with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a lack of
commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore, may also
be considered in determining unfitness.” People in Interest of D.P.,
181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 34 Mother’s treatment plan required her to (1) attend parenting
time; (2) maintain sobriety; (3) complete a substance abuse
evaluation, follow all treatment recommendations, and submit to
weekly, random drug testing; (4) establish and maintain stable
housing and employment; (5) participate in parenting education;
(6) maintain contact with the Department; (7) address all criminal
cases to conclusion and avoid any new criminal charges; and
(8) complete a mental health evaluation and domestic violence
victim assessment and follow any recommendations.
¶ 35 The juvenile court found that, although mother had engaged
in some aspects of her treatment plan, she remained unable or
unwilling to provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficient to meet
16 the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs.
Therefore, the court determined that mother was unfit. In so
concluding, the court focused on mother’s noncompliance with the
substance use and domestic violence objectives of her treatment
plan, finding that mother did not maintain sobriety or engage in
domestic violence victimization treatment as required. See id.
¶ 36 The record supports these findings. During her testimony,
mother denied any domestic violence during her relationship with
father. But multiple witnesses, including a patrol deputy, the
caseworker, and a parenting time supervisor, described a domestic
violence incident between mother and father in July 2022, which
mother described to them as “pretty scary” because she feared that
father “was going to kill her.” Even so, mother did not complete the
domestic violence victim assessment as required by her treatment
plan. And mother’s therapist was not aware of any domestic
violence between mother and father, testifying that treatment for
domestic violence victimization and post-traumatic stress disorder
was not the focus of their treatment.
¶ 37 Moreover, mother discounted her prior substance use,
acknowledged that she continued to use marijuana “a couple times
17 a week,” and refused to accept any responsibility for the
Department’s involvement with the family. Mother testified that she
“didn’t know how else [she] could improve her protective capability,
because [she was] very protective of [her] children.” The caseworker
described mother’s extensive history with child protective services
in multiple states, including periods of progress and treatment plan
compliance followed by issues necessitating further departmental
intervention. Based on mother’s testimony, history, and willingness
to submit to drug testing only when and how she chose, the
caseworker expressed concern about mother’s ability to maintain
sobriety. Ultimately, the caseworker opined that, even though
mother had completed some components of her treatment plan, she
had not sufficiently and successfully complied with the treatment
plan as a whole.
¶ 38 Nevertheless, mother alleges that the evidence was insufficient
to support the court’s finding that she did not fully comply with her
treatment plan. True, as mother asserts, she lived in the same
home for more than a year, was employed at the time of
termination, completed a parenting course, maintained contact with
the Department, complied with probation, completed a mental
18 health evaluation, and engaged in therapy intermittently for more
than two years. Moreover, the caseworker testified that he believed
mother had complied with the domestic violence victimization
component of her treatment plan. And the juvenile court
acknowledged that mother had complied with some components of
her treatment plan.
¶ 39 But, ultimately, after considering and weighing all the
evidence presented, the juvenile court determined that mother had
not reasonably complied with her treatment plan and it had not
been successful. See People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588
(Colo. App. 2003) (“[P]artial compliance, or even substantial
compliance, may not result in a successful plan that renders the
parent fit.”); see also A.M., ¶ 15 (“The credibility of the witnesses;
the sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the
inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are
within the discretion of the trial court.”). Mother has not convinced
us that this determination is incorrect.
¶ 40 Specifically, we are unpersuaded by mother’s argument that
there was “absolutely no evidence” to support the juvenile court’s
finding that the child’s exposure to methamphetamine occurred
19 while she was in mother’s care. A caseworker for the Department
testified that in June 2024 — a period when the child had extensive
unsupervised family time with mother, including consecutive
overnights — an individual observed mother’s older daughter, who
had a history of methamphetamine use, in mother’s home. And the
permanency caseworker testified that the child’s positive hair
follicle test was part of mother’s demonstrated pattern of exposing
her children to illicit substances by continuing to associate with
substance users. Therefore, the caseworker expressed concern that
mother had not demonstrated the ability to ensure the “ongoing
safety of the child in the home.” In contrast, he did not have
concerns that the foster parents used, or associated with
individuals who used, illicit substances.
