25CA1461 Peo in Interest of EY 05-07-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1461 Garfield County District Court No. 24JV30009 Routt County District Court No. 25JV1 Honorable Billy-George Hertzke, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of E.Y., a Child,
and Concerning C.H.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Bernard*, and Ashby*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 7, 2026
Lynaia South, County Attorney, Matthew Fredrickson, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Molly Hamsher, Assistant County Attorney, Steamboat Springs, Colorado for Appellee
Cassandra Coleman, Guardian Ad Litem
Joel M. Pratt, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado Springs, Colorado for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.H. (mother)
appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental
responsibilities for E.Y. (the child) to W.Y. (father). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In May 2024, father brought the child to the Garfield County
Department of Human Services acting manic and requesting
assistance. While there, father called for an ambulance. When law
enforcement arrived with emergency services, they arrested father
for violating a protection order restraining him from having contact
with the child. The Garfield County Department then placed the
child with mother. But four days later, mother informed the
Garfield County Department that she was overwhelmed, and she
thought it was in the child’s best interests to be placed in foster
care. Following a shelter care hearing four days later, the Garfield
County Department returned the child to father’s custody, under its
protective supervision, and filed a petition in dependency or neglect.
¶3 In October 2024, after law enforcement responded to a welfare
check and found father “mentally decompensating” under the
influence of alcohol and/or drugs, the Garfield County Department
sought, and the juvenile court granted, temporary custody of the
1 child for placement in foster care. About six weeks later, the
Garfield County Department returned the child to father’s care
under its protective supervision.
¶4 Following mother’s admission that the child lacked proper
parental care through her acts or omissions, the juvenile court
adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The juvenile court
then adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring her to (1) obtain
and maintain a safe and stable residence for the child; (2) cooperate
with the Garfield County Department; (3) complete a mental health
assessment and follow all recommendations; (4) participate in life
skills; and (5) maintain a positive relationship with the child by
attending all scheduled family time, completing an in-person
parenting assessment, and attending an approved parenting class.
¶5 Six months later, the juvenile court changed venue to Routt
County, father’s county of residence. Shortly thereafter, the child’s
guardian ad litem (GAL) moved for an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR) to father, which the Routt County Department
of Human Services joined. Following a hearing, the juvenile court
allocated sole decision-making responsibility and primary
residential care to father and accorded mother two hours of
2 parenting time, supervised by a licensed mental health professional,
per month.
II. APR Determination
¶6 Mother contends that the court erred by applying the wrong
legal standard when allocating parental responsibilities. We
disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 The Colorado Children’s Code authorizes a juvenile court to
enter an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing
parenting time when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a
dependent or neglected child. § 19-1-104(5)-(6), C.R.S. 2025;
People in Interest of E.Q., 2020 COA 118, ¶ 10.
¶8 When allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency and
neglect proceeding, the court must consider the legislative purposes
of the Children’s Code under section 19-1-102, C.R.S. 2025. People
in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 18. The overriding purpose of
the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s welfare and safety by
providing procedures to serve the child’s best interests. L.G. v.
People, 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). Thus, the court must
allocate parental responsibilities in accordance with the child’s best
3 interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 13. A court
may also consider the best interest factors found in section
14-10-124, C.R.S. 2025, of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act,
but the court’s focus must remain on the child’s safety and
protection and not the parent’s custodial interests. Id.
¶9 An APR is within the sound discretion of the juvenile court.
See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63,
¶ 15. A juvenile court abuses its discretion “when its decision is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies
or misconstrues the law.” People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55,
¶ 14. It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine
the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and to
assess the credibility of witnesses. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243
P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). When there is record support for
the court’s findings, its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding
on review. B.R.D., ¶ 15. But whether the court applied the correct
legal standard in making its findings is a question of law that we
review de novo. People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10.
4 B. Preservation
¶ 10 The Routt County Department and GAL assert that we should
decline to address mother’s appellate claim because it is
unpreserved. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14
(explaining that, in dependency and neglect cases, appellate courts
do not address unpreserved issues). However, we need not
determine whether mother preserved her argument, or was required
to, because even if we assume she did, we discern no basis for
reversal. Cf. C.R.C.P. 52 (“Neither requests for findings nor
objections to findings rendered are necessary for purposes of
review.”); see also L & R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530,
536 (Colo. App. 2011) (declining to resolve an issue where the
outcome would not change).
