OPINION BY
Judge BUTLER.
The Pennsylvania Medical Society, on behalf of itself and all of its members; and Peter M. Daloni, M.D., Karen A. Rizzo, M.D. and Martin D. Trichtinger, M.D.; and the Hospital & Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania, Geisinger Health System, St. Vincent Health Center and Abington Memorial Hospital (Petitioners) filed an application for summary relief based on the Court’s July 24, 2009 en banc opinion disposing of preliminary objections filed by the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) and the Office of the Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (collectively, the Commonwealth). For the reasons that follow, we grant Petitioners’ application for summary relief.
Under Section 711(d) of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act,1 health care providers are, with certain exceptions, required to maintain minimum medical professional liability coverage. In addition, Section 712 of the MCARE Act2 establishes a medical professional liability fund commonly known as the MCARE Fund. The MCARE Fund is used to pay claims against providers for losses or damages awarded in medical professional liability actions in excess of their basic insurance coverage. The MCARE Fund is funded by an “assessment” on each participating health care provider. The amount of the assessment is determined by the provider’s prior claim history and private medical malpractice insurance premiums. Accordingly, Pennsylvania health care providers are required to maintain private professional liability insurance and to contribute to the MCARE Fund.
In 2003, the General Assembly enacted the Health Care Provider Retention (HCPR) Program3 (Abatement Law) to alleviate the threat that many physicians would leave Pennsylvania if the exorbitant cost of professional liability insurance was not addressed. The Abatement Law served to provide abatements to physicians and other participating MCARE providers (excluding hospitals), thereby reducing their annual MCARE assessments. The Abatement Law provided eligible physicians in high risk practices 100% abatement of their annual assessment, and other [36]*36eligible health care providers 50% of their annual MCARE assessment. When originally enacted, the Abatement Law was limited to the 2003-2004 MCARE assessments. Subsequent legislation, however, extended the abatement program to the 2005, 2006, and 2007 MCARE assessments.4
In order to fund the abatement program and reduce providers’ MCARE Fund assessments, the General Assembly established a special account known as the HCPR Account, from which the abate-ments were to be paid. Section 1112(a) of the Abatement Law5 provides:
(a) Fund established. There is established within the General Fund a special account to be known as the [HCPR] Account. Funds in the account shall be subject to an annual appropriation by the General Assembly to [DPW]. [DPW] shall administer funds appropriated under this section consistent with its duties under section 201(1) of ... the Public Welfare Code.[6]
DPW was the administrator of these funds because it could, it was thought, receive matching federal Medical Assistance funds. According to Section 201(1) of the Public Welfare Code, DPW has the power and the duty to apply for, receive and use such federal funds “for the financing in whole or in part of programs in fields in which the department has responsibility.” It is undisputed that, in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, the General Assembly appropriated to DPW a total of $737 million for health care provider retention.
The General Assembly raised funds to pay for the abatements by increasing the tax on cigarettes by 25 cents per pack (18.52% of the cigarette tax). Section 1211 of the Cigarette Tax Law,7 required that a portion of the tax collected be deposited into the HCPR Account:
There is established in the General Fund a special account to be known as the [HCPR] Account. Eighteen and fifty-two hundredths per cent of the proceeds of the tax imposed by section 1206 shall be deposited in the account. Funds in the account shall be subject to an annual appropriation and shall be administered as provided by law.
In addition, motor vehicle violation surcharge revenue was available, pursuant to Section 712(m) of the MCARE Act to help fund the program. See Section 6506 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 6506.
In 2004, the Budget Secretary was appointed to make transfers from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund, and to determine the amount of such transfers up to a specified limit. Specifically, Section 1112(c) of the Abatement Law8 provides: “The Secretary of the Budget may annually transfer from the [HCPR] account to the [MCARE] Fund an amount up to the aggregate amount of abatements granted by the Insurance Department under section 1104(b).”
