25CA0475 Peo in Interest of CT 12-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0475 El Paso County District Court No. 21JV540 Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of C.T., Child-Appellant,
and Concerning M.N.S.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Welling and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 24, 2025
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Assistant County Attorney, Adrianne A. Brambila, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem
Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant M.N.S. ¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, M.N.S. (mother) and
the guardian ad litem (GAL) for C.T. (the child) appeal the judgment
terminating mother’s legal relationship with the child. We reverse
and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 In early 2021, C.J.T. (father) and the child relocated from New
Mexico to Colorado without mother’s consent. Mother was
subsequently incarcerated for ten months in Texas for a federal
drug offense.
¶3 In August 2021, after receiving reports that the then-three-
year-old child and father were living in hazardous conditions, the
El Paso County Department of Human Services (the Department)
filed a petition in dependency or neglect citing concerns of neglect
and substance abuse by father. The petition identified mother as
“N.T.” and described her relationship with the child as unknown.1
The court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on
1 The record is unclear whether N.T. was a nickname or alias for
mother, the identification of a separate individual, or simply a misnomer.
1 father’s admission and “N.T.’s” nonappearance. Father passed
away a short time later.
¶4 Nearly ten months after the Department filed the petition,
mother’s prison case manager in Texas reached out to the
Department seeking information about the child. The Department
amended the petition to reflect mother’s correct legal name and
mother entered a no-fault admission. The juvenile court then
adjudicated the child dependent or neglected and adopted a
treatment plan for mother. Mother’s treatment plan required her to
(1) engage in consistent visitation with the child; (2) cooperate with
the Department; (3) maintain a safe and stable environment;
(4) complete a substance abuse evaluation and follow all
recommendations; (5) address any mental health issues; (6) avoid
new criminal convictions and address any pending criminal
charges; and (7) work with a family therapist and complete a
parenting class.
¶5 Five months later, the Department moved to terminate
mother’s parental rights. Following a six-day evidentiary hearing
spanning seven months, the juvenile court granted the
2 Department’s motion and terminated mother’s legal relationship
with the child.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
¶6 As a preliminary matter, we address whether the juvenile
court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child-
custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), §§ 14-13-101
to -403, C.R.S. 2025, and, as a result, whether it had authority to
terminate mother’s legal relationship with the child. See People in
Interest of M.S., 2017 COA 60, ¶ 12 (concluding that the UCCJEA
applies to dependency or neglect proceedings).
¶7 Upon review of the record, we asked the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing whether “the juvenile court had
jurisdiction to terminate mother’s parental rights under the
UCCJEA in light of mother’s testimony that she had previously filed
a child custody case in New Mexico.” The Department asserts that
the juvenile court had jurisdiction while mother and the GAL
dispute jurisdiction.
¶8 We review de novo whether the juvenile court had subject
matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Id. at ¶ 14. “The primary
aim of the UCCJEA is to prevent competing and conflicting custody
3 orders by courts in different jurisdictions” and “to avoid
jurisdictional competition over child-custody matters in an
increasingly mobile society.” People in Interest of M.M.V., 2020 COA
94, ¶ 17. “To effectuate this purpose, [the UCCJEA] establishes a
comprehensive framework that a Colorado court must follow to
determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction in a child-custody
matter or whether it must defer to a court of another state.” Id.
¶9 Under the UCCJEA, a court has jurisdiction to make an initial
child-custody determination if, as relevant here, the state is the
home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the
proceeding. § 14-13-201(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. “Home state” is
defined as the state in which the child lived with a parent for at
least 182 consecutive days immediately before the commencement
of the proceeding. § 14-13-102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 10 The court that makes an initial child-custody determination
generally retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. § 14-13-202(1),
C.R.S. 2025; M.S., ¶ 15. And a court of this state may not modify a
child-custody determination made by a court of another state
unless it has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody
determination and (1) the court of the issuing state determines it no
4 longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction; or (2) a court of this
state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person
acting as a parent don’t “presently reside” in the issuing state.