C. Analysis
¶ 11 In allocating parental responsibilities, the juvenile court
considered the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs, the
factors under section 14-10-124(1.5) and found that the child’s
emotional and physical wellbeing would be best served by allocating
primary physical custody to father. The court further found that
mother did not successfully complete her treatment plan, maintain
5 consistent contact, or have a “stable, safe or healthy relationship
with the child.” Thus, the court found that it was in the child’s best
interests for mother’s parenting time to be supervised by a licensed
mental health professional.
¶ 12 Mother does not contest these findings. Instead, she asserts
that, because the juvenile court’s order modified a prior order
allocating parental responsibilities between the parents stemming
from their dissolution of marriage proceeding, the court erred by
considering section 14-10-124(1.5) (detailing factors for courts to
consider when initially allocating parental responsibilities) and not
section 14-10-129, C.R.S. 2025 (governing modifications of
parenting time). In so arguing, mother asserts that the juvenile
court was required to make endangerment findings before
“restricting” her parenting time.
¶ 13 However, Title 19, not Title 14, governs the juvenile court’s
allocation of parental responsibilities in a dependency and neglect
proceeding. See L.A.G. v. People in Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d
1385, 1390 (Colo. 1996) (“[T]he exclusive authority of a juvenile
court to determine issues of child custody arising in the course of
dependency and neglect proceedings is established by the
6 [Children’s] Code.”). And endangerment findings are not required
for the entry of an APR under Title 19. See People in Interest of L.B.,
254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Because the adjudication
of [the child] as dependent and neglected provided the predicate for
the disposition entered, no finding concerning either unfitness or
endangerment was necessary.”). Moreover, proceeding, as mother
argues, with “a presumption that prior orders should remain in
effect,” would erroneously prioritize a parent’s custodial interests
over the child’s best interests. See H.K.W., ¶ 13.
¶ 14 In short, because the juvenile court focused on the overriding
purpose of the Children’s Code when allocating parental
responsibilities, we conclude that the juvenile court applied the
correct legal standard and discern no error.
III. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 15 Mother next asserts that the juvenile court erred by allocating
parental responsibilities without considering whether the Garfield
County and Routt County Departments made reasonable efforts to
reunite the family by providing appropriate family time and
accommodating her disability. We discern no error.
7 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 16 A department must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
parents and reunite families following the placement of abused or
neglected children out of the home. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5,
19-3-208(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. Reasonable efforts
“means the exercise of diligence and care . . . for children . . . who
are in [or are at imminent risk of being placed in] foster care or
out-of-home placement.” § 19-1-103(114).
¶ 17 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213, requires a public entity, such as a county
department of human services, to make reasonable
accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities. See
People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶¶ 11-12. Specifically, the
ADA requires that, as part of the reasonable efforts determination,
the court consider whether the department provided a parent with
reasonable accommodations. People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA
36, ¶ 34.
¶ 18 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability
under the ADA requires a case-by-case determination. Id. at ¶ 21.
Before a department can be required to provide reasonable
8 accommodations under the ADA, it must know that the individual
has a qualifying disability, either because that disability is obvious
or because someone has informed the department of the disability.
Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, while a department must provide appropriate
screenings and assessments of a parent, the parent is responsible
for disclosing information regarding her disability. Id. at ¶ 21. And
a parent should also identify any modifications that she believes are
necessary to accommodate her disability. Id.
¶ 19 A parent is ultimately responsible for using the services
provided by a department to obtain the assistance needed to comply
with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,
1285 (Colo. App. 2011). In determining whether a department
made reasonable efforts, a juvenile court should consider the
totality of the circumstances and account for all services and
resources provided to a parent, measuring them holistically rather
than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan objectives.
See People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.
¶ 20 Whether a department of human services satisfied its
obligation to provide reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact
and law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review
9 the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error and review de
novo its legal determination, based on those findings, as to whether
the department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.
B. Family Time
¶ 21 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by granting the
APR despite the Garfield County Department’s failure to make
reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Specifically, mother asserts
that the Garfield County Department repeatedly reduced her family
time without first requesting a hearing in violation of section
19-3-217(3), C.R.S. 2025. The Routt County Department and GAL
assert that mother did not adequately preserve this contention. We
agree. See M.B., ¶ 14 (noting that appellate courts will “review only
issues presented to and ruled on by the lower court”).