It is undisputed that the Commonwealth has granted physicians and other partici[37]*37pating health care providers abatements from their 2003-2007 MCARE assessments in the amount of $946 million as follows:
Calendar Year Value of Abatements
2003 $203,000,000
2004 $245,000,000
2005 $208,000,000
2006 $158,000,000
2007 $132,000,000
Pet. for Rev. ¶ 19. It is also undisputed that, in 2004, $100 million was transferred from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund. In 2005, an additional $230 million was transferred. Thus, the Commonwealth has transferred $330 million from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund. Although abatements continued to be granted, and revenues to fund the awarded abatements continued to accumulate in the HCPR, no funds were transferred to the MCARE Fund after 2005. From 2004 through 2007, approximately $170 million of motor vehicle violation surcharge revenue was deposited into the MCARE Fund. The HCPR Account, as of July 31, 2009, had only approximately $723 million in it. It is unclear, according to Petitioners, how much of the motor vehicle violation surcharge revenue deposited into the MCARE Fund was available and used to fund abatements. Petitioners’ claim, based upon these facts, that at least $446 million (if all of the motor vehicle surcharge violation revenue was available) and possibly as much as $616 million (if none of the motor vehicle surcharge violation revenue was available) was deposited into the HCPR Account for abatements, but was not transferred to the MCARE Fund.9 The Commonwealth, on the other hand, has stated that, to the extent that it was required to fund the MCARE Fund, the Budget Secretary made transfers sufficient to allow the MCARE Fund to meet its statutory claims and expenses (the transfer in 2005 being the last one necessary), and that there was no requirement that dollar-for-dollar transfers be made in the total amounts of abatements granted.
On December 11, 2008, Petitioners filed petitions for review in this Court’s original jurisdiction in the nature of a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the Commonwealth is required to fully fund the HCPR and to transfer those funds to MCARE under the applicable abatement statutes, and that the Commonwealth’s failure to do so was a violation of the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.-10 The petitions for review also sought injunctive relief against the Commonwealth, ordering that it refrain from using funds dedicated for abatement for any other purpose, and provide an accounting of the MCARE Fund and HCPR Account since 2004.11
[38]*38On January 12, 2009, the Commonwealth filed preliminary objections asserting that Petitioners’ claims failed as a matter of law because: (1) DPW’s obligation to administer and fund MCARE abatements was contingent upon its success in securing matching federal funding, which it was ultimately unable to do; (2) the Budget Secretary’s authority to transfer funds is discretionary and not mandatory; (3) the Budget Secretary’s authority to make annual transfers expired December 31, 2008, by operation of law; and, (4) assessments levied under the MCARE Act are akin to insurance premiums and are not taxes.
As stated above, this Court, sitting en banc, issued an unreported memorandum opinion on July 24, 2009, sustaining the Commonwealth’s preliminary objections as to the Uniformity Clause, but overruling the Commonwealth’s preliminary objections as to the Commonwealth’s duty and its failure to fund the subject accounts. On September 9, 2009, Petitioners filed this application for summary relief, stating that this Court ruled on the merits of Petitioners’ claims in its July 24, 2009 opinion, when it held that the Commonwealth had a mandatory statutory duty to transfer sufficient funds from the HCPR Account to fully fund the MCARE Fund abatements; and stating that since the facts are not in dispute, Petitioners are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
Petitioners aver that this Court ruled on the merits of Petitioners’ claims in its July 24, 2009 opinion, when it held that the Commonwealth had a mandatory statutory duty to transfer sufficient funds from the HCPR Account to fully fund the MCARE Fund abatements. We disagree with Petitioners’ contention, in light of the fact that the July 24, 2009 opinion examined a different question than what has been presented by the instant application. The opinion issued by this Court on July 24, 2009 considered and disposed of the Commonwealth’s preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, which merely tested the legal sufficiency of the complaint. The Court held that Petitioners’ pleadings were legally sufficient to allow the case to continue. The merits of the case, however, were not conclusively ruled upon at that time. The Honorable Bernard J. McGin-ley made this clear in his October 19, 2009 order denying Petitioners’ re-application for special relief in the nature of a preliminary injunction when he stated that, in overruling most of the Commonwealth’s preliminary objections on July 24, 2009, the Court was “leaving open the underlying question whether [the Commonwealth has] the legal duty to use the HCPR Account funds to fully fund previously granted abatements.” McGinley, J., Order dated October 19, 2009, ¶ 4. The Court will now proceed to close that question.