§ 14-13-203(1), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 11 During the termination hearing, mother testified that a New
Mexico court granted her temporary emergency custody of the child
approximately eight months before the Department filed the petition
in dependency and neglect.2 No other information was provided
regarding the status of the New Mexico case, and the juvenile court
never conferred with any New Mexico court. Following the close of
evidence, the juvenile court found that the child was born in New
Mexico and had moved to Colorado with father about seven months
2 We aren’t persuaded by the Department’s contention that mother
failed to provide sufficient evidence proving the existence of an out- of-state order. The Department, not mother, bore the burden of establishing the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 33. And once mother notified the juvenile court of the prior order, the court had statutory procedures available to it to obtain further information about the out-of-state child-custody proceeding. See People in Interest of C.L.T., 2017 COA 119, ¶ 42 (acknowledging that the statute places the burden on trial courts even when parties provide only “skeletal information” suggesting the existence of an out-of-state child-custody proceeding).
5 before the Department filed the petition. The court then concluded
that it had subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 12 We turn first to whether the New Mexico order constituted a
“[c]hild-custody determination” under section 14-13-102(3) and
conclude that it didn’t. The GAL correctly notes that a temporary
order qualifies as a child-custody determination and is sufficient to
confer exclusive, continuing jurisdiction on the issuing state. See
§ 14-13-102(3). But the out-of-state order in question wasn’t only a
temporary order, it was also an ex parte order. Mother testified that
father needed to be served for the out-of-state order “to go into
effect.” And the parties agree that father was never served.
¶ 13 Section 14-13-205(1), C.R.S. 2025, requires that any parent
whose parental rights have not been terminated be given notice
through service of process “[b]efore a child-custody determination is
made.” See also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-10A-205(a) (2025) (containing
identical notice requirement under New Mexico’s version of the
UCCJEA). Moreover, a division of this court has recognized that
Colorado courts must recognize and enforce a foreign child-custody
order “if it was made under factual circumstances that
substantially comply with the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional standards,”
6 including giving the parents notice and the opportunity to be heard.
People in Interest of A.B-A., 2019 COA 125, ¶ 20 (emphasis added)
(citing § 14-13-104(2), C.R.S. 2025).
¶ 14 By extension, to confer exclusive, continuing jurisdiction on
an issuing state, a child-custody determination must meet the
UCCJEA’s jurisdictional standards. Cf. § 14-13-105, C.R.S. 2025
(“A child-custody determination made by a court of this state that
had jurisdiction under this article binds all persons who have been
served in accordance with the laws of this state or notified in
accordance with section 14-13-108[, C.R.S. 2025,] or who have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given
an opportunity to be heard.” (emphasis added)); § 14-13-205 cmt.
(“An order is entitled to interstate enforcement and nonmodification
under this Act only if there has been notice and an opportunity to
be heard.”). Because the New Mexico order was an ex parte order
that was never served on father, it didn’t meet those requirements
and therefore didn’t constitute a “child-custody determination” as
defined by section 14-13-205(1). As a result, the New Mexico court
never acquired exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA.
7 ¶ 15 We next consider whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction
to make an initial child-custody determination under section
14-13-201(1)(a) and conclude that it did. The juvenile court found
that Colorado was the child’s home state. The record supports this
finding. Specifically, father and the child arrived in Colorado seven
months (more than 182 days) before the Department filed the
petition, and father was employed, renting an apartment, and
saving for a down payment on a house.
¶ 16 Even so, the GAL contends that the record compels the
opposite conclusion — that father and the child were only in
Colorado temporarily — pointing out times when father mentioned
his goal of returning to New Mexico. But this argument effectively
asks us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
that of the juvenile court, which we can’t do. See People in Interest
of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. And because the record supports
the juvenile court’s home state finding, we won’t disturb it. See
People in Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, ¶ 21.