¶ 41 Even so, mother argues that, because “the evidence presented
never established whether the child was exposed to illegal
methamphetamine or medication,” the court could not determine
“by clear and convincing evidence that the exposure occurred while
the child was in [her] care.” To be sure, a joint witness, testifying as
an expert in toxicology and drug analysis, explained that some
prescription drugs and nasal decongestants metabolize into
20 methamphetamine. But there was no evidence that the child took
any of the specifically identified medications during the hair follicle
test’s lookback period. And because the juvenile court’s finding has
record support, we have no basis to disturb it. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.
¶ 42 Moreover, irrespective of the hair follicle test, the court found,
with record support, that mother minimized her past substance
use, continued to “imbibe in substances,” lacked protective
capacity, minimized the child’s medical needs, and did not
acknowledge the impact her decisions had on the child. See People
in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 251 (Colo. 2010) (“A parent’s
refusal to acknowledge the impact of her prior behavior on her
children may prevent that parent from providing reasonable
parental care.”). And these findings are sufficient to support the
court’s conclusion that mother was unfit.
¶ 43 For these reasons, we discern no error.
E. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 44 Father and mother contend that the juvenile court erred by
finding that there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We
21 1. Applicable Law
¶ 45 Before terminating parental rights under
section 19-3-604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and
eliminate less drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726
P.2d 1108, 1122 (Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic
alternatives, a court must give primary consideration to the child’s
physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.
§ 19-3-604(3). To aid the court in determining whether there is a
less drastic alternative to termination, the department must
evaluate a reasonable number of persons identified by the parent as
placement options. People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532
(Colo. App. 2004).
¶ 46 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately
meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.
A.M., ¶ 27. Hence, if the court considers a less drastic alternative
but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best interests, it
must reject the less drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at
¶ 32. We must affirm the court’s determination of whether there is
a less drastic alternative if its findings are supported by the record.
People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.
22 2. Analysis
¶ 47 The juvenile court determined that there was no less drastic
alternative to termination that would meet the physical, emotional,
and mental health needs of the child and that termination was in
the child’s best interests. In so finding, the court considered the
length of time the case had been pending, the duration of the child’s
out-of-home placement, and the child’s need for permanency and
stability. The court acknowledged that alternatives to termination
existed — specifically guardianship or an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) — but found that the proposed alternatives
were not best for the child. See A.M., ¶ 32.
¶ 48 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker
opined that, based on the nearly three-year-long Expedited
Permanency Planning case and the child’s age and attachment
issues, it was important for her to have a permanent placement.
Moreover, the child’s therapist’s supervisor, testifying as an expert
in the area of childhood trauma and play therapy, described the
child’s aggressive and hyperreactive behavior during therapy
sessions as a sign of trauma. And based on the child’s intense
23 separation anxiety, she opined that the child needed a consistent,
calm, stable, and permanent environment.
a. Father’s Contentions
¶ 49 Nevertheless, father asserts that the juvenile court erred by
basing its finding that there was no less drastic alternative on two
improper assumptions: (1) that an APR would “necessarily have
either parent assuming some parental responsibilities” and (2) that
an APR is inherently unstable. But father’s assertions are belied by
the record.
¶ 50 First, the court did not base its rejection of an APR on the fact,
or assumption, that it would require the parents to retain some
parental responsibilities. The court merely cited applicable law,
including D.P. in which a division of this court concluded that
“[p]ermanently placing the child with a family member or placing
the child in a foster home while allowing the parent to assume some
parental responsibilities are not viable alternatives to termination if
the child needs a stable, permanent home that can be assured only
by adoption.” 181 P.3d at 408. Father’s proposal — that the court
“could have . . . crafted [an APR] that allowed the caretaker to
determine when, and if, the parents and child were ready to resume
24 some type of relationship” — would have resulted in an erroneous
delegation of parenting time decisions to the caregiver and, thus,
was not a viable less drastic alternative. See B.C., 122 P.3d at
1070-71 (a court must make decisions about parenting time and
may not delegate this function to others).