Currently before this Court is an application for summary relief. In ruling on an application for summary relief we must “view the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and enter judgment only if there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the right to judgment is clear as a matter of law.” McSpadden v. Dep’t of Com., 886 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). “The moving party has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material [39]*39fact.” Bigansky v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 442 Pa.Super. 69, 658 A.2d 423, 425 (1995). “A material fact is one that directly affects the outcome of the case.” Kuney v. Benjamin Franklin Clinic, 751 A.2d 662, 664 (Pa.Super.2000) (citing Stevens Painton Corp. v. First State Ins. Co., 746 A.2d 649, 658 (Pa.Super.2000)).
Petitioners first argue that the facts claimed by the Commonwealth as necessary to establish Petitioners’ claims are not in dispute, are immaterial or are not factual at all, and the fact that there are outstanding discovery requests does not preclude summary relief. Specifically, Petitioners aver that “the Pennsylvania Insurance Department has credited the abatements, without receipt of HCPR Account funds, against funds already in the MCARE Fund, thereby improperly paying the assessment abatements with MCARE funds supplied in part by Petitioners, rather than with funds transferred from the HCPR Account.” PA Med. Society Pet. for Rev., ¶ 61; see also Hospital & Health-system Assoc. Pet. for Rev., ¶ 5. The Commonwealth argues that, in establishing the HCPR program, the General Assembly “did not link the HCPR Account directly, much less exclusively, to the Abatement Program,” and that the appropriations made to the MCARE Fund need not be, and were not, related to the abatements previously granted. Comm. Answer and New Matter to PA Med. Society Pet. for Rev., ¶¶ 153, 155, 157. We agree with Petitioners.
The factors that directly affect the outcome of this case relate to: (1) whether the Commonwealth had a duty to make transfers from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund in the amount necessary to fully fund the abatements to providers in 2003-2007 under the HCPR program, and (2) whether the Commonwealth failed to make transfers from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund to fully fund the abate-ments awarded to providers in 2003-2007 under the HCPR program. The former question is a matter of statutory interpretation. In its July 24, 2009 en banc opinion, this Court stated:
When Section 1112 is read in conjunction with the rest of the HCPR statute, including its title, and the description of the purpose and funding mechanisms for the HCPR program, to give the Budget Secretary complete unfettered discretion to decide whether to fund the MCARE Fund, regardless of the need for the funds, is obviously inconsistent with the statutory scheme. It certainly appears that the General Assembly has mandated that the HCPR Account pay for the abatements.
The Pennsylvania Med. Soc’y v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (Pa.Cmwlth. Nos. 584, 585 M.D.2008, filed July 24, 2009) {The Pennsylvania Med. Soc’y), slip op. at 14. On the same reasoning, we now hold, as a matter of law and of statutory interpretation, that the Commonwealth had a duty to make transfers from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund in the amount necessary for abatements to be paid by the Fund, and not by providers.
Thus, the only remaining issue is whether there are any genuine issues of material fact which prevent establishing whether the Commonwealth failed to make transfers from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund to fully fund the abate-ments awarded to providers in 2003-2007. On that point, it is undisputed that, in 2004, $100 million was transferred from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund. In 2005, $230 million was transferred. Thus, the Commonwealth has transferred $330 million from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund. Comm. Answer and New Matter to PA Med. Society Pet. for [40]*40Rev., ¶ 25; Stip. of Facts, filed October 15, 2009, ¶ 9. The Commonwealth has also admitted that, although abatements continued to be granted, and revenues to fund the awarded abatements continued to accumulate in the HCPR, none of those funds were transferred to the MCARE Fund after 2005. Comm. Answer and New Matter to PA Med. Society Pet. for Rev., f 117.
