Peo in Interest of AE

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 8, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0835
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0835 Peo in Interest of AE 01-08-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0835 Mesa County District Court No. 23JV53 Honorable JenniLynn E. Lawrence, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Ap.E and Ar.E, Children,

And Concerning V.A.,

Appellant,

and

A.E.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Freyre and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 8, 2026

Donald L. Steerman, County Attorney, Meeker, Colorado, for Appellee

Cassandra L. Coleman, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant Ainsley Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, V.A. (mother) appeals

the judgment allocating parental responsibilities for Ap.E. and Ar.E.

(the children) to K.E. (the paternal grandmother). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services (the

Department) received a referral when mother was arrested, leaving

two-year-old Ap.E. and eleven-month-old Ar.E. without a caregiver.

The Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect, raising

concerns about mother’s incarceration, criminal activity, domestic

violence, mental health, neglect, and substance dependence.

¶3 A jury determined that the children lacked proper parental

care as a result of mother’s actions or failures to act and that they

were in an environment injurious to their welfare as a result of

mother’s acts or omissions. The juvenile court adjudicated the

children dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for

both parents. After adjudication, mother elected to proceed pro se,

assisted by court-appointed advisory counsel.

¶4 The Department and guardian ad litem (GAL) later moved to

allocate parental responsibilities to the paternal grandmother, who

had served as the children’s placement provider since their removal

1 from mother. Father joined the Department and GAL’s motion and

submitted a proposed parenting plan allocating sole decision-

making to the paternal grandmother.

¶5 Almost two years after the petition was filed, and after a

contested hearing, the juvenile court entered an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) and closed the dependency and

neglect action.

¶6 Mother appeals, claiming that the court erred by (1)

determining that the Department made reasonable efforts because

it declined to provide her with reasonable accommodations, (2)

releasing one of the Department’s witnesses before mother could

cross-examine her, and (3) finding that she was not a fit parent. We

consider and reject these claims in turn.

II. Mother Abandoned Her Request for ADA Accommodations

¶7 Mother first claims that her due process rights were violated

when the juvenile court denied her motion for accommodations

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). We conclude that

mother abandoned her claim and therefore do not review it.

¶8 The ADA was enacted to ensure “equality of opportunity” and

“full participation” of individuals with disabilities. People in Interest

2 of T.B., 12 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo. App. 2000). Specifically, it

provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in, or

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 11. The juvenile court

qualifies as a public entity under the ADA.

¶9 “[A] ‘disability’ under the ADA requires more than a diagnosis

of mental or physical impairment” and “a plaintiff must ultimately

prove either an actual or perceived substantial limitation in a major

life activity to prevail on a claim under the ADA.” Hughes v. Colo.

Dep’t of Corr., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1239-40 (D. Colo. 2009).1

Whether a parent qualifies as an individual with a disability under

the ADA is determined on a case-by-case basis. See Colo. State Bd.

of Dental Exam'rs v. Major, 996 P.2d 246, 249 (Colo. App. 1999).

1 Mother cites the ADA as the basis for her challenge to the APR

judgment. Though she has not brought an independent claim asserting that a public entity violated the ADA, we nevertheless refer to caselaw enforcing the ADA for general guidance on how a juvenile court may address such issues that arise in the context of a dependency and neglect action.

3 ¶ 10 Around one year after adjudication, mother moved for

reasonable accommodations under the ADA. Mother asserted that

she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and asked the

court to provide “flexibility in the timing of . . . court hearings” and

allow “for accommodations such as extensions if necessary” to meet

filing deadlines.

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that, based on mother’s notice, it

could not determine whether she had a qualifying disability under

the ADA. The court provided mother with the judicial district’s

“ADA Request Form” and encouraged her to complete it, noting

that, “with additional information, there may be a determination

that [mother] has a qualifying disability.” In doing so, the court

reserved ruling on whether mother was a qualified individual with a

disability.

¶ 12 However, our review of the record reveals that mother did not

file a completed form or otherwise provide the court with the

additional requested information needed to make a determination.

And because mother did not secure a ruling, we conclude she

abandoned her ADA challenge and will not review it on appeal.

“When a party raises an issue in the district court, but the court

4 doesn't rule on it, the defendant must ask the district court to

rule on it to preserve it for appeal. If the defendant doesn’t do that,

we deem the issue abandoned and won't address it.” People v.

Stewart, 2017 COA 99, ¶ 55 (J. Jones, specially concurring). Even

when a party makes “occasional objections,” divisions of this court

have deemed their appellate claims abandoned when they do not

request rulings from the trial court. See Vanderpool v. Loftness,

2012 COA 115, ¶¶ 27-28.

III. Court Did Not Err in Addressing Mother’s Requests Outside of ADA

¶ 13 Despite mother’s failure to provide the additional information

requested, the juvenile court nevertheless addressed mother’s

specific requests for latitude in the court proceedings “irrespective

of any qualifying disability.” It found that mother’s request for

flexible timing for hearings was not reasonable, reasoning that while

it would consider mother’s input when scheduling a hearing, “once

a hearing is scheduled, it is expected that the parties will

participate in a hearing. If the party or parties do not appear, it will

be the conclusion that they have decided not to participate, unless

something is provided to the contrary.”

