25CA0184 Peo in Interest of CFJ 07-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0184 El Paso County District Court No. 22JV218 Honorable Larry E. Schwartz, Judge Honorable Lara Y. Nafziger, Magistrate
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of C.F.J. and K.N.J., Children,
and Concerning A.J.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 31, 2025
Kenneth Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie Douglas, Contract Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Ainsley E. Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.J. (mother)
appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for C.F.J.
and K.N.J. (the children) primarily to their maternal grandmother.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In October 2022, the El Paso County Department of Human
Services received a referral that the twin children tested positive at
birth for methamphetamine and amphetamine. The Department
and mother agreed to a safety plan that required mother, who was
living with the children and their maternal grandmother, to have all
of her contact supervised by maternal grandmother and to take
urinalysis tests (UAs). However, according to the Department,
mother tested positive on a UA for methamphetamine and
amphetamine and failed to provide proper medical care for the
children. The Department then filed a petition in dependency and
neglect.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother that required
her to (1) eliminate substance use; (2) have a healthy parent-child
1 relationship; (3) communicate with the Department; and (4) address
mental health needs.
¶4 The children remained in their placement at maternal
grandmother’s home for the duration of the case. Mother also
remained at maternal grandmother’s home but had only supervised
family time.
¶5 The guardian ad litem (GAL) moved for an allocation of
parental responsibilities (APR) that gave maternal grandmother
physical custody of the children. After an evidentiary hearing in
October 2024, a magistrate adopted the GAL’s proposed APR and
entered a judgment giving (1) maternal grandmother physical
custody; (2) mother supervised parenting time; and (3) maternal
grandmother and mother joint decision-making responsibility.
¶6 Mother then petitioned for juvenile court review of the
magistrate’s ruling, asserting that the magistrate erred by entering
the APR because the Department failed to make reasonable efforts
to reunite her with the children. The juvenile court affirmed the
magistrate’s judgment.
2 II. Discussion
¶7 Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to
establish a compelling reason to grant physical custody of the
children to grandmother and, therefore, the magistrate erred by
entering the APR. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶8 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within
the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in
Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.
¶9 A juvenile court’s review of a magistrate’s decision is like
appellate review, and the court must defer to the magistrate’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. C.R.M. 7(a)(9);
see also People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 37. Our review
of the juvenile court’s decision is effectively a second layer of
appellate review, so we apply the same clearly erroneous standard
to the magistrate’s factual findings, but we review legal conclusions
de novo. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning D.P.G., 2020
3 COA 115, ¶ 15. The proper burden of proof is also a question of law
that we review de novo. LeHouillier v. Gallegos, 2019 CO 8, ¶ 18.
B. Analysis
¶ 10 In dependency and neglect proceedings, the juvenile court has
jurisdiction to allocate parental responsibilities between parents
and nonparents. § 19-3-508(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of
H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 12. An allocation of parental
responsibilities is governed by the Children’s Code. People in
Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 13. The overriding purpose of the
Children’s Code is to protect children’s welfare and safety by
providing procedures through which the children’s best interests
can be served. Id. at ¶ 19. Therefore, the court must allocate
parental responsibilities in accordance with the children’s best
interests. People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App.
2011).
¶ 11 Although a finding of parental unfitness is not required, People
in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121, ¶ 43; L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208, the
court may only award permanent custody of children to a
nonparent if the moving party (here, the GAL with the support of
4 the Department) establishes a compelling reason why it is in the
children’s best interests for the nonparent to have custody.
¶ 12 The magistrate determined that the GAL and the Department
had “met their burden” to show that an APR was in the children’s
best interests. The magistrate found that mother had not complied
with her treatment plan or otherwise addressed the issues that gave
rise to the petition and the adjudication of the children as
dependent and neglected. Accordingly, the magistrate had no basis
for knowing whether mother could safely parent the children on her
own.
¶ 13 The magistrate’s findings are supported by the record. The
caseworker, who was the sole witness at the hearing, testified as
follows:
• The Department opened the case because of concerns about
mother’s substance use and one of the children missing
medical appointments.
• Mother did not complete a substance use evaluation or
treatment or submit to UAs.