The Commonwealth argues that transfers from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund were not necessary after 2005 since the MCARE Fund “has been able to fulfill its current obligations to pay claims and expenses” without further transfers from the HCPR Account. Comm. Br. at 36, citing Adams Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Comm. Answer and New Matter to PA Med. Society Pet. for Rev., ¶ 117. There is no dispute that the MCARE Fund has had the ability to pay its bills. The question before us, however, is not whether it can pay current claims, but whether the Commonwealth failed to make transfers from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund to fully fund the abatements awarded to providers in 2003-2007. This is an issue of fact, as to which the underlying-material facts remain undisputed.12
The Commonwealth claims that there are numerous additional material facts in dispute in this litigation, and there is outstanding discovery, such that the Court cannot be assured there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Commonwealth Br. in Opp. to Petitioners’ Application for Summary Relief, App. A. It is clear, however, that those facts “in dispute” do not directly affect the outcome of this case. On the contrary, the undisputed facts and admissions of record reflect that the Com[41]*41monwealth had a duty to fully fund the MCARE Fund with monies from the HCPR, but failed to do so. We hold, therefore, that there are no genuine issues of material fact.13
Petitioners further argue that based on the record, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Commonwealth, however, contends that Petitioners have no clear right to relief since Petitioners lack standing to bring this action; Petitioners’ reading of the pre-2009 statutory scheme is fundamentally flawed; there is a far more reasonable reading of the statute than that presented by Petitioners; there is no support for Petitioners’ claim that the Commonwealth was required to make a dollar-for-dollar transfer in the amounts of the abatements; DPW was not required and has no authority to transfer money to the MCARE Fund to pay for abatements; and the recently-enacted budget legislation contradicts Petitioners’ claims, and makes the relief they seek unavailable to them.
The Commonwealth incorrectly argues that Petitioners do not have standing to bring this action. This Court has held:
It is well settled that an association, as a representative of its members, may have standing to bring a cause of action even in the absence of injury to itself. In order to have standing, the association must allege that at least one of its members is suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action. Moreover, the member of that association who is threatened with injury must have an interest in the litigation that is substantial, direct and immediate.... [A]n interest is ‘substantial’ when there is a discernable adverse effect to an interest of the aggrieved individual which differs from the abstract interest of the general citizenry in having others comply with the law. An interest is ‘direct’ when an aggrieved person can show a causal connection between the alleged harm to his or her interest and the matter of which he or she complains. Finally, the interest is ‘immediate’ when the causal connection between the injury and the matter complained of is not too remote.
Pennsylvania Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, Teamsters Local 502, 696 A.2d 859, 868-69 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) (citations omitted). Petitioner, Pennsylvania Medical Society, has specifically averred that members, Drs. Daloni, Rizzo and Trichtinger, have suffered harm in that they received abatements of only 50% of their assessment amounts between 2003 and 2007. PA Med. Society Pet. for Rev., ¶¶ 2-6. It is clear that the interest alleged to have adversely affected these medical care providers differs from that of the general citizenry. In addition, there is a causal connection between the failure of the Commonwealth to fully fund the MCARE Fund and the harm claimed to have been suffered by these individuals. Finally, the causal connection between the Commonwealth’s failure to fulfill its duty is not too remote for purposes of [42]*42standing. Therefore, Petitioners’ interests, which are allegedly harmed as a result of the Commonwealth’s failure to fully fund the MCARE Fund, is sufficiently substantial, direct and immediate to warrant the conclusion that Petitioners have standing.
As to whether Petitioners’ reading of the applicable pre-2009 statutory scheme is flawed, whether there is a more reasonable reading of the statute than that presented by Petitioners, whether there is support for Petitioners’ claim that the Commonwealth was required to make a dollar-for-dollar transfer in the amounts of the abatements, or whether DPW was required and has authority to transfer money to the MCARE Fund to pay for abate-ments, this Court, as indicated, finds the reasoning of the July 24, 2009 en banc opinion overruling the Commonwealth’s preliminary objections highly instructive in addressing those precise issues. As such, we restate the Court’s reasoning and analysis as applicable here. In that opinion, this Court stated:
Section 1112(a) of the Abatement Law, 40 P.S. § 1303.1112(a), requires that DPW shall administer funds appropriated consistent with its duties under section 201(1) of Public Welfare Code. [The Commonwealth] contend[s] Section 201(1) of the Public Welfare Code provides that DPW shall have the following limited power and duties: With the approval of the Governor, to act as the sole agency of the State when applying for, receiving and using Federal funds for the financing in whole or in part of programs in fields in which the department has responsibility.’ 62 P.S. § 201(1) (Emphasis added).