5 ¶ 14 The court further explained that mother’s request for flexibility

in meeting filing deadlines was unnecessary because any party

could request additional time. The court encouraged mother to

reach out to her advisory counsel for assistance in filing such

requests.

¶ 15 During the APR hearing, mother asked the court to “allow [her]

some extra time to gather” her thoughts if she was experiencing

PTSD symptoms. The court granted this request without making

any disability finding, advising mother “at any time . . . if you feel

like you need a break, if you feel like you need some time to get

your thoughts gathered . . . as I do with all participants in these

proceedings, anytime anyone needs a break, we’re happy to take

one.” We discern no error in these rulings.

¶ 16 Separate from her request for accommodations from the

juvenile court, mother also requested accommodations from the

Department. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate

her because there was no evidence that the Department provided

her with accommodations. In other words, mother claims that the

Department’s efforts could have been reasonable only if they were

6 accompanied by the accommodations she requested. We are not

persuaded.

¶ 17 A juvenile court is required to consider the Department’s

reasonable efforts when it enters an APR to a nonparent. People in

Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 20. And though the Department

must reasonably accommodate a parent who is a qualified

individual with a disability under the ADA, People in Interest of S.K.,

2019 COA 36, ¶¶ 25, 34; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (defining

“disability” under the ADA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining

“qualified individual” under the ADA), as discussed above, mother

abandoned her request for the court to make the necessary

determination.

¶ 18 We recognize that mother eventually provided the court with a

copy of a letter purporting to be a disability determination notice

from the State of Colorado. After a lengthy discussion at the APR

hearing, the juvenile court found that the letter demonstrated that

mother “ha[s] a disability such that [she is] eligible for Health First

Colorado Benefits. . . That’s as much information as I could take

judicial notice of.” But the court’s judicial notice of the letter was

insufficient to establish mother’s disability status under the ADA.

7 See RHJ Medical Center, Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F.Supp.2d 723,

752 (W.D.Pa. 2010) (“A record identifying a person as disabled for

some other purpose — like a receipt of social security benefits —

may not necessarily establish the fact that the person has a record

of being disabled under the ADA”). We therefore discern no error in

the court’s determination that the letter submitted by mother did

not satisfy the court’s earlier request for the information necessary

to make its own determination.

¶ 19 We further reject mother’s assertion on appeal that she did not

need to prove she was a qualified individual with a disability

because the Department “regarded [her] as having” an impairment

that substantially limited one or more major life activities. Mother

cites the Code of Federal Regulations for the proposition that the

ADA applies, but fails to explain why the Department, as a public

entity, is not exempt from providing accommodations when her

disability status is only established through the “regarded as” prong

of the definition. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(ii) (“A public entity is not

required to provide a reasonable modification to an individual who

meets the definition of “disability” solely under the “regarded as”

prong of the definition of “disability” at § 35.108(a)(1)(iii).”).

8 ¶ 20 In any event, mother has identified only two specific requests

in support of her challenge to the Department’s reasonable efforts,

neither of which is availing. True, early in the case, the court

granted mother’s request to include life skills services on her

treatment plan. But the court did so because there was no

objection to adding the service, and without determining whether

the service was necessary as a reasonable accommodation under

the ADA. And though we do not read mother’s brief as challenging

the Department’s compliance with the court’s order to provide life

skills services, we nevertheless conclude that the court’s finding

that the Department made life skills services available to mother is

supported by the record.

¶ 21 And to the extent mother’s brief can be read as challenging the

juvenile court’s ultimate reasonable efforts determination

independent of her ADA accommodations, her argument consists of

a single conclusory statement and therefore is not properly before

us. People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 35 (we will not

consider a claim which is “merely a bald assertion without

argument or development”).

9 IV. Release of Department’s Expert Witness Before Mother’s Cross-Examination

¶ 22 Mother next contends that the juvenile court violated her due

process rights by dismissing a witness at the APR hearing before

mother was able to cross-examine her.

¶ 23 Procedural due process requires notice of the proceeding and a

meaningful opportunity to be heard. People in Interest of M.M., 726

P.2d 1108, 1115 (Colo. 1986). A parent may not obtain relief on a

due process claim absent a showing of harm or prejudice. See

People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007).

A. Additional Background

¶ 24 At the APR hearing the Department’s first witness was an

evaluator who completed a “parenting capacity interactional

evaluation” with mother and the children. The Department and

other parties completed direct and cross-examination before the

court adjourned for lunch. The court noted that mother would have

“the opportunity to cross when we come back from lunch if she

chooses to.” The court confirmed that all parties could return by

1:15 p.m., and hearing no objection, recessed.

