Peo in Interest of AEW

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 21, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0416
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0416 Peo in Interest of AEW 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0416 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV30769 Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.E.W., a Child,

and Concerning A.M.W.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Welling and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025

Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 A.M.W. (father) appeals the judgment terminating his parent-

child legal relationship with A.E.W. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Denver Department of Human Services (the Department)

filed a petition in dependency or neglect alleging, as relevant here,

domestic violence and housing instability. Nine months before the

petition was filed, the parents placed the then-three-year-old child

with paternal grandmother on a voluntary basis, where she

remained for the duration of the case.

¶3 Father agreed to a deferred adjudication approximately five

months after the petition was filed. Nearly one year later, the court

revoked father’s deferred adjudication and adopted a treatment plan

with conditions nearly identical to the requirements of the deferred

adjudication. Father’s treatment plan required him to (1) complete

a domestic violence evaluation and any recommended treatment;

(2) engage in a substance abuse component if deemed necessary

based on a hair follicle test; (3) maintain stable housing and a

verifiable source of income; (4) attend family time; and (5) cooperate

with the Department.

1 ¶4 Approximately two years after the petition was filed and over

five months after father’s deferred adjudication was revoked, the

Department moved to terminate his parental rights. After a

contested hearing, the juvenile court granted the termination

motion.

II. Request for Continuance

¶5 Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to continue the termination hearing. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 We review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of

discretion. See C.S. v. People in Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627, 638

(Colo. 2004). Under this standard, we will not disturb the juvenile

court’s decision absent a showing that it was manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or was based on a misunderstanding or

misapplication of law. People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13,

¶ 41; People in Interest of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136, ¶ 10.

¶7 The Colorado Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with

all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best

interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024. Thus, when

2 ruling on a motion to continue, the juvenile court “should balance

the need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice

against the facts underlying the motion and the child’s need for

permanency.” People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 11. In

expedited permanency planning (EPP) cases, such as this one, a

court cannot grant a continuance unless the moving party

establishes (1) good cause for the continuance and (2) that the

continuance will serve the child’s best interests. § 19-3-104, C.R.S.

2024.

B. Analysis

¶8 At the beginning of the termination hearing, father’s attorney

moved for a continuance because father was in the hospital with

heart issues. The attorney showed the court a text message from

father containing a photograph of a hospital bracelet. But the court

found that the photo could not be “authenticated in any way” and it

was unclear whether it was even from father.

¶9 Thus, the juvenile court denied father’s motion for a

continuance but said it would reconsider its ruling if father

provided medical documentation. In doing so, the court found that

the case had been open for over two years, that this was an EPP

3 case, that a further delay would not be in the child’s best interest,

and that there was no “basis . . . to keep [the child] in limbo.” The

court further found that it had “an obligation to give [the child]

permanency and balance [father]’s due process rights with that.”

The court also noted that it would “absolutely consider anything

[father] file[d] in the future related to adding another date for him to

testify . . . or vacate his portion of the hearing . . . and reset it.”

¶ 10 Father appeared by telephone toward the end of the

termination hearing and renewed his request for a continuance but

failed to provide any medical documentation explaining his

hospitalization. The court again denied father’s request but invited

him “to file what you need to file . . . and should we have additional

documentation, I will address that when that is available.” At the

conclusion of the termination hearing, the court held the matter in

abeyance for seven days to allow father to file additional information

related to his hospitalization and request for a continuance. But

the record contains no further filings from father.

¶ 11 Based on this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the

juvenile court’s ruling because the court properly weighed the need

for orderly and expeditious administration of justice and the child’s

4 need for permanency against the motion, which included an

opportunity for father to supplement the record to support that he

had been hospitalized. See C.S., 83 P.3d at 638; R.J.B., ¶ 11.

Considering that the case had been pending for over two years, and

the family had worked with the Department for two years before

that — accounting for most of the child’s life — father did not

establish that a continuance was in the child’s best interests, nor

did he establish good cause given the lack of documentation. See

§ 19-3-104.

III. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 12 Father next argues that the juvenile court erred when it found

that he could not become a fit parent within a reasonable amount of

time. We discern no error.

¶ 13 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for

clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on

those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

5 ¶ 14 To terminate a parent-child legal relationship under section

19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, the juvenile court must find, by clear

and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit and that the

parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(II), (III).

¶ 15 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them

unable or unwilling to give their child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s

physical, emotional, and mental health needs. People in Interest of

A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006). In making this

determination, the juvenile court must consider the specific needs

of the child. See People in Interest of K.T., 129 P.3d 1080, 1081

(Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 16 A parent’s noncompliance with a treatment plan generally

“demonstrates a lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs”

and can therefore be considered in determining parental fitness.

People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008). But

even if a parent substantially complies with a treatment plan, the

6 parent may still be unfit if the plan did not successfully rehabilitate

the parent. People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 26.

¶ 17 When deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70

P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003). What constitutes a reasonable

time is fact-specific and varies from case to case. People in Interest

of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App. 2007). But a reasonable time

is not an indefinite time, and it must take into account the child’s

physical, mental, and emotional needs. People in the Interest of

S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 25.

¶ 18 Father argues that he could have become fit within a

reasonable time because he completed his domestic violence

evaluation and was committed to his domestic violence treatment.

The juvenile court found that although father had partially

complied with his treatment plan, he had not “internalized the

services provided” to address concerns regarding his “lack of

7 respect for court orders” and “domestic violence behaviors.” The

court found that father continued to engage in “threats, (verbal)

abuse, and aggression” and additional time would not change

father’s conduct or condition within a reasonable time. The record

supports the court’s findings. See S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10 (we must accept

the juvenile court’s factual findings if they have record support).