This Court does not agree with [the Commonwealth] that the General Assembly’s reference in Section 1112(a) of the Abatement Law to Section 201 of the Public Welfare Code was necessarily intended to place a condition precedent on the transfer of funds. Section 201 of the Public Welfare Code, titled ‘State participation in cooperative federal programs’ lists powers and duties of the DPW and subsection (1) merely established DPW as the single department responsible for the application and receipt of federal matching funds. Section 201(1) of the Public Welfare Code provides no limitation on DPW’s authority to transfer funds in the absence of federal funding, but only states, as is required by federal law, that if the Commonwealth decides to apply for and use federal funds for programs administered by DPW, the DPW is the only State agency that may do so.
[The Commonwealth’s] position that the DPW may not act unless it receives federal funds has no basis in statute, and is, in fact, contrary to the plain meaning of the statute....
Next, [the Commonwealth] assert[s] ... the Abatement Law does not require the Budget Secretary to transfer funds from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund. They contend the Budget Secretary’s authority is discretionary. This raises an issue of statutory construction and legislative intent.
The object of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. When the language of the statute is clear, that language is dispositive of legislative intent and so vitiates the need for further interpretation. Importantly, the plain language reading of a statute requires that ‘sections of a statute must be construed with reference to the entire statute and not apart from their content.’
Here, [the Commonwealth] rel[ies] on Section 1112(c) of the Abatement Law which states that ‘the Secretary of the [43]*43Budget may annually transfer from the account to the [MCARE] Fund an amount up to the aggregate amount of abatements granted by the Insurance Department under section 1104(b).’ (Emphasis added). The language of this section appears to give the Budget Secretary discretion to transfer funds from the HCPR Account to the MCARE Fund. However, as its name suggests, the HCPR Program was established to retain health care providers in Pennsylvania by reducing the burden of paying professional liability insurance premiums under the MCARE program. The General Assembly established mandatory abatements, a mandatory account from which to fund the abatements and two mandatory funding sources for the abatements.[14]
When Section 1112 is read in conjunction with the rest of the HCPR statute, including its title, and the description of the purpose and funding mechanisms for the HCPR program, to give the Budget Secretary complete unfettered discretion to decide whether to fund the MCARE Fund, regardless of the need for the funds, is obviously inconsistent with the statutory scheme. It certainly appears that the General Assembly has mandated that the HCPR Account pay for the abatements. As Petitioners point out, there is no provision for the [Insurance Department] to refuse to award abate-ments or decline to notify DPW when abatements are awarded. In addition, the General Assembly has taken measures to assure that the abatements are paid by the Fund, not providers. If a provider has already paid the assessment prior to the award of the abatement the General Assembly has directed in Section 1110 of the Abatement Law that ‘[t]he Insurance Department shall either issue refunds or credits for monies due health care providers under this chapter^’]
The Pennsylvania Med. Soc’y, slip op. at 11-14 (citations and footnote omitted). Thus, this Court’s prior opinion sufficiently addresses the Commonwealth’s arguments.
Finally, the Commonwealth argues that, regardless of Petitioners’ prior entitlement, the budget legislation passed at the end of 2009, by eliminating the HCPR program and the HCPR Account, abolished Petitioners’ right to relief, and that a declaration by this Court on these issues will “prove to be purely academic” and “nothing more than advisory opinions.” Comm. Br. at 35. We disagree. Section 1976(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1976(a), specifically provides that:
(a) The repeal of any civil provisions of a statute shall not affect or impair any act done, or right existing or accrued, or affect any civil action pending to enforce any right under the authority of the statute repealed. Such action may be proceeded with and concluded under the statutes in existence when such action was instituted, notwithstanding the repeal of such statutes, or such action may be proceeded with and concluded under the provisions of the new statute, if any, enacted.
[44]*44Moreover, this Court addressed this issue in its July 24, 2009 opinion, albeit in terms of the expiration of the abatement program, but the reasoning of this Court is equally applicable to the repeal by virtue of the 2009 budget legislation. The Court explained:
Contrary to [the Commonwealth’s] position, the end of the HCPR Program only means that the Insurance Department will no longer grant abatements to eligible health care providers. It does not mean that DPW and Budget Secretary may avoid their statutory responsibilities to fund the program from the specifically designated HCPR Account while the program was in effect. If indeed it is determined that the funds were inappropriately withheld, then it is entirely proper and consistent with the Abatement Law to direct the [Commonwealth] to transfer the appropriated funds to the MCARE Fund.