¶ 22 Mother acknowledges that she did not “address the repeated
reductions [of,] and increased restrictions on [her] family time” at
the APR hearing. Even so, she argues the issue is adequately
preserved for our review because the “visitation component” of her
treatment plan was a “primary reason” why the juvenile court
allocated her two hours of supervised parenting time per month.
Although the juvenile court considered mother’s lack of consistent
10 participation in family time when deciding what parenting time
schedule for mother was in the child’s best interests, we disagree
with mother that this finding sufficiently preserved for our review
her reasonable efforts argument based on a failure to hold hearings
when entering orders restricting her parenting time.
¶ 23 Neither mother nor her counsel objected to the reductions in
her family time as they occurred, argued at the APR hearing that
such reductions exemplified a lack of reasonable efforts by the
Garfield County Department, or asked the juvenile court to deny
the APR because of a lack of reasonable efforts. See Forgette v.
People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 21 (“Although we do not require that parties
use talismanic language to preserve an argument for appeal, a party
must present the trial court with ‘an adequate opportunity to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law on any issue before we will
review it.’” (quoting People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo.
2004)). As a result, the juvenile court did not make any reasonable
efforts findings before allocating parental responsibilities. Nor does
mother provide any authority supporting her argument that the
court was required to make such findings when allocating parental
responsibilities between parents. Cf. A.S.L., ¶ 20 (determining that
11 the court is required to consider reasonable efforts when it enters
an APR to a nonparent).
¶ 24 Thus, because mother did not present the juvenile court with
an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of
law regarding her assertion that the Garfield County Department
improperly restricted her family time and failed to provide
reasonable efforts to reunify the family, we do not review this issue.
See M.B., ¶ 14.
C. ADA Accommodations
¶ 25 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred by not
considering “the department’s failure to implement her requested
A.D.A. accommodations, before ruling that [she] had failed to
complete her treatment plan.” We disagree.
1. Additional Background
¶ 26 Four-and-a-half months before the APR hearing, mother’s
counsel filed a notice asserting that the ADA applied based on
mother’s schizophrenia diagnosis. As a result, mother requested
several accommodations including (1) medical reminders for
appointments and medicine; (2) transportation support; (3)
motivational interviewing; (4) clearly defined case standards; (5)
12 written instructions, at an appropriate educational level, prior to
appointments; (6) increased structure, routines, and predictability;
(7) simplified instructions and the opportunity to repeat back
instructions to confirm understanding; (8) cognitive behavior
therapy (CBT); and (9) caseworker communication after important
meetings and court appearances. The Garfield County Department
did not object to any of mother’s requested accommodations but
emphasized that, to provide the accommodations, the Department
needed her to communicate.
2. Preservation
¶ 27 The Routt County Department and GAL assert that mother did
not preserve this claim for appeal. We need not decide this issue
because, even if we assume mother preserved her claim, we discern
no reversible error.
3. Analysis
¶ 28 Mother argues that once notified of her disability and need for
accommodations the Garfield and Routt County Departments did
not provide reasonable accommodations for her and therefore failed
to make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her. See S.K., ¶ 34
(holding that the ADA requires that, as part of the reasonable efforts
13 determination, the court consider whether the department provided
a parent with reasonable accommodations). And she correctly
asserts that the juvenile court made no specific written or oral
findings regarding ADA accommodations at the APR hearing. As
discussed in section III.B. above, the need for the court to make
findings as to reasonable efforts at the APR hearing at all is unclear
since it was ordering APR to a parent. But reading mother’s
argument to challenge the court’s general determinations that her
treatment plan was appropriate and she failed to successfully
comply with her treatment plan, we address it here.
¶ 29 We note that the court’s failure to make express findings at
the APR hearing, on its own, “does not establish a failure by the
court to ensure that the Department made reasonable efforts.”