¶ 51 Second, father provides no record support for his contention
that the juvenile court based its denial of an APR on the
assumption that APRs are “inherently unstable.” Rather, as
discussed above, the court considered specific less drastic
alternatives to termination before rejecting them as not in the
child’s best interests based on her particular physical, mental, and
emotional needs. A.M., ¶ 32.
¶ 52 Finally, to the extent father asserts that, before rejecting an
APR as a less drastic alternative, a court must “consider an actual
draft [of an] APR,” he does not provide any authority for this
proposition. And we are not aware of any.
b. Mother’s Contention
¶ 53 Mother asserts that the Department “refused to look into
placement with any relative interested in [an] allocation of parental
25 responsibilities.” But, like father’s argument, this contention is
belied by the record.
¶ 54 The caseworker testified that he contacted eleven individuals
regarding placement, including the child’s paternal aunts, maternal
grandmother, paternal grandfather, great-grandmother, cousins,
and family friends. The caseworker discussed the possibility of an
APR with several of these individuals and pursued evaluations of
two of the individuals under the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children. See D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532.
¶ 55 Even so, mother asserts that the Department failed to pursue
placement with relatives willing to accept an APR. But this
argument overlooks the juvenile court’s finding that an APR, in
general, was not in the child’s best interests. In other words, even if
the Department had further explored placement with relatives
willing to accept an APR, the court found, with record support, that
an APR was not the best option for the child. See A.M., ¶ 32.
¶ 56 In sum, because the record supports the court’s finding that
there was no less drastic alternative that would serve the child’s
best interests, we cannot disturb it. See B.H., ¶ 80.
26 III. Due Process
¶ 57 Father contends that the juvenile court’s failure to consider
his written closing argument,1 and this court’s denial of his request
for a limited remand to allow the juvenile court to rule on a motion
to accept his late-filed closing, deprived him of due process. We are
not persuaded.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 58 Because “[p]arents have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children,”
A.M., ¶ 17, termination of the parent-child legal relationship must
satisfy due process by providing “fundamentally fair procedures,”
People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 20 (quoting Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982)). “Under this principle, a
parent must be provided with ‘notice of the allegations in the
termination motion, the opportunity to be heard, the opportunity to
have counsel if indigent, and the opportunity to call witnesses and
1 As we discuss more fully below, infra Part IV.B., father elected to
proceed pro se midway through the termination hearing. As a result, he filed his written closing argument pro se.
27 engage in cross examination.’” People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO
55, ¶ 16 (quoting A.M., ¶ 18).
¶ 59 We review procedural due process claims de novo. People in
Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 26. But a parent may not obtain
relief on a due process claim absent a showing of harm or prejudice.
People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007).
B. Additional Background
¶ 60 On the last day of the termination hearing, the juvenile court
ordered the parties to file written closings by July 11, 2025. In its
termination order, issued eleven days after the deadline, the court
noted that father’s closing argument had not yet been received.
Three months later (and over two months after filing his notice of
appeal), father moved this court to remand the case to the juvenile
court on a limited basis to allow the court to “make factual findings,
accept or reject the late filing, and — if the juvenile court [were to
decide] to accept the filing — issue a revised final order.” This court
denied father’s motion.
C. Analysis
¶ 61 Father asserts that the “lack of opportunity to have his closing
considered” deprived him of the opportunity to be heard and,
28 thereby, deprived him of due process. But father had the
opportunity to be heard. He was present in court when the
deadline was given and did not request additional time to complete
and file his closing argument. Furthermore, he was on notice by
August 13, 2025, at the latest, that the juvenile court had not
received his closing argument, because on that date his counsel
filed his notice of appeal and attached the juvenile court’s
termination order. And yet, father waited an additional two months
to request a limited remand. Father cites no authority in support of
his implied assertion that a court must grant a party’s markedly
delayed filings in order to protect their due process rights. And we
are aware of none.
¶ 62 Additionally, even assuming, without deciding, that the fact
that the juvenile court did not consider his late filing implicated
father’s due process rights, he has not shown that he was
prejudiced as a result. See id.