¶ 17 Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court had subject
matter jurisdiction to enter the termination judgment.
8 III. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review
¶ 18 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t
reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan
hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 19 When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time a
petition in dependency or neglect is filed, the juvenile court must
consider the statutory expedited permanency planning provisions,
which require that the child be placed in a permanent home as
expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,
19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025; see S.Z.S., ¶ 25.
¶ 20 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights
presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in
Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 17. We review the court’s factual
findings for clear error, People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA
12, ¶ 10, and won’t disturb them unless the record doesn’t support
9 them. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 17. We review the
juvenile court’s legal conclusions, including its ultimate
determination of whether the Department satisfied its reasonable
efforts obligation, de novo. See S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10; People in Interest of
A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. The credibility of the witnesses;
sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the
inferences and conclusions drawn from the evidence are within the
juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021
CO 14, ¶ 15.
IV. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 21 The GAL and mother assert that the juvenile court erred by
finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate
mother and reunify the family. Specifically, they contend that the
Department failed to make reasonable efforts to (1) locate mother
and engage her in the case; (2) provide adequate case management,
including the timely provision of referrals and services; and
(3) provide adequate family time. We agree.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 22 “One of the goals of the Children’s Code is to preserve the
parent-child relationship whenever possible.” People in Interest of
10 A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 5. To that end, before a juvenile court may
terminate parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), a
department must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent
and reunify the family. See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.
2025; People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App.
2011). As relevant here, “reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of
diligence and care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.
§ 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 23 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S.
2025, are generally deemed sufficient to meet the reasonable efforts
standard. § 19-1-103(114). Under that statute, services that “must
be available and provided” as determined by individual case
planning include, among others, screenings, assessments, home-
based family and crisis counseling, information and referral services
to assistance resources, family time services, and placement
services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Additional services may be required if
funding is available, including transportation, childcare, diagnostic
and mental health services, drug and alcohol treatment services,
and family support services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).
11 ¶ 24 In assessing a department’s efforts, the juvenile court should
consider whether the services provided were sufficient to support
the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915, by
“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all
services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the
completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of
My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. After a treatment plan is
adopted, a department “is obligated to provide the services
envisioned in the plan.” S.Z.S., ¶ 37.
¶ 25 A department must provide family time services for parents
and children when such services are determined to be necessary
and appropriate by individual case plans. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV);
People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Colo. App. 2005). In
determining whether and what family time services are necessary
and appropriate, the health and safety of the child is paramount.
See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070. Services, including family time
services, should further the purposes of the Children’s Code,
including the preservation of familial ties whenever possible.
§ 19-1-102(1)(b).
12 B. Additional Background
¶ 26 After receiving the referral, the Department spoke to father,
who identified mother as “N.T.” Six days after filing the petition, the
Department ran a search for the name “N.T.” and discovered a
possible out-of-state address but no “recent [i]nformation.”3 The
Department mailed notifications and a summons to that address.
But no responses were received, and the summons was returned as
“non-deliverable.” The Department also ran an out-of-state “inmate
locator” search for “N.T.” about two months into the case. A month
later, the Department requested authorization to serve “N.T.” by
publication. In support, the Department asserted that it had
exercised due diligence to locate N.T., citing the search it completed
three months prior.
¶ 27 After the Department’s search efforts, father’s counsel notified
the Department that his paralegal had found out-of-state criminal
cases pending for mother. And at one point father “gave [the
caseworker] a different name” — other than “N.T.” — for mother.
3 To complete the search, the Department searched several websites
for the name “N.T.,” including the Colorado Department of Corrections, Colorado state courts, the county assessor, a social media site, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and a search engine.