¶ 19 This case opened, in part, because father committed domestic

violence against mother in the presence of the child. Father’s

treatment plan required him to complete a domestic violence

evaluation and any recommended treatment. The caseworker

testified that for father to successfully complete the domestic

violence component of his treatment plan, he had “to internalize

change on how to be a safe parent, how to manage anger, as well as

understand the impact of his anger . . . on his child.” The domestic

violence treatment provider testified that father’s evaluation

categorized him as “the most significant, highest level of offender,”

based, in part, because he had violated probation and had previous

domestic violence charges. To successfully complete treatment as a

high-level offender, father had to (1) attend group therapy weekly;

(2) participate in individual therapy with the DV treatment provider

8 once every sixty days; (3) have a second clinical contact (in addition

to individual therapy) running concurrent with group therapy; and

(4) complete assignments mandated by the Domestic Violence

Offender Management Board (DVOMB).

¶ 20 Father attended some group therapy sessions and met with

his treatment provider. But he did not complete any of the required

DVOMB assignments. And he did not sign releases to authorize his

treatment provider to confirm that he had engaged in a second

clinical contact. The treatment provider testified that he was

considering an unsuccessful discharge for father based on text

messages father sent with “apparent comments about a disregard

for protection orders, possible triangulation of a child between a

high-conflict coparenting group, [and] disparaging remarks about a

victim (mother) in the case.” These text messages raised concerns

for “victim safety” and illustrated that father was at “risk for re-

offense.” The treatment provider testified that father would not be

able to successfully complete treatment if he did not internalize the

skills domestic violence treatment was designed to instill, such as

demonstrating empathy for victims.

9 ¶ 21 The caseworker testified that father was merely completing a

“checklist” when he engaged in domestic violence treatment, and

that he “did not internalize change.” Ultimately, the caseworker

opined that father had not successfully completed the domestic

violence component of his treatment plan because of “these ongoing

text messages and the disparaging remarks that he has made

towards [mother]” and “based on his lack of internalizing change.”

¶ 22 Father also did not complete his domestic violence evaluation

until approximately seventeen months after the petition was filed

and one year after he agreed to a deferred adjudication in this EPP

case. And he did not begin treatment until two months later. After

engaging in treatment for approximately one month, he “fell off [the]

radar” for another eight weeks. Thus, despite the age of the case,

father began consistently engaging in group and individual therapy

only three months before the termination hearing. The treatment

provider testified that the fastest someone could complete treatment

was nine months, but it could take up to sixteen months depending

on their “internalization of the competencies and their completion of

[] assignments.” And the caseworker opined that father was not

10 likely to change within the next six months due to his history of

domestic violence.

¶ 23 Next, father argues that he had frequent contact with the child

and, therefore, they could have reunified if given additional time.

But the juvenile court found, with record support, that father had

contact with the child outside of professionally supervised parenting

time which violated a protection order and illustrated father’s “lack

of respect for court orders.”

¶ 24 The child was not in father’s care prior to the filing of the

petition and father refused to cooperate with the Department before

the court case opened. After the petition was filed, father was not

able to have contact with the child because of civil and criminal

protection orders. Father’s treatment plan required him to follow

court orders, including protection orders, and to “work together

with the caseworker to schedule regular parenting time.” The

caseworker testified that she encouraged father to resolve his active

warrants and have the protection orders modified to allow him to

have court-approved contact with the child. But the criminal

protection order preventing any contact with the child was not lifted

11 until three months before the termination hearing, and the civil

protection order allowed only professionally supervised visitation.

¶ 25 Father stated in text messages to the caseworker that no

protection order would stop him from being around the child and

that he would always get his way regardless of protection orders.

The caseworker opined that father did not engage in his treatment

plan because “he boast[ed] that he already sees his daughter and

can access her whenever he wants.” The record contains no

information that father engaged in supervised visitation, but it

shows that paternal grandmother facilitated frequent contact

between father and the child in violation of the protection order and

treatment plan. The caseworker testified that she was never “able

to supervise or observe a visit with [father] and his daughter,” so

she could not give any “information as to how the relationship

looks” and she had “not gotten any reports as to details of how . . .

[their] relationship is with each other.” Because of father’s

disregard for court orders, the caseworker opined that he had “not

demonstrated that he is a fit parent.”

¶ 26 Finally, father argues that he had stable housing and

employment. The juvenile court acknowledged that father had

12 “been resourceful in obtaining employment and obtaining housing,”

but noted that “employment, state of residency, and housing has

changed several times” during the case. The court concluded that

father “did not engage in services and supports” to “obtain a

residence suitable for the minor child” and did not “demonstrate an

ability to meet [the child’s] basic needs.”

¶ 27 The caseworker testified that father had not maintained stable

housing because of his incarceration and had several moves,

including to Texas and Louisiana. Shortly before the termination

hearing, father told the caseworker that he was at risk of eviction

and planned to leave for Seattle. And at the time of the termination

hearing, the caseworker did not know where father was residing.

Although father reported various places of employment to the

caseworker, he never provided the Department with any

verification.

¶ 28 Based on this record, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s

conclusion that father’s conduct or condition rendered him unfit

and that his conduct or condition would not likely change within a

reasonable time. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29 (appellate court will not disturb

13 the juvenile court’s finding that a parent could not become fit within

a reasonable time when the record supports it).

IV. Conclusion

¶ 29 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GROVE concur.