Peo in Interest of AM

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1961
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1961 Peo in Interest of AM 04-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1961 Arapahoe County District Court No. 20JV182 Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.M., Jr., a Child,

and Concerning D.S.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE LUM Fox and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 3, 2025

Ronald A. Carl, County Attorney, Kiley Schaumleffel, Assistant County Attorney, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 D.S. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationship with A.M., Jr. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the

Department) received referrals expressing concerns about mother’s

substance use, parole violations, and neglect of the child. The

Department filed a petition in dependency or neglect, and the

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected. The

one-month-old child was placed in foster care where he remained

for the pendency of the case.

¶3 One year after the filing of the petition, the juvenile court

terminated mother’s legal relationship with the child. Mother

appealed, and a division of this court remanded the case for the

limited purpose of considering a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion. The

juvenile court granted the Rule 60(b) motion and vacated the

termination order.

¶4 The Department filed a subsequent motion to terminate

mother’s parental rights, which the juvenile court denied for lack of

reasonable efforts. The juvenile court then adopted an amended

treatment plan for mother that required her to, among other things,

1 (1) develop a positive working relationship with the Department; (2)

develop skills to maintain a sober lifestyle; (3) address any mental

health issues; (4) engage in family therapeutic interventions to

strengthen the parent-child relationship; and (5) demonstrate

cognitive, emotional, and behavioral capacities necessary to parent

the child.

¶5 Several months later, the Department again moved to

terminate mother’s parental rights. After the hearing, the juvenile

court terminated mother’s parental rights.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 Mother argues the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department engaged in reasonable efforts to reunite her with the

child. We discern no basis for reversal.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 In deciding whether to terminate parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, the juvenile court must consider

whether the county department of human services made reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite them with the child.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2024. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

2 care” to reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-103(114).

Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy the

reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶8 Among the services required under section 19-3-208 are

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information and referral services to available public and private

assistance resources; family time; and placement services. § 19-3-

208(2)(b).

¶9 In assessing the department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile

court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, People in

Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. But the parent is ultimately

responsible for using the services to comply with the plan, People in

Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011), and the

court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in

3 treatment in determining whether the department made reasonable

efforts, see People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶ 10 Whether the Department satisfied the obligation to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family

is a mixed question of law and fact. People in Interest of A.S.L.,

2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings

for clear error but review de novo its legal determination, based on

those findings, as to whether the department satisfied its

reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 On appeal, mother does not assert that the Department failed

to provide any of the services listed in section 19-3-208 that were

necessary for her to comply with her treatment plan and become a

fit parent. Rather, she contends that the Department failed to

conduct an appropriately diligent search for individuals who could

serve as a permanent placement option.

¶ 12 Yet, for the purposes of a termination proceeding, the

Department does not have a duty to investigate relatives to satisfy

its reasonable efforts obligation because “those aren’t services

aimed at rehabilitating” the parent. People in Interest of B.H., 2021

4 CO 39, ¶ 79 (“[S]ection 19-3-604(2)(h) doesn’t ask the trial court to

assess whether the Department . . . explored enough placement

options.”). Moreover, to the extent mother relies on a regulation

that addresses family and search engagement when a child is to be

placed out of the home, Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Rule 7.304.52, 12

Code Colo. Regs. 2509-4, we conclude that it is section 19-3-208,

not the regulation, that specifies the services required to fulfill the

Department’s reasonable efforts obligations. See S.N-V., 300 P.3d

at 915.

¶ 13 Regardless, the record shows that the Department considered

eight possible placement options. However, only one individual,

mother’s cousin, expressed a willingness to be considered for

placement. After speaking to the cousin, the caseworker

determined she was not a viable placement option due to her prior

criminal history. No other family member contacted the caseworker

after this initial search and mother did not provide any additional

names to explore. Therefore, there was no evidence of a change in

circumstances of any of the previously explored placement options.

To be sure, the Department could have followed up with the

potential placement options closer to the termination

5 hearing. However, the Department was not required to do so to

comply with its reasonable efforts obligation. Accordingly, we

discern no error on these grounds.

III. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 14 We also discern no error if we construe mother’s argument as

an assertion that the juvenile court erred by finding that there were

no less drastic alternatives to termination. See B.H., ¶ 79.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 15 Implicit in the statutory scheme for termination is the

requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives to termination. People in Interest of M.M., 726

P.2d 1108, 1122 (Colo. 1986). When considering less drastic

alternatives, the court gives primary consideration to the child’s

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-

604(3). A juvenile court may consider and weigh various factors in

determining the viability of a less drastic alternative, including

whether (1) a less drastic alternative is available, People in Interest

of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 356 (Colo. App. 2007), and (2) the alternative

option provides the child with adequate permanency or meets the

6 child’s needs, People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910 (Colo.

App. 2005).

¶ 16 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. People in Interest

of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27. If a juvenile court considers a

less drastic alternative but finds instead that termination is in the

child’s best interests, it must reject the alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32. And under those circumstances, we must

affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. B.H., ¶ 80.

¶ 17 The record amply supports the juvenile court’s finding that

there were no less drastic alternatives to termination that would

meet the physical, emotional, and mental health needs of the child.

¶ 18 At the time of the termination hearing, the case had been open

for four years. Based on the child’s age and mother’s level of

engagement with her treatment plan, the caseworker opined that it

was in the child’s best interests to find a permanent placement.

The child last saw mother three-and-a-half years before the

7 termination hearing and was comfortable and well-established in

the foster home, the only home he had ever known. The caseworker

opined that (1) the level of mother’s engagement was not

appropriate for an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR); (2)

an APR was not appropriate for the child; and (3) termination was

in the child’s best interests. Thus, even if the Department had

engaged in further efforts to find a relative placement, or a

placement open to an APR, that wouldn’t change the less drastic

alternatives analysis.

¶ 19 Because the juvenile court’s finding that there was no less

drastic alternative to termination that served the child’s best

interest has record support, we will not disturb it.

IV. Disposition

¶ 20 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.