10 ¶ 25 The court reconvened on the record at 1:25 p.m. Mother had

not yet appeared. The court found that, “in light of [mother] not

timely returning from our lunch break, . . . she has waived her right

to cross examine the witness . . . . [W]e have released [the witness]

and are proceeding ahead” with the Department’s next witness.

¶ 26 Mother appeared while the next witness was being offered as

an expert and objected to the matter proceeding without her being

able to cross-examine the evaluator.

B. Analysis

¶ 27 Mother claims that she was denied the right to be heard when

the juvenile court dismissed the evaluator and “denied [her] the

right to cross-examine the [D]epartment’s” witness. We reject

mother’s contention for three reasons.

¶ 28 First, we are not aware of any cases, and mother provides

none, that support her claim that she had the right to cross-

examine this witness. See People in Interest of G.E.S., 2016 COA

183, ¶ 50 (the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment does

not extend to dependency and neglect cases).

¶ 29 Second, mother’s claim that the juvenile court did not provide

her with adequate notice that the witness would be dismissed if she

11 did not return on time is belied by the record. When it denied her

request for “flexibility in the timing of . . . court hearings” six

months before the APR hearing, the court notified mother that if

she did not appear at a scheduled hearing, “it will be the conclusion

that [she] ha[s] decided not to participate, unless something is

provided to the contrary.” Before breaking for lunch on the first day

of the APR hearing, the court noted that mother would be given the

opportunity to cross-examine the evaluator “if she chooses to.” The

court’s finding that mother chose not to timely return from lunch,

absent any communication from her indicating otherwise, followed

the procedures established by the juvenile court.

¶ 30 Third, mother fails to establish that she was prejudiced by the

release of the witness when mother did not timely return from

lunch. During her case-in-chief, mother recalled two of the

Department’s witnesses: the paternal grandmother and the ongoing

caseworker. Mother did not attempt to recall the evaluator and

does not assert that she would not have been permitted to do so by

the juvenile. Nor does the record suggest that holding the hearing

in mother’s absence impaired the basic fairness of the hearing.

Mother does not explain what information her cross-examination

12 would have elicited that would have substantially influenced the

outcome of the case. See People in Interest of C.C., 2022 COA 81, ¶

20 (an error is harmless unless “it can be said with fair assurance

that it substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired

the basic fairness of the trial itself”).

¶ 31 To the extent that mother claims the court’s dismissal of this

witness impacted her rights under the ADA, we already determined

above that she abandoned her ADA claims.

V. Fitness

¶ 32 Last, mother contends that she was a fit parent because she

had substantially complied with the treatment plan at the time of

the APR hearing.

¶ 33 Mother acknowledges that the court was not required to enter

a fitness finding as part of its APR order. See § 19-3-507(1)(a),

C.R.S. 2025; see also People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208

(Colo. App. 2011) (APR must be determined in accordance with a

child’s best interests; parental unfitness is not required for an APR

for a child adjudicated dependent or neglected). However, because

we agree that the court relied on its finding that mother was not fit

as the compelling reason why it was not in the children’s best

13 interests to return to mother’s care, we consider mother’s challenge

to the factual findings underlying its fitness determination.

¶ 34 Partial or even substantial compliance with a treatment plan

“may not be sufficient to correct or improve the parent’s conduct or

condition.” People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1151 (Colo.

App. 2006). However, the court found that the uncontested

evidence at the APR hearing demonstrated that mother had not

demonstrated compliance with her treatment plan. The court found

that mother was “committed to resisting efforts to comply with her

treatment plan” and “has not successfully completed her treatment

plan nor has she addressed the issues that led to the

[Department]’s involvement.” The court found that mother “remains

an unfit parent. [Her] conduct is not likely [to] change within a

reasonable time.”

¶ 35 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that mother attended family time “pretty consistently,” but that

unhealthy dynamics between mother and the children and unsafe

situations during family time persisted. Outside of family time,

mother “hasn’t really engaged in this case or in the services.”

Mother completed capacity to parent and domestic violence victim

14 assessments but did not follow through with the recommendations.

Mother continued to engage in criminal activity and had five open

warrants at the time of the hearing. And she refused to participate

in a substance dependence class or engage in substance testing.

¶ 36 The caseworker’s uncontested testimony was that mother “had

two years to engage fully in services to become a safe and

appropriate parent and she simply has chosen not to.” As a result,

the caseworker opined that “the same reasons of concern that led to

the Department getting involved with this family again are still very

present concerns,” including mother’s criminal activity, mental

health, substance dependence, and lack of appropriate caregiving

for the children.

¶ 37 Given this evidence, we conclude that the record supports the

court’s finding that mother was not a fit parent.

VI. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE YUN concur.