25CA1733 Peo in Interest of BD 03-05-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1733 Montezuma County District Court No. 24JV20 Honorable William Young Furse, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner,
In the Interest of B.D., a Child,
and Concerning C.B.,
Appellant,
and
B.D.,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026
No Appearance for Petitioner
Beth Padilla, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant One Accord Legal, LLC, Katelyn B. Parker, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.B. (mother)
appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental
responsibilities for seven-year-old B.D. (the child) to mother and
B.D. (father), with father serving as the primary residential parent
during the school year. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The child lived with mother and father in Rico during the first
six years of her life, attending school in Telluride, before mother
moved with the child to Cortez in the fall of 2024. Shortly
thereafter, mother filed a petition for allocation of parental
responsibilities.
¶3 During the domestic relations case, the domestic relations
court ordered the Montezuma County Department of Social Services
to investigate child safety concerns. The court also entered a
temporary order for the child to reside primarily with mother with
the Department’s protective supervision. The Department then filed
a petition in dependency and neglect.
¶4 Both parents entered no-fault admissions, and the juvenile
court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected with regard to
both mother and father and adopted treatment plans for both
1 parents. Later, the juvenile court set a contested allocation of
parental responsibilities (APR) hearing. The juvenile court’s
resulting APR order made father the primary residential parent
during the child’s school year.
II. Mother’s Primary Argument
¶5 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by relying solely
on best interest factors from the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
Act (UDMA) in determining that father should be the child’s primary
custodial parent during the school year. She argues that the
juvenile court did not apply the required provisions of the
Children’s Code. We are not convinced.
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law
¶6 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the
sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. When there
is record support for the court’s findings, its resolution of
conflicting evidence is binding on review. Id. However, whether the
court applied the correct legal standard presents a question of law
that we review de novo. Id.
2 ¶7 The tests for determining parenting time pursuant to the
UDMA and the Children’s Code are not identical. L.A.G. v. People in
Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996). In custody
proceedings initiated pursuant to the UDMA, a district court must
“determine [parenting time] . . . in accordance with the best
interests of the child” applying the factors specifically enumerated
in section 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2025. See also L.A.G., 912 P.2d at
1388.
¶8 But when allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency
or neglect proceeding, the court “shall hear evidence of the proper
disposition best serving the interests of the child and the public,”
L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1391 (citation omitted), and consider the
legislative purposes of the Children’s Code, id. at 1385. See also
People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011).
The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s
welfare and safety by providing procedures through which the
child’s best interests can be served. See § 19-1-102(1), C.R.S.
2025; L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). Still, a
juvenile court may consider provisions of the UDMA, including the
best interest factors in section 14-10-124, so long as the court’s
3 focus remains on the child’s safety and protection and not on the
parents’ custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA
70, ¶ 13.
B. Analysis
¶9 The juvenile court’s written order indicates that it “considered
evidence and testimony along with the factors outlined in section
14-10-124.” And its oral findings are consistent with many best
interest factors from section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and (a.5). The court
considered
• the wishes of the child regarding parenting time and
concluded that the child’s young age gave her wishes
“minimal weight when determining her best interests,”
see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(II);
• the bond between the child and parents and determined
that “the child’s best interests are served through equal
parenting time tempered by the child’s school needs,” see
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I), (III), (IV);
• the distance between the parents’ residences and the fact
that child exchanges have been going smoothly, § 14-10-
124(1.5)(a)(VIII); 4 • mother’s mental health conditions, including a finding
that they “significantly impair at times her cognitive
functioning and her ability to fulfill her parental
responsibilities,” see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V); and
• that Colorado law requires it to give “paramount
consideration [to] the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs,” see § 14-10-
124(1.5)(a.5).
¶ 10 In addition to considering these UDMA best interest factors,
the juvenile court’s findings and order are consistent with the
Children’s Code and its legislative purposes. The juvenile court’s
written order explicitly states that that it had jurisdiction over the
APR by virtue of the Children’s Code, specifically, that it had
jurisdiction “pursuant to C.R.S. 19-1-104[, C.R.S. 2025].” See
L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1388 (Once a court accepts jurisdiction
pursuant to section 19-1-104, it “must determine the question of
custody according to the provisions of the [Children’s] Code.”).
¶ 11 And significantly, the juvenile court’s oral findings and order
focus on the protection and safety of the child rather than the
parents’ custodial interests. H.K.W., ¶ 13. The juvenile court 5 repeatedly considered the child’s safety and welfare, both as it
related specifically to section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V), but also more
generally. It found, “[w]hen rendering a decision as to parenting
time . . . , the court must evaluate how a parent’s mental health
issues . . . impact the child’s well-being and safety, ensuring that
decisions are evidence based and focused on the child’s best
interests pursuant to [section] 14-10-124.” But it also stated,
without referencing the UDMA, that “protective measures . . . [were]
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25CA1733 Peo in Interest of BD 03-05-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1733 Montezuma County District Court No. 24JV20 Honorable William Young Furse, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner,
In the Interest of B.D., a Child,
and Concerning C.B.,
Appellant,
and
B.D.,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026
No Appearance for Petitioner
Beth Padilla, Guardian Ad Litem
The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant One Accord Legal, LLC, Katelyn B. Parker, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.B. (mother)
appeals the juvenile court’s judgment allocating parental
responsibilities for seven-year-old B.D. (the child) to mother and
B.D. (father), with father serving as the primary residential parent
during the school year. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The child lived with mother and father in Rico during the first
six years of her life, attending school in Telluride, before mother
moved with the child to Cortez in the fall of 2024. Shortly
thereafter, mother filed a petition for allocation of parental
responsibilities.