A.S.L., ¶ 15. And, because the provision of reasonable
accommodations is a subset of a court’s reasonable efforts
determination, a court’s failure to express reasonable
accommodations findings, on its own, does not establish a failure
by the court to ensure that a department provided reasonable
accommodations. See S.K., ¶ 34 (“[A] juvenile court should consider
whether reasonable accommodations were made for the parent’s
14 disability in determining whether the parent’s treatment plan was
appropriate and reasonable efforts were made to rehabilitate the
parent.”).
¶ 30 Reviewing de novo the ultimate question of whether the
Garfield and Routt County Departments satisfied their obligations,
we conclude that the record sufficiently demonstrates the
Departments’ efforts to provide reasonable accommodations for
mother’s disability during the pendency of the case.
¶ 31 The Routt County Department caseworker testified that she
reached out to mother multiple times, by phone, email, and text, to
try to assess mother’s status. But mother responded inconsistently
and primarily via text message. The caseworker acknowledged
mother’s disability and need for appointment reminders, additional
processing time, and transportation support, among other
accommodations. But, based on mother’s preference to primarily
communicate via text and her lack of consistent communication,
the Departments were limited in their ability to provide mother with
her requested accommodations.
¶ 32 Even so, mother asserts that the caseworkers failed to use
“motivational interviewing techniques” and, despite mother’s
15 difficulty following complicated instructions, the Departments
offered no transportation assistance beyond the offer of bus passes.
But mother does not clarify how the Departments could have
provided motivational interviewing techniques via text message.
Nor does mother explain how more detailed instructions about the
provided bus passes would have accommodated her disability. See
id. at ¶ 21. Indeed, mother does not connect her inability to ride
the bus to her disability, stating only that she was “unable to get on
the bus for the scheduled visit.” See id. at ¶ 34 (“[W]hen a parent
involved in a dependency and neglect proceeding has a disability
under the ADA, the Department and the juvenile court must
account for and, if possible, make reasonable accommodations for
the parent’s disability when . . . providing rehabilitative services to
the parent.”) (emphasis added).
¶ 33 In sum, the record reflects that the Garfield County and Routt
County Departments endeavored to make reasonable
accommodations for mother’s disability, but ultimately mother’s
lack of engagement limited the accommodations the Departments
could provide to her. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285. Thus, we
discern no basis for reversal.
16 IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 34 Mother contends that she received ineffective assistance of
counsel because her counsel failed to (1) object to repeated changes
in mother’s family time or request a hearing pursuant to section
19-3-217(3); (2) discuss the Garfield County Department’s proposed
treatment plan before the juvenile court ordered it as part of its
dispositional order; (3) request ADA accommodations sooner than
four-and-a-half months before the APR hearing; (4) file a written
response to the APR motion to advocate for more parenting time for
mother; (5) refute the caseworker’s testimony that father had
completed his treatment plan; and (6) object to the GAL’s portrayal
of mother as a domestic violence offender. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 35 A parent has a statutory right to effective counsel in
dependency and neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2), 19-3-202(1),
C.R.S. 2025; A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10, ¶ 47. A parent can raise a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency and
neglect proceeding for the first time on appeal. People in Interest of
C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo. App. 2007).
17 ¶ 36 We employ the same Strickland test that is used in criminal
cases to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
dependency and neglect proceedings. A.R., ¶ 60 (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Under this test, to establish a
claim, the parent must show that (1) counsel’s performance was
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and
(2) the parent was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance —
that is, there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 60. “If the parent fails to establish
either prong of this test, the claim fails.” People in Interest of C.B.,
2019 COA 168, ¶ 26.
¶ 37 If the parent’s allegations lack sufficient specificity, we may
summarily deny the ineffective assistance claim. See C.H., 166
P.3d at 291. In other words, a remand for an evidentiary hearing is
only required if the parent’s allegations are sufficiently specific and
compelling to constitute a prima facie showing of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id.
18 B. Timeliness
¶ 38 The Routt County Department and GAL assert that we should
deny mother’s claim of ineffective assistance stemming from the
dispositional hearing, as untimely. Citing A.R., they argue that,
because mother did not appeal the juvenile court’s adjudicatory
order or disclose an impediment to her ability to raise this claim in
such an appeal, her claim is untimely. However, their reliance on
A.R. is misplaced. In A.R., the parent sought relief from a juvenile
court’s judgment terminating her parental rights based, in part, on
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from
“counsel’s performance at the adjudicatory hearing.” A.R., ¶ 43.