¶ 63 Father’s only claim of prejudice is that disallowing
consideration of his closing argument “throws into question the
standard of review in this [c]ourt.” In support, father references
that in his closing he argued that there was a less drastic
29 alternative, namely, an APR to a family member. But, as detailed
above, even without father’s closing argument the juvenile court
specifically considered, and rejected, the alternative of an APR to a
family member. And to the extent father asserts that he could not
preserve this issue without acceptance of his closing argument, the
record reflects sufficient preservation. Thus, “we are unable to
discern that the termination proceedings would have been affected
in any appreciable way” by the acceptance and consideration of
father’s late-filed closing argument. E.B., ¶ 22 (citing People in
Interest of C.G., 885 P.2d 355, 358 (Colo. App. 1994)).
¶ 64 Based on the record and lack of prejudice, we discern no
violation of father’s due process rights.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 65 Father also contends that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel during the shelter hearing, the adjudicatory proceedings,
and leading up to and during the termination hearing. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 66 A parent has a statutory right to effective counsel in
dependency and neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2), 19-3-202(1),
C.R.S. 2025; A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 47. A parent can raise a
30 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency and
neglect proceeding for the first time on appeal. People in Interest of
C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo. App. 2007). However, in an appeal
from a judgment terminating parental rights, an appellate court
may consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
counsel’s performance at the prior adjudicatory hearing “only when
the party asserting the claimed ineffective assistance did not have a
full and fair opportunity to bring such a claim immediately after his
or her child was adjudicated dependent and neglected (as, for
example, by way of a direct appeal of the adjudication order).” A.R.,
¶ 85; see also § 19-1-109(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (stating that an order
adjudicating a child dependent or neglected is a final and
appealable upon entry of the initial dispositional order). Thus, a
parent’s assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
counsel’s performance at the adjudicatory hearing is untimely if
raised following the termination of parental rights if (1) the parent
was aware (or reasonably should have been aware) of the facts
giving rise to any claim of ineffective assistance at the adjudicatory
hearing at or shortly after that hearing; (2) the parent made no
effort to file a timely appeal from the adjudication order; and (3) the
31 record does not disclose any factual or legal impediments to the
parent’s ability to pursue a timely appeal. See A.R., ¶ 43.
¶ 67 We employ the same Strickland test that is used in criminal
cases to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
dependency and neglect proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 60 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Under this test, to
establish a claim, the parent must show that (1) counsel’s
performance was outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance, and (2) the parent was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient
performance — that is, there is a reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Id.
¶ 68 If the parent’s allegations lack sufficient specificity, we may
summarily deny the ineffective assistance claim. See C.H., 166
P.3d at 291. In other words, a remand for an evidentiary hearing is
only required if the parent’s allegations are sufficiently specific and
compelling to constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id.
32 B. Additional Background
¶ 69 On the same day that the Department filed the petition in
dependency or neglect, the juvenile court appointed counsel for
father. After the fourth day of the termination hearing, father’s
counsel moved to withdraw at father’s request. Following a hearing
on the motion, the court concluded that father had not asserted a
“well-founded reason” to believe that his counsel could not, or
would not, competently represent him. Considering the length of
the case, the pending termination hearing, and counsel’s competent
representation of father, the court found that appointing alternate
counsel for father was not appropriate. Father then elected to
proceed without counsel, at which point the court advised him and
determined that he voluntarily waived his statutory right to
counsel. Father proceeded pro se for the remainder of the
C. Father’s Contentions of Ineffectiveness
1. Advocacy for the Child’s Return Home
¶ 70 Father contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance because he did not file a motion for the child’s return
home at the beginning of the case. But the record reveals that
33 father’s counsel made this request orally during the shelter hearing.
And, following a hearing during which father’s counsel presented
evidence, attempted to call father as a witness,2 and engaged in
cross-examination of adverse witnesses, the court denied the
request as not in the child’s best interests.
¶ 71 Father does not suggest how the filing of a written motion, as
opposed to making an oral request, would have changed the
proceeding’s outcome. Therefore, we conclude that father has not
raised a sufficiently specific or compelling allegation to constitute a
prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel as it relates
to pursuit of a request for the child’s return home.
2. Adjudication Advisement
¶ 72 We reject as untimely father’s contention that his counsel
failed to properly advise him of the consequences of making an
admission that the child was dependent or neglected. See A.R.,
¶ 43.