¶3 During the domestic relations case, the domestic relations
court ordered the Montezuma County Department of Social Services
to investigate child safety concerns. The court also entered a
temporary order for the child to reside primarily with mother with
the Department’s protective supervision. The Department then filed
a petition in dependency and neglect.
¶4 Both parents entered no-fault admissions, and the juvenile
court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected with regard to
both mother and father and adopted treatment plans for both
1 parents. Later, the juvenile court set a contested allocation of
parental responsibilities (APR) hearing. The juvenile court’s
resulting APR order made father the primary residential parent
during the child’s school year.
II. Mother’s Primary Argument
¶5 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by relying solely
on best interest factors from the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
Act (UDMA) in determining that father should be the child’s primary
custodial parent during the school year. She argues that the
juvenile court did not apply the required provisions of the
Children’s Code. We are not convinced.
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law
¶6 Allocating parental responsibilities is a matter within the
sound discretion of the juvenile court. See In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 15. When there
is record support for the court’s findings, its resolution of
conflicting evidence is binding on review. Id. However, whether the
court applied the correct legal standard presents a question of law
that we review de novo. Id.
2 ¶7 The tests for determining parenting time pursuant to the
UDMA and the Children’s Code are not identical. L.A.G. v. People in
Interest of A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1391 (Colo. 1996). In custody
proceedings initiated pursuant to the UDMA, a district court must
“determine [parenting time] . . . in accordance with the best
interests of the child” applying the factors specifically enumerated
in section 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2025. See also L.A.G., 912 P.2d at
1388.
¶8 But when allocating parental responsibilities in a dependency
or neglect proceeding, the court “shall hear evidence of the proper
disposition best serving the interests of the child and the public,”
L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1391 (citation omitted), and consider the
legislative purposes of the Children’s Code, id. at 1385. See also
People in Interest of L.B., 254 P.3d 1203, 1208 (Colo. App. 2011).
The overriding purpose of the Children’s Code is to protect a child’s
welfare and safety by providing procedures through which the
child’s best interests can be served. See § 19-1-102(1), C.R.S.
2025; L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647, 654 (Colo. 1995). Still, a
juvenile court may consider provisions of the UDMA, including the
best interest factors in section 14-10-124, so long as the court’s
3 focus remains on the child’s safety and protection and not on the
parents’ custodial interests. People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA
70, ¶ 13.
B. Analysis
¶9 The juvenile court’s written order indicates that it “considered
evidence and testimony along with the factors outlined in section
14-10-124.” And its oral findings are consistent with many best
interest factors from section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and (a.5). The court
considered
• the wishes of the child regarding parenting time and
concluded that the child’s young age gave her wishes
“minimal weight when determining her best interests,”
see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(II);
• the bond between the child and parents and determined
that “the child’s best interests are served through equal
parenting time tempered by the child’s school needs,” see
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I), (III), (IV);
• the distance between the parents’ residences and the fact
that child exchanges have been going smoothly, § 14-10-
124(1.5)(a)(VIII); 4 • mother’s mental health conditions, including a finding
that they “significantly impair at times her cognitive
functioning and her ability to fulfill her parental
responsibilities,” see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V); and
• that Colorado law requires it to give “paramount
consideration [to] the child’s physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs,” see § 14-10-
124(1.5)(a.5).
¶ 10 In addition to considering these UDMA best interest factors,
the juvenile court’s findings and order are consistent with the
Children’s Code and its legislative purposes. The juvenile court’s
written order explicitly states that that it had jurisdiction over the
APR by virtue of the Children’s Code, specifically, that it had
jurisdiction “pursuant to C.R.S. 19-1-104[, C.R.S. 2025].” See
L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1388 (Once a court accepts jurisdiction
pursuant to section 19-1-104, it “must determine the question of
custody according to the provisions of the [Children’s] Code.”).
¶ 11 And significantly, the juvenile court’s oral findings and order
focus on the protection and safety of the child rather than the
parents’ custodial interests. H.K.W., ¶ 13. The juvenile court 5 repeatedly considered the child’s safety and welfare, both as it
related specifically to section 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V), but also more
generally. It found, “[w]hen rendering a decision as to parenting
time . . . , the court must evaluate how a parent’s mental health
issues . . . impact the child’s well-being and safety, ensuring that
decisions are evidence based and focused on the child’s best
interests pursuant to [section] 14-10-124.” But it also stated,
without referencing the UDMA, that “protective measures . . . [were]
necessary to optimize the child’s safety and serve her best
interests.” The juvenile court thus focused on the protection of the
child’s welfare and safety in addition to the best interest factors
from the UDMA. See § 19-1-102(1); L.G., 890 P.2d at 654. In this
way, its ruling considered the legislative purposes of the Children’s
Code because it “encompass[ed a] determination of whether [the
parenting time award] would best serve [the] child’s welfare and the
best interests of society.” L.A.G., 912 P.2d at 1393.
¶ 12 We are satisfied that the court applied the correct legal
standard in this matter.
6 III. Mother’s Remaining Argument
¶ 13 To the extent that mother also argues that the juvenile court’s
ruling was not supported by the evidence, we disagree. Mother
accurately points out that the record contains evidence that she
“engaged in mental health therapy, maintained safe and
appropriate housing, and . . . could meet the child’s needs.”
Nevertheless, other evidence supports the court’s findings. For
example, mother did not inform father of major decisions for the
child, mother’s mental health issues sometimes prevented her from
safely driving with the child, mother struggled with employment,
and the child had school-attendance issues while in mother’s care.
Because there is record support for the juvenile court’s findings, we
will not disturb its resolution of conflicting evidence. See B.R.D.,
2012 COA 63, ¶ 15.
IV. Disposition
¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.