Our supreme court held that, because the parent “was aware (or
reasonably should have been aware) of the facts giving rise to any
claim of ineffective assistance at the adjudicatory hearing” and
because “[a]n order decreeing a child to be neglected or dependent
[is] a final and appealable order after the entry of the disposition,”
her claim was untimely. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 43 (quoting § 19-1-109(2)(c),
C.R.S. 2025). But here, mother asserts only that her counsel was
ineffective at the dispositional hearing, not the adjudicatory
hearing. And dispositional orders are not, by themselves, final and
19 appealable orders. See People in Interest of H.T., 2019 COA 72, ¶ 1.
Therefore, because mother did not have a prior opportunity to raise
her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the dispositional
hearing, we will address it on its merits.
¶ 39 Even if we assume, without deciding, that trial counsel’s
actions amounted to deficient performance, mother has failed to
show that but for counsel’s failures the result of the proceeding
would have been different. See A.R., ¶ 60.
¶ 40 Mother’s only assertions of prejudice are that, had counsel
“taken any of [the] listed actions promptly, the trajectory of the
dependency and neglect case could have changed” because mother
“could have had” (1) consistent family time; (2) CBT treatment; and
(3) increased support to facilitate family time. And with these,
mother asserts, the juvenile court’s parenting time orders “could
have been different.”
¶ 41 But, as the caseworker testified, mother did not communicate
to schedule family time or consistently attend the family time that
she did schedule. And to the best of the caseworker’s knowledge,
mother did not complete the mental health assessment required by
20 her treatment plan. Thus, even if mother’s counsel had objected to
ongoing reductions in mother’s family time, discussed the treatment
plan with mother before its adoption, or filed for ADA
accommodations earlier in the case, mother has not established
how these actions would have resolved her overall lack of
engagement. See People v. Sherman, 172 P.3d 911, 914 (Colo. App.
2006) (holding that a speculative claim does not satisfy the
prejudice prong of Strickland). And, ultimately, the juvenile court
focused on mother’s lack of consistent engagement when deciding
the best parenting time schedule for the child.
¶ 42 Mother’s remaining ineffective assistance claims focus on the
evidence presented during the APR hearing. First, she asserts that
counsel erred by not requesting more parenting time for mother —
specifically, an allocation of equal parenting time or, at a minimum,
more than two hours of therapeutically supervised parenting time
per month. But mother’s counsel opposed the GAL’s proposed
parenting time schedule, advocating instead for a gradually
increasing parenting time schedule. And, considering that the
juvenile court declined to order the requested graduated parenting
time schedule, we do not see how the outcome of the proceeding
21 would have been different had mother’s counsel advocated for even
more parenting time.
¶ 43 Second, mother asserts that trial counsel failed to refute the
caseworker’s representation that father had completed his
treatment plan — noting that father had not engaged in the
treatment recommended by his mental health evaluation or signed
a release allowing the caseworker to verify his domestic violence
treatment. But father’s treatment plan did not require him to
engage in domestic violence treatment. And, before opining that
father had reasonably complied with his treatment plan, the
caseworker acknowledged that he had not participated in the
treatment recommended by his mental health evaluation as
contemplated by his treatment plan. Moreover, when allocating
parental responsibilities between the parents, a court is not
required to make findings regarding parental fitness or treatment
plan compliance to determine which APR is in the child’s best
interests. See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208.
¶ 44 Finally, mother asserts that her counsel “allowed” mother to
be “portrayed at the APR hearing as a domestic violence offender.”
Mother’s only basis for this assertion is one statement made by the
22 GAL in her closing argument, specifically “[a]s was alluded to by
[mother], there [were] times when the parties . . . had informal
supervision between each other. That ha[d] not worked out because
of the domestic violence between them . . . .” But, as stated, the
GAL based her argument on mother’s own testimony discussing the
parties’ domestic violence history. And the juvenile court made no
findings about, or reference to, domestic violence instigated by
either party when allocating parental responsibilities.
¶ 45 For these reasons, mother’s claims do not establish a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s allegedly
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Therefore, mother has not made a prima facie
showing of ineffective assistance of counsel and, as a result, her
claims must fail. See C.B., ¶ 26.
V. Disposition
¶ 46 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE ASHBY concur.