13 ¶ 28 Mother was incarcerated in Texas shortly after the Department
filed the petition. Several months later, mother received a letter
from paternal grandmother, who claimed to have custody of the
child. After mother continued to ask questions and request contact
with the child, paternal grandmother admitted that the Department
had custody of the child. Mother and her prison case manager
began researching, writing letters, conducting online searches, and
making phone calls to try to find the child.
¶ 29 Almost ten months after the Department filed the petition, the
caseworker received a message that a prison case manager had
reached out on mother’s behalf, seeking information about the
child. The caseworker attempted to contact the prison case
manager three times over the course of three months and also sent
mother a letter. In early September 2022, one year after the case
began, the caseworker spoke to mother for the first time.
¶ 30 Mother appeared at the permanency planning hearing eight
days later and requested video visits with the child. The juvenile
court ordered that the Department, “with GAL approval, ha[d]
discretion to set up visitation for [m]other.” The Department
decided mother’s initial contact with the child should occur through
14 reintegration therapy, but the therapy didn’t begin until four
months later. At that time, the juvenile court granted mother two
therapeutic visits per week. But her second weekly visit didn’t
begin for another five or six months.
¶ 31 Two years after the case began, mother moved to Colorado and
transitioned to supervised in-person family time. In-person family
time started at one hour per week for the first two weeks and then
increased to two hours per week. Four months later, mother’s in-
person family time increased to four hours per week, where it
stayed for the remainder of the case.
C. Analysis
¶ 32 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made
reasonable efforts, including (1) attempting to locate mother;
(2) arranging family time for mother; and (3) providing numerous
referrals for services.
¶ 33 Our review of the record leads us to conclude that several of
the court’s findings lack record support. See J.G., ¶ 17. And even
accepting the court’s findings that do enjoy record support, we
agree with the GAL and mother that the court erred in its legal
15 determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate mother and reunify her with the child. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.
1. Efforts to Locate Mother
¶ 34 As detailed above, the caseworker ran two searches for “N.T.”
early in the case. But the Department didn’t conduct additional
searches or engage in other efforts to locate mother once father and
his counsel provided a different name for mother and information
about her pending out-of-state criminal cases.
¶ 35 Even so, the Department on appeal contends that it took “all
of the necessary steps to locate [m]other,” pointing to the search it
conducted for “N.T.” one week after it filed the petition. We
recognize that the Department’s initial efforts to locate mother were
hindered because it had an incorrect name. But the Department
doesn’t explain why it undertook no additional efforts to locate
mother once it received new information from father and his
counsel. Ultimately, it was mother’s own efforts that led her to the
Department and commenced her involvement in the case.
2. Case Management
¶ 36 The juvenile court found that the caseworker “stayed in good
contact with [mother’s] treatment providers,” attempted visits to
16 observe family time, and set up a referral for “co-parenting.” But
the record reflects that, outside of staffing meetings, the caseworker
spoke to mother’s mental health provider only once in over five
months despite expressing concerns about the length and
modalities of mother’s treatment. Moreover, the caseworker
observed just three visits between mother and the child, totaling
less than two hours of observation time, in her nineteen months on
the case.
¶ 37 The record also reveals that the Department didn’t submit a
timely referral for mother’s co-parenting therapy with the foster
family despite the reintegration therapist’s recommendation. The
reintegration therapist testified that co-parenting therapy between
mother and the foster family was important for the child. She noted
that, while she observed “positive qualities” of attachment between
mother and the child, “co-parenting concerns” and the potential for
the child to experience a distressing “loyalty bind” hindered
progress. According to the therapist, “the child [was] being put in
the middle.” For example, both the reintegration therapist and the
family time supervisor observed the child commenting that he
couldn’t do certain things, such as go on trips, jump on the
17 trampoline, or have a sleepover with the foster grandparents, until
he was adopted. The reunification therapist also heard the child
tell mother that he couldn’t eat the snacks she brought because his
foster mother had told him that mother was “poisoning” him.