• Mother did not demonstrate that she understood the impact of
her substance use on her ability to parent the children.
5 • Mother did not complete a mental health evaluation or
complete any mental health treatment during the case.
• The Department had received a referral about eight months
earlier concerning mother’s mental health. According to the
referral, mother reported that “there were agents trying to
poison [her and the children] through the cables,” and mother
wanted to put tin foil on the children’s cribs to protect them
from attacks by “rays and blocks.” The referral also said that
mother “heavily used alcohol.”
• Mother did not sign releases and her communication with the
Department was “[v]ery sporadic.”
• Mother had not addressed any of the safety concerns that
prompted the Department to file a petition, and she was not “a
safe and appropriate parent at th[at] time.”
¶ 14 Thus, while the magistrate did not explicitly state that the GAL
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25CA0184 Peo in Interest of CFJ 07-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0184 El Paso County District Court No. 22JV218 Honorable Larry E. Schwartz, Judge Honorable Lara Y. Nafziger, Magistrate
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of C.F.J. and K.N.J., Children,
and Concerning A.J.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 31, 2025
Kenneth Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie Douglas, Contract Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Ainsley E. Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.J. (mother)
appeals the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for C.F.J.
and K.N.J. (the children) primarily to their maternal grandmother.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In October 2022, the El Paso County Department of Human
Services received a referral that the twin children tested positive at
birth for methamphetamine and amphetamine. The Department
and mother agreed to a safety plan that required mother, who was
living with the children and their maternal grandmother, to have all
of her contact supervised by maternal grandmother and to take
urinalysis tests (UAs). However, according to the Department,
mother tested positive on a UA for methamphetamine and
amphetamine and failed to provide proper medical care for the
children. The Department then filed a petition in dependency and
neglect.
¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent or
neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother that required
her to (1) eliminate substance use; (2) have a healthy parent-child
1 relationship; (3) communicate with the Department; and (4) address
mental health needs.
¶4 The children remained in their placement at maternal
grandmother’s home for the duration of the case. Mother also
remained at maternal grandmother’s home but had only supervised
family time.
¶5 The guardian ad litem (GAL) moved for an allocation of
parental responsibilities (APR) that gave maternal grandmother
physical custody of the children. After an evidentiary hearing in
October 2024, a magistrate adopted the GAL’s proposed APR and
entered a judgment giving (1) maternal grandmother physical
custody; (2) mother supervised parenting time; and (3) maternal
grandmother and mother joint decision-making responsibility.
¶6 Mother then petitioned for juvenile court review of the
magistrate’s ruling, asserting that the magistrate erred by entering
the APR because the Department failed to make reasonable efforts
to reunite her with the children. The juvenile court affirmed the
magistrate’s judgment.
2 II. Discussion
¶7 Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to
establish a compelling reason to grant physical custody of the
children to grandmother and, therefore, the magistrate erred by
entering the APR. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶8 The allocation of parental responsibilities is a matter within
the juvenile court’s discretion. See In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. A court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the law. People in
Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.
¶9 A juvenile court’s review of a magistrate’s decision is like
appellate review, and the court must defer to the magistrate’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. C.R.M. 7(a)(9);
see also People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 37. Our review
of the juvenile court’s decision is effectively a second layer of
appellate review, so we apply the same clearly erroneous standard
to the magistrate’s factual findings, but we review legal conclusions
de novo. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning D.P.G., 2020
3 COA 115, ¶ 15. The proper burden of proof is also a question of law
that we review de novo. LeHouillier v. Gallegos, 2019 CO 8, ¶ 18.
B. Analysis
¶ 10 In dependency and neglect proceedings, the juvenile court has
jurisdiction to allocate parental responsibilities between parents
and nonparents. § 19-3-508(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest of
H.K.W., 2017 COA 70, ¶ 12. An allocation of parental
responsibilities is governed by the Children’s Code. People in
Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 13. The overriding purpose of the
Children’s Code is to protect children’s welfare and safety by
providing procedures through which the children’s best interests
can be served. Id. at ¶ 19. Therefore, the court must allocate
parental responsibilities in accordance with the children’s best
interests. People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App.
