Peo in Interest of AM

Opinion

25CA0535 Peo in Interest of AM 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0535 Adams County District Court No. 22JV159 Honorable Kelley R. Southerland, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.M., a Child,

and Concerning M.M.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025

Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Megan Curtiss, Assistant County Attorney, Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.M. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental

responsibilities for A.M. (the child) to the child’s maternal

grandmother and grandmother’s husband (the grandparents). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2022, the Adams County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the

then-eight-week-old child. The Department alleged concerns about

mother’s mental health and her ability to care for the child.

¶3 The juvenile court granted temporary legal custody to the

Department, and the child was placed in foster care. Thereafter,

the court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected and adopted

a treatment plan for mother.

¶4 Within the first month of the case, the Department conducted

a diligent search and identified grandmother, who lived in Texas, as

a potential placement option. Grandmother told the caseworker

that she and her husband were willing and able to be a placement

for child, and thus, the Department initiated a home study under

1 the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). While

the home study was pending, the grandparents began having

weekly virtual visits with the child and came to Colorado to meet

her. Eventually, the Texas Department of Family and Protective

Services completed the ICPC home study and denied placement

with the grandparents because of grandmother’s “two prior CPS

cases with Reason to Believe dispositioning.”

¶5 Thereafter, the grandparents intervened in the case and filed a

motion for in-person visits with the child, which noted that

grandmother planned to move to Colorado to “establish a further

relationship with [the child] and develop a greater bond.” The

juvenile court granted the request for weekly in-person visits, and

grandmother moved to Colorado. During that time, the Department

conducted its own home study and concluded that grandmother

was a safe and appropriate placement option.

¶6 In January 2024, the grandparents filed a motion to place the

child with grandmother in Colorado. Three days later, mother filed

a motion for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to the

foster parents. The foster parents, who had intervened in the case,

later joined mother’s motion for an APR to them. The juvenile court

2 scheduled separate hearings on the motions — one on placement

and another on an APR. Before the court held either hearing, the

grandparents and the guardian ad litem (GAL) jointly moved for an

APR to the grandparents.

¶7 The juvenile court then held a three-day placement hearing,

which concluded in August 2024. It later issued a written order

(placement order) denying the grandparents’ request to place the

child with grandmother. Specifically, the court found that placing

the child with grandmother would not comport with the ICPC, the

Department’s regulations, or the Colorado Children’s Code; would

present an “unjustified threat of harm to the child”; and would

prohibit reunification between the child and mother. The court

subsequently denied the GAL’s motion to reconsider the placement

order.

¶8 After the placement hearing, a different judicial officer was

assigned to preside over the case. Before the new judicial officer

held the hearing on the parties’ competing motions for an APR, the

foster parents moved the court to take judicial notice of the prior

placement order. And mother moved the court to apply the law of

the case doctrine at the upcoming APR hearing; specifically, mother

3 wanted the court to find that it was bound by the prior judicial

officer’s findings and conclusions from the placement order.

¶9 The juvenile court issued a written order taking judicial notice

of the existence of the placement order and its underlying findings.

However, the court found that it was not required to apply the law

of the case doctrine and was not bound by the placement order.

The court then held a three-day hearing on the competing APR

motions. At the end of the hearing, the court granted an APR for

the child to the grandparents.

II. Law of the Case Doctrine

¶ 10 Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court

erred by failing to apply the law of the case doctrine. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 11 The law of the case doctrine generally requires a court to

follow prior relevant rulings made in the same case. In re Marriage

of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1213 (Colo. App. 2006). However, when

applied to a court’s own rulings, the law of the case doctrine is

discretionary, not mandatory. Sidman v. Sidman, 2016 COA 44,

¶ 9. Thus, it does not prevent a court from revisiting, modifying, or

rescinding its own prior rulings. See In re Bass, 142 P.3d 1259,

4 1263 (Colo. 2006) (noting that rulings or orders made in the

progress of an ongoing proceeding “may be rescinded or modified

during that proceeding upon proper grounds”). To that end, a court

is not bound by its prior ruling if following that ruling will result in

error or if that ruling is no longer sound due to changed conditions.

Silva v. Wilcox, 223 P.3d 127, 135 (Colo. App. 2009). Relatedly, the

transfer of a case from one judge to another judge of the same court

does not prevent the new judge from revisiting prior rulings or

“freeze” the first judge’s rulings. Pearson v. Dist. Ct., 924 P.2d 512,

515 (Colo. 1996).

¶ 12 The law of the case doctrine applies only to a court’s decisions

of law and not to its resolution of factual questions. In re Marriage

of Dunkle, 194 P.3d 462, 467 (Colo. App. 2008). Moreover, it does

not apply to “preliminary” or “tentative” rulings. In re Estate of

Walter, 97 P.3d 188, 191 (Colo. App. 2003) (quoting Governor’s

Ranch Pro. Ctr., Ltd. v. Mercy of Colo., Inc., 793 P.2d 648, 650 (Colo.

