Pent v. The Ocean Belle

19 F. Cas. 200
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJanuary 15, 1861
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 19 F. Cas. 200 (Pent v. The Ocean Belle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pent v. The Ocean Belle, 19 F. Cas. 200 (S.D. Fla. 1861).

Opinion

MARVIN, District Judge.

This /Ship, laden with 3,048 bales of cotton, bound from New Orleans to Liverpool, ran ashore near Marquisas Island, situated about thirty miles to the westward of this place, on the morning of the 0th of January, 1801. Learning that the ship was ashore, eight wrecking vessels, of the aggregate tonnage of 481 tons, carrying in all sixty-four men, and a steam propeller of the burthen of 450 tons, carrying twenty-one men, proceeded from this port to her assistance, and, after carrying out an anchor, lightened the ship of 1,140 bales of cotton, when, by heaving at the windlass, and tugging by the steamer, the ship came off the reef. She was then towed around an extensive shoal, and brought to this place. She was towed in all about seventy miles.. The weather was good, and the ship sustained but little damage while ashore, so that the ship is in a fit condition to proceed on her voyage without being discharged or repaired. Had the weather been bad, her exposed situation would have subjected her to great peril of total loss. The value of the ship, for the purpose of determining the question of salvage, may be estimated at $30,000, and the cargo at $133,-000, making the aggregate $105.000. The questions to be decided are, what amount of compensation ought to be allowed for the services rendered in saving the ship and cargo, and how shall the sum allowed be divided among the salvors?

As to the first question, the law has long since been settled in England and the United States that salvage is a reasonable compensation; an adequate reward for saving property exposed to marine peril, and not any definite proportion of the value saved. The reasonableness of the compensation must, .in the nature of the case, depend upon a full and fair consideration of all the circumstances of time, place, labor, danger, value;, and number of salvors who performed, or were necessary to perform, the salvage service. IVhat would be no more than reasonable on this coast, where so many shipwrecks occur, and where the assistance of so few transient or trading vessels can be had to save the property, and where, consequently, the employment of a number of regular wrecking vessels lias been found necessary for that purpose, might be unreasonably large in the neighborhood of commercial ports, or on the coast of England or the United States, or in any place where regular wrecking vessels were unnecessary, because wrecks were fewer, and the assistance of transient persons or vessels could be more easily obtained. But there must be a limit to the augmentation of the rates of salvage for services rendered on this ecast, and that limit will be more clearly seen by adverting to the reasons which the law assigns for allowing salvage in any case for services rendered on any other sea or coast. Persons engaging in the business of wrecking are very apt to acquire a habit of thinking that they are entitled of right to a reward for saving property, — to something more than common pay for common labor. And when that reward is withheld from them, or is not so large as they think it ought to be, they think great injustice is done them. Whereas the truth of the mat-1 ter is, according to all the leading cases on the law of salvage in England and the United States, salvors are entitled of right to a reasonable compensation for work and labor only; and no injustice is done them when they are paid this, and the reward is withheld. The reward — or the excess beyond pay for work and labor — is not awarded to-them on their own account at all. but purely on account of commerce in general, to encourage others to save property in the like peril. If persons would as readily and voluntarily save property on the sea as they do-on shore from a burning house, no salvage would be decreed by the courts in the one case any more than in the other. Mason v. The Blaican, 2 Cranch [9 U. S.] 240; The Sarah, 1 C. Rob. Adm. 312, note; The Hector. 3 Hagg. Adm. 95. From this view of the subject, it follows that salvages ought never to be graduated at higher rates than the-good of commerce really requires; and whenever it appears that more vessels and men are employed in the business of saving property than the good of commerce truly requires, it is evident that the rates of salvage-[202]*202have l>een too high. — too stimulating, — and the court should at once he admonished that the good of commerce required that they should he reduced. Commerce may be dam-nified by too high salvages, not only by being subjected to their i>ayment, but also by increasing the inducement to salvors to collude with shipmasters with a view to the acquisition of such salvages. It is believed that no vessel or cargo has been lost on this coast in many years in consequence of an insufficient supply of wrecking vessels and men to save them. This fact is evidence that the salvages have been sufficiently high for the good of commerce. We have no evidence that they have not been too high; and whether they may not be somewhat reduced and graduated on a lower scale to the advantage of commerce is a question worthy of the very serious consideration of the court. That the interests of persons engaged in the wrecking business cannot be promoted by high rates of salvage, is perfectly obvious to the mind of every impartial and disinterested person. High rates of salvage induce a large number of persons to engage in the business and share its profits. An increase in the number of the sharers diminishes the share of each, in like manner as an increase in the divisor diminishes the quotient. A further increase in the salvages would have the same effect. A progressive series of augmentations in the rates of salvage would end in taking the whole property saved for the salvage, and in collecting a large number of persons upon the coast, dependent upon shipwrecks for their living, whose individual annual shares, on account of their increased numbers, would be no larger than shares of a less number, receiving only salvages graduated on a moderate scale. The interests of the professional salvor cannot, in the long run, be promoted by high rates of salvage; and his interests, when rightly understood, will always be seen to be in harmony with the interests of commerce. Both are best secured, in the long run, by moderate salvages.

We will now advert to number of cases, by way of showing what have been the usual rates of salvage decreed by this court. We shall select the cases indifferently from the two classes: First, from that when the vessel was saved; and, second, where it was lost. The Ellen Hood [Case No. 4,377] was decided in 1855. That ship ran ashore to the northward of Cape Florida, about 150 miles from this place. She was laden with 3.039 bales of cotton. Ten wrecking vessels, carrying in all eighty men, lightened her of 901 bales, heaved her off, and brought her to this port. The ship and cargo were valued at $192,391. The court decreed $20,500 for salvage. The Courier [Id. 3,283], laden with 3.024 bales of cotton, got ashore on Carys-fort Iteef. and lay in an exposed situation. The master carried out his own anchors, after which the weather became bad, and the crew insubordinate. Six wrecking vessels, carrying sixty-two men, carried out another anchor, lightened the ship of 900 bales, and heaved the ship off. They were employed several days in performing the service, the weather being too bad to work. The ship and cargo were valued at $140,000, and $19,-000 were decreed for salvage. The ease of Roberts v. The Ocean Star [Id. 11,908] was decided in 1860. This ship, laden with 2,590 bales of cotton, went ashore on the outer side of Brewster Reef — a dangerous reef situated near Cape Florida.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Duff v. Merritt
86 F. 675 (Second Circuit, 1898)
Pyman v. Clarke
77 F. 754 (Fifth Circuit, 1896)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
19 F. Cas. 200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pent-v-the-ocean-belle-flsd-1861.