Similarly, during two different visits the family time supervisor
overheard the child tell mother that his foster mother had told him
he “should say [he] [didn’t] want to see [mother].” The reintegration
therapist opined that the child needed “stability within the co-
parenting unit” to progress in the reunification process.
¶ 38 Given these concerns, the reintegration therapist discussed
the need for co-parenting therapy with the caseworker. But the
caseworker didn’t submit the referral until four months later — just
one week before the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental
rights. The caseworker justified this delay by explaining that she
thought the reintegration therapist would provide the service and
that she wasn’t aware that a referral needed to be submitted. But
the caseworker acknowledged that she had been present when the
reintegration therapist testified, over two months prior, that the
therapist couldn’t provide co-parenting therapy and that a referral
needed to be submitted.
18 ¶ 39 Due to the Department’s delay, co-parenting therapy didn’t
commence before the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental
rights. See § 19-3-208(2)(a) (“‘Services’ shall be designed
to . . . [p]romote the immediate health, safety, and well-being of
children eligible for these services . . . [and] [f]acilitate, if
appropriate, the speedy reunification of parents with any of their
children who have been placed in out-of-home placement . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
¶ 40 The Department, without citing any record support, asserts
that it “consistently . . . maintain[ed] contact with [m]other’s
providers” and that “[i]f reasonable efforts had not been made,
[m]other would not be in all of the services that she was in.” True,
the Department made referrals for mother’s substance abuse and
mental health treatment. But based on our review of the
Department’s comprehensive case management efforts, we agree
with the GAL and mother that the juvenile court erred by
concluding that the Department made reasonable efforts. See
My.K.M., ¶ 33.
19 3. Family Time
¶ 41 Last, in support of its conclusion that the Department made
reasonable efforts, the juvenile court found that the Department
arranged virtual family time while mother resided out-of-state and
then in-person family time once mother moved to Colorado. While
we agree that the record supports this finding, the court’s order
doesn’t account for the Department’s (1) delay in starting
reintegration therapy; (2) delay in providing family time as ordered;
and (3) refusal to expand mother’s family time as recommended.
¶ 42 During mother’s first appearance, the juvenile court
improperly ordered that the Department would have “discretion to
set up visitation for [m]other.” See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070
(“[D]ecisions concerning visitation may not be unconditionally
delegated to third persons . . . .”). The court didn’t enter any other
family time orders at that time, including orders governing the
frequency or duration of family time visits. Due to a delay in the
Department’s submission and implementation of the referral for
reintegration therapy, the child’s first visit with mother didn’t occur
until four months later. The caseworker admitted that this delay
wasn’t reasonable. And mother’s expert expressed concern that
20 this delay could have impeded progress toward reunification of the
family.
¶ 43 Recall that once reintegration therapy began, the juvenile
court ordered that mother have two therapeutic visits per week. At
the permanency planning hearing six weeks later, the GAL
expressed concern that mother was still receiving only one visit per
week. In response, the court ordered the second visit to commence
within two weeks. But over three months later, mother still hadn’t
received the second weekly visit as ordered. The caseworker
explained that she had submitted a new referral allowing up to
three visits per week, but she said that the foster mother was
“having a little bit of difficulty getting it to fit into her schedule.”
Mother’s second weekly visit with the child didn’t begin until five or
six months after the court initially ordered it.
¶ 44 In September 2023, about three months later, mother moved
to Colorado and began exercising in-person family time once per
week, increasing to twice per week five months later. Despite
continued positive reports and recommendations for increased
family time from the reintegration therapist and family time
supervisor, mother’s family time remained at four hours per week
21 for the last year of the case. The reintegration therapist testified
that, typically, the reunification process is “experience based” and
needs to “continue to build.” But here, “hindrances and
roadblocks” from the Department, including a lack of
communication and hesitancy to follow the therapist’s
recommendations based on reported statements from the child,
delayed progress. The reintegration therapist explained that it
would be “atypical” for a parent to have supervised family time for
as long as mother unless “major” safety concerns existed. And
neither she nor the family time supervisor had any concerns with
mother or her interactions with the child. The reintegration
therapist opined that, if not for the Department’s
roadblocks — such as its lack of communication and hesitancy to
implement recommended family time expansion — the case would
have been “at a different stage.”