App. 1990)); see also S. Fork Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Town of S.

Fork, 228 P.3d 192, 195-96 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[A]ny order, however

denominated, that does not constitute a final judgment remains

5 subject to revision or modification at any time before the entry of

such a judgment.”), aff’d, 252 P.3d 465 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 13 Because a court’s decision about whether to apply the law of

the case doctrine is discretionary, we review that decision for an

abuse of discretion. See People v. Vialpando, 954 P.2d 617, 624

(Colo. App. 1997). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is

“manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misapplies the law.” People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178,

¶ 60.

B. Analysis

¶ 14 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to follow

the placement order as the law of the case or “establish a sufficient

basis for deviating from the prior court findings” when it granted an

APR to the grandparents. More specifically, she argues that the

juvenile court abused its discretion by declining to adopt, as part of

its APR judgment, the findings from the placement order — that

placement with grandmother would be contrary to the child’s best

interests; violate the ICPC, the Department’s regulations, and the

Children’s Code; present an unjustified threat of harm to the child;

and prohibit reunification with mother.

6 ¶ 15 We reject mother’s argument for three reasons. First, the

juvenile court’s findings about whether placement with the

grandparents was in the child’s best interests were not subject to

the law of the case doctrine because they were not decisions of law.

See Dunkle, 194 P.3d at 467. Rather, they were factual findings

based on the evidence presented to the court at the time of the

placement hearing.

¶ 16 Second, to the extent that any part of the placement order

constituted a decision of law, it was not a final decision for

purposes of applying the law of the case doctrine. See Walter, 97

P.3d at 191. Rather, a placement order is a temporary order

subject to modification, if warranted, to serve the child’s best

interests. Indeed, a division of this court has specifically noted that

a juvenile court retains the ability to revisit and modify its

dispositional orders, including placement orders, throughout a

dependency and neglect proceeding. See People in Interest of Z.P.S.,

2016 COA 20, ¶¶ 23-25. And the flexibility to revisit or modify

those orders allows the court to consider whether a new placement

is necessary to serve a child’s best interests, thereby furthering the

purposes of the Children’s Code. See id.

7 ¶ 17 Third, even if the law of the case doctrine applied to the

placement order, the juvenile court had the discretion to decline to

adopt or follow it. See Bass, 142 P.3d at 1263; Pearson, 924 P.2d

at 515. And we perceive no abuse of discretion in that decision for

the following reasons.

¶ 18 The juvenile court found that it needed to “hear all admissible

evidence regarding the best interests of the child at the time of the

[APR] hearing” and that its APR determination would require a

“wider evaluation of law and facts” than the prior placement order

did. In other words, the court correctly acknowledged that its APR

determination had to be based on the child’s best interests and the

circumstances that existed at the time of the APR hearing, not at

the time of the placement hearing, which occurred approximately

six months before the APR hearing. See People in Interest of N.G.G.,

2020 COA 6, ¶ 29 (a court’s determination regarding a child’s best

interests must be based on the circumstances existing at that time).

¶ 19 Relatedly, a court may decline to apply the law of the case if its

prior ruling is no longer sound due to changed conditions. See

Silva, 223 P.3d at 135. Indeed, at the APR hearing, the juvenile

court heard evidence showing that the circumstances of the case

8 were different than they were at the time of the placement hearing.

And those differences necessarily impacted the court’s analysis of

the child’s best interests. For example, in the placement order, the

court found that placement with grandmother was not in the child’s

best interests because, among other things, it would prevent the

possibility of reunification with mother. However, at the APR

hearing, mother stipulated that she was no longer seeking

reunification with the child.

¶ 20 Moreover, in the placement order, the court discredited the

Department’s home study of grandmother, noting that unlike the

thorough ICPC home study, the Department’s home study consisted

only of an interview with grandmother and input from the

caseworker. However, at the APR hearing, an expert “in conducting

home studies that comport with the requirements of the Texas

Department of Family and Protective Services” testified that she had

conducted an additional home study of the grandparents. Although

the expert did not testify as a representative of the Texas

Department of Family and Protective Services, she stated that her

home study, which concluded that the grandparents were a safe

and appropriate placement option, “adhered to all of the ICPC

9 requirements.” And the juvenile court specifically credited this new

testimony and the additional home study in its determination that

an APR to the grandparents was in the child’s best interests.

¶ 21 In sum, we are not convinced that the law of the case doctrine

was triggered by the juvenile court’s placement order. However, to

the extent that it was, the court did not abuse its discretion by

declining to apply it. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted.

III. Disposition

¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.