2011).
¶ 11 Although a finding of parental unfitness is not required, People
in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121, ¶ 43; L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208, the
court may only award permanent custody of children to a
nonparent if the moving party (here, the GAL with the support of
4 the Department) establishes a compelling reason why it is in the
children’s best interests for the nonparent to have custody.
¶ 12 The magistrate determined that the GAL and the Department
had “met their burden” to show that an APR was in the children’s
best interests. The magistrate found that mother had not complied
with her treatment plan or otherwise addressed the issues that gave
rise to the petition and the adjudication of the children as
dependent and neglected. Accordingly, the magistrate had no basis
for knowing whether mother could safely parent the children on her
own.
¶ 13 The magistrate’s findings are supported by the record. The
caseworker, who was the sole witness at the hearing, testified as
follows:
• The Department opened the case because of concerns about
mother’s substance use and one of the children missing
medical appointments.
• Mother did not complete a substance use evaluation or
treatment or submit to UAs.
• Mother did not demonstrate that she understood the impact of
her substance use on her ability to parent the children.
5 • Mother did not complete a mental health evaluation or
complete any mental health treatment during the case.
• The Department had received a referral about eight months
earlier concerning mother’s mental health. According to the
referral, mother reported that “there were agents trying to
poison [her and the children] through the cables,” and mother
wanted to put tin foil on the children’s cribs to protect them
from attacks by “rays and blocks.” The referral also said that
mother “heavily used alcohol.”
• Mother did not sign releases and her communication with the
Department was “[v]ery sporadic.”
• Mother had not addressed any of the safety concerns that
prompted the Department to file a petition, and she was not “a
safe and appropriate parent at th[at] time.”
¶ 14 Thus, while the magistrate did not explicitly state that the GAL
and Department had established a “compelling reason” for the APR,
the magistrate did find that (1) an APR giving maternal
grandmother physical custody was in the children’s best interests;
(2) mother had not addressed the issues that caused the case to be
opened; (3) despite the requirements of the treatment plan, mother
6 had not demonstrated sobriety or engaged in any mental health
treatment; and (4) maternal grandmother continued to supervise
mother’s interaction with the children. Those findings are sufficient
to support the magistrate’s determination that a “compelling
reason” existed to award custody of the children to grandmother.
¶ 15 We reject mother’s argument that the magistrate’s findings
suggest that the court impermissibly shifted the burden to mother
to prove that she was sober and could safely care for the children.
The magistrate’s observation that “there’s simply no proof of
sobriety” was not an attempt to shift the burden of proof to mother;
it was a finding that mother had failed to comply with her treatment
plan, which required her to “demonstrate a lifestyle free of drugs
and alcohol, through consistently clean urinalyses . . . and positive
reports from providers.” “It is the parent’s responsibility to secure
compliance with and success of a treatment plan.” People in
Interest of S.M.A.M.A., 172 P.3d 958, 962 (Colo. App. 2007).
Therefore, the magistrate could properly consider that mother had
failed to demonstrate her sobriety at any point during the case. See
People in Interest of L.K., 2016 COA 112, ¶¶ 35-39 (finding of
treatment plan noncompliance based on the evidence presented did
7 not amount to the juvenile court improperly shifting the burden of
proof), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. C.K. v. People, 2017 CO 111.
¶ 16 Finally, to the extent mother asserts that the magistrate was
required to explain which factors under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a),
C.R.S. 2024, she considered in issuing the APR ruling, we disagree.
A court deciding an APR motion within a dependency and neglect
proceeding is “not required to apply the best interests factors
specifically listed under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a).” L.B., 254 P.3d
at 1208. Nonetheless, the magistrate here noted that she
considered the factors under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) as well as
the best interests of the children under the Children’s Code. But
under the circumstances, she had no obligation to delineate the
specific statutory factors on which she relied in reaching her
conclusions. See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208.
¶ 17 Accordingly, because the record supports the magistrate’s
findings, and the magistrate applied the correct legal standard and
burden of proof, we discern no abuse of discretion in the entry of
the APR order.
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.
8 JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.