The Pennsylvania Med. Soc’y, slip op. at 15 (citation omitted).
Granted, in the absence of a constitutional bar, the General Assembly is free to repeal and amend previous legislation. City of Phila. v. Schweiker, 817 A.2d 1217 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), affd, 579 Pa. 591, 858 A.2d 75 (2004). However, Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.
Pa. Const, art. I, § 11. Accordingly, “[a] statute [or statutory repeal] is normally construed to operate prospectively[, and] shall [not] be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly.” Borough of Jefferson Hills v. Jefferson Hills Police Dep’t Wage & Policy Comm., 904 A.2d 61, 64-65 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (citations omitted). Pennsylvania law specifically protects vested interests from being extinguished by subsequent legislation. Krenzelak v. Krenzelak, 503 Pa. 373, 469 A.2d 987 (1983). A vested right is “[a] right that so completely and definitely belongs to a person that it cannot be impaired or taken away without the person’s consent.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1438 (9th ed. 2009); In the Interest of K.A.P., Jr., 916 A.2d 1152 (Pa.Super.2007), aff'd, 596 Pa. 351, 943 A.2d 262 (2008). Rights are only vested when they are fixed and without condition. Sher v. Berks County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 940 A.2d 629 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008). Moreover, vested rights “must be something more than a mere expectation, based upon an anticipated continuance of existing law. It must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a demand made by another.” Konidanis v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 598 Pa. 55, 74, 953 A.2d 1231, 1242 (2008) (citing Lewis v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 220 Pa. 317, 324, 69 A. 821, 823 (1908)).
In this case it is clear that doctors have to pay the assessment, or they cannot practice in the Commonwealth. According to Section 1102(a) of the Abatement Law,15 “[t]he program shall provide assistance in the form of assessment abatements to health care providers for calendar years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 ....” for those health care providers not deemed ineligible, who timely submit applications to the Insurance Department. (Emphasis [45]*45added). Section 1104(b) of the Abatement Law16 provides that:
Upon receipt of a completed application, the Insurance Department shall review the applicant’s information and grant the applicable abatement of the assessment for the previous calendar year specified on the application in accordance with all of the following:
(1) The Insurance Department shall notify the Department of Public Welfare that the applicant has self-certified as eligible for a 100% abatement of the imposed assessment if the health care provider was assessed under section 712(d)....
(2) The Insurance Department shall notify the Department of Public Welfare ■ that the applicant has self-certified as eligible for a 50% abatement of the imposed assessment if the health care provider was assessed under section 712(d)....
(Emphasis added).
If a provider pays his assessment for the calendar year prior to applying for abatement, Section 1104(c) of the Abatement Law17 also provides that:
[T]he health care provider may, in addition to the completed application required by subsection (a), submit a request for a refund.... If the Insurance Department grants the health care provider an abatement of the assessment for the calendar year in accordance with subsection (b), the Insurance Department shall either refund to the health care provider the portion of the assessment which was abated or issue a credit to the health care provider’s professional liability insurer.
The absence of Insurance Department discretion to deny abatements properly applied for, read together with this Court’s conclusion that in enacting the HCPR program, the General Assembly established mandatory abatements, a mandatory account from which to fund those abate-ments and two mandatory funding sources for the abatements, makes it clear that qualified health care providers’ rights to the abatements are fixed and without condition. Thus, they are more than mere expectations, and rise to the level of a legal or equitable title, subject to the present or future enforcement of a demand. Moreover, “[f]or purposes of Article 1, Section 11 ... it is enough to say that the moment a cognizable legal injury is befallen a potential plaintiff, whatever that injury may be, a cause of action has ‘accrued’ and cannot be subsequently eliminated or altered by retroactive act of the legislature.” Konidaris, 598 Pa. at 66, 953 A.2d at 1237. We hold, therefore, that the abatements are vested rights that cannot be extinguished by the October 2009 budget legislation.
Based on the foregoing, viewing the record in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, it is clear that Petitioners are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. Since the Petitioners have established that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, their application for summary relief is granted.
President Judge LEADBETTER and Judge BROBSON did not participate in the decision in this case.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2010, Petitioners’ application for summary relief is granted.