2 When father’s counsel called father to testify, father said, “Yeah, I
got nothing to say and it’s pretty much been said.” After a follow up question from the court, father made it clear that he had no interest in testifying at the hearing.
34 ¶ 73 Father claims that he could not have pursued this issue
sooner because he did not learn that he had admitted that the child
was dependent or neglected until he read the termination order.
But even assuming, as father asserts, that his counsel never
“advised [him] as to the content and consequences” of his written
admission, the written admission itself, signed by father,
specifically stated that he “underst[oo]d that [the] child [would] be
adjudicated to be dependent and neglected, and that [the] jury
trial . . . [would] be vacated.” Moreover, the juvenile court advised
father that he had the right to admit or deny the allegations in the
Department’s petition and, if he admitted the allegations, a
judgment of adjudication would enter.
¶ 74 Based on this record, we are not persuaded by father’s
contention that he was unable to file a timely appeal from the
adjudication order. And, therefore, this contention is not properly
before us for review. See id. at ¶ 85.
3. Provision of Documents and Termination Hearing Representation
¶ 75 Father next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he “failed to provide [father] with even one piece of paper
35 from motions and orders to discovery” and “was unsatisfactory” in
his representation of father during the termination hearing.
¶ 76 First, father raised these concerns during the hearing to
resolve his counsel’s motion to withdraw. And the court (1) found
that father’s counsel competently represented him during the four
days of the termination hearing preceding his withdrawal; and
(2) was not convinced that father’s counsel failed to provide father
with documentation. Even if father’s claims were sufficiently
specific or compelling to establish a prima facie claim that his
counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance, the only remedy would be to remand the
matter to the juvenile court for an evidentiary hearing. See C.H.,
166 P.3d at 291. But the juvenile court already held a hearing and
resolved father’s allegations. Thus, we need not remand the case to
the juvenile court.
¶ 77 Second, father fails to allege with any specificity how he
believes his trial counsel failed to adequately represent him during
the termination hearing. Father states only that his counsel “was
unsatisfactory during the portion of the termination when he
represented [f]ather” and “refus[ed] to mount a satisfactory
36 defense.” But those generalized, conclusory allegations alone are
insufficient to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. See id. (“A remand is required only if the parent’s
allegations are sufficiently specific and compelling to constitute a
prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
¶ 78 Third, even if we assume, without deciding, that counsel failed
to provide documentation to father, and that such failure fell below
the range of professionally competent assistance, father has failed
to sufficiently allege any prejudice. Following counsel’s withdrawal,
the court continued the termination hearing so that the Department
could provide necessary documentation to father. And before
resuming the termination hearing the court confirmed that father
received the documentation he believed necessary to prepare for the
hearing. Father does not explain how his earlier receipt of any
documentation would have impacted the ultimate outcome of the
case.
¶ 79 Nevertheless, father asserts that we should conclude that he
was “presumptively prejudiced.” “In the criminal context, the
Supreme Court has observed that a court may presume prejudice if
counsel ‘entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to
37 meaningful adversarial testing.’” A.R., ¶ 66 (quoting United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)). The Colorado Supreme Court
has held that the presumed prejudice standard should also apply to
terminations of parental rights. Id. However, the “presumption of
prejudice applies only in relatively narrow circumstances.” Id.; see
also Ybanez v. People, 2018 CO 16, ¶ 25 (noting that the United
States Supreme Court has previously presumed prejudice “only [in]
a few narrow circumstances,” namely, “where counsel was not
made available, was prohibited by the trial court from participating
in a critical aspect of the proceeding, or acted under a conflict of
interest”).
¶ 80 Father does not detail how his counsel “fail[ed] to subject the
case to serious adversarial testing.” And the court made counsel
available to father, did not prohibit his counsel from participating in
any aspect of the proceeding, and his counsel was not acting under
a conflict of interest. Therefore, we conclude that the presumptive
prejudice standard does not apply to father’s claims.
38 D. Conclusion
¶ 81 Because father has not alleged a sufficiently specific or
compelling allegation, his claims of ineffective assistance must fail.
See A.R., ¶ 60.
V. Disposition
¶ 82 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE BROWN concur.