¶ 45 On appeal, the Department doesn’t address the concerns
raised by the GAL and mother regarding family time. To the extent
the Department argues that its other efforts — including referrals
for treatment, financial assistance, and consistent
communication — sufficiently supported the juvenile court’s
22 reasonable efforts determination, regardless of the delays in family
time, we disagree.
¶ 46 Family time is a required service, if deemed appropriate by an
individual case plan, for parents of children in out-of-home
placement. § 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). In this case, mother’s first
treatment plan objective required that she “have consistent
visitation with [the] child in order to maintain and strengthen their
bond.” But, as discussed above, the Department didn’t provide
family time as ordered until almost a year after mother’s prison
case manager first reached out on mother’s behalf. The provision of
family time services uniquely impacts the ability of parents and
children to successfully reunify. See § 19-1-103(64.5) (defining
“[f]amily time” as “any form of contact or engagement between
parents . . . and children or youth for the purposes of preserving
and strengthening family ties”); § 19-3-208(2)(a) (family time shall
be designed to facilitate the “speedy reunification” of parents and
children). The Department’s failure to provide adequate family time
services throughout this case substantially restricted mother’s
statutory right to family time and reunification with the child.
23 4. Conclusion
¶ 47 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court
erred by finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to
reunify mother and the child.
¶ 48 We also conclude that the error wasn’t harmless. See People
in Interest of M.V., 2018 COA 163, ¶ 66 (explaining that an error
isn’t harmless if “it can be said with fair assurance that [the error]
substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the
basic fairness of the trial itself”), overruled on other grounds by,
People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42. The court’s
termination order focused, in part, on the lack of a “secure”
attachment between mother and the child as well as the lack of
progress during the last year and a half of the case. But mother’s
ability to rebuild an attachment with the child was delayed by
nearly two years — first, by the Department’s lack of effort to locate
her and, second, by the Department’s delay in setting up family
time as ordered. In addition, the case stagnated, at least in part,
due to the Department’s delay in (1) approving recommended
expansions of, and increases to, mother’s family time and
(2) submitting the recommended referral for co-parenting therapy.
24 Under these circumstances, we can’t say that the Department’s lack
of reasonable efforts was harmless.
¶ 49 Accordingly, based on the Department’s lack of reasonable
efforts, we reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s
legal relationship with the child and remand the case for further
proceedings.
V. Other Contentions
¶ 50 Because we have concluded that the juvenile court erred with
respect to its reasonable efforts determination, we need not address
the other contentions raised by mother and the GAL.
VI. Indian Child Welfare Act
¶ 51 While not raised as an issue on appeal, our review of the
record reveals that the juvenile court didn’t comply with the
provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1963, because it didn’t ask mother on the record whether
she had reason to know that the child was an Indian child at either
the dispositional or termination hearing. See § 19-1.2-107(2)(a),
C.R.S. 2025 (requiring the juvenile court to ask the parties on the
record whether they know or have reason to know that the child is
an Indian child at any emergency, voluntary, or involuntary child-
25 custody proceeding); M.V., ¶ 42 (identifying the dispositional
hearing as a child-custody proceeding under ICWA); see also People
in Interest of C.A., 2017 COA 135, ¶ 2 (holding that even if the
juvenile court conducted an ICWA inquiry at an initial temporary
custody hearing, it must still make another inquiry when
termination is sought).
¶ 52 Because we are remanding for further proceedings, the
juvenile court on remand should conduct the proper ICWA inquiry
and make findings as to whether ICWA applies before entering any
future judgment.
VII. Disposition
¶ 53 We reverse the termination judgment and remand the case to
the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.