Peo in Interest of AF

Opinion

25CA0081 Peo in Interest of AF 06-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0081 Jefferson County District Court No. 23JV30041 Honorable Lindsay Van Gilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.F., D.F., and S.F., Children,

and Concerning A.T.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025

Kimberly Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Assistant County Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 A.T. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationships with A.F., D.F., and S.F. (the children). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth and Families

filed a petition in dependency or neglect, alleging concerns about

mother’s fentanyl use.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan that required mother to

address her substance use and her mental health.

¶4 Mother began treatment and had periods of sobriety and

progress. But mother also had relapses. After her first relapse,

mother eventually reengaged in treatment. But after a second

relapse, mother did not. The children’s guardian ad litem moved to

terminate mother’s parental rights. After an evidentiary hearing,

the juvenile court granted the motion and terminated mother’s

parental rights.

1 II. Reasonable Efforts

¶5 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Division made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her. We

disagree.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶6 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, a department must make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2024. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence

and care.” § 19-1-103(114).

¶7 A department satisfies its reasonable efforts obligation if it

provides services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-

103(114); see People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 10. As

necessary and appropriate, those services include screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans; home-based family and

crisis counseling; information and referral services; family time

services; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b)(I)-(V).

¶8 When evaluating a department’s efforts, the juvenile court

should consider whether the services provided were appropriate to

2 support the parent’s treatment plan. E.D., ¶ 11. But the parent is

ultimately responsible for using those services to obtain the

assistance needed to comply with the treatment plan. Id. at ¶ 12.

¶9 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. Id. at ¶ 13.

That means we review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear

error but review de novo its legal determination as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 Mother argues that the urinalysis testing services provided

were “not appropriate to support” her treatment plan because the

results “consistently” produced false positives and required

secondary testing.

¶ 11 To be sure, the record shows that roughly ten urinalyses

completed over a four-month period initially tested positive for

alcohol but proved negative on confirmation testing. But the

caseworker explained that the Division was concerned about

mother’s fentanyl use, not alcohol use, and believed that the false

positives stemmed from mother’s exposure to workplace chemicals.

The caseworker confirmed that she had explored alternative

3 substance monitoring options but was advised that urinalysis

testing provided the “best information” about fentanyl use.

¶ 12 And while the caseworker testified that false-positive results

could slow a parent’s progress in some cases, mother doesn’t argue

that the false positives affected her progress in this case. Indeed,

the caseworker testified that mother was sober and progressing

during the four months she had the false-positive results. It was

only after mother’s second relapse — which was triggered after

mother had been prescribed fentanyl in the emergency room — that

mother stopped progressing.

¶ 13 Given all this, we conclude that the Division’s continued use of

urinalysis testing to address mother’s fentanyl use did not violate

its reasonable efforts obligation.

III. Reasonable Accommodations to Avoid Nonemergency Removal

¶ 14 For the first time on appeal, mother contends that the juvenile

court erred at the initial hearing by failing to “find whether

reasonable accommodations and modifications. . . were provided to

avoid nonemergency removal on the basis of disability,” as required

by section 24-34-805(2)(e), C.R.S. 2024.

4 ¶ 15 But the juvenile court’s later temporary custody order found

that “[t]he children were seriously endangered, and an emergency

situation existed which required the immediate temporary removal

of the children from the home[,]. . . which made it reasonable not to

make efforts to prevent their removal.” (Emphasis omitted.)

¶ 16 Because section 24-34-805(2)(e) doesn’t apply to emergency

removals, we needn’t address mother’s unpreserved claim that the

juvenile court should have considered it at the initial hearing.

IV. Disposition

